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SUMMARY
A great deal of anecdotal evidence indicates that people employ context 
as an aid to memory. Psychological accounts of memory also have made 
much use of context as a theoretical construct. An examination of the 
psychological literature revealed that the term “context" has been used 
to refer to four classes of information; process, semantic, 
physiological and environmental. Studies investigating the use of 
process, semantic and physiological information in psychological 
processing were reviewed generally, while a much more detailed review was 
carried out with respect to studies investigating the use of 
environmental context information. The review of environmental context 
studies reported numerous investigations obtaining such effects and 
identified several factors that may have been responsible for the reputed 
unreliability of such phenomena. Consideration of the reviews of the 
four types of context also indicated that there was greater similarity 
than difference in their effects suggesting a possible equivalence of 
psychological function.
To ensure the tenability and validity of the proposed research in the 
light of the potential influence of those factors identified in the 
review of environmental context effects, a partial replication of 
Smith's (1979, expt.1) demonstration of an environmental context 
reinstatement effect was attempted. Subsequent to the successful 
attainment of such an effect, but prior to an assessment of various 
potential and actual models of environmental context phenomena, the 
emerging metatheoretical criteria that psychological accounts should 
comply with were discussed. The concept of different terms of 
abstraction was introduced, with the three forms identified by Marr 
(1982) defining the requirements of an information-processing
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explanation. The requirement of ecologically valid process models for 
animate systems was emphasised and convergence on the mapping of 
information into knowledge structures as an initial step in processing 
was identified. Pre and post cognitive accounts; including Anderson and 
Bower's (1972; 1974) FRAN and HAM based accounts, Norman and Rumelhart's 
(1970) system for perception and memory, Tulving's (1982; 1983) GAP
system, Glenberg’s (1979) component levels account, Smith's (Smith, 
Glenberg and Bjork, 1978; Smith, 1979; 1982; 1984) cueing account, and 
Godden and Baddeley's (1980) relative cueing account, were found to be 
unable to accommodate the full variety of environmental context effects, 
and/or failed to provide an adequate account in terms of the former 
psychological requirements. As an alternative, an account derived from 
Norman and Bobrow’s (eg. 1976; 1979) schema characterisation of
psychological processing was proposed. Apart from being able to 
accommodate the variety of environmental context effects, the account 
also fulfilled the metatheoretical criteria. In addition, the nature of 
the account provides an insight into the relationship between the 
different contexts and establishes a basis for the prediction and 
exploration of environmental context and other psychological phenomena.
Experiment two examined the prediction that low level processing would 
facilitate environmental context effects and the tenability of the 
familiarity account of these effects through the use of a reinstatement 
paradigm. Using the same basic paradigm, experiment three examined the 
prediction that high level processing would reduce the effect of 
environmental context. The experimental methodology was considered when 
an alternative strategy of statistical analysis based on the linear model 
underlying ANCOVA was introduced and employed to assess the predicted 
interaction between the form of processing and the environmental context 
effect. The significant interaction supported the account of
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environmental context effects and the general utility of the schema 
characterisation of psychological processing.
Experiment four focused on retrieval, rather than encoding operations. 
An attempt was made to control and manipulate environmental context 
interference, and the self-generation of environmental context as a 
retrieval strategy. However, examination of subjects' recall protocols 
and questionnaire responses revealed that while the former variable was 
ineffective, the experimental control and manipulation of the latter 
variable had failed miserably. Nevertheless, the self-generation of 
environmental context at retrieval by the vast majority of subjects not 
only demonstrates that people employ environmental context information 
at retrieval, but that the potential utility of such information is 
common, although primarily implicit knowledge.
Experiment five examined the hypothesis suggested by some previous 
research that with a longer recall delay, environmental context 
information would increase in utility at retrieval. In such a situation 
the observation of an environmental context effect with high level 
processing conditions would indicate that environmental context 
information had been encoded during the presentation period. However, 
no effect of environmental context was observed with either high or low 
level processing conditions. These results were explained by 
considering the probable form of environmental context representations 
and the effect of time on such representations.
Experiment six had several goals. One was to demonstrate the 
applicability of the schema based account to environmental context 
defined as a function of the stimulus materials. Another was to examine 
the prediction that under appropriate conditions, an environmental
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context effect could be obtained with recognition procedures. Also, an 
attempt was made to determine whether the lack of environmental context 
effect with high level processing conditions was a consequence of 
encoding limitations, or the style of retrieval enabled by the form of 
memory representation produced by such processing. The replication of 
the influence of processing on the environmental context reinstatement 
effect indicated the general applicability of the account and also the 
tenability of its description of recognition and recall which was 
discussed at some length. The pattern of results obtained also indicated 
that although both encoding limitations and the style of retrieval 
enabled by the memory representations produced by high level processing 
conditions could influence the manifestation of an environmental context 
effect, the latter was a more likely account of the non-effect observed 
when high level processing was operated.
Experiment seven explored the often suggested relationship between 
intentional action and environmental context. Recent psychological 
accounts of such intentional activities also have been schema based and 
have acknowledged the role of environmental context in maintaining 
and/or eliciting actions. An attempt was made to produce a corollary of 
the intentional tasks reported as being affected by environmental 
context that was independent of general environment and that could be 
examined formally. The results obtained supported the theoretical 
accounts of environmental context use and supplemented the anecdotal 
evidence previously available.
The final chapter considered the particular style of the approach 
employed in the present series of studies. In addition, the main 
findings were reiterated and their implications discussed. It was 
concluded that the context effects reported and observed were in accord
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with a sophisticated processing system that strategically employs 
information in a practical and effective manner.
CHAPTER ONE
THE USE OF CONTEXT: GENERALLY AND IN PSYCHOLOGY
1. Evidence Of A General Appreciation Of The Influence Of Context 
On Hemory.
1.1. Folk applications.
In murder investigations the police are increasingly utilising 
reconstructions of events (sometimes filmed), particularly of the 
victim's last known movements, in an attempt to obtain more information 
about the crime by jogging some potential witness’s memory. This method 
has been successful at reminding people that in fact they did see the 
events which had been described so many times before.
A common suggestion to someone who has forgotten something is to tell 
them to go back to the place and/or position where the thought originally 
occurred. Frequently this helps them to remember whatever it was that 
they had forgotten.
Returning to an old haunt can produce a variety of memories which seemed 
to have been totally forgotten. Not only"is it possible to remember such 
things as how a place looked and who or what used to be there; indeed the 
amount of apparently trivial detail that can be recalled is often
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surprising, but old feelings and motivations frequently return to mind 
as well. The type of memory where one feels the internal and external 
sensations which seem to epitomise a past situation is very often induced 
by a return to such a familiar place, or by some aspect of a place which 
is similar to one from the past.
All students, or for that matter anyone who has taken some sort of exam, 
will probably have experienced the ability to remember exactly in which 
book or set of notes and on which page, indeed the place on the page, a 
vital and desired piece of information occupies. Unfortunately, this 
type of remembering seems to manifest itself most strongly when the 
sought after information refuses to reveal itself.
These anecdotes have at least two things in common. They are all events 
which everyone I have spoken to in the past three years has had experience 
or knowledge of, and secondly, they are all to do with memories which are 
tied up in some way with the context in which they occurred. However, 
it is not only in Folk knowledge that demonstrations of an appreciation 
of some tacit relationship between context and memory can be found.
1.2. Literature and philosophy.
In both of these traditional areas of psychological enquiry, there is 
evidence of an awareness of some link between context and memory. 
Authors of the classics to authors of "pulpM magazine stories have used 
context as a reminder.
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Proust is probably the most renowned for his contextual memories. His 
book, A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu, was translated to "Remembrance of 
Things Passed". Unfortunately, this title fails to capture the 
essential meaning of the French version and indeed was a translation that 
Proust himself was not happy with. The original title conveys the notion 
of attempting to re-obtain; rather than remember, passed times. This 
ability to obtain a period from the past from memory in any way 
approaching the reality it is concluded, is only possible via involuntary 
memory. This type of remembering is totally cue dependent, and operates 
at a physical level rather than any other.
A few examples from the novel itself should illustrate the phenomenon.
No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my 
palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon 
the extraordinary thing that was happening to me... And 
suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the 
little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray 
(because on those mornings I did not go out before mass), when 
I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Leonie 
used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or 
tisane (vol.1, p.48-50).
...I had entered the courtyard of the Guermantes mansion and 
in my absentminded state I had failed to see a car which was 
coming towards me; the chauffer gave a shout and I just had 
time to step out of the way, but as I moved sharply backwards 
I tripped against the uneven paving-stones in front of the 
coach-house. And at that moment when, recovering my balance, 
I put my foot on a stone which was slightly lower than its 
neighbour, all my discouragement vanished and in its place was 
that same happiness which at various epochs of my life had been 
given to me by the sight of trees which I thought that I 
recognised in the course of a drive near Balbec, by the sight 
of the twin steeples of Martinville, by the flavour of a 
madeleine dipped in tea, and by all those other sensations of 
which I have spoken . . . almost at once I recognised the vision: 
it was Venice ... the sensation which I had once experienced 
as I stood upon two uneven stones in the baptistery of St. 
Mark's had ... restored to me complete with all the other 
sensations linked on that day to that particular sensation 
(vol.3, p.898-900).
A servant ... chanced to knock a spoon against a plate ... the
19
sensation was again of great heat, but entirely different: 
heat combined with a whiff of smoke and relieved by the cool 
smell of a forest background ... I seemed to be in the railway 
carriage again, opening a bottle of beer ... so forcibly had 
the identical noise of the spoon knocking against the place 
given me . . . the illusion of the noise of the hammer with which 
a railwayman had remedied some defect on a wheel of the train 
while we stopped near the little wood (vol.3, p.900-901).
...I wiped my mouth with the napkin which he had given me; and 
instantly... a new vision of azure passed before my eyes ... 
I thought that the servant had just opened the window on to the 
beach . . . for the napkin . . . had precisely the same degree of 
stiffness and starchedness as the towel with which I had found 
it so awkward to dry my face as I stood in front of the window 
on the first day of my arrival at Balbec (vol.3, p .901).
Physical context information, which "by chance" makes contact with, and 
produces in the person a reinstatement of all feelings, thoughts and 
sensations of that time and situation is concluded to be the only method 
by which the true experiences of that time and situation can be 
remembered. Through the reinstatement of all that a person had 
experienced at some time past, in the present, these experiences are 
revealed to be outside time. It was this facet of these occurrences 
which had given rise to what was described in the first example as the 
“extraordinary thing" and that removed Proust's "discouragement" and 
replaced it with “happiness". Part of the reason for this transition was 
that while he experienced such an occurrence, he escaped the present and 
so had no worries of the future. Another reason for his new feelings was 
the realisation that his assessment of life's tedium had been based on 
incorrect evidence: his voluntary memories. The real remembrance of the 
past in the present was an event which had exciting consequences in 
relation to a person’s real being; and that in time.
However, this is not the place to delve into the Bergsonian type
philosophy of Proust's novel. What should be obvious is the explicit and 
important role of context in remembering.
20
The Russian author Vladimir Nabokov (1967) provides another 
autobiographical example of context aiding memory. In his book, Speak. 
Memory. he tells of the time, when in Cambridge again, he went to visit 
his old tutor. The tutor was having some difficulty in remembering who
Nabokov was, until he clattered into some tea things as he had done the
first time they met. At that point the tutor looked at him and said,
Oh, yes, of course, I know who you are (p.273)
Another author who has used context information to produce some memory 
is George Eliot. In The Mill On The Floss, the opening chapter describes 
Dorlcote Mill viewed from a bridge over the river Floss. This episode 
is actually a dream, which is confused with reality, as the author's 
elbows press into her chair causing her to believe that she is resting 
against the stone bridge.
In the psychological literature, both Carr ( 1925) and Waters ( 1934) 
report two separate incidents which could have come from some comedy. 
Both tell of a case of a specific language capability (Chinese and Dutch 
respectively), which was lost out of context, that is when the people 
left China and Holland, and then reappeared when they returned to the 
respective countries.
In philosophy, the Seventeenth Century empiricist and associationist 
John Locke, acknowledged the psychological effect that context could 
exert. In his An Essav Concerning Human Understanding, he describes 
several instances of the link that can arise between context and memory. 
The lightest anecdote, also cited by Godden & Baddeley (1975) and 
Baddeley (1976), is of
...a young gentleman, who, having learnt to dance, and that 
to great perfection. There happened to stand an old trunk in 
the room where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece 
of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps 
of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance 
excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; 
nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or 
some such other trunk had its due position in the room (Locke, 
1 690) .
1.3. Miscellaneous media.
Many less "respected" adventure novels, comics, films and television 
programmes provide examples of contextual reminders. Loss of memory is 
often repaired in the most dramatic situations, if not by a blow to the 
head, then more subtly by a tune, a noise, a sight, a smell, or some 
combination of these.
In a genre assumed by many of these categories; the detective story, many 
cases have been solved by having key witnesses return to the scene of the 
crime or action. Something about being back in the same place helps 
their memory.
The familiarity of such examples as these really makes specifics 
redundant, but for good measure one could cite the film Random Harvest, 
where Ronald Coleman's memory is prodded by the sound of a factory 
whistle and finally returned by the familiar sound of a squeaky gate, or 
the television series Tales Of The Gold Monkey, where the forgetful 
ex-alcoholic Corky had his recall aided by some odd contextual event 
nearly every week.
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1.4. Assessment.
The original purpose for giving all of these examples was to support and 
illustrate the claim that there is a general awareness of a relationship 
between context and memory. This awareness manifests itself not only in 
stories about remembering, but also in some of the practical methods 
people utilise to aid their ability to remember.
Yet despite all this, when it is explicitly stated that context; and 
especially the physical or apparently non-semantic context, can help 
remembering, still it seems a bit strange. A possible reason for this 
strangeness will be forwarded after some of the empirical evidence 
regarding the effect of context manipulations on memory has been 
discussed (see chapter two, section 7.). However, with the first real 
separation in the types of context which may exist suggested, it seems 
appropriate to consider what exactly is meant when the term context is 
used.
2. Definitions Of Context.
2.1. Common usage.
The term "context" is quite difficult to define. In normal language its 
most common use is to restrict and identify one of several possible 
meanings. For example, saying that euthanasia is the accepted and normal 
practice with the vast majority of general practitioners would doubtless 
cause some consternation, until it was pointed out that of course we were 
talking within a veterinary context.
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Another use of context is to refer to the physical surroundings of some 
activity, event, or item. Distracting contexts are often held to blame 
for the failure to achieve some academic goal.
I am sure that without much effort many more examples of both semantic 
and physical context can be thought of. Yet as this is done and more 
thought is devoted to the exercise of delineating between the two types 
of context, it seems that the exercise gets more and more difficult. The 
problem seems to be that physical contexts carry with them a semantic 
influence and likewise semantic contexts can be identified with 
particular physical contexts, or situations. This aspect of context 
will be returned to later (see chapter thirteen, section 2.3.), but for 
the moment it may be worth considering why the normal use of such a 
seemingly ambiguous term as context does not cause any problem in 
comprehension.
2.2. In psychology.
The problem of defining context does not only extend into, but is 
compounded in the psychological literature. Context must be one of the 
most ubiquitous and possibly vague terms presently in use in psychology. 
Smith, Glenberg & Bjork (1978), quite poetically have described context 
as,
...a kind of conceptual garbage can that denotes a great 
variety of intrinsic or extrinsic characteristics of the 
presentation or test of an item ...
while Nadel h Willner (1980), in a more down to earth manner, state that
The term "context" has been used in such a bewildering variety 
of ways that one is tempted to conclude that it defies accurate
definition.
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Their opinion is that context conveys the notion of something which 
surrounds and influences. The problem is determining what the 
"something" is. However, for some theorists this "something" is almost 
everything. Bower & Anderson have defined context as,
and
...background external and introceptive stimulation 
prevailing during presentation of the phasic experimental 
stimuli ... [plus the subject’s] mental set (Bower, 1972a, 
p.93) .
...the subject’s general mood or attitude, his physical 
posture and his physiological state as well as any conspicuous 
external cues prevailing during presentation (Anderson & 
Bower, 1972 , p.101).
...physical characteristics of an item's presentation, 
implicit associations to the items and some cognitive elements 
representing the list in question (Anderson & Bower, 1974, 
p.409).
The term context appears as one of the key words in a plethora of research 
covering many areas and situations. Unfortunately from many of these 
brief mentions, it is impossible to ascertain what the term is actually 
being used to refer to. Most workers use "context" within their own 
particular context and as often as not this meaning will differ from that 
intended to be conveyed when other authors use the term.
3. Origins Of Psychological Definitions Of Context.
3.1. Theoretical.
Really there are two sources of context definition. One source is the 
theorist who utilises context in the explanation of some psychological 
function. It seems from the beginning of psychological enquiry and
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certainly since the application of associationism by behaviourists, that 
context has been regarded as one of the major cues involved in initiating 
any set of learned responses (eg. Carr, 1917; 1925; Hull, 1945; McGeoch, 
1942; Skinner,1938; Smith 8c Guthrie, 1921; Tolman, 1932) and although 
some things may have changed with a more cognitive psychology, the use 
of context as a theoretical construct has not (eg. Anderson 8c Bower, 
1972; 1974; Barnes, 1964; Estes, 1955; Norman 8c Rumelhart, 1970;
Underwood, 1969). Such uses of context will be returned to later, when 
the ability of the models in which they are incorporated are considered 
as providing an explanation for the results of the second source of 
context definition.
3.2. Operational.
This other source of context definition, both chronologically as well as 
figuratively comes from those studies which have actually manipulated 
context in order to determine its effect upon a variety of tasks. This 
type of context definition is operational. But this does not mean it is 
made too explicit. Usually the context has to be discovered by examining 
the description of the experimental materials and procedure. Examples 
of manipulations which have been called changes in "context” could 
include physical environment (eg. Godden 8c Baddeley, 1975), the 
perception of stimulus relations (eg. Jones, Rana 8c McGonigle, 1980), 
semantic distinctions (eg. Light 8c Carter-Sobell, 1970), physiological 
state (eg. Spear, Smith, Bryan, Gordon, Timmons 8c Chiszar, 1980), nature 
of task (Underwood, 1977) and the background colour of stimulus cards 
(eg. Weiss 8c Hargolius, 1954 ).
Although these examples seem to cover a whole host of experimental 
manipulations, a closer look at the different context studies in the
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psychological literature suggests that basically there are only four 
different types of circumstance:-
( i) when the types of tasks performed are altered
(ii) when the interpretive semantics are altered.
(iii) when the subject's physiology is altered.
(iv) when the physical environment is altered.
To what extent the subjective and physical circumstances can be viewed 
as independent depends upon one's philosophical stance, while the 
subjective-physical dichotomy itself suggests another way in which the 
types of context could be separated. A distinction very similar to this 
is made by Hewitt ( 1977 ) and will be considered later (see chapter two, 
section 6.3.).
The type of separation made here is based on the fact that it is possible 
to vary the manipulations involved in producing these four types of 
context independently of each other. But perhaps of greater interest to 
the psychologist, is whether or not the information provided by each 
context is utilised in a similar manner. Here we are talking of a 
possible equivalence in psychological function.
In the remaining sections of this chapter, the findings from studies 
which have investigated the first three types of circumstance will be 
reviewed. A more extensive and detailed review of those studies which 
have examined the effect of the fourth circumstance: altering the
physical environment, will be presented in the following chapter.
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4. Experimental Review Of The Influence Of Context.
4.1. When the types of tasks performed are altered.
Falkenberg (1972) used the Brown-Peterson paradigm (Brown, 1958; 
Peterson & Peterson, 1959), to investigate the effect of a context 
produced by a task prior to learning and prior to recall of a consonant 
trigram. He found that the greater the resemblance of the task prior to 
recall to that carried out before learning, the greater the subject’s 
ability to recall the target information. The measure which was most 
sensitive in detecting this effect was the number of errors made when the 
subjects recalled the consonant trigrams. The way in which these errors 
were defined is best illustrated by Falkenberg's own example. If 
subjects were given the trigram QSX, but recalled QXK, this would be 
regarded as two errors. So in order to recall correctly subjects had to 
remember order information as well as which items were presented.
Apart from demonstrating context effects with this type of manipulation, 
Falkenberg’s paper demonstrates context effects of equivalent size with 
presentation-recall groups ranging from 5.4 to 18 seconds. This 
suggests that the advantage provided by a reinstatement of context is not 
restricted to attempts to retrieve information from long-term memory; 
although the fact that such short-term memory tasks as the Brown-Peterson 
paradigm have been shown to have quite large long term memory components 
should not be forgotten (eg. Baddeley & Scott, 1971).
A barrage of other experiments reported in the Falkenberg paper, tested 
alternative explanations of the context effect. Explanations such as 
its being due to proactive or retroactive interference, varying degrees 
of rehearsal, some artifact of a within subject design, or an increase
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in between trial interval were all found to be inadequate accounts of the 
effect.
Falkenberg explains the phenomenon as being an example of stimulus 
generalisation. He contends that the distinction between stimulus and 
context is arbitrary and that if the context is regarded as part of the 
"overall functional stimulus" , such effects as he reports would be 
predicted by stimulus generalisation. This analysis is based on 
McGeoch's (1942) explanation of forgetting (which will be discussed in 
chapter five, section 3.1. ). Falkenberg however, attributes McGeoch 
with a four factor account of forgetting, the extra item being stimulus 
generalisation, while McGeoch would seem to regard this as more of an 
effect of some circumstances upon which the three factors depend (eg. 
stimulus similarity). The adequacy of this type of explanation will be 
considered in chapter five.
As part of an attempt to discover how people can remember and identify 
the temporal order of information previously presented to them, 
Underwood (1977) carried out a similar manipulation. Subjects were 
required to carry out different types of memorisation tasks on a series 
of four word lists. He found that subjects who did this improved their 
subsequent ability to identify a word's temporal position (ie. which 
list, 1,2,3, or 4, did the word belong to?) compared to subjects who 
carried out the same type of task with all lists. This finding was 
independent of the degree of learning which occurred with any list.
Similarly Block and Reed (1978) found that subjects' perception of a time 
period was not influenced by the specific nature of the task (semantic 
or structural) they were required to carry out, but it was affected when 
they had to alternately carry out both types of task within this period.
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When subjects carried out the two tasks alternately, the same time period 
was regarded as being longer than when they were required to carry out 
only one type of task.
Although the latter experiments do not attempt to examine any
reinstatement of the original context on the subjects' ability to 
remember target information (as the majority of experiments to be 
reported do), still they provide evidence that the context produced by 
the operation of psychological processes can serve to differentiate
items in memory.
Underwood explains his results in terms of associations formed between 
list numbers (ie. 1,2,3 and 4), the process context and list words, while 
Block and Reed emphasise the aspect of contextual change to account for 
their results and refer to Anderson and Bower's (1972) model of memory 
to provide a mechanism to accommodate their explanation (for an account 
of Anderson & Bower, 1972, see chapter five, section 4.).
4.2. When the interpretive semantics are altered.
Of all the types of context, this is the one which has received the most 
intensive and extensive investigation. It would be virtually impossible 
and totally impractical to provide a complete review of all of this work. 
Instead a general outline of semantic context studies and their results 
will be given. Hopefully this will manage to convey some of the 
importance that these studies have had in changing opinions and 
explanations of learning and memory, as well as providing an account of 
the basic findings.
30
The study of semantic context bridges the gap between the Ebbinghaus and 
Bartlett traditions of investigation. Generally the study of memory was 
propagated by adherents to the Ebbinghaus tradition (from Ebbinghaus, 
1885). Stimuli presented to be memorised were devised to contain as 
little information as possible. In this way it was hoped that a person’s 
prior knowledge would not influence the learning of the stimulus 
materials and so a clear picture of the fundamentals of learning and 
memory would emerge. To some extent this methodology had success. 
Functions such as the rate of learning and forgetting determined by these 
methods have been elucidated by subsequent research rather than 
invalidated. Yet as this type of methodology and the almost atheoretical 
approach that aligned with it continued, it became more and more obvious 
that it was not going to provide a comprehensive explanation of memory 
function.
Bartlett (1932) disagreed with the general acceptance of the Ebbinghaus 
approach, claiming that the attempt to eliminate meaningful information 
from the stimulus materials created a situation which was not 
representative of normal memory. Bartlett developed his own techniques 
to investigate more natural memory, using pictures, passages, stories, 
etc. as stimuli. On the basis of these investigations he claimed that 
one of the most important aspects of learning and memory was the 
subject's attempt to extract some meaning from the material they were 
presented with.
Eventually as psychology reoriented and again regarded mental activity 
as being within the realm of acceptable theory, the role of meaning began 
to be considered in models of memory. But even until the late Sixties 
and early Seventies the method of investigation was almost exclusively 
a direct descendant of the Ebbinghaus tradition. The presented stimuli
3 1
were either logically unassociated paired-associates, or word lists. 
Using such methods, the role of the specific semantic context within 
which an item was presented began to be investigated.
Since then, the extent of the 
increased. Investigations into 
thematic context; comparable with 
out producing similar effects 
explanation.
semantic context investigated has 
the effect of supersentential or 
those of Bartlett, have been carried 
and developing similar models of
Many studies of semantic context have shown that the ability to remember 
is best when the original semantic context is reinstated. Although some 
may be expressed differently, explanations of this phenomenon assume 
that information is encoded within a particular context and is best 
retrieved when a similar context is invoked. A variety of systems have 
been constructed which attempt to model this aspect of behaviour. Some 
of these will be considered in chapter five. But exactly what evidence 
is there that information is encoded within a particular context and is 
best remembered when this is reinstated?
Probably the most illustrative and convincing evidence of the claim that 
information is encoded within a particular context comes from studies by 
Dooling and Lachman (1971) and Bransford and Johnson (1972). Both sets 
of researchers have shown that the provision of an appropriate thematic 
context, approximately doubles subjects' comprehension and recall of a 
passage. This doubling of comprehension and recall was in comparison to 
the situation where no-context was provided, even although each 
individual sentence was logically meaningful.
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Another experiment, by Bransford, Barclay and Franks (1972), emphasised 
that the context used in forming a representation does not have to be 
specified explicitly in the information presented. The usual example 
taken from their study is of the following sentences:
(1) Three turtles are sitting beside a log. A fish swam under them.
(2) Three turtles are sitting on a log. A fish swam under them.
The important aspect of the two pairs of sentences is what they allow the 
reader to infer about what the fish swam under. It is only in the second 
pair of sentences that it is logical to infer that the fish swam under 
the log as well as the turtles.
Bransford et al. tested subjects' ability to recognise sentences saying 
that the fish had swum "under the log". Subjects who had received the 
first pair of sentences did not identify other sentences which said that 
the fish had swum "under the log", but subjects who had received pair (2) 
were as confident that they had seen "under the log" as they were 
confident that they had received the actual "under them" wording. This 
type of error in recognition could only occur if subjects were including 
information in their representation of the event, beyond that provided 
by the stimulus materials.
It is this tendency for subjects to manifest a context for the presented 
information beyond that actually presented to them which explains why the 
word JAM has a different "meaning" when coupled with STRAWBERRY than when 
it is paired with TRAFFIC.
Light and Carter-Sobell (1970) presented subjects with a list of words
each accompanied by another which invoked a particular contextual 
representation. The words strawberry/traffic-JAM are taken from their
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study. Later subjects had to identify words which had been presented to 
them earlier. The words presented to them were either the original pair, 
the second word alone or this word preceded by another which invoked a 
different context. Recognition performance was best when the original 
pair were presented again. The next best performance was when the second 
word (eg. JAM) was presented alone and the worst performance was obtained 
when another word, invoking a different context, was presented along with 
one of the originals (eg. strawberry-JAM, then traffic-JAM). The same 
effect has been demonstrated when more subtle variations in encoding 
context have been presented, for example, train-BLACK, then white-BLACK 
(Tulving & Thompson, 1973).
A whole host of studies which have investigated semantic context have 
replicated these effects. One study by Woodall and Folger (1981) has 
demonstrated that the benefit of reinstating the original semantic 
context which was present at encoding when subjects were trying to 
remember, was not restricted to verbal material. They used meaningful 
gestures to accompany speech and found that subjects recall of what had 
been said was better if they were re-presented with the gestures which 
accompanied it.
Unlike Woodall and Folger's experiments, the majority of studies which 
have investigated the effect of changing or reinstating the original 
encoding context at the time of remembering have used verbal material as 
both stimuli and context, and recognition procedures to measure memory. 
The use of verbal material obviously allows the greatest and easiest 
manipulation of semantics. Recognition measures also tend to be used for 
convenience. The typical type of paradigm, as illustrated in the 
discussion of the Light and Carter-Sobell, and Tulving and Thompson 
studies, involves the presentation of two words of which one is the
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nominal stimulus. Together these words produce a certain context. The 
use of a recognition procedure at test allows the re-presentation of the 
nominal stimulus either alone, with another word so altering the context, 
or with the same word as before so reinstating the original context. 
With this type of procedure the experimenter has a large degree of 
control over the semantic context at presentation and test. Control of 
the semantic context at test is not so easy to obtain with recall 
procedures.
Recall procedures in investigations of semantic context are most often 
observed in the situation in which some particular semantic context is, 
or is not provided at the encoding stage (eg. Dooling 8c Lachman, 1 9 7 1 ;  
Bransford 8c Johnson, 1 9 7 2  ) . Here there is no manipulation at test. This 
type of experiment primarily examines encoding, while the reinstatement- 
nonreinstatement of context at test experiments focus on the encoding- 
retrieval interactions.
Despite the greater awkwardness of using recall as a measure of memory 
performance in a reinstatement-no reinstatement paradigm, it has been 
done and similar results to those obtained with recognition procedures 
have been reported. In order to achieve recall within a prevailing 
semantic context, several studies have used cues (eg. Barclay, 
Bransford, Franks, McCarrell 8c Nitsch, 1 9 7 4  ; Ley 8c Huba, 1 9 8 0  ), so the 
type of remembering is actually cued-recall. However some studies have 
managed to obtain free-recall measures as well as cued-recall measures 
with reinstatements and changes in semantic context. Marcel and Steel 
( 1 9 7 3 )  included a free-recall (no-cue) condition in their investigation 
of semantic context. Not surprisingly, they found that an appropriate 
(ie. same semantic context as learning) cue produced better remembrance 
than the no-cue conditions (immediate and delayed), but they also found
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that these no-cue conditions produced better remembrance than the 
provision of an inappropriate (ie. different semantic context to 
learning) cue. A clever experiment by Reddy and Bellezza (1983) 
demonstrates why this is. They recorded the overt verbalisations of 
subjects as they learned a list of words. There were two learning 
conditions; one where subjects had to construct a story from the words 
presented to them, and one in which subjects had to produce associations 
between words and describe the visual images they had of the words. 
Their ability to remember the list of words was tested in three different 
ways. In one condition subjects free-recalled, but again they had to 
overtly verbalise what they were thinking as they did so, and as before 
this was recorded. Another condition provided subjects with a written 
record of their own learning verbalisations, but without the list words. 
The third condition again provided a learning verbalisation transcript 
without the list words, but each subject received one which had been 
produced by some other subject.
In accord with the other studies mentioned, Reddy and Bellezza found that 
the subject's remembrance was related to the degree of semantic context 
reinstatement. But what they were able to show was that the recorded 
free recall verbalisations also took the form of semantic context 
reinstatements. Those subjects in the condition which had to construct 
a story seemed to be able to recreate the context more easily than the 
subjects in the other learning condition and as a result were able to 
recall more. Reddy and Bellezza attribute this easier re-creation of a 
story to its greater formal structure.
Overall these studies demonstrate the importance of semantic context in 
memory. Studies such as those by Dooling & Lachman (1971) and Bransford 
and Johnson (1972) show that comprehension and memory performance are
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dependent on having a context within which the information can be 
represented. This ties in with Bartlett’s concept of the "pursuit of 
meaning" , although it would seem that meaning is a consequence of the 
context. The studies involving semantic context reinstatements and 
changes as memory is tested suggest that in order for information to be 
retrieved, it has to be in a context. This in turn suggests that an 
efficient "memory system" should operate by encoding information within 
a context. Attempts to encode in this manner are equivalent to a 
"pursuit of meaning". This is something which has plagued attempts to 
obtain meaningless stimuli and has produced the paradox of degrees of 
meaningfulness with non-sense syllables.
4.3. When the subject's physiology is altered.
Experiments of this type are usually termed investigations of state- 
dependent learning. However, this title can be misleading. The 
characteristic effect observed in such studies is a function of the 
congruity of the learning and memory test states. The phenomenon is 
therefore a result of encoding and retrieval interactions. For this 
reason both Wickelgren (1975) and Eich (1977) prefer to re-label the 
phenomenon state-dependent retrieval. Although this shifts the 
emphasis, it could be just as misleading.
This type of analysis of the state-dependent effect is typically 
psychological. The general model applied is of information-processing 
that over time can be conceived of having at least three stages; 
encoding, storage and retrieval. On the basis of the behaviour observed
in particular circumstances, certain conclusions can be drawn in terms 
of the model.
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Another approach which seems to be encouraged by the physiological nature 
of the state-dependent variable is to try and identify the physiological- 
biochemical changes which produce the effect. These two approaches are 
not mutually exclusive, but it seems that the latter approach still has 
to explain its results in terms of the former.
The reason for this is that the two types of analysis describe the same 
events, but in different terms of abstraction. It is just that the form 
of abstraction which seems to convey with most meaning the psychological- 
physiological-biochemical-chemical-physical etc. processes is the 
psychological information-processing analysis. This topic will be 
returned to in chapter four, but for the moment it may be well to 
emphasise that "form of abstraction" has nothing to do with distinctions 
between wholism and reductionism.
The usual state dependent experiment has four conditions. Subjects are 
tested under two different physiological states: one drug induced, and 
one usually non-drugged. Memory for some task is tested with learning 
in state 1 and recall in state 1, learning in state 1 and recall in state 
2, learning in state 2 and recall in state 2, and learning in state 2 and 
recall in state 1. A significant interaction between learning state and 
recall state indicates a state dependent effect.
Unfortunately not all experiments follow this methodology. The area of 
state dependency is one which has many contributors from different 
disciplines. Physiologists, biochemists and psychiatrists, as well as 
psychologists have produced research in this area. Any person intent on 
delving into this large literature should be ready to search out a good 
number of obscure journals.
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Fortunately, Eich (1980) has provided an impressive review of this field 
including all work published or presented at conferences between January 
1 965 and December 1 978. Eich's purpose in doing this was to try and 
discover why state dependent effects seemed to be so unreliable. Given 
the variety of approaches; some of which border on the methodologically 
inept, the variety of sources and variety of drugs and dosages used, this 
was an extremely worthy task.
Several hypotheses suggesting why and where the state dependent effect 
should and should not appear were considered. They were (a) the type of 
psychoactive drug administered, (b) the dosage of drug dispensed, (c) the 
nature of the items to be remembered, (d) the "level" of item analysis 
and (e) the nature of retrieval cues available to the rememberer.
Eich presents a very persuasive case for the hypothesis that the state 
dependent effect is actually a cue-dependent phenomenon. The reason for 
the number of studies which could not replicate the state-dependent 
effect was their use of procedures which are not sensitive to the effect. 
Specifically, Eich claims that failures to demonstrate state-dependence 
are restricted to situations in which the utilisation of stored 
information is tested in the presence of discreetly identifiable 
retrieval cues. The greatest retrieval cue is what Eich calls a copy 
cue. Here the same stimulus is presented again and the subject has to 
say whether or not it was presented originally: in other words a
recognition test. Of the fifty-seven studies covered in the review, only 
two studies using a recognition paradigm found a state-dependent effect. 
The other eleven studies using this procedure did not obtain a 
significant result. A second class of cues available to subjects are 
what Eich calls list cues. These include units of information (other 
than copy cues) which originally appeared as part of the experimental
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list. Situations in which this class of cues are available are generally 
cued recall paradigms, such as paired associate or category cueing. Of 
this kind of study, ten out of eleven did not produce a state-dependent 
effect. Of all the other studies (minus seven with negative outcomes 
previously ascribed to the administration of ineffective drug doses), 
only three instances did not produce a state dependent effect. Twenty 
three studies in which only "invisible" cues were available; that is 
unidentifiable cues which for theoretical convenience are assumed to be 
used, produced the state-dependent effect.
In conclusion, Eich makes the point that although the nature of the 
cueing condition seems to be a prime factor determining the appearance 
of state-dependent effects, there may be other factors which also 
contribute to the occurrence of the phenomenon. Three of these are 
explicitly mentioned by Eich. They are; the degree of original learning, 
the population from which the subject sample is drawn and the extent to 
which the memory task requires the remembrance of serial order 
information.
The first of these, the degree of original learning, would seem to be 
intimately related to one of the possibilities already considered by 
Eich, namely the “level” of item analysis. Eich reports only one study 
which investigates such a manipulation in conjunction with changes in 
state; an experiment carried out by himself. In this study he found an 
improvement in recall with deeper (semantic) processing in both same and 
different state recall conditions. There was no interaction between 
depth of processing and recall condition. However, Eich had subjects 
process words semantically by asking them to give synonyms. It is 
possible that this procedure could cause large interference effects. 
Subjects perhaps would be unable to distinguish between the presented
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items and their generated synonyms at recall. If so, this would cause 
problems in scoring and if only presented items were scored after recall, 
this procedure could actually reduce the recall scores in comparison with 
some other method of achieving a "deep level" of processing. Any 
consequence this interference would have in relation to the state 
dependent effect would depend on whether or not it would exert a 
systematic effect and whether or not it would produce an increase in 
variation which could mask the interaction between level of processing 
and recall condition. Only further research will provide an answer.
The possibility that subjects’ ability to remember serial order 
information is affected by changes in state from learning to test has 
been suggested by several researchers (eg. Eich, 1 9 7 7 ;  Hill, Schwin, 
Powell & Goodwin, 1 9 7 3 ;  Stillman, Weingartner, Wyatt, Gillan & Eich, 
1 9 7 4 ) ,  but this hypothesis goes no further than describing an aspect of 
some tasks which have been affected by the change in state. There has 
been no suggestion of how, or why a change in state should affect memory 
for tasks with such requirements.
The suggestion that the type of subject could influence the occurrence 
of state-dependent effect arises from studies which have examined 
alcoholics' performance (eg. Weingartner 8c Fallice, 1 9 7 1 ;  Lisman, 1 9 7 4 ) .  
However, as many studies have obtained state-dependent effects with 
“normal" subjects, it is questionable to what extent the findings of 
studies using alcoholics as subjects should be regarded as contradicting 
any account of “normal” state-dependent effects. A criticism pertinent 
to this issue is detailed in the following paragraph in relation to the 
study of mood state with depressive patients.
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Eich's (1980) review dealt solely with research which had used drugs to 
induce changes in state. In addition to this research, there are studies 
which have investigated the effects of changed states such as are caused 
by alterations of the subject's mood. These studies are not always so 
orientated toward a memory perspective, but instead are often carried out 
to investigate some aspect of psychopathology. Subjects are usually 
suffering from some clinical syndrome which may influence their 
performance. Consequently, any perceived changes in psychological 
function may have more to do with particular aspects of the general 
syndrome, rather than just the altered mood state.
However, several studies using normal subjects have been able to achieve 
changes in state by manipulating subjects’ mood (eg. Bower, 1981; Bower, 
Gilligan & Monteiro, 1981; Bower, Monteiro & Gilligan, 1978; Leight & 
Ellis, 1981). In accord with the drug state studies, both Bower and 
Leight and Ellis have found an advantage for remembering in a similar 
mood-state to that of learning. Leight and Ellis induced moods in their 
subjects by using a procedure developed by Velten (1968). Subjects read 
60 statements which refer to the reader (ie. themselves). The examples 
of a depressive statement and an elated statement given by Leight and 
Ellis are: "Every nowand then I feel so tired and gloomy that I'd rather 
just sit than do anything", and "If your attitude is good, then things 
are good, and my attitude is good". After assessing the effect of the 
mood inducement, they presented subjects with a perceptual grouping 
task. In the experiment which investigated reinstatement effects only 
depressive moods were induced, but two input conditions were used: 
constant and varied. Letter sequences of a particular structure were 
used as stimuli. An example of one of the sequences would be BONKID. 
Each letter sequence consisted of four consonants and two vowels 
presented in this type of order which potentially could create two
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pronounceable trigrams, but each sequence was actually divided at 
different points, eg. 2,2,2, giving 80 MK ID; or 1,4,1, giving B ONKI 0. 
etc. Each letter sequence was presented four times and could be 
presented constantly with a particular structure, eg. 2,2,2, or they 
could be presented with a different structure each time, eg. 2,2,2; 
1,4,1; 2,3,1; 1,3,2. Contrary to Eich's (1980) argument, Leight and
Ellis found asymmetrical reinstatement effects only with recognition in 
the constant input condition, and not with free recall. One factor 
contributing to this result may be that the recognition and recall 
statistical analyses differed in power. If the error terms are compared, 
it can be seen that the recognition error term (MSe = 1.75) is almost half 
that of the recall error term (MSe = 3.21). Another explanation of the 
difference between the recognition and recall effects in the constant 
input condition is that subjects in the free recall group used their 
memory of the mood they had learned in to aid recall, while subjects in 
the recognition group did not. This would amount to a self-generated 
reinstatement of mood and is not without a parallel in the environmental 
context literature (Smith, 1979; described in chapter two, section 2.2.) 
Unfortunately, little information is provided regarding the free recall 
and recognition procedures. In the usual recognition procedures, 
subjects have to press a key to indicate "yes" or "no" as quickly as they 
can, or they are given a list within which they have to identify items. 
In both cases attention is focused on the specific items and quick 
decisions are made through choice or instruction. In recall, subjects' 
attention can shift from aspect to aspect. Retrieval is much less 
directed by external influences and more by the self-generation of 
(sometimes complex) strategies.
The other main finding as far as the perspective of this review is 
concerned, was that the reinstatement effect was only observed in the
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constant input condition. Leight and Ellis accounted for this by 
suggesting that it was due to the greater degree of learning which occurs 
in the varied input condition. It has already been mentioned in relation 
to the drug-state studies that greater learning may influence the state- 
dependent effect (the effect exerted by this variable will be returned 
to in relation to environmental context). The asymmetry of the 
reinstatement effect is considered to reflect the lack of 
distinctiveness provided by the association of the to-be-remembered item 
to a neutral or normal mood-state. As so much information is acquired 
in this state, the state will not particularly discriminate the to-be- 
remembered information from any other information.
In the investigations carried out by Bower, hypnosis and imagination were 
used to induce mood-states. Bower (1981) reports the initial difficulty 
they had in obtaining reinstatement effects. Eventually they discovered 
that the effect could be secured by presenting subjects with two word 
lists to learn: one in mood A, the other in mood B. Recall of the first
list learned was then tested in either the same or in a different mood 
to that within which it had been learned (a similar type of paradigm will 
be seen in some environmental context studies). Bower presents an 
explanation of state-dependent effects which is based on Anderson and 
Bower's (1974) propositional model. In essence, the explanation of the 
reinstatement effects and why they only occur when two lists are 
presented in two separate moods provided by Bower is similar to the 
account forwarded by Eich (1980). Both contend that state-dependent 
effects only will be observed when the to-be-remembered information 
cannot be retrieved except by its distinctive association with the 
particular state. These models will be reviewed in chapter five.
uIn an investigation which relates to the "state" literature: in that the 
source of information accompanying the nominal stimuli arises primarily, 
although not exclusively, from the subject's physiology, Rand and Wapner 
(1967) examined the effect of posture changes on the ability to relearn
a list of six non-sense syllables. Subjects learned in both erect and
supine postures, and relearned in all four reinstatement and change
conditions. Four separate lists were presented with each item being 
shown for 3 seconds. Relearning occurred after subjects had spent
fifteen minutes doing sums.
Relearning continued until subjects had reached a criterion of two 
consecutive correct trials. The ratio of the number of trials to relearn 
to the number of trials to learn originally, to the criterion of one 
errorless trial was calculated in all conditions for each subject. Two 
such calculations were made. One was for a weak criterion: the number 
of trials to one errorless trial, and the other was for a strong 
criterion: the number of trials to two errorless trials.
Analysis revealed a significant benefit for congruent posture at 
learning and recall, but only with the weak criterion. No effect was 
observed with an analysis of the number of trials to the strong 
criterion. So, whatever factor is distinguished by the change in 
criterion has influence on the manifestation of a posture effect.
CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF STUDIES INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF MANIPULATING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
1. Introduction.
1.1. Theoretical orientation.
In most psychological texts concerned with memory there is usually a
section that mentions a token number of studies which have obtained some
effect on memory by varying the physical environment between learning and 
recall. Generally, these accounts seem to be included to achieve a
certain breadth of coverage, rather than as examples of important
empirical results provoking serious theoretical consideration. In all 
likelihood this is due to the general opinion that such effects are not 
only unreliable, but are of little consequence in the development of an 
understanding of memory.
The theoretical viewpoint and purpose of most of the research using a 
physical environment manipulation carried out between the early 1930s 
and late 1960s compounded this latter opinion. These experiments set out 
to test interference explanations of forgetting. Their reasoning was 
that if associations were established between the nominal stimuli; 
usually verbal material, and the physical environment, then the physical
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environment should be able to evoke the verbal material. If at some 
later point the subject tried to remember some other information within 
this physical environment and the former stimuli were evoked by their 
association with the environment, interference between the two sets of 
information would be observed.
As the main purpose of these experiments was to alter the levels of 
interference observed by varying the degree of association between the 
physical environment and some nominal stimulus set, it was assumed that 
the physical environment exerted its effect by means of little more than 
accidental (contiguous) association. Hopefully a proper review of the 
literature reporting such alterations of physical environment in terms 
of the effects observed and later consideration of theoretical accounts 
of these effects will persuade that physical environment phenomena are 
not quite as simple as first suggested, and are of importance in 
developing an understanding of the psychological operation of memory.
1.2. Definitions and layout.
Prior to the review of these studies it seems appropriate to provide some 
explanation of the meaning of the term "physical environment". Physical 
environment refers to all the physical parameters within which a stimulus 
is represented, from the shape and hue of the stimulus materials, to the 
lighting, any sounds or smells, the temperature, the size of the room or 
wherever the subject is, where it is, etc. Time is not included in this 
definition as it is assumed that any variables associated with a change 
in time will be accommodated by this, or one of the previous sections,
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eg. over the course of a day, the light level changes (physical 
environment), and (state) changes associated with circadian rhythms 
occur.
Due to the size of this category of variables, it seems sensible to divide 
it in some way to allow easier reading. The division is based on a simple 
methodological distinction. The physical environment variable can be 
some information contained within the stimuli materials, such as 
specific additional items, the colour background which the nominal 
stimuli items are presented upon, or even the colour of the nominal 
stimuli items themselves.^ Alternatively, the physical environment 
variable can be what ordinarily one would comprehend as being physical
environment, that is an area, place, or room.
2. When The Physical Environment Is Altered.
2.1. Physical environment as a function of the stimulus materials.
One of the first, if not the first published study of context and its 
effect on human memory was reported by Shuh Pan in 1926. Pan 
investigated the influence of several types of context with a paired
1 In such a situation it makes sense to consider the-experimentally 
defined physical environment as the nominal environmental context 
for the same reasons as the experimentally defined stimuli items are 
termed nominal stimuli items.
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associate paradigm. Each pair of words had presented along with them 
words which were either logically related to the stimuli or response 
word, words which were logically related to both stimuli and response 
words, or words which were logically unrelated to stimuli and response 
words. There were also conditions where no stimuli were presented except 
for the stimuli and response words (no-context condition) and where 
numbers accompanied the two stimuli and response words at presentation. 
In another experiment a face and name were presented on top of a picture 
card of some well known place in Chicago. Pan investigated the effect 
of all these contexts at learning and also variations of the contexts at 
recall.
The type of context manifested by the provision of logically related and 
unrelated words is likely to be semantic. As such the results of these 
manipulations are in accord with those already discussed in chapter one 
(section 4.2.). The context variations which are of concern here are 
those involving numbers and places.
Each stimulus pair and their context was presented for 3 seconds, but 
while the word pairs and number contexts were presented only three times, 
the face name pairs and place contexts were presented until memory for 
these items was perfect. In comparison to the no-context condition, the 
learning of the word pairs with a number context was hampered. However, 
if the data are analysed in terms of Z scores (t-values cannot be 
calculated as the number of subjects per group is not given), this 
difference has a probability value of only 0.192, and is therefore not 
significant. A comparable analysis of learning was not carried out with
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the place context data.
One further difference separates the number context study from that of 
the place context. At recall the intervening gap between learning and 
test for the number context study is twenty four hours, while the same 
gap for the place context study is forty eight hours. A comparison 
between recall when the original learning context is reinstated and when 
no-context is provided is made with the number context data. This result 
again is not significant (probability associated with Z score = 0.145).
There is no report of a manipulation involving a test for recall when a 
different number context is present. In contrast, in the place context 
experiment, there is no report of recall when no-context is presented. 
Here the comparison is between the original learning context and a new 
context. A significant advantage for the reinstatement condition is 
found when the data are re-analysed using a related samples t-test (t = 
8.024, p < 0.001).
Pan also investigated the relationship between the effect of a change in 
place context and the degree of original learning. As learning had 
continued until perfect memorisation, those pairs learned first could be 
assumed to be better learned by the end of the list of face-name and place 
context presentations. Pan observed that the detrimental effect of 
context change varied with the degree of learning. The face-name 
pairings least well learned were most affected by a change in context.
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Dulsky (1935) presented subjects with a pair of non-sense syllables on 
a coloured card every 5 seconds. Ten pairs of non-sense syllables were 
presented three times, then recall was tested. Learning and recall was 
then alternated until perfect recall was attained. After five minutes 
recall was tested again and if it was not perfect, it was once more 
alternated with learning until it was perfect. Two types of measure were 
recorded; the total number of correct and incorrect items recalled and 
the number of relearning trials to the criterion of perfect recall. 
Eleven different learning and recall conditions were investigated. The 
main finding was that changes in background colour from learning to test 
decreased subjects' ability to remember. This was observed with both 
types of measure. Changing the background colour of the response term 
side of the card decreased remembrance more than changing the stimulus 
side colour. This type of change in background colour reduced the 
ability to remember more than a change from the single background colour 
for stimulus and response at learning, to another single colour at test.
Some changes in colour background were from colours such as red, yellow, 
etc., to grey, while others involved swapping colours from one non-sense 
syllable to another throughout the test. In this latter situation Dulsky 
assumed that if the response term was associated with its colour and its 
stimuli term, then in the situation where the colours are interchanged 
there will be response competition between the term cued by the colour 
and the term cued by the stimulus term. If this happened one would expect 
a reduction in the ability to remember in this condition as compared to 
the condition in which there was a change in colour to the non-term 
associated grey. Dulsky obtained this difference between the two
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conditions and so reasoned that the deleterious effect of a change in 
colour background has more to do with a lack of cues normally provided 
by the colour than with the novelty of the new background. The last two 
conditions Dulsky examines are the only ones which are similar to the 
usual context/no-context reinstatement paradigm. The whole set of 
stimulus and response terms were presented with the one background colour 
and are tested with this reinstated or not. Dulsky found slight 
differences between these two conditions in the expected direction, but 
claimed it was statistically unreliable. This result is in accord with 
his claim that the lack of (colour) cues is the most potent factor, as 
in this situation the response term's colour background was reinstated 
at test.
There is however, one conspicuous problem with the Dulsky paper. 
Throughout its entirety there is not one statistical comparison 
reported. Only total recall and presumably the average number of trials 
to relearn are reported per condition: no variance measures are given so 
it is not possible to re-analyse the data. Subject numbers per group are 
given, but as no explanation of the make up of the totals is provided; 
with respect to the number of items obtained per recall, any calculation 
of an average would be meaningless. It is perhaps best to concentrate 
on the numbers of relearning trials as these are independent of recall, 
while recall is not independent of trials. But of course this does not 
overcome the problem of attaining an indication of statistical 
significance.
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Weiss and Margolius (1954) set out to investigate the support that 
background stimuli could provide in both the learning and recall of what 
they termed primary stimulus items. In five conditions subjects were 
presented with nine paired-associate non-sense syllables, each on a 
different coloured card. The stimulus item was first shown to the 
subjects for 3 seconds before a shutter lifted to reveal the response 
item also. Stimulus and response items were then presented together for 
3 seconds. After twenty-four hours, subjects' ability to recall the 
response items was tested.
Two factors were investigated in conditions one to four; the effect of 
changes in the primary stimulus and changes in background colour on the 
ability to remember. Conditions five and six examined the effect of 
colour background on learning.
Group one was the reinstatement condition where the same stimuli items 
were presented again on their original colours. The group two situation 
was similar except that all the stimuli items were presented on grey 
backgrounds. In group three, subjects were presented with stimuli items 
in which the fourth and fifth letters of the six letter stimuli items had 
been changed. These represented generalised primary stimuli. All the 
colour backgrounds remained constant from learning to test, but group 
four subjects were presented with generalised primary stimuli items on 
grey background coloured cards. Group five subjects were presented with 
the original colour of cards, but not with the primary stimulus items. 
A sixth condition had subjects learn the same paired-associates, but they 
were presented on grey cards. At recall this situation was similar to
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condition five in that the different colour cards were presented, but 
without the stimuli items. In all conditions the number of trials 
required to learn the list to a criterion of one perfect recall was 
recorded. At test the number of items correctly recalled on the first 
trial was recorded, as was the number of relearning trials required to 
obtain the previous criterion.
A significant benefit in terms of the number of trials to criterion was 
found for those subjects who had learned with the different background 
colours compared to those who had learned only with a grey background 
colour (ie. groups 1-5 cf. 6). For groups one to four, the type of 
background colour presented at recall was found to be significant. There 
was no significant effect of the type of stimuli item presented at 
recall, nor was there any interaction between these two factors. This 
indicated that there was an advantage for remembrance when the colour 
background was reinstated even when the nominal primary stimuli items 
were slightly changed. The average relearning score for group five was 
significantly less than that for group six, but was not significantly 
different to those of groups one and three. Another comparison between 
the group five and group two relearning scores (which is not reported in 
the article, but which can be calculated from the published data), shows 
a significant relearning advantage for group five (t = 3.25, df = H). 
These results and perhaps the latter by itself, which compares 
remembrance of the response, when only the colours are presented, with 
that when the nominal primary stimuli are presented without the learning 
colours, suggest that the colour background is the most effective 
response cue.
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Underwood (1963) explained the Weiss and Margolius data in terms of cue 
selection, where the subject selects aspects of the stimulus compound as 
the functional cue. Saltz (1963) claims that although this explanation 
suggests that both the nominal stimulus term and the background colour 
could both cue the response, it does not unambiguously explain why there 
is superior performance when both the primary stimulus and the background 
colours present at learning are presented at test (ie. the reinstatement 
condition). Saltz suggests that this is due to the colour background 
making the stimulus more distinctive at learning and so affecting the 
type of representation: cognitive differentiation. This is
distinguished from any perceptual differentiation which would not affect 
the type of retention of the information, but only the way it was 
perceived. In an attempt to ascertain which of these hypothesised 
processes produced the effects observed, Saltz presented ten paired- 
associate (non-sense syllable-word) items either each on a different 
background colour, or without any background colour. At test (4 seconds 
after each learning trial), the nominal stimuli (non-sense syllable) 
could be presented on its original presentation colour or not, and 
subjects had to recall the response word. Each paired-associate was 
presented for 2 seconds at learning and each subject’s total recall after 
fifteen learning and recall trials was recorded.
An analysis of variance indicated that both colour during learning 
(F1,148 = 19.14, p < 0.001) and colour at test (F1.148 = 1 2.02, p = 0.001) 
significantly aided recall of the response item. As there was no 
interaction between these two factors it suggested that both cognitive 
and perceptual differentiation aided recall to a similar extent. The
recall in tootin the colour-no colour and no colour-colour conditions were 
both significantly greater than the condition in which no colour was 
presented at learning or test ®ie. no colour-no colour!. As better 
recall is obtained in situations where the colour was present only at 
learning or at test and therefore could not directly cue the response 
term, any cue selection hypothesis would have to involve an association 
between the stimuli term as well as the response and the background 
colour. It could be assumed that in the colour-no colour condition, 
subjects could form associations between the stimuli items and the 
colour. At test the presentation of the stimuli item could evoke the 
colour which could then elicit the response. In the no colour-colour 
condition it would need to be assumed that an association between the 
stimuli item and colour would be formed at test. On subsequent 
interleaved learning trials the stimuli item could then evoke the colour 
which in turn could then be associated with the response.
To reduce the likelihood of such a strategy being operated by subjects, 
Saltz presented stimuli items which were easier to associate with the 
response items than they were to the colours. Results similar to those 
before were obtained and subjects interviewed after the experiment 
reported that the conscious use of colour as a cue was too confusing to 
maintain.
Despite all this, the result that when the stimuli and colours presented 
at learning were reinstated at test the best recall performance was 
obtained was still not unambiguously accounted for. The reinstatement 
condition is the only condition in which colour could act as a cue, so
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it is possible that this in addition to differentiation could have 
produced the superior recall. However, this condition is also the only 
one in which both cognitive and perceptual differentiation can occur. 
Therefore the result could also be explained by their simultaneous 
operation.
In line with the traditions of experimental psychology, another study was 
carried out by Birnbaum (1966). This looked at the possibility that in 
the colour-no colour condition associations did develop between the 
nominal stimuli item and colour, and the colour and response. 
Replicating Saltz’s (1963, expt.2) procedure, Birnbaum found that both 
such associations existed between these elements (p < 0.001 in both
instances). In addition, in a transfer of learning task where subjects
had to learn to provide the response term when presented with either one 
of the previously associated colours, or a different colour, it was found 
that there was easier learning, as measured by correct response term 
recall, with the colour-response pairs which were consistent with the
original learning (F1,48 = 17.22, p < 0.001). This result is not
predicted by Saltz's stimulus differentiation hypothesis. No 
investigation or mention of the tenability of the more involved cue- 
mediation hypothesis as an explanation of the no colour-colour result was 
made.
Elio and Reutener (1978) brought the debate between stimulus cuing and 
differentiation explanations of the effect of colour context almost into 
the eighties. However, one important change was that the revived 
application of the two concepts took the form of possible psychological
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operations which need not be mutually exclusive. They set about 
investigating the method of effect colour context had by applying the 
hierarchical organisation of words paradigm, the influence of which had 
been researched previously by Bower, Clark, lesgold and Winzenz (1969). 
This paradigm involves the presentation of a set of words which have a 
common conceptual link in an inverted tree like structure. At the top 
of the set is one word which subsumes the two words below it. These two 
words subsume two words below each of them and in turn each of these four 
words are the nominal headings of a four word list. In the Elio and 
Reutener study this hierarchical clustering and relationships between 
words also could be manifested in the background colours of the stimuli 
words.
I 6 | P | Y | B I 
I 6 | P | I Y | B I
I 6 I I P I I Y I I B I
green pink yellow blue
Figure 2.1. Background colour hierarchy (from Elio & Reutener, 19781,
The top word could have four bands of colour, the two words below it would 
each have two colours from the top word's four colours, and the four word 
lists and their headings would each be on one background colour (see 
figure 2.1.1.
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In all, six conditions, or six types of word hierarchy were presented. 
Coloured or black and white hierarchies could be presented and this was 
crossed with conceptually organised word sets or randomly organised word 
sets. In all conditions the same spatial layout was maintained. The 
conditions were (i) blocked (ie. conceptually/hierarchically organised) 
words/blocked colour, (2) blocked words/no colour, (3) blocked 
words/random colour, (4) random words/blocked colour, (5) random 
words/no colour, (6) random words/random colour.
Subjects were each presented with four hierarchies from one of the six 
conditions. Each hierarchy was presented for a period of 13 seconds and 
immediately after all four had been shown successively, subjects were 
required to recall as many words as they could from all the hierarchies.
The data analysis revealed that recall was aided by the blocked, ie. 
organised colour conditions, irrespective of whether or not the words 
were in a blocked or random arrangement C F 2,114 = 17.98, p < 0.001). As 
recall was higher in the condition with randomly arranged words with the 
blocked colour than the random word/random colour condition (t = 2.5, df 
= 38, p < 0.05), it did not appear that the colour had simply emphasised 
the word conceptual structure. The result that only the blocked 
word/blocked colour condition subjects recalled more than subjects in 
the equivalent no-colour condition (t = 3.42, df = 38, p < 0.01) suggested 
to Elio and Reutener that the colour context of each word was not being 
used to cue the words. If this had been the case then subjects in the 
blocked word/random colour condition also should have had significantly 
higher recall than subjects in the blocked word/no colour condition. 
Presumably the rationale behind this is that if any word is recalled it 
would have an association with its background colour. As only four 
colours were used, the colour evoked by this association also should have
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an association with another 1/4 of the set words, minus one (ie. the word 
already recalled). Overall it should be expected that the same number 
of words would be remembered in blocked and random colour conditions if 
a cuing process alone was in operation, as the same number of words would 
be associated in the same manner to the colours. It is also worth noting 
that over the four trials each subject experienced, the magnitude of the 
effects reported increased (eg. random word/blocked colour condition vs. 
random word/random colour condition on the fourth and last trial, t = 
5.75, df = 38, p < 0.001).
The explanation of these results forwarded by Elio and Reutener is based 
on Anderson and Bower's (1972) model of recognition and retrieval 
processes in free recall and regards the colour background as a list 
marker. However, as this model will be discussed in chapter five, it is 
enough to note that these results indicate that colour context can be 
used as an organisational factor at encoding and recall.
About a decade before the Elio and Reutener study and in common with many 
room environmental context studies, Gottlieb and Lindauer (1967) 
reported an investigation into the result of changing or reinstating a 
colour shape context on retroactive interference (RI). An A-B, A-C 
paradigm was applied with the stimuli being number-nonsense syllable 
paired-associates. At the initial or original learning phase (OL), 
subjects were presented with eight of the paired-associates at a rate of 
2:2 seconds, to learn to a criterion of one errorless trial. At OL all 
the paired-associates were presented on a common set of coloured shapes. 
Two groups of subjects received the A-C, interpolated learning phase 
(IL). The paired-associate list presented here was on a different set 
of coloured shapes to that of OL. Twenty minutes after the end of OL, 
all three groups in the experiment were tested for recall. The number
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stimulus was presented on the same coloured shape background as the IL 
to what was deemed to be the strong RI group, and was presented on the 
same coloured shape background as original learning to what was deemed 
to be the weak RI group. The third group; the control group, who had 
received no IL, recalled with the number stimuli presented on the same 
coloured shape background as original learning. It was assumed 
therefore, that the control group should experience little or no RI. The 
effect of RI as measured by the correct number of responses on the first 
recall trial was as predicted, with significant differences between the 
RI strong, RI weak and no RI groups (F2,57 = 40.09, p < 0,001). The mean 
number of trials to relearn the lists to criterion revealed a significant 
difference between the two RI groups and the control group (F2,57 = 4.35,
p = 0.017), but not between the two RI groups. On the second recall test
after the first relearning trial, similar results to those already 
obtained with recall were found. This suggests that cued-recall is a 
more sensitive measure of environmental context effects than the 
relearning measure is.
Based on a similar theoretical viewpoint, Lehr and Duncan (1970) used 
coloured stimuli letters in a study of the spontaneous recovery of prior 
learning. Subjects were presented with two paired associate lists in an 
A-B, A-C paradigm. Stimuli items were CVC trigrams, ie, non-sense 
syllables, presented at a 2:2 second rate and the response items were
high frequency adjectives. In the list one priming condition, the first
list stimuli items were coloured red, the second list stimuli items 
black, and the stimuli items were coloured red at recall. In list two 
priming, the first list stimuli items were presented coloured black, the 
second list stimuli items red, and at recall the stimuli items were red. 
The priming control condition had black stimuli items throughout all 
learning and recall phases. All three of these conditions had recall
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tested immediately after learning (six minutes after learning list one), 
and also twenty minutes after learning list one. In a learning control 
condition subjects learned only list one, which was coloured black. In 
all conditions the response words were coloured black. Both lists were 
taken to a learning criterion of eight out of twelve responses before 
recall began.
A significant increase in recovery was found only in those lists which 
had been primed. This was indicated by significant interactions (list 
one priming, F1,76 = 4.67, p = 0.034; list two priming, F1,76 = 7.96, p 
= 0.006), between the retention intervals and learning conditions (ie. 
one vs. two lists learned). This result demonstrates that the 
presentation of a matching stimulus colour at recall (cf. learning) can 
reduce the amount of information forgotten from immediate to delayed 
recall. Lehr and Duncan explained the results as being due to the colour 
reducing the generalised response competition, ie. interference via its 
association with the responses.
2.2. Physical environment as a function of the subjects’ location.
2.2.1. memory for presented stimuli.
Smith and Guthrie; in their 1921 psychology text, mention what must be 
the first of the physical environment studies using humans as subjects. 
They informally report two experiments carried out by W.R. Wilson. He 
found that there was a greater saving in learning when subjects were 
tested in the same place as they had learned: indoors or outside, than 
when learning acquired outside was tested inside, or vice versa. In 
another experiment he found that performance benefited similarly when 
either the presence or absence of the smell of pepperment was reinstated.
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Abernethy (1940) reported a study of the effect of altering classroom 
and/or instructors at examinations. This vigorously controlled 
experiment extended over a period of five years, the first three of which 
were devoted to obtaining various exam tests of equal difficulty. Two 
student classes were used as subjects (N = 181), with each divided into 
four groups. Each group then performed four examinations in different 
controlled orders at different times throughout the four weeks of actual 
experimentation. Each group therefore was tested at each level of test 
conditions, ie. same class, same instructors; same class, different 
instructors; different class, same instructors; different class, 
different instructors.
Abernethy found that changing instructors did not affect performance as 
much as changing classroom, and that changing both was associated with 
the worst performance. She also comments that the best students, ie. 
those highest in scholastic rank, showed least effect of change, while 
those lowest in scholastic rank demonstrated the greatest deleterious 
effect of change from learning to test.
Metzger, Boschee, Haugen and Schnobrich (1979) also carried out another 
examination of classroom environmental context. Two classes of (25) 
university students were given weekly tests in their usual classroom on 
three occasions. On the fourth week, one group of subjects was tested 
in a different classroom. On the fifth week, the other group of subjects 
was tested in a different classroom, while the first group was tested in 
its usual classroom. On the sixth week of the study, both groups were 
tested in their usual classrooms.
The data analysis took the form of comparing the number of errors made 
by subjects in each group, on each test. Over the first three tests, no
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significant differences were observed between groups. In the fourth 
test however, the change group made significantly more errors than the 
non-change group, t(4 8} = 33.05. On the next test; when the groups 
reversed conditions, again the (new! change group made more errors, t(48) 
=2.97. On the final test; when both groups were tested back in their 
usual classroom, environmental contexts, no significant differences were 
observed.
Metzger et al. also analysed the subjects' error scores in terms of high 
and low error groups. An average error score over the first three tests 
was calculated for each subject. A median split provided two groups. 
Subsequent to this, a deviation score was calculated by subtracting each 
subject's average number of errors (over the first three tests) from the 
number of errors made when they were tested in a changed classroom 
environmental context. A comparison of the high and low error groups, 
indicated that the "best" students suffered most from a change in 
classroom environmental context, t(48J = 77.22.
Unfortunately, Metzger et al. do not provide any details of the type of 
materials and test involved in the study, apart from implying that the 
tests were on the topic of physical geography. Although the form of 
analysis carried out is probably appropriate given the type of questions 
asked by educationalists, the discrepancy in the size of effects suggests 
that from a theoretical perspective, a rigorous analysis of the data 
would have produced more interesting results.
Paradigms developed to investigate interference effects were applied to 
investigations of room type environmental context before they were 
applied to colour context studies and state dependent studies (eg. Bower, 
1981). Bilodeau and Schlosberg (1951) carried out such a study to
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investigate the effect on retroactive interference (RI), Subjects were 
presented with three lists, each consisting of ten pairs of disyllabic 
adjectives to learn in a particular room. Subjects were given eight 
trials to learn, within which each pair of adjectives was presented for 
4 seconds and were separated by an inter-stimulus gap of eight seconds. 
An interpolated task which could involve doing long division sums, or 
instead learning a similar three lists, occurred prior to the relearning 
of the originally presented list. There were three basic experimental 
conditions. In condition one, subjects received the three separate 
phases of the experiment in the same room (AAA), Condition two was 
identical to condition one, except that where subjects in condition one 
had had a long division interpolated■task, subjects in condition two 
learned the three similar lists. Condition three was as condition two, 
except that subjects learned the interpolated task lists in a different 
room (ABA). In all conditions, rooms were counter-balanced. Relearning 
in the final phase of the experiment involved the anticipation of each 
response after seeing the stimulus word. The relearning took place eight 
minutes after the original learning.
2
Bilodeau and Schlosberg reported significant differences between all 
three conditions on the first relearning trial. Subjects in condition 
one could anticipate most words and subjects in condition three performed 
better than subjects in condition two (ie. ABA > AAA). The results 
demonstrated that performance on the recall task was best when the 
interpolated activity is dissimilar to that of original learning, but if 
the two activities are similar, carrying out the interpolated activity
2 Bilodeau & Schlosberg do not provide a detailed account of their 
statistical analyses in this paper, preferring to refer any in­
terested reader to Bilodeau’s thesis.
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in a different environment will benefit performance. One other aspect 
of the phenomenon reported by Bilodeau and Schlosberg was that although 
females' performance was superior overall, the experimental effects were 
equal across both sexes.
Greenspoon and Ranyard (1957) repeated the experiment reported by 
Bilodeau and Schlosberg, but with several alterations and additions. 
Subjects were presented with two lists of ten non-sense syllables. Each 
syllable was presented for 3 seconds with three seconds between each 
stimulus item. Subjects were required to serially learn the presented 
lists such that they could anticipate each successive item. In all 
conditions subjects learned the second list in the second phase of the 
experiment. Therefore, there was no comparison of the effect of type of 
interpolated activity. Despite this deletion, Greenspoon and Ranyard 
employed four basic conditions. Subjects could receive all three 
experimental phases in one room (AAA), they could try to relearn in a 
different room (AAB) , they could learn in a different room to that in 
which all subsequent phases took place (ABB), or they could receive only 
the interpolated learning in a different room (ABA). Both original 
learning and interpolated learning continued to a criterion of two 
consecutive errorless trials. Relearning of the original list occurred 
three minutes after original learning and continued until the learning 
criterion was reattained.
The first part of the data analysis was to check that neither lists nor 
rooms (which had both been counter-balanced) had differentially affected 
learning. On the basis of the number of trials to criterion, no 
differences were found. An analysis of both the number of trials to 
relearn to criterion (F3,129 = 16 .23, p < 0.001) and the number of items 
correctly anticipated on the first trial (F3.129 = 32.49, p < 0.001),
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indicated that the best performance was obtained when interpolated 
learning occurred in a separate room to that of original and relearning, 
and with the latter two occurring in the same place. By including the 
two conditions AAB and ABB Greenspoon and Ranyard were able to show that 
it was not just a change in environment from original learning to 
interpolated learning or vice versa, but also the reinstatement of the 
original learning environment which benefited performance.
Dallett and Willcox (1966) replicated part of Greenspoon and Ranyard's 
experiment to ensure that their environmental change was an effective 
manipulation before they carried out their own investigation of such a 
change on proactive interference. In the partial replication, a 
significant difference was found between the AAA and ABA conditions 
(FI,20 = 14.44, p < 0.001), but rather than use another room, the second 
environment was provided by having subjects put their heads into a 
specially constructed box.
In their investigation of the effect on proactive interference, Dallett 
and Willcox presented subjects with lists of twenty five high frequency 
nouns. Each list was presented at a rate of 3 seconds per item. Subjects 
were required to master the serial recall of the first list presented to 
them with thirty trials (however, in a five day experiment reported, this 
criterion was relaxed!. After the first list, subjects learned a second 
list in the same environment. Subjects returned on the next day and in 
the same environment had to try and recall as many of the words from the 
two lists as they could, in any order. Another two lists were then 
presented for the subjects to learn, but this could occur in the same 
environment or in a different environment. This procedure was repeated 
each day until the final day, which consisted only of a recall session. 
Three separate experiments were carried out; a three day experiment, a
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four day experiment, and a five day experiment. In the three and four 
day experiments, half of the subjects experienced a change in environment 
on days two and three respectively, and then continued to learn and 
recall in that environment. In the five day experiment both sets of 
subjects experienced a change in environment, but at different times: one 
group changed environment on day three, and the other on day four.
In all three experiments, separate analyses of the number of trials to 
the learning criteria indicated that there were no differences between 
groups which experienced an environmental change and those that did not. 
In the four and five day experiments, separate analyses of the number of 
words correctly recalled revealed significant interactions between 
groups and days (F2,36 = 3.18, p = 0.053: this is incorrectly quoted by 
Dallett and Willcox as being < 0.05). This indicated that in these
situations overall recall is better when the environment is changed than 
when it remains constant. To account for the lack of such an effect in 
the three day experiment, Dallett and Wilcox suggest that it may be 
necessary for proactive interference to build up before a change in 
environment is effective. The failure to find any such effects with 
relearning again would suggest that the recall procedure is a more 
sensitive measure (cf. Gottlieb & Lindauer, 1967).
Also based on an interference model of forgetting is a developmental 
study of learning and recall in conjunction with a room environment 
reinstatement/change paradigm carried out by Jensen, Harris and Anderson 
(1971). Children from six different age groups were presented with a 
list of eight non-sense syllables to learn. Syllables of ninety per cent 
meaningfulness were selected to allow the younger children to master the 
task within a reasonable time. Each syllable was presented for 3 seconds 
with another three seconds inter-stimulus gap. Each subject was re­
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presented with the list until they could make five correct anticipations. 
Each age group was divided into two basic experimental groups: one group 
recalled in the same room as they had learned in (AA) , and the other group 
recalled in a different room (AB). After twenty four hours recall was 
obtained by a relearning by anticipation procedure similar to original 
learning.
An analysis of covariance, controlling for the number of learning trials 
required for the different age groups, and using the number of errors 
made on the first relearning/recall trial as the dependent variable, 
indicated that across all age groups there was a significant advantage 
for performance in the same environment (F1,263 = 4.42, p = 0.036). A 
subsequent analysis found that females' performance was better overall, 
but that all other effects acted equally across both sexes (cf. Bilodeau 
& Schlosberg, 1951).
With a rather more extreme manipulation, Godden and Baddeley (1975; 1980) 
have investigated the effect of reinstating or changing underwater and 
on-land environments. In each condition, subjects were presented with 
thirty six unrelated words at a rate of three words per 2 seconds, with 
four seconds between each set of three. Subjects were tested in all four 
conditions which involved: learning on land, recalling on land (DD); 
learning on land, recalling underwater (DW); learning underwater, 
recalling underwater (WW); and learning underwater, recalling on land 
(WD). At test, approximately four minutes after the presentation of the 
last item, subjects wrote; in any order upon a formica board, as many 
items as they could remember.
An analysis of the correct recall indicated a highly significant benefit 
for the reinstatement conditions (F1,12 = 22.0, p = 0.001). Wilcoxon
69
tests revealed that while recall on land was better than recall 
underwater, for those subjects who learned underwater their recall was 
best underwater.
One possible explanation of these results is that the apparent 
deleterious effect of an environment change is due to the movement or 
disruption inherent in this act, ie. going from one environment to 
another. The lack of such movement in the DD and WW conditions would 
explain the superior performance of subjects in these conditions. A 
variant of this explanation is that rehearsal would be differentially 
disrupted by the activity between presentation and the test. To test 
both of these hypotheses, Godden and Baddeley ran another experiment 
involving two DD conditions. In one of these, subjects entered the water 
between learning and test while in the other condition the procedure was 
as undisrupted as before. The recalls of the subjects in the two 
conditions differed only slightly and in the opposite direction to that 
which would be predicted by either the disruption or differential 
rehearsal hypotheses.
It would seem then that free recall performance is best in the reinstated 
conditions because there is a match between the learning and test 
environments. Godden and Baddeley (1980) also looked at recognition 
performance under the same conditions. Surprisingly, especially 
considering the magnitude of the free recall effect, the only difference 
found with recognition was that words learned underwater were not 
identified as well as those learned on land, irrespective of where they 
were tested. The lack of an interaction between learning and test 
environments was also reflected in the subjects' d ' scores.
Mayes, Meudell and Som (1981, expt.2) reported a study which added a 
temporal factor to the investigation of the effect of environmental 
context reinstatement/change on the ability to remember. Subjects were 
presented with two lists each of thirty highly associated word pairs, 
with each pair presented at a rate of one every 2 seconds. Subjects 
learned in only one room, but were tested for recall of one list in a 
different room, while the other list was tested in the same room as 
learning. Recall was tested after one minute and after one week. A ten 
minute gap was placed between the learning of the two lists. In the one 
minute retention interval condition, subjects left the learning 
environment to go to a waiting area and read a passage from a book. At 
recall, subjects were required to produce a response to every stimulus 
item as well as provide a confidence rating of their response 
correctness.
An analysis of recall with a correction for guessing revealed a large 
effect of the reinstatement/change manipulation, but only in the one week 
delayed recall condition (F1,60 = 36.3, p < 0.001). Another analysis of
recall, but only using the data from the reinstatement conditions
indicated that subjects who learned and were tested in what Mayes et al. 
termed the "unusual" room forgot at a faster rate than comparable
subjects in the “ ordinary^' room (F1 ,60 = 4.2, p = 0.045 ).
The most extensive research into room type environmental context effects 
to date, has been carried out by S.M. Smith (1979; 1982; 1984; Smith, 
Glenberg & Bjork, 1978). In the room type environmental context 
reinstatement/change paradigm, apart from the context match/mismatch 
variable, two other factors have been mentioned which are generally 
confounded in the experimental procedure: the disruption involved in 
moving from one room to another, and the novelty of the new environment.
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Godden and Baddeley (1975) and Dulsky (1935) have determined that these 
factors, although they would exert an influence to bias the results in 
favour of a reinstatement effect, cannot account for the phenomenon. 
However, Smith (1979) has argued that because of the way in which such 
determinations have been made, it is not clear what proportion of the 
typical difference between the environmental context 
reinstatement/change conditions is actually due to the matching of test 
with learning context. To assess this, Smith operated three basic 
conditions, each involving five separate phases. Subjects learned a 
list of eighty high frequency nouns presented at a rate of 3 seconds per 
item. After this presentation they were given a recognition test with 
ten stimuli and ten filler items. This first phase took ten minutes. 
Subjects then returned to a waiting area for three minutes. In the third 
phase subjects entered a different room to the learning room and spent 
ten minutes drawing it. They then returned to the waiting area for 
another three minutes. In the final phase of the experiment subjects 
spent ten minutes free recalling as many of the words that they had been 
presented with as they could remember. The recall room was determined 
by experimental condition. Three separate rooms were used. The three 
main conditions are represented in figure 2.2., with the letters A, 6, 
and C identifying the different rooms.
ABA ABB ACB
Figure. 2.2. Room order for the three main conditions in 
Smith (1979, expt.1). -
In the ABA conditions subjects returned to the same room to recall in as 
they had spent ten minutes in learning the words. In condition ABB 
subjects recalled in a different room to that in which they had learned, 
but it was familiar to them as they had spent ten minutes in this room
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drawing it. Indeed, they may have been more familiar with this room than 
the learning room. In the ACB condition, subjects not only recalled in 
a different room to that in which they had learned, but also to that which 
they had spent ten minutes drawing. Consequently, subjects in this 
condition would be unfamiliar with their recall room. Equally in all 
conditions, subjects had to move between rooms. In other words, 
disruption between learning and recall was held constant across all 
conditions, and the novelty or familiarity of recall context was varied 
between conditions. If the novelty of a recall context does exert any 
influence on subjects' performance, it should be expected to manifest as 
a difference between conditions ABB and ACB. If the matching of learning 
and test context exerts an effect, a difference between conditions ABA 
and ABB should be observed.
Orthogonal analysis of the recall data revealed significant differences 
between conditions ABA and ABB (F1 ,27 = 5.78, p = 0.023 ), but not 
conditions ABB and ACB (F1,27 = 0.08, p = 0.779). These results
demonstrate the benefit to recall of a match between learning and test 
context, and together with the Godden and Baddeley (1975) experiment and 
Dulsky's (1935) results and rationale, suggest that this is the only 
important factor in the reinstatement/change paradigm.
Another aspect of this experiment was that subjects in the counter­
balance conditions (eg. for ABA, BAB) received auditorily presented 
words, while the other subjects received visually presented words. The 
modality of input was found not to- exert any effect of the subjects' 
ability to recall in any of the conditions.
In the same paper Smith describes another study (expt.2) in which 
subjects learned the list of words and completed the partial recognition
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test exactly as before. Twenty four hours later, subjects returned 
either to the same room or a different room to recall. The majority of 
subjects were placed in one of four different context recall conditions. 
Before recalling, some were given pictures of the original learning room. 
In another condition, the subjects were told to try and imagine the 
original learning environment. In a third condition, subjects were told 
to imagine a room at home while they recalled, and in the last of these 
different conditions subjects were given the usual instructions just to
recall as many words as they could.
Smith found that in the former two conditions, the deleterious effect of 
a change in environment was eliminated, with recall increasing to equal 
that of the reinstatement recall condition. The instruction to imagine 
the room that learning occurred in was as effective as presenting the 
subjects with pictures of the learning room. The only significant recall 
differences were found between the subjects in the two unaided conditions 
(normal instructions in different condition, and imagine room at home
different condition) and the rest (F4.A5 = 5.13, p = 0,002).
In a third experiment Smith investigated the robustness of the ability 
to self-generate the learning environment. Subjects were presented with 
five different tasks. Of these tasks only the list learning, which was 
carried out exactly as before, was a verbal task. List learning always 
occurred in one particular room, but the other four tasks could take 
place in one other room, or each in a separate room. Twenty four hours 
later, recall of the list was tested either in the same room as it had 
been learned in, or in a new room. Subjects recalling in a new room again 
were told to imagine the original learning room. The orders of the four 
conditions are illustrated in figure 2.3., below.
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Conditions
1 2  3 4
Task 1 A A A A
List learning B B B B
Task 3 A C A C
Task 4 A D A D
Task 5 A E A E
Recall B B F F
Figure. 2.3. Room orders for expt. 3 (from Smith, 1979).
The worst recall performance was found in the condition where six 
different rooms were used (condition 4 in fig. 2.3.). The other three 
conditions differed significantly from this condition (F1,36 = 6.35, p 
= 0.016), but not from each other. This suggests that self-generated 
learning environment is not as efficient in promoting recall when the 
number of intervening or experienced environments is increased.
In an attempt to identify the origin of better performance in reinstated 
environmental conditions, Smith, Glenberg and Bjork (1978, expt.3) 
presented subjects with eighty words which had to be sorted into ten 
categories. Category names were provided and indeed the stimuli words 
were chosen from these ten categories in equal numbers. The next day 
subjects were taken to either the same, or a different room and were asked 
to recall in any order as many of the words that they had sorted the day 
before as they could.
The results showed that more categories (F1,16 = 5.65, p = 0.030), as well 
as more words per category (F1,16 = 8.93, p = 0.009) were recalled in the 
same condition. This suggests that whatever influence environmental 
context exerts, it affects each individual item.
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In the fourth experiment reported by Smith et al. , a view of memory 
similar to that advanced by Kintsch (1970) was adopted. On the basis of 
this model, an attempt was made to assess where the environmental context 
exerted its effect. Free recall and recognition tasks were examined. It 
was reasoned that if recognition involves the accessing of a particular 
meaning of a word before the decision process is operated and if 
environmental context influences the semantic encoding of a word, one 
would expect to see poorer identification of words which have more than 
one possible meaning (eg. balanced homographs, high frequency words) 
after a change in environmental context. If only the decision process 
is influenced by environmental context, then all items to be remembered 
should be affected by a context manipulation. If only the retrieval 
process is influenced then one would expect the effect of environmental 
context to be restricted to free recall situations.
Subjects were presented with each of the ninety-six stimuli items for 3 
seconds each. Immediately after the completion of the presentation a 
recognition test consisting of sixteen stimuli and sixteen filler items 
was presented. The next day subjects returned to either the same or a 
different room. Half of the subjects in each condition received a free 
recall test and the other half received a recognition test. Subjects in 
the recognition test condition had to identify the eighty untested 
stimuli items from the eighty filler items which were presented in a ten 
page booklet.
In recall the expected advantage for subjects performing in a reinstated 
environmental context was found compared to those subjects performing in 
the changed context condition (FI,24 = 12.79, p = 0.002). In agreement 
with previous studies (eg. Geis Jc Winograd, 1975; Kintsch, 1970), high 
frequency words and polarised homographs were better recalled than their
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low frequency and balanced homograph counterparts (F1.120 = 45.49, p < 
0.001 and F1,120 = 4.22, p = 0.042, respectively). Analysis of the
recognition data, in the form of d' scores, revealed no effect of 
environmental context on the recall of homographs or non-homographs. 
However, an interaction between word frequency and environmental context 
iri the expected direction was obtained (F1,72 = 4.12, p = 0.046). It was 
also found that homograph d ‘ scores in the environmental context change 
condition had significantly greater variation than in the reinstatement, 
condition (F-max4,40 = 2.77, p < 0.05). The word frequency effect with 
recognition was also replicated (cf. Winograd & Geis, 1974).
Overall the results demonstrate that the environmental context 
influences subjects’ ability to recall information, but hardly 
influences their ability to recognise information. Smith et al. suggest 
that the poorer recognition of high frequency words indicates an 
influence of environmental context on the accessing of a semantic sense 
of a word. However, another interpretation of this result is that as 
high frequency words are more difficult to recognise on the basis of some 
record of familiarity, so the additional information provided by 
environmental context reinstatement provides a comparative advantage at
3
retrieval and therefore exerts an effect on recognition.
In the final experiment reported by Smith et al., the semantic 
variability at test and input was controlled by presenting a cue word 
along with the nominal stimulus. The purpose of this was to try and 
determine if environmental context had any influence on processes other
3 The background to this interpretation is built up through chapters 
five (sections 6. and 8.3.), six (section 1.5.), ten (section 6.1.) 
and eleven (section 1.3. ).
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than the derivation of a semantic sense. In the terms of the model 
adopted by Smith et al., differences in recognition decision processes 
would be reflected. Changing the cue word from presentation to test has 
been found to adversely influence recognition of high frequency words, 
but not low frequency words (Reder Anderson & Bjork, 1974). It was 
assumed that this was due to the greater potential for different meanings 
available with high frequency words. With the result of cuing so 
predicted, any effect of environmental context should be due to an 
influence on the decision process of recognition.
The analysis of the d ‘ scores showed that the environmental context 
reinstatement/change factor had not exerted any effect. Smith et al. 
concluded that this meant that the decision process is not influenced by 
environmental context.
In the second experiment reported in this study Smith et al. looked at 
the effect of an environmental context manipulation on cued-recall. Two 
lists of forty-five weakly associated word pairs were created. Fifteen 
of the stimuli items were common to both lists, but were paired with 
different responses in list one to what they were in list two. The word 
pairs were presented aurally at a rate of one pair in 4 seconds, or 
visually at a rate of one pair in 3 seconds in the two different learning 
contexts. In the first session subjects were presented with one list 
four times, after which they were tested for cued-recall on fifteen of 
the thirty unique pairs. In the second session on the following day, 
subjects were similarly presented and tested with the other list in the 
other learning context. On the third day, subjects were tested either 
in the day one or day two context, or alternatively in a neutral context. 
The recall test involved the presentation of the fifteen common stimuli 
pairs and then the sixty unique pairs from the two lists. Prior to
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Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
| Learn list 1 | I Test: 15 common
Env.1 | (or 2) *. | * I and then the 60
| Test unique pairs. | I unique pairs.
| | Learn list 2 |
Env.2 | * I (or 1)*. I As above.
| | Test unique pairs.|
Env.N I-------------------- I I As above.
Figure 2.4. Diagram of Smith, Glenberg and Bjork's (1978)
2nd experiment (the *'s represent counter balance 
conditions ) .
beginning the test, subjects were told that some items may require more 
than one response (see figure 2.4.).
If learning environment reinstatement benefits recall in comparison with 
a change in environment at test, then Smith et al. claim that subjects 
tested in their day one environment should recall more of the information 
presented there than the information presented in the day two 
environment. Likewise subjects tested in the day two environment should 
recall more of the information presented there, than that learned in the 
day one environment. In both situations where recall is tested in a 
reinstated environment, more information learned in those environments 
should be recalled than would be if recall was in the other learning or 
neutral environments.
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of cue type (greater recall 
with unique cues; F1.18 = 60.6, p < 0.001) and response type (day two 
learning recalled better than day one learning; F1.18 = 13.2, p = 0.002). 
However, the pertinent interaction between test context and response 
type was not significant. Smith et al. claim that this is due to an
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inflated error term in the neutral conditions. A subsequent analysis 
excluding this group did reveal a significant interaction between test 
context and response type (F1 . 12 = 4.8, p = 0.049). It may have been 
noticed that this paradigm also controls for disruption and novelty of 
test environment. However, in this experiment the defined context also 
involved a time factor. Subjects only used a particular room at a 
particular time, ie. 8am, 12am, and 4pm. It is very likely that what have 
been described here as state variables (ie. physiological changes 
associated with circadian rhythms) contributed to the result.
The last experiments to be reviewed which have been carried out by S.M. 
Smith involve the effect on recall of varying learning environment. In 
the first experiment reported by Smith et al., subjects were presented 
with forty unrelated high frequency nouns at a rate of 2 seconds per word 
slide, or 3 seconds per word in the auditory condition. The list was then 
presented again, with subjects being allowed 10 seconds per word so they 
could rate each one as either "good" or "bad". Three hours later in a 
second session, subjects were presented with the same stimuli and 
procedure. However, the second session could occur either in the same 
environment or in a new environment. Three hours after the second 
session subjects were taken to yet another environment. There they were 
asked to write down as many of the words that they had been presented with 
that they could remember.
The results showed that subjects who had been presented with the words 
in two different environments could recall significantly more words than 
those subjects who had been presented with the words in one environment 
(F1,12 = 50.63, p < 0.001 ) .
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Smith (1982, expt.1) carried out a similar type of experiment, but rather 
than repeat the presentation of the same list in different environments, 
he had subjects learn different lists in different environments. Four 
lists of twenty five high frequency nouns were presented aurally at a 
rate of one every 3 seconds. Subjects had the lists presented in either 
one room, two rooms (two lists in each room), or four rooms (one list in 
each room). After each list presentation subjects returned to a waiting 
area. The time between each list presentation (ILI) was varied across 
all groups. This could be either thirty seconds or five minutes. In 
addition the gap between last list presentation and the recall test (RI) 
could be thirty seconds or five minutes. Subjects first carried out a 
free recall test and then were presented with a recognition test 
consisting of all the stimuli items and an equal number of filler items.
Analysis of the recall scores showed a significant effect of the number 
of rooms (F2,72 = 3.96, p = 0.023). As the number of rooms increased, 
so did recall. Those groups receiving the five minute gaps between lists 
also recalled significantly more than subjects receiving the thirty 
second ILIs (F1,72 = 4.17, p = 0.045). As would be expected, as the RI 
increased, recall decreased (F1,72 = 3.98, p = 0.050). Although no 
interactions were significant, the only group which did not obtain any 
benefit from learning in different rooms was the thirty second ILI and 
RI group. Clustering in recall (ie. the adjacent recall of some list 
words) significantly increased as the number of learning environments 
increased (F2.72 = 9.0, p < 0.001).
The analysis of the recognition data (cast as the number of hits per 
subject) revealed no significant effects at all. The only groups showing 
any similarity of trend were those groups with both an ILI and RI of five 
minutes.
In the second experiment Smith (1982) reports, subjects were divided into 
three groups. One group received the four lists in four rooms, another 
group received all the lists in the one room, and the other group received 
all the lists in one room, but did not move to the waiting area between 
list presentations. All groups had ILI and RIs set at five minutes and 
list presentation was as described for the previous experiment. Two 
tasks were administered in the new test environment. The first was a 
forced choice recognition task. Pairs of words were presented and 
subjects had to select which of the two was a previously presented 
stimulus item. A recognition test was presented again in case the free 
recall task presented first in the previous experiment had contaminated 
the results. ILI and RIs of five minutes were used as it seemed from the 
results of the previous recognition test that if any effect was to be 
found, it would probably appear under such conditions. The second test 
was a list differentiation test.
One possible explanation of the increased recall with a larger number of 
learning rooms is that room changes allow a greater distinction between 
lists in memory. For certain models (eg. Anderson & Bower, 1972; 197A; 
see chapter five, section A.) list differentiation is a prerequisite of 
efficient memory performance. If differentiation is affected by changes 
in learning environment, this could account for the superior memory 
performance. However, the consequence of superior list differentiation 
should be evident in a recognition test also.
Analysis of the recognition data conformed with that of experiment one. 
No differences were found between any of the groups. A similar result 
was obtained with the list differentiation data, although again this test 
could have been contaminated by the preceding recognition task.
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In the final experiment reported by Smith (1982) the effect of learning 
in a number of rooms in relation to the reinstatement phenomenon was 
examined. Three lists each of thirty-two high frequency nouns were 
created. Presentation was as previously described for the other
multiple room learning experiments. One or three rooms could be used at 
learning and in all conditions five minute ILI and RIs were used. Recall 
could occur in the same (or one of the same) room(s) as learning, or in 
another neutral environment. As with all the environmental context 
studies reported, counter-balancing controlled for room specific effects 
(see figure 2.5.).
Number of input rooms
Test context One Three
AAA-A ABC-A
Same BBB-B ABC- B
CCC-C ABC-C
AAA-D ABC-D
Different BBB-D ABC-D
CCC-D ABC-D
Figure 2.5. Room orders for list presentations (from Smith, 1980).
The analysis of the subjects' recall scores found the normal 
reinstatement/change effect with one learning room groups (F1 ,116 = 
3.99, p = 0.0A8), but not with the three learning room groups. To check 
that the lack of reinstatement in the three room learning condition was 
not due to only one of the three rooms being reinstated, a comparison of 
the number of items recalled from each of the three lists was made. In 
this situation one might expect the list learned in the test context to 
be best remembered. However it was found that all three lists in this 
condition were equally recalled. Together these results would suggest 
that the deleterious effect of recalling in a different environment to
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that in which learning occurred can be eliminated by learning in several 
environments.
Smith (1984) has also compared multiple encoding environments with 
self-generation of encoding environment in terms of their ability to 
reduce the environmental context dependent effect. All subjects were 
presented with three, thirty-two high frequency noun lists. Each word 
was presented auditorily, at a rate of one every 3 seconds. Between each 
list presentation was a five minute break which subjects spent in a hall. 
Half of the subjects returned to the same room each time to learn the next 
list, while the other subjects went into a different room for each list. 
Five minutes after the presentation of the third list, all subjects were 
taken to a novel environment to make their attempt to recall the words. 
Half of the subjects in the one room presentation condition were asked 
to try and remember the presentation room as an aid to their recall, while 
the other subjects received no instructions. A similar division was made 
with respect to the three room presentation subjects, but with the 
instructed subjects being asked to try and remember all three rooms as 
an aid to their recall.
The results indicated that the subjects instructed to remember the 
presentation environments recalled most (F1.112 = 7.03, p < 0.01). 
However, the interaction between the instruction and number of 
presentation rooms factors CF1,112 = 3.75, p = 0.055) and subsequent 
Newman-Keuls tests revealed that the former effect was only present for 
subjects in the one room presentation condition.
Oolinsky and Zabrucky (1983) investigated the environmental context 
reinstatement effect with "immediate’' recall, in terms of the serial 
position of best remembered items. Subjects wore welders’ goggles,
equipped with flip opaque shades. The two environments were created by 
having subjects engage, or not engage the opaque shades. Each subject 
was auditorily presented with two lists of eighteen (noun) words, 
presented at a 2 second rate. Immediately after each list's 
presentation, subjects recalled verbally for forty seconds. Recall was 
made with either the opaque shades in the same position as at learning, 
or in a different position to that of learning.
A slight effect of environmental context reinstatement was observed, 
F (1 , 15) = 3.84, p = 0.069. However, analysis of the serial position 
curve revealed a significant advantage for different environmental 
context subjects for the first three positions (primacy), F (1 , 1 5 ) = 6.25, 
p = 0.025, but' an advantage for reinstated environmental context subjects 
on recall of the items from position four onwards (recency), F(1,15) = 
8.56, p = 0.010.
Nixon and Kanak (1981) also examined the effect of environmental context 
reinstatement and change on free-recall serial position. However, at 
presentation they also instructed half of their subjects to attend to the 
overall environment; explaining that it could help learning. All 
subjects were visually presented with a list of thirty-five adjectives, 
at a rate of one every 3 seconds. After spending fifteen seconds moving 
to and from an adjacent hall, the two minute free recall test was 
initiated in the reinstated or a changed environment.
An analysis of the subjects’ overall recall scores revealed an advantage 
for those subjects instructed to attend to the encoding environment 
F(1,60) = 10.41, p = 0.002, but no environmental context reinstatement 
effect. However, an analysis of the serial position of recalled items 
revaled an interaction between serial position and environmental context
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reinstatement at recall, F (1,60) = 3.56, p = 0.064. The first five items 
were best recalled in the changed environment, while the last five items 
were best recalled in the reinstated environmental context.
As Falkenberg (1972) demonstrated with process context, the two studies 
by Dolinsky and Zabrucky, and Nixon and Kanak, demonstrate that 
environmental context reinstatement effects are not restricted to long 
term memory. Exactly what effect environmental context has on long term 
memory in these situations is more equivocal.
Eich (1985) also investigated the effect of instructions directing 
subjects to employ environmental context in their encoding of nominal 
stimuli items. After presentation of each list word, subjects either 
generated an image of the (noun) item conjoined with a particular feature 
of the environmental context, or generated an image of the item in 
isolation. After reporting each image, subjects gave a rating of its 
clarity. The rate of presentation of the twenty-four item list was 
determined by the subjects' speed of image generation and description. 
Free recall was tested two days later in either the original or a changed 
environmental context. Immediately after free recall, subjects were 
presented with a two-alternative, forced-choice recognition test, with 
the two alternatives being conceptually related nouns.
Apart from finding a general recall advantage for items imagined to be 
conjoined with the encoding environment, F (1,60) = 25.49, p < 0.001, Eich 
also found that an environmental context reinstatement effect was 
manifest with such conjoined image items, but not with the isolated image 
items (interaction effect, F( 1 , 60) = 4.74, p = 0.033 ). However in
contrast, the recognition analysis (probability of hit) demonstrated a 
general advantage for isolated items, but no environmental context
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reinstatement effects.
In common with Eich, Devane and Parkman (1978) also instructed half of 
their subjects to form a mental picture of two objects. The other half 
of the subjects were told to associate each pair of nouns in the eighteen 
pairs list, so that when provided with the first, they would be able to 
respond with the second. The pairs of words were presented visually at 
a rate of one every 7 seconds to one group of subjects and presumably at 
a similar rate auditorily, to the other group of subjects. Subjects were 
given two presentations of the list before exiting to the corridor. On 
returning to either the same or a different environment, subjects carried 
out a cued-recall task (visually or auditorily cued), which in all cases 
was supervised by a different experimenter.
An analysis of cued-recall indicated an advantage for subjects 
instructed to use imagery, F( 1,72) = 14.22, p < 0.00!. An interaction 
between this factor and recall environmental context was observed also, 
in that only those subjects instructed to employ imagery manifested an 
environmental context reinstatement effect, F(1,72) = 4.98, p = 0.029.
Given the results reported by Eich, the suggestion is that the images 
constructed at encoding by subjects in the latter experiment employed 
environmental context features.
2.2.2. memory for elapsed time.
The effect of changing environmental context on the ability to make 
temporal judgements also has been investigated. To do this, Block (1982) 
set up a paradigm involving three parts. First, subjects were given some 
task to do for a set period of time (D1). After this they are given
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another task which lasted the same time as the first (ie. D1 = D2). 
Subjects were then tested on their ability to estimate the length of each 
time period and then on some aspect of the tasks carried out.
In the first experiment reported, the effect of a change in context from 
D1 to D2 and the effect of making the judgement in the same (or one of 
the same) context(s) as compared with making the judgement in a different 
context was examined. In all conditions subjects were disrupted in the 
same manner between 01, D2 and judgement.
Block discovered that subjects erroneously regarded D1 as being larger 
than D2, if between the two periods there was no change in context. If 
there was a change in context, this mistake was not made. The type of 
context that the judgement was made in did not influence these results. 
In each time period subjects had rated fifteen occupations on how well 
suited they were to each other. Each occupation name was presented for 
10 seconds. In the test period the thirty occupation names plus five 
filler occupations were presented on a sheet of paper. Subjects had to 
identify if the word had appeared in the two presentations, if it was in 
D1 or D2, and its relative position within its presentation set. The 
only effect of a change in environment with the task data was that D2 
items were less likely to be regarded as D1 items if there was a change 
in environment between D1 and D2.
In the second experiment reported, Block specifically investigated the 
effect of disruption. Three conditions were compared: no disruption, 
disruption only and disruption and environment change from 01 to 02. The 
tasks given in each period were identical to experiment one.
It was found that subjects' time estimates in the no-disruption condition 
demonstrated a larger positive error than subjects in the the disruption 
only condition. In the disruption and context change condition there was 
no time error. Analysis of the occupation identification test(s) 
revealed that a change in context at D2 again decreased the chances that 
a D2 item would be regarded as a D1 item.
In the final experiment Block looked at the relationship between process 
context (see chapter one, section 4.1.) and environmental context. To 
create different process contexts, subjects had to determine if a word 
matched with a description presented along with it. The description 
could be in terms of structural features, ie. the sort of type set, or 
it could be in terms of semantic category membership.
Thirty two words, each presented for 5 seconds, were judged in each time 
period. From D1 to D2 half of the subjects received mixed and then 
unmixed judgements. In addition to this, from D1 to D2 the environments 
could be changed or subjects could be disrupted only. One other 
difference from the method of experiments one and two was that the memory 
test involved the presentation of four words randomly selected from each 
quarter of the presented lists and four filler items (making a total of 
thirty six items).
The duration judgement data analysis revealed a main effect of process 
context, and an interaction between environmental and process context. 
Normally (eg. Block & Reed, 1978, expt.2), a positive time order error 
appears in the mixed-unmixed process context condition, but here the only 
condition revealing such an effect was the disruption only, mixed- 
unmixed condition. In the list differentiation task again it was found 
that a change in environmental context reduces the probability than an
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item from D1 will be assigned to D2.
3. Context Studies With Non-Human Subjects.
3.1. Introduction.
Although all the experiments reported in the previous sections have been 
carried out with human subjects, a sizeable literature also exists with 
respect to context effects with animal subjects. A great deal of this 
research is related to work on hippocampal function (see chapter six, 
sections 2.2. to 2.5.), but there are studies which have looked at the 
influence of context in normal animals.
3.2. Overview.
Watson (1907) found that rats' performance on a maze was influenced by 
an environmental context alteration. A decade later Carr (1917) 
reported an extensive investigation into the effect of varying degrees 
of environmental context alteration at learning and test. He concluded 
that the animals (rats) adapted to the whole sensory environment. He 
found their learning of a maze to be best when environmental conditions 
were kept constant. Relearning or subsequent performances; after 
criterion attainment, benefited most from a reinstatement of the 
original learning conditions. Carr also showed that a variety of 
contextual changes could differentially influence performance.
More recently, Zentall (1970) has shown that a parallel exists between 
human RI effects with a change of context and those observed in a similar 
paradigm with rats as subjects. Fewer errors were made when original
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learning was tested in the same environment when intermediate learning 
(IL) took place in another environment, than when IL occurred in the 
reinstated environment. A similar effect with PI was found not to be 
significant, but this was attributed to masking by a floor effect.
Oeweer, Sara and Hars (1980) demonstrated that a ninety second exposure 
to the background stimuli of the testing room significantly improved the 
performance of maze running by rats previously trained on the task.
Spear, Smith, Bryan, Gordon, Timmons and Chiszar (1980) also 
demonstrated the benefit rats obtain from the reinstatement of 
environmental context and state variables, while Jones, Rana and 
McGonigle (1980 ) have argued that rats’ (as well as monkeys’ and 
peoples’) performance given prior learning is determined by the context 
within which information is presented. This type of animal performance 
is comparable to that observed with human semantic context variations.
4. Ineffective Context Manipulations.
4.1. Introduction.
Of course, not all-studies have been able to demonstrate an effect of 
context. Little is known about "process context", but there seems to be 
a general agreement regarding the consequences and to a lesser extent, 
the explanation of alterations in semantic context. With respect to 
state dependency, Eich ( 1 980 ) has done much to put in order the enigmatic 
literature, giving a reasonable account of why failures to produce such 
effects have occurred. In the environmental context literature fewer 
failures to produce context effects have been reported, but due to the 
bias or requirements of publication, this does not necessarily'mean that
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a smaller number of studies have been unsuccessful. However, at least 
six studies have reported no effect of environmental context 
manipulations. It may be worth considering these studies in relation to 
those which have obtained such effects, in an attempt to discover why no 
influence was observed and consequently what the determining conditions 
are.
4.2. Review.
Farnsworth (1934) carried out an investigation into the practical effect 
of changing the classroom at test from that normally taught in. Three 
classes were used, and pairs of subjects from each were matched on grades 
obtained prior to the pertinent exam. No significant difference was 
found between those groups tested in a different environment to that in 
which they were normally taught and those tested in their usual 
environment.
In a later study, Farnsworth (1937) had subjects practise a pursuit rotor
task and a number task as a seventy decibel chord sounded out. One group
of subjects practised for one session and another group practised the 
tasks for two sessions. These groups were then split in two and half of 
the subjects carried out the tasks again with noise, while the other half 
of the subjects carried out the tasks without the accompanying noise. 
Again, Farnsworth found no benefit to those subjects carrying out the 
tasks in the same noisy conditions, nor did he find any difference in 
their performance when he stopped the noise.
In a study using a similar type of environmental context as a variable,
Pessin (1932) examined subjects' ability to learn four lists each of 
seven non-sense syllables. Each item was presented for 1.5 seconds and
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each list was learned to a criterion of one errorless trial. Each 
subject participated in four conditions determined by the crossing of 
quiet and loud conditions at learning and relearning. Loud conditions 
were produced by accompanying the nominal stimuli items with flashing 
lights and a buzzer. An analysis of the number of relearning trials to 
obtain one errorless trial and the number of errors made in doing so 
showed no significant benefit for the learning reinstated conditions.
Nagge (1935) carried out an experiment where an interpolated list of 
twelve non-sense syllables was learned in a different room to that of 
original learning and relearning. Each item was presented at a rate of 
approximately one every 3 seconds and each list was learned to a 
criterion of one errorless trial. Analyses of savings in relearning and 
anticipation scores revealed no difference between those subjects 
learning the interpolated list in the same room and those learning the 
interpolated list in a different room to that in which original learning 
and relearning took place.
Strand (1970) reported a study where the disruption, which is normally 
part of the environmental change (but not the reinstatement) condition, 
was included as a separate condition. Using a paradigm designed to 
examine the influence of RI, she presented subjects with one word list 
in the control conditions and two lists in the experimental conditions. 
Each list consisted of twenty words each of which was presented for 1.5 
seconds. List presentation was repeated until subjects could correctly 
recall twelve words. Three conditions (crossed with experimental and 
control manipulations) were distinguished by the activity engaged in by 
subjects between learning list one and two. In the no change (N) 
condition, subjects remained in the one environment throughout. In the 
disrupted (D) condition subjects moved out of the learning environment,
93
but returned to it to learn list two. Only in the change (C) condition 
did subjects move into a different environment to learn list two. In all 
conditions the final recall test was carried out in the list one learning 
environment.
A comparison of the number of trials to criterion revealed no significant 
differences between the groups. A comparison of control and 
experimental groups showed a significant effect of RI (F1,75 = 80.54, p 
< 0.01). However, although there was superior recall in the D and C 
conditions compared to the N condition, the D and C conditions did not 
differ significantly from each other.
On the basis of these results Strand claims that the previous findings 
of a reduction in RI with environmental context change has nothing to do 
with the change in context. Instead Strand argues that the apparent 
memory decrement is a consequence of the disruption involved in moving 
from one environment to another in the different test context condition.
Of all the failures to obtain effects of environmental context, the 
result of the experiment carried out by Strand is of most concern. If 
Strand's conclusion that disruption is responsible for the decrements in 
memory rather than any match/mis-match between presentation and test 
environments was accepted, then the whole theoretical perspective from 
which these effects have been viewed would have to be altered. Rather 
than reflecting encoding and retrieval interactions in memory, such 
effects would be more likely to demonstrate the interference of "non- 
memory" processes on memory retrieval.
It is for this reason that both Godden and Baddeley ( 1 975 ) and Smith 
(1979) have attempted to demonstrate that the environmental context
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effects observed in their experiments could not be attributed to the 
disruption of moving from one environment to another in the different 
context condition. Although Strand's finding of an effect of disruption 
has been used to question the validity of environmental context 
reinstatement effects, it is worth pointing out that Godden and Baddeley 
could not replicate this result, even with the degree of disruption 
involved in moving from land to underwater and vice versa. However, a 
more detailed discussion of Strand's experiment will have to be postponed 
until further evidence, regarding those factors which may determine 
environmental context effects, has been presented and assessed (see 
sections 5. and 6.2.).
Fernandez and Glenberg (1985) presented the results of a series of eight 
experiments. After the first experiment the series took the form of an 
attempt to determine the cognitive factors responsible for the lack of 
an environmental context reinstatement effect.
The basic learning paradigm employed by Fernandez and Glenberg was to 
have subjects construct (write) a sentence relating two words, which were 
presented at a subject paced rate on punch cards. The responses of 
subjects were collected in specially prepared booklets.
In the first experiment the familiarity of words was manipulated by 
altering the number of presentations. Each subject was tested after one, 
or seven days and performed; in order, free recall and then alternately, 
cued-recall and recognition tasks on all the presented items in the 
original, or a changed environmental context. In all measures, 
retention interval and the number of presentations exerted a significant 
effect, but no effect of environmental context was observed.
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In the second experiment, the common presence of the experimenter at 
presentation and test was eliminated. Two experimenters re-ran the 
former experiment (one experimenter taking subjects through the 
presentation phase and the other experimenter carrying out the test 
phase), but with a sub-set of the stimuli items previously employed and 
requiring only free-recall after a presentation-test gap of five 
minutes. Again, no effect of environmental context was observed.
Experiment three examined the possibility that the processing demands of 
the sentence construction task inhibited the encoding of environmental 
context information. Consequently, task difficulty was manipulated by 
providing subjects with associated word pairs or with randomly assigned 
word pairs, to construct sentences with. However, after a retention 
interval of one day, the only significant effect obtained was that of 
task difficulty.
Experiment four tested the hypothesis that the absence of the 
environmental context reinstatement effect was due to subjects employing 
non-environmental context information as retrieval cues. To test this, 
subjects were provided with a sentence within which the two to-be- 
remembered words were present, or were provided with the sentence 
generation task as before. It was reasoned that the use of environmental 
context information as a retrieval cue would be facilitated by the former 
method of presentation. But again after a retention interval of one day, 
the only effect was that of the newly introduced factor: type of
orienting task.
Experiment five demonstrated a relationship between serial position and 
the environmental context reinstatement effect, but rather than as Nixon 
and Kanak, and Dolinsky and Zabrucky had found, Fernandez and Glenberg
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observed an advantage to same environmental context recall in both 
primacy, t( 9 0 ) = 2.67, and recency, t ( 9 0 ) = 2.02, positions. However, 
the difference in results is probably a consequence of the longer 
retention interval (five minutes) employed by Fernandez and Glenberg.
Experiment six attempted to replicate the results of experiment five and 
determine if the environmental context effect is associated with the 
beginning and end of a session, or a list. Subjects were presented with 
two lists of randomly paired nouns as had been used in the previous 
experiment, separated by two minutes of arithmetic. As in all previous 
experiments, the subjects task was to produce a sentence relating each 
word pair. However, no significant (main or interaction) effect of 
environmental context was obtained, although a significant interaction 
between lists and serial position was observed.
Experiment seven investigated the possibility that the manifestation of 
an environmental context effect was being inhibited by the generation of 
sentences. Rather than having to create a sentencewith the word pairs, 
subjects were asked to provide judgements regarding the size of the two 
objects referred to by the nouns. This task also was self-paced. Five 
minutes later, subjects performed a free-recall task. Again no 
significant effects of environmental context were observed.
After such inability to obtain effects of environmental context, 
Fernandez and Glenberg attempted to replicate the methodology employed 
by Smith (1979, expt.1). The only differences between experiments 
concerned the use of two different environments cf. Smith, and the 
exclusion of recalled filler and recognition items from the analysis of 
recall scores. In addition, the serial position recall was also 
analysed. An overall recall advantage for reinstated conditions was
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found, F{1,46) = 3.31, p = 0.075, but was reported as not meeting the 
criteria of significance. An analysis of items in terms of their serial 
position also failed to obtain significant results.
5. An Assessment Of Factors Influencing Environmental Context 
Effects.
5.1. Introduction.
As can be seen from the presentation of the two sets of studies: those 
which have succeeded in obtaining an effect of environmental context and 
those which have not, quite a variety of methods have been employed in 
the attempt to investigate such phenomena. Essentially these different 
methods are functions of the variation of a set of factors which are; the 
nominal type of environmental context, the degree of difference between 
environmental contexts, stimulus presentation time, presentation-test 
gap and the nominal task requirement at presentation and test. In 
addition, one other variable has emerged, namely the degree of learning 
of the nominal task. The question which arises next is, what influence 
do each of these factors have in the production of an environmental 
context effect?
Fortunately for the purposes of assessment several studies have included 
comparisons between levels of some of these factors. However, to a large 
extent comparisons will have to be made between experiments differing on 
more than one factor. Obviously this reduces the importance that can be 
attached to any conclusion drawn in such a situation, but as with most 
reviews this is as much as can be achieved prior to a formal experimental 
test of the ideas obtained from such an analysis.
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5.2. Nominal type of environmental context.
At the beginning of this chapter a distinction was made between 
environmental context which was presented as part of the stimulus 
materials and the room type of environmental context. Consideration of 
the environmental context effects obtained when these two types of 
environmental context are manipulated suggests that this is an 
influential factor.
One reason for the greater effects obtained when the environmental 
context manipulated is a function of the stimulus materials could be that 
subjects consider this environmental context as more important or 
significant than room type environmental context. Every activity in 
life takes place in some sort of environmental context, so unless there 
is something special or peculiar about the place, it is unlikely to be 
regarded with much importance. However, when an experimenter presents 
stimuli words on a variety of different coloured cards it quickly prompts 
consideration of why different coloured backgrounds are being used.
Implicit on the part of the experimenter is a similar type of assumption. 
This is evident from the way in which black (or white) backgrounds are 
often regarded as constituting the neutral stimuli condition.
If the saliency of an environmental context is a determining factor in 
the size of such an effect, then one would expect studies with room type 
environmental context that emphasise the use of such environments also 
to obtain larger effects. Certainly from those studies using many rooms 
(eg. Smith, 1982, expt.1) and those employing distinctive environments 
(eg. Godden h Baddeley, 1975; Mayes, Meudell & Som, 1981) there would 
seem to be some support for this notion.
99
Of course it is naive to think that any type of environmental context 
difference would give rise to an effect. This is demonstrated by two of 
the "non-effect" studies which employed noise as a means of creating an 
alternative environmental context. Pessin (1932) concluded that the 
reason he had failed to detect an effect of the loud versus quiet 
manipulation was because subjects in the loud (and presumably 
distracting) conditions were increasing their work rate to maintain 
their performance level. Dulsky (1935) also supported this view, 
claiming that if these motivational factors had been constant across all 
conditions, the reinstatement/change effect would have been observed. 
Farnsworth's (1937) experiment could be criticised in a similar manner 
to Pessin's study. Farnsworth himself suggests that
...a true decrease in [the] score due to the change in 
Nebenreize was masked by an increase in score due to the 
elimination of a major source of distraction. (Farnsworth,
1937, p.278)
In both cases it would certainly seem sensible to try and block out such 
stimuli when one was performing a task. If this was done, it is unlikely 
that a reinstatement of these conditions would aid performance, as there 
would be little match with this information in memory.
It is not enough to say that at test a change from the learning 
environment will be to the detriment of the performance of some task. 
Consideration must be given to the nature of the task and the nature of 
the environmental context, and to any possible effect that the latter may 
have on the former.
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5.3. Degree of difference between environmental contexts.
It was not just by coincidence that the same paradigm was used by Nagge 
(1935), Bilodeau and Schlosberg (1951) and Greenspoon and Ranyard 
(1957). Bilodeau and Schlosberg's rationale for carrying out their 
study was to determine if with a greater degree of environmental change, 
an environmental context effect could be established. Greenspoon and 
Ranyard attempted to replicate Bilodeau and Schlosberg's study to reduce 
the dubiety of the situation. The two later successes would seem to 
indicate that the failure to observe any influence of environmental 
context in the Nagge experiment, was due to an insufficient separation 
between the two levels of the independent variable.
One of the early studies of the influence of environmental context by 
Carr (1917) showed that varying the degree of environmental context 
reinstatement affected the level of performance of rats. More recently 
and with human subjects, Godden and Baddeley (1975) obtained an extremely 
large environmental context effect with what must be one of the largest 
differences between environmental contexts in the present literature. 
However, despite the evidence (and presumably most theoretical 
conceptions of the phenomena) which would suggest a relationship between 
the degree of difference between environmental contexts and the size of 
effects observed, very little attention seems to have been paid to this. 
One particular indication of this is the brevity with which most writers 
report the environmental contexts that have been used in the study.
These experiments serve to illustrate the point that if environmental 
context effects are to be observed, it must be ensured that significantly 
different environments are employed. Unfortunately, a problem arises 
with respect to the a priori determination of effectively different
environments. This issue is considered in chapter three, where the 
adoption of a practical approach to resolving the problem is described.
5.4. Stimuli presentation time.
Weiss and Margolius (1954) reported data which indicated that the most 
effective response cue was not the stimulus word in their paired 
associate paradigm, but the colour background on which the stimuli words 
were presented on. They also happened to present this information for 
the longest period of time. The stimulus word on its background colour 
was presented first for 3 seconds. After this, stimulus word and 
response word were presented for another 3 seconds. So the stimuli word 
and colour were presented for a total of 6 seconds and for half of this 
time the response word was also present.
Overall it seems that the shortest presentation time that has been used 
in an experiment that has obtained an environmental context effect is 
approximately 2 seconds per item. However the determination of some 
minimum stimulus presentation time that is associated with the 
observation of environmental context effects is complicated by the 
rather lax reporting of inter-stimulus gaps. If a stimulus is presented 
for 3 seconds and there is a 2 second gap before the next stimulus 
appears, the subjects have effectively 5 seconds presentation time. The 
stimuli items are not going to become unavailable to the subject as soon 
as they disappear from sight. Rundus (1971) has provided evidence 
suggesting that the limit to rehearsal in list learning is not the time 
available to the subject, but rather the number of items which have to 
be rehearsed in that time. The real consideration is not how long the 
stimuli are presented for, but what this time allows the subject to do 
with the stimuli items.
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Although the contrast between the Weiss and Margolius, and Strand studies 
suggests that there is some relationship between presentation time and 
the magnitude of environmental context effects, the previous discussion 
mentions some of the difficulties in drawing such a simple conclusion. 
However, given that psychological processing does have a temporal 
dimension, it would seem plausible to assume that one of the basic 
determining conditions of the effect is adequate time for the appropriate 
processes to be initiated and completed.
5.5. Presentation-test gap.
Most of the studies reported in sections 2.1. and 2.2. use different 
presentation-tests gaps. Fortunately however, some experiments have 
specifically examined the effect of varying the presentation-test gap on 
the influence of environmental context.
Mayes, Meudell and Som, (1981, expt.2) reported what is probably the most 
simple and direct examination of this. They found that subjects were 
unaffected by a change in environment if recall was after one minute, but 
demonstrated the typical environmental context reinstatement effect if 
they were tested after one week. Although the magnitude of this effect 
may be supported by the within subjects design and a high degree of 
inter-environmental difference, it is still very impressive.
Smith (19821 has also investigated the influence of presentation-test 
gap in relation to environmental context effects, but rather than placing 
this within the context of a reinstatement paradigm, it was examined in 
relation to the effect of multiple learning environments. Smith found 
that the benefit of learning in several rooms became manifest with a 
presentation-test gap of five minutes rather than one of thirty seconds.
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At this point it is also worth mentioning that Falkenberg (1972) obtained 
process context reinstatement effects with presentation-test gaps as low 
as 5.4 seconds.
5.6. Nominal task.
Theoretically the nominal task can be divided into encoding and retrieval 
phases. These phases can be considered as independent to the extent that 
the type of encoding does not determine the type of remembrance that may 
be requested of the subject. In most cases the type of presentation
encourages a particular type of encoding which is normally appropriate
for the type of retrieval subsequently required of the subject. For 
example, the ability to remember paired-associates is tested by a cued- 
recall procedure.
For those investigating environmental context as a function of the 
stimulus materials, the paired-associate paradigm has certainly been the 
favourite. All but Elio and Reutener have used this method and all
including Elio and Reutener have obtained effects of environmental
context.
In the case of place type environmental context investigations, paired- 
associate paradigms have not been so common. However, Bilodeau and 
Schlosberg have reported an environmental context effect using this 
method, as has Smith et al. (1978, expt.2). Unfortunately, the Bilodeau 
and Schlosberg statistical data could not be obtained, but the size of 
the reinstatement effect observed by Smith et al. with cued recall, is 
much smaller than that normally found with free-recall paradigms (eg. 
Smith et al., expts.1,3,& 4).
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Smith (1982, et al., 1978) and Godden and Baddeley (1980) have all failed 
to obtain environmental context effects with recognition procedures, 
while they have obtained these effects if subjects were asked to free- 
recall. Similarly, both Dallett and Willcox (1968), and Gottlieb and 
Lindauer (1967) have reported failures to detect environmental context 
effects with relearning measures, but have been able to detect the 
effects with serial learning free-recall and cued-recall, respectively.
Eich (1985) and Nixon and Kanak (1981) provided one group of subjects 
with instructions directing them to make use of environmental context 
information. Although Nixon and Kanak did not find that these 
instructions significantly interacted with the environmental context 
reinstatement effect, they did find that subjects so instructed recalled 
more than other subjects. Eich on the other hand not only found a recall 
advantage for subjects receiving conjoined environment imagery 
instructions, but also an environmental context reinstatement effect 
only with these subjects.
It would seem then that not only is the type of memory test a determining 
factor in the manifestation of environmental context effects, but so too 
is the form of encoding carried out as the nominal stimuli are presented.
5.7. Degree of learning of the nominal stimuli.
The last factor to be mentioned which seems to influence the observation 
of environmental context effects is the degree of learning. Pan (1926), 
in his study of the paired-associate learning of face-name pairings 
presented on pictures of well known Chicago places, found that those 
items most rehearsed, and so presumably better learned, were less 
affected by a change in context (ie. the Chicago place). However, Reed
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(1931) refers to Oberschelp who was unable to obtain any relationship 
between the paired-associates' degree of learning and the influence of 
context. Unfortunately, the description of Oberschelp's study is very 
brief. No information regarding the type of contexts used is provided, 
nor is it made clear if any context effect was observed.
Abernethy (1940) on the other hand, did notice a similar relationship to 
that observed by Pan. She found that a change in classroom and/or tutor 
affected those students highest in scholastic rank least; the assumption 
being that the highest in scholastic rank had achieved a greater degree 
of learning.
6. General Assessment Of The Influence Of Context.
6.1. Across the different types of context.
After having looked at the different types of context in this and the 
previous chapter and despite some fairly obvious gaps in the information 
available, it is possible to make some attempt at cataloguing and
comparing the types of effects observed.
One of the basic findings across all types of context is that if the 
context prevailing at presentation or learning is reinstated, memory 
performance on the task is better compared to that observed when the 
context is altered. It is possible that the degree of difference between 
contexts is proportional to the detriment in memory performance. 
Alternatively it may be that some threshold degree of difference is
required in order that a reinstatement effect will be observed.
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Both semantic and environmental context variation between item set 
presentations at encoding improves subsequent memory performance. The 
case may be the same for state and process context, but no examples or 
refutations are known of.
Differences appear to arise with respect to the types of memory test 
which detect the reinstatement/change phenomenon. With semantic context 
the effect can be detected with free recall, cued-recall and recognition 
paradigms; with state and environmental context the effect can be 
detected by free recall, less well with cued-recall, and apparently not 
by recognition, while process context seems only to have been 
investigated with and detected by free recall paradigms.
A great similarity exists between the effects of environmental context 
and physiological state, in that the effects of both are not easily 
detected by tasks which provide the subjects with cues. The more 
complete the cues are, the less likely it is for an effect to be detected 
(see Eich's analysis of state-dependent effects in chapter one, section
4.3.).
It seems that the form of encoding may also exert an important influence 
as to whether an environmental context effect will be observed. This is 
suggested by those studies which have considered the degree of learning 
and the effect of instructions to utilise environmental context 
information at encoding.
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6.2. In relation to Strand, Farnsworth and Fernandez and Glenbergs’ 
non-effects.
Now that those factors which seem to influence the appearance of 
environmental context effects have been discussed and briefly considered 
in relation to the other types of context effects, the possible reasons 
for the failure of Strand and Farnsworth’s (1934) studies to obtain 
effects of environmental context can be returned to.
There are several points worth mentioning in relation to Strand's 
experiment. First of all, Strand did obtain at least one effect of 
context: the consistency of list two recall order was significantly 
increased with context change (F2.51 = 3.31, p < 0.05). Context did 
influence subjects’ memory, but it would seem to require a sensitive 
measure to detect it. Secondly, the study reported by Strand is actually 
an abstraction of a larger study involving the presentation of
categories. Each list contained two categories with ten exemplars of
each. Strand claims that as subjects were not informed of the 
categories, the list can be considered to be unrelated items. This 
opinion may have seemed valid at the time, but with the results of Smith 
(1979, expt.1) and the apparent concordance between the cue-dependent 
nature of physiological state effects and environmental context effects, 
a shadow of doubt must now be cast over this.
In Farnsworth's (1934) study, although a matched pair control was 
applied, the experiment was not as carefully constructed as that of 
Abernethy. Smith (1982) has shown that learning in several environments 
can reduce the deleterious effect of a context change. Presumably study
for the exam would not be confined to the teaching environment, and so
this also would reduce the magnitude of any observed effect. However,
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Farnsworth did find a non-significant advantage for the reinstated 
conditions in two of the three class comparisons he made (D/6D = 0.54 and
0.84). It is perhaps more surprising that this and Abernethy's results 
should have conformed at all to the reinstatement pattern, when the other 
potentially confounding influences existing within these studies are 
considered.
One of the most obvious differences between the first seven Fernandez and 
Glenberg experiments and other studies of environmental context effects 
is the type of task subjects were presented with. Both sentence 
construction and size judgements (on the basis of visual imagery) would 
seem to require a style of processing involving the elaboration of the 
words beyond that expected as a consequence of the casual learning that 
takes place in most list memorisation tasks.
The suggestion that the cause of the lack of effect is the different sorts 
of task presented by Fernandez and Glenberg is given further credibility 
when it is considered that the replication of Smith's (1979, expt.1) 
carried out by Fernandez and Glenberg did obtain a significant difference 
between the two recall environmental context conditions, in favour of the 
reinstated environmental context condition. Although Fernandez and 
Glenberg reported the F-value obtained as not significant, the 
probability associated with the value was 0.075. Most other researchers 
would regard this as a result that at least suggests that some difference 
exists between groups, even if it has not fully achieved the accepted, 
yet arbitrary criterion of 0.05. However, even with such a criterion 
set, it can be demonstrated that Fernandez and Glenberg have actually 
obtained a significant result. They may have noticed this if they had 
used a t-test instead of an F-test. The classical probabilities 
associated with the traditional ANOVA F-values are two-tailed (Keppel,
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1982). Therefore, if a directional hypothesis is being tested, these 
probabilities are not strictly applicable. As with one tailed t-tests, 
the correct probability is actually half that obtained from the two- 
tailed tables. In this case, as the superiority of reinstated 
environmental context conditions obviously is predicted, the difference 
between means observed is significant at the 0.038 level.
6.3. Different or similar contexts?
After a review of the context literature, Hewitt (1977) suggested that 
there were two types of context; intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic 
context was that information which was always represented with the 
nominal stimulus item, but was not an integral part of its meaning, eg. 
environmental and state. However, despite the greater similarity 
between environmental and state effects, there is still a good degree of 
similarity between all the types of context effects. The question is 
whether or not there is enough difference between the different context 
effects; particularly between environmental and state on one hand and 
semantic and process on the other, to justify making a distinction 
between them. Presumably, any such distinction would have the 
consequence of implying some difference in psychological origin. As 
mentioned in chapter one (section 3.2.), the important theoretical issue 
is whether or not there is an equivalence in the psychological function 
of the different types of context.
7. The Oddity Of Physical Context Effects.
7.1. Introduction.
There is a good deal of evidence to support the claim that physiological 
state and environmental context influence memory performance. Of the 
two, that physiological state should exert an influence is more 
intuitively obvious. This intuition predicts that such effects should 
be either improvements, or decrements in performance. However, these 
simple predictions are not in accord with the type of interactive effects 
which are actually observed.
It was mentioned earlier that despite the implicit assumption of a 
relationship between physical context and memory, it still had an air of 
oddity about it. Even though the assumed relationships do have an 
impressive amount of empirical support, it does not stop the ability of 
physical context to influence memory from seeming odd. Yet it does not 
seem odd that semantic context; nor physiological state in the simple 
manner described above, should be able to influence memory.
7.2. Probable cause.
With respect to psychological function, people tend to have a dualistic 
attitude. Within this there is room for certain physiological changes 
and semantic alterations to influence memory. The fact that a particular 
change in a person's or an animal's physiology can affect memory,
supports a mechanistic view of brain operation which is distinct from the
operation of mind. However, the particular type of state dependent
effects reported here disturb this view as they do not conform to the
normal concept of an improvement or a deterioration in performance. The
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fact that semantic context influences memory confirms the view that our 
minds operate abstractly, imposing meaning or extracting meaning placed 
there by another mind. The effect of semantic context supports the view 
that our behaviour is controlled at a satisfying, anthropomorphically 
abstract level.
The oddity of physical context effects may come from their apparent
contradiction of the way in which we believe our behaviour to be
controlled. The suggestion is that perhaps such things as shapes, 
colours and degree of light could influence our intellectual
functioning. The logical conclusion of this line of reasoning seems too 
extreme: it appears to state that the very aspects of our behaviour that 
were taken to indicate the existence of an anthropomorphic mind, are to 
a large extent outwith our control and instead depend on a variety of 
incidental and supposedly insignificant stimuli. This would seem to 
have repercussions for the dualistic concept of mind and the notion of 
free-will, by implying a comparatively simple mechanistic account of 
such intellectual functions.
7.3. Resolution.
Hopefully this thesis will show that this logic is flawed and that such 
a conclusion is false. Non-semantic context and specifically 
environmental context do influence psychological processes. This
influence however, is not arbitrary. It is the product of a system which 
utilises information in a practical and effective manner. The apparent 
oddity of physical context effects is one consequence of applying 
inappropriate terms of conception in the attempt to understand the use 
and subsequent influence of context in psychological processing.
CHAPTER THREE 
EXPERIMENT ONE 
THE DEMONSTRATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT EFFECT
1. Introduction.
1.1. Determining the amount of environmental difference.
In the same way that it is difficult to specify with any great deal of 
precision degrees of semantic difference, it is also difficult to specify 
degrees of environmental context difference. Exceptions to this are of 
course situations in which simple environmental contexts are used, such 
as background colours. However, when the whole room or surroundings are 
defined as the environmental context, the determination of degrees of 
difference becomes an intuitive rather than objective exercise.
Research such as that by Baroni, Peron and Salmaso (1980), Brewer and 
Treyens (1981), Salmaso, Baroni, Job and Peron (1983) and Tversky and 
Hemenway (1983) is beginning to investigate the way in which such context 
information is encoded, represented and retrieved. Eventually this 
should reveal what the important aspects of defined environments are and 
as a consequence should allow some determination of the degree of 
difference between environments.
An alternative approach in determining environmental difference would be 
to assume that if no environmental context effects could be discerned in 
a memory experiment, then the degree of difference between the 
environmental contexts is not significant. However, it does not take a 
great deal of thought to appreciate the flaw in this reasoning. Far too 
many factors could intervene to produce a "non-effect"; even with a 
significant difference between environments. Relying on the results of 
a typical memory experiment would cause the determination of a 
significant environmental difference to depend on the effect of all the 
factors that influence memory phenomena; from encoding variations to 
retrieval strategies. The present level of understanding of the way in 
which environmental context information is utilised by psychological 
processes in any particular encoding and retrieval mode does not inspire 
confidence in the assertion that no effect means no significant 
environmental difference.
The first requirement to increase our knowledge of the way in which 
psychological processes utilise environmental context information is the 
creation of a situation in which an environmental context effect can be 
replicated and then manipulated. To achieve this, effectively different 
environmental contexts have to be employed.
1.2. Establishing different environmental contexts.
As the first step in this investigation of environmental context effects, 
radically different room environments were prepared. The differences 
between the rooms were based on a combination of logic and intuition. For
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example, it seemed reasonable that if one was a long, thin, bright room 
with a window at one end, this would be perceived as quite different to 
a short, fat, dark room without any windows. However, the problem of 
specifying the degree of difference still remains. To cope with this 
problem rather than solve it, detailed descriptions of all the 
environmental contexts are presented in the appendix (appendix A). It 
may be that at some point psychological knowledge will be such that these 
descriptions will be able to be used to provide an estimate of the 
perceived degrees of difference.
1.3. Experimental paradigm.
The first experiment had as its prime purpose the demonstration that 
these environments were sufficiently different to give rise to an 
environmental context effect. To achieve this, one of the simplest and 
most elegant paradigms constructed to isolate and investigate the 
environmental context reinstatement effect; reported by Smith (1979, 
expt.1), was adapted and employed.
As was described in the previous chapter, the experimental session was 
divided into three parts; a presentation period, an environmental 
familiarisation period and a recall period. However, in the experiment 
to be reported, during the environmental context familiarisation period 
subjects carried out a non-verbal matching task, rather than drawing the 
room they were placed in. Subjects in the presentation environment do 
not have their attention so specifically focused on their surroundings 
as they do when they draw the intermediate environment. By presenting
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another task at this point it was assumed that the subsequent 
acquaintance with the intermediate environment would be on a par with 
that of the presentation environment.
Another change from the procedure described by Smith was the reduction 
of the between room waiting time from 3 minutes to 30 seconds. The reason 
for this was to reduce the likelihood of subjects dwelling on the task 
and rehearsing items during this period.
The only other significant procedural change in the experiment was in the 
scoring of subjects' recalls. Whereas Smith scored all items correctly 
recalled from both the stimuli list and the recognition test, here only 
those correctly recalled items which had not appeared in the recognition 
test were scored. The reason for this was that for the recognition and 
filler items, presentation times and the type of psychological 
processing were liable to be much more varied.
Smith in common with other researchers included in the design*of the 
experiment a counter-balance to control for room specific effects. This 
aspect of the design was maintained, but rather than just controlling by 
counter-balancing presentation and recall environments, the number of 
subjects in each sub-condition was increased to allow a proper analysis 
for such effects.
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1.4. Experimental hypotheses.
The consequences of these alterations to Smith's original paradigm will 
be considered later in the discussion of the experiment. For the moment 
it may be worth reiterating the experimental hypotheses. If the 
experimental procedure and environments are effective and the match 
between presentation and test environments is an influential variable, 
there should be significantly higher recall in the same and familiar 
(ABA-BAB) conditions compared to any other conditions. If the 
familiarity of the test environment exerts an influence, there should be 
significantly greater recall in the different, but familiar (ABB-BAA) 
condition when compared to the different and unfamiliar (ACB-BCA) 
condition. If previously, the relative familiarity of the test 
environment falsely had made it seem as though an environmental context 
effect had occurred, only the latter hypothesis should be supported. If 
the imbalance in disruption between conditions was responsible for any 
effect; as it is now equal across all conditions, no effect should be 
evident. If any one environment is more conducive to encoding, a room 
effect should be observed, while an interaction between the two factors 
would indicate some more complex relationship between specific encoding 
and recall environments.
1 17
2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
48 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were unpaid 
volunteers, naive regarding the purpose of the experiment.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Rooms A, B and C were employed in the experiment. Descriptions of 
these rooms can be found in appendix A.
2.3. Stimuli:
80 high frequency (> 50 occurrences per million words), three to six 
letter logically unrelated nouns were selected from the Kucera and 
Francis ( 1 967) word count. ^ 70 of these items were presented on 
slides. Each slide consisted of one centrally located word printed 
in upper case. Two sets of slides were constructed: black print on 
a clear background and clear print on a black background. The 
latter slides were used in room B to avoid extra illumination. The 
remaining 10 words selected from the word count and 10 of the words
1 A full listing of all stimuli and filler words is presented in 
appendix B.
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prepared on slides (both randomly selected) constituted the 
recognition test. These 20 items; randomly arranged in the form of 
a single column of upper case words, were presented to subjects on 
a slip of paper.
2.4. Apparatus:
In both presentation environments (rooms A and B) the slides were 
projected onto white walls by Kodak carousel projectors. 
Presentation rate was controlled by a Kodak electronic interval 
timer.
2.5. Design:
A two factor (3 x 2) between subjects design was applied. The first 
factor was defined by the relationship between the presentation 
environment and the recall environment; same or different, and the 
familiarity of the recall environment; familiar or unfamiliar. The 
second factor was defined by the presentation room environments; A 
or B.
2.6. Procedure:
Each subject's 31 minute experimental session was divided into 
three 10 minute periods, separated by two 30 second waiting periods. 
In the first 10 minutes subjects viewed an automatic presentation 
of the 70 word slides. Each slide was presented for approximately
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4 seconds. 3 seconds exactly would have been a preferable 
presentation time, but unfortunately the lowest setting on the 
interval timer was approximately 4 seconds. As a result of the 
projector mechanics, there was a variable 1 to 1.5 seconds gap 
between slides as they changed. This break was quite compatible 
with the presentation of the stimuli. A similar break between 
stimuli items would have been provided if the projector had not been 
so helpful. Subjects were told of the slide presentation times and 
that their task was to try and memorise all the words they would be 
presented with, but not necessarily in the same order. They were 
then instructed to turn on the projector using the switch beside 
them when the experimenter left the room, and to switch off the 
projector after the last word slide had been presented and black 
blank slides began to be shown. After the presentation was 
complete, the subject informed the experimenter who then 
administered the recognition task. Subjects were given unlimited 
time to mark those words they recognised, but no subject took more 
than 2 minutes. When they had completed the recognition task the 
subjects returned to the waiting area before moving to the next 
scheduled room. In this environment subjects were presented with 
a visual, non-verbal matching task. After completing this task 
subjects again returned to the waiting area for 30 seconds. In the 
third period, ^subjects entered the appropriate environment and were 
asked to try and write down all the words they had been presented 
with in the first period, including all those making up the 
recognition test, that they could remember. At the end of the 10 
minute period the experimenter returned, terminated the
experimental session and debriefed the subject. The room order for 
those subjects in the SAME and FAMILIAR condition was ABA/BAB, the 
room order for the DIFFERENT and FAMILIAR condition was ABB/BAA and 
the room order for the DIFFERENT and UNFAMILIAR condition was 
ACB/BCA.
Scoring:
Each subject’s written recall of the word list was examined for the 
presence of presented items. Mis-spelling was ignored, but the 
extremely small number of synonyms/approximations produced by some 
subjects were regarded as incorrect. Three types of item could be 
recalled; filler (F) items from the recognition test, recognition 
(R) items from this list and presented (P) items which did not 
appear in the recognition test. Separate counts of each type of 
item were made.
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3. Results.
3.1. P-item ANOVA.
3.1.1. preliminary analysis.
The familiar analysis of variance (ANOVA) actually consists of two 
components: a linear model upon which variance is partitioned and a
F-test of the variances of interest. Both of these component procedures 
make certain assumptions regarding the nature of the data presented to 
them (Kirk, 1982). Most, if not all of these assumptions are met by the 
application of the normal requirements of experimental design and by the 
methods of calculation employed. However, some assumptions made of the 
data are generally outside the experimenter's power of control. 
Specifically, these assumptions concern the normality and variance 
homogeniety of each data set.
The F-test assumes that the two variance estimates come from independent 
normal distributions, while the ANOVA model assumes that the within group 
error terms are normally and independently distributed with common 
variance and a mean equal to zero. As the ANOVA model also assumes that 
the only source of variation within each group is the error terms, the 
normality assumption for both components is effectively equivalent.
Norton (1952) found that when deviations from normality are 
heterogeneous across groups, a 2 to 3 point overestimation of the 5 
percent significance level could occur ie. when alpha = 0.05 the real
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value could be as high as 0.08. However, it is likely that this 
distortion would have been less if sample sizes greater than Norton’s 3 
or 5 had been used. With regard to the homogeniety of variance 
assumption, Rogan and Keselman (1977) reported increases in type 1 error 
of 2 to 4 percentage points above the nominal significance level with 
large degrees of heterogeneity.
So, although ANOVA "With equal sample sizes is robust with respect to 
departures from these assumptions; particularly the assumption of 
normality, extreme violations do have effect. As such assumption 
violations can influence the outcome of the ANOVA, it seems most sensible 
to know if any such violation exists, in order that appropriate action 
or interpretation may be initiated. The only way to obtain this 
information is to carry out preliminary tests of these assumptions. 
Hartley’s (1940; 1950) F-max statistic is a simple test that is sensitive 
not only to variance heterogeneity, but also non-normality (Box & 
Anderson, 1955). In situations where non-normality is present, the 
F-max statistic is inflated. Therefore, the F-max test would seem to be 
an ideal procedure for identifying violations in normality or variance 
homogeniety that would be likely to affect the outcome of an ANOVA.
Hartley’s F-max test; carried out on the data presented in the top half
of table 3.1. , revealed no significant deviations from the assumptions
2
of normality and homogeneity of variance, F-max(6,7) = 4.19.
2 All alpha levels were set at 0.05.
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CONDITION | ABA BAB 
1
ABB BAA ACB BCA
X RECALL | 27.12 26.37
I
21.75 20.37 21.12 20.00
S. D.
1
| 9.25 6.28 
1
9.63 8.17 4.70 4.84
CONDITION
| SAME- 
1 FAMILIAR(SF) 
1
DIFFERENT- 
FAMILIAR(DF)
DIFFERENT- 
UNFAMILIAR ( DU )
X RECALL I 26.75 
1
21.06 20.56
S.D
1
| 7.91
I
8 .93 4 . 77
Table 3.1. Mean recall and standard deviation of P-items by group.
3.1.2. overall F-tests.
A 3 x 2 (presentation-recall environment match/recall environment
familiarity x presentation environment) completely randomised analysis 
of variance was carried out on subjects P scores. As is reflected in 
figure 3.1., there was a significant main effect of presentation-recall 
environment match/recall environment familiarity, F(2,42J = 3.44, MSe =
55.02. The main effect of presentation environment was not significant, 
F(1,42) = 0.26, nor was the interaction between these two factors, 
F (2,4 2 ) = 0.01 .
30
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Figure 3.1. Mean recall of P-items per group.
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3.1.3. specific comparisons.
Planned orthogonal pair-wise (one tailed) comparisons confirmed that the 
significant main effect was due to the difference between the means of 
the SF and DF conditions, t( 4 2 ) = 2.1 68 and not between the means of the 
DF and DU conditions, t (42) = 0.191 (see table 3.1. and figure 3.1. ).
3.1.4. power and degree of association.
A post-hoc analysis of the power (1-B) of the F test identifying the
significant main effect revealed it to be operating at 0.50'. The degree 
2
of association (W ) between the significant main effect and subjects P 
scores was also calculated and found to be 0.095.
3.2. ANOVA Of P, R And F-Itern Recall.
3.2.1. preliminary analysis.
P, R, and F-item recall was prepared for analysis by calculating the 
proportion of the total number of items presented that were recalled. 
For R and F-items the total number presented was ten., while for P-items 
the total was sixty.
An approximation to the binomial distribution is often a consequence of 
calculating the proportion scores. An arcsin transformation is usually 
recommended to establish normality of distribution when proportions are 
employed (Kirk, 1982, p.83). However, with the present proportion data, 
an examination of the distributions revealed that the only significant 
deviation from normality was a large positive skew with R-items. This 
was removed most effectively by the square root transformation, Y ‘ =
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sqrt[Y + 1] + sqrtCY].
After transformation, Hartley's F-max test on the between subject scores 
indicated that the assumptions of normally and independently distributed 
errors were tenable, F-max(6,7) = 1.63.
The means and standard deviations pertaining to this analysis are 
presented in table 3.2. below.
Condition |
I
ABA BAB ABB BAA ACB BCA
X Recall |
I
1 .741 1 . 656 1.651 1.613 1 . 688 1 . 694
I
S. D. |
I
0. 226 0.203 0. 241 0.189 0.196 0.212
Table 3.2. Average Transformed P, R and F-item recall.
However, in repeated measures designs, further assumptions are made 
concerning the nature of the relationships between the repeated 
measures. It is assumed that there is homogeneity of variance of 
differences between groups. Although variance-covariance matrices 
reflecting data of this form include matrices with compound symmetry, 
this is not a necessary condition for the existence of homogeniety of 
variance of differences.
Unfortunately, the form of the data obtained in most psychological 
studies is unlikely to conform to this restrictive assumption. 
Essentially the assumption is that in repeated measure experiments the 
effect of different variables will increase or decrease the different 
subjects' scores by similar amounts. Consequently, Keselman, Rogan, 
Mendoza and Breen ( 1900) go as far as suggesting that rather than 
investigating the validity of the assumption, effort is directed to
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dealing with the problem caused by the assumed violation.
The problem caused by such violation is that the calculated F-statistics 
are overly optimistic. To cope with this it is possible by altering the 
degrees of freedom to obtain more stringent probability values 
associated with the calculated F~values.
Two such corrections are often made. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
which assumes maximal heterogeneity of differences, by dividing the 
numerator arid denominator df's by the df's associated with the repeated 
factor. Alternatively, the Huynh-Feldt correction alters the df’s of 
the F-statistic numerator and denominator, on the basis of the extent to 
which the data violates the homogeneity of variance of differences.
A test of the assumption of homogeneity of variance of differences was 
carried out (symmetry test, Anderson, 1958, p.259). This indicated that 
the probability of the heterogeneity of variance of differences observed 
occurring by chance was < 0.0001.
3.2.2. overall F-tests on word type recall.
An analysis of a three factor ( 3 x 2 x 3 )  mixed design; with repeated 
measures on the third factor, was carried out. The first two factors 
were identical to those described in the previous analysis, while the 
third factor expressed the type of word recalled (P, R or F-item). Table
3.3. presents a summary of this analysis. Table 3.A. presents the means 
and standard deviations pertaining to the main effect of word type.
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SOURCE df mean square F P
Huynh-Feldt
P
FML 2 0.0638 1 . 63 0.207
LE 1 0.0543 1 .39 0. 245
FL 2 0.0249 0. 64 0 . 533
error 42 0.0391
word type (W ) 2 7.1002 148.15 0. 000
W x FML 4 0.0465 0. 97 0.413
W x LE 2 0.0026 0 .05 0. 907
W x FML x LE 4 0.0133 0.28 0.845
error 84 0.0479
Table 3.3. Summary of the three factor mixed ANOVA.
P R F
I
percentage X I 37.88 56 .67 8 .96
X trans data | 1 . 994 1 . 247 1 .780
S.D. trans data |
I
0. 183 0. 280 0. 153
Table 3.4. Percentage mean, and transformed mean and standard 
deviation of overall P, R and F-item recall.
3.2.3. specific comparisons.
Pair wise (two-tailed) orthogonal 
differences between overall R and 
overall P and F-item recall, t(84)
3 As the assumption of homogeneous variance of differences was found 
to be untenable, separate error terms were calculated for each 
comparison (Kirk, 1982).
comparisons revealed significant 
P-item recall, t(84) = 7.926 and
= 10.250.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. General conclusions.
In common with Smith (1979, expt.1), the pattern of results observed in 
this experiment support the view that the environmental context 
reinstatement effect is a consequence of a match between the 
presentation/encoding context and test/recall context. The 
establishment of such a result also indicates that one of the research 
requirements has been fulfilled: effectively different room
environments have been created. The lack of any room-specific effect or 
interaction between factors, suggests that at least with these 
environments, some aspect(s) common to, or equal across both rooms is 
involved in the production of the environmental context reinstatement 
effect.
4.2. Familiarity.
However, the interpretation of the experimental results may be 
compromised by the alteration of the intermediate task. It could be 
argued that if the visual matching task was more demanding than the 
memorisation task, subjects would have comparatively less time or fewer 
processing resources to attend to the room environment. If this was the 
case there could be a difference in the familiarity of the recall 
environments between SF and DF conditions biased in favour of the SF 
condition. The unfamiliarity of the DF condition could be the variable 
causing the observed effect rather than the match or mis-match between 
presentation and 'test environments. Although argument alone cannot 
exclude the possibility that the relative demands of the memorisation and 
visual matching tasks made the familiarisation procedure ineffective,
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one piece of evidence can be presented which suggests that this is very 
unlikely to have occurred. After the experimental session subjects were 
informally debriefed. During this time all persons questioned reported 
that they found the memorisation task more difficult or demanding than 
the visual matching task. Providing the greater ease of carrying out the 
visual task reflects the fact that less time or fewer processing 
resources are utilised, subjects will not be prevented by the task from 
becoming as familiar with their environment as subjects employed 
memorising the words. In such circumstances there will be no systematic 
familiarity bias to confound interpretation of the experimental results. 
However, as was implied at the outset, to ensure the unequivocal nature 
of the effect and its interpretation, familiarity will again be examined 
in the next experiment.
4.3. Presentation-test gap.
The other procedural alteration to Smith's experiment mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter: a decrease in the amount of time spent in the 
waiting area, may contribute to the explanation of why subjects' recalls 
were so much higher in this experiment compared with those in Smith's 
experiment. P-item recalls were scored from a total set of 60 words. The 
average percentage recall across all conditions was 38*/. In Smith's 
experiment the recall was scored from a total set of 90 words, with the 
average being 22*/. It was said that the five minute difference in the 
presentation-recall gap between experiments may contribute to the 
explanation, but from what is known of the rate of forgetting, it does 
not seem likely that such a difference in recall can be attributed wholly 
to the difference between presentation-recall gaps of 11 and 16 minutes.
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4.4. Presentation time and encoding strategies.
Two other factors could have contributed to the higher recalls in the 
present experiment. The first of these was the additional presentation 
time of each word caused by the intransigence of the interval timer. The 
second factor was the use of mnemonics by subjects. Again during the 
informal debriefing, many high scoring subjects reported having applied 
a strategy such as forming a mental image, or composing a story from the 
words. Subjects with low scores often reported such activities as “just 
sat and watched the words appear". This variety of different encoding 
strategies and their consequence on recall is reflected in the within 
group variance or error term. In Smith's experiment this value was equal 
to 37.13, while in the present experiment it was 55.02. An F-test was 
carried out to compare the two values (F4 2,27 = 1,46, p = 0.151) and 
although they did not differ significantly, it still represents a 
sizeable increase in variance.
4.5. The meaning of the indices of power and degree of association.
Despite the increase in error variance, power analyses revealed that the 
present experiment was operating at a greater power than Smith's 
experiment {1 -B = 0.4).* In this situation two other factors could have 
produced such a difference; the magnitude of treatment effects and the 
sample size. The omega squared value: a measure of the magnitude of
treatment effects, suggested a greater effect was observed in Smith’s
2
experiment (W = 0.126). As a greater treatment effect would serve to
4 Although Smith does not report power nor omega squared indices, they 
can be calculated from the data that is provided.
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increase the power of an analysis, it would seem that the greater power 
of the present experiment is attributable to its larger sample size (48 
cf. 30). However, in common with power analysis , the omega squared value 
is a ratio employing the variation in sample scores. All else being 
constant, both power and omega squared increase with decreases in sample 
variation. As a result these indices cannot be regarded as objective 
measures between analyses. In situations where comparisons are to be 
attempted care must be exercised in the interpretation of the measures 
and only a rough guide can be hoped for. In the present comparison it 
would seem that the experiments are differentiated primarily by the 
greater variation in the present experiment.
Beyond this, Glass and Hakastian (1969) and Dooling and Danks (1975), 
have argued that the omega squared measure is only appropriate for 
random effects models, while Carrol and Nordholm (1975) and Lane and 
Dunlap (1978) have claimed that omega squared tends to overestimate the 
treatment effect. Carrol and Nordholm found this overestimation was 
most pronounced when sample sizes were of the order of 5 to 10 subjects 
per condition. However, they did feel that the calculation of omega 
squared is of value when significant F-values are obtained and when the 
sample size is larger.
The omega value obtained from this analysis is useful in that it gives 
a rough idea as to the extent of environmental context match/mismatch at 
recall. Cohen (1977) provides a "scale" by which the size of these 
values may be judged. He suggests that a small effect in psychology (due 
to high error terms normally encountered) is reflected by an omega 
squared value of 0.01. A medium effect is reflected by a value of 0.06 
and a large effect is reflected by a value of 0.15 or more. So the 
environment context effect observed here falls into the medium to large
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category of magnitude of effect.
4.6. ANOVA of P.R and F-item recall.
The latter ANOVA revealed a main effect of word type with items from the 
original stimulus list that were included in the recognition test, being 
best recalled. Next best recall was of stimuli items which were 
presented only as part of the original list, while worst recall was of 
recognition test filler items. The average recognition score was 8.06, 
with an average of 0.42 false alarms. This would suggest that the 
pattern of word type recall could be explained in terms of a high degree 
of learning of stimuli items at original presentation, followed by a 
second presentation of some of these items which because of their high 
degree of learning subjects could easily recognise, without having to pay 
a great deal of attention to the filler items. The consequences for 
recall were that the second presentation of the items in the recognition 
test incremented their recall above that of P-items, whereas the degree 
of attention afforded the filler items could not result in an ability to 
recall them as well as the other two item types.
The effect on word type supports the view expressed in the introduction 
(section 1.3.) that the processing of P, R and F-items would be more 
varied than the processing of P-items alone. But perhaps more 
importantly, this in conjunction with the lack of any other effect 
approaching significance, sheds some light on the discrepancy in the 
effect of the presentation-recall environment match/ recall environment 
familiarity factor, between the two ANOVAs. Specifically, it suggests 
that the inclusion of R and F items increments the overall experimental 
variance such that it masks any other effect. Certainly such a 
determination is not in conflict with the evidence discussed in relation
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to power and degree of association measures- However, as will be seen 
in future chapters, there may be another factor present when R and F items 
are included in the analysis, that exerts an influence to reduce the 
degree of environmental context effect observed.
4.7. In prospect.
In the next two experiments most of the topics and points touched on in 
this discussion will be returned to in a more formal manner. For the 
moment, on the basis of the evidence from the experiments reported in 
chapter two as well as from this seminal experiment, the view that 
environmental context effects are distinct psychological phenomena 
raises the questions of why and how they occur. The next few chapters 
consider attempts which have been made to answer these questions.
CHAPTER FOUR
THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVE AND CRITERIA
1. Introduction.
Accounts of context and accounts incorporating context have been 
developed throughout the history of psychology. In any assessment of the 
utility and validity of an account it is bound to be the prevailing 
criteria of such endeavours that are brought to bear. In what seems to 
be a period of transition in psychology, it is appropriate to consider 
what these criteria are and are likely to be, before any of the accounts 
are presented and assessed.
2. The Theory Of Psychological Information-Processing.
2.1. Origins.
The "information-processing" approach to the study of psychology has 
been apparent since the mid-nineteen-fifties, but it seems only from the 
mid-seventies that a proper awareness of the essential nature of this 
approach became evident. Allport (1980) has summarised the historical 
route through which the approach has been developed.
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The basis of the approach: the analogy between brain and computer,
initially focused attention on comparisons involving features which were 
a consequence of digital computer design. Many ideas in psychology can 
be traced to this type of comparison. For example, short-term memory is 
often viewed as the central processor which mediates access to long-term 
memory. Long-term memory itself is often regarded as a passive 
representation through which the central processor must search.
Although Allport identifies another source, it seems that one 
consequence of this structuralist approach would be the view that 
information processing is carried out in discrete stages. Typically, 
this sort of analysis has taken the form of flow-charts tracing the path 
of the stimulus through the system. Neisser (1976), presented a summary 
diagram of the information processing approach to perception and 
cognition which; whether intended or not, includes one of the best 
parodies of such pseudo-explanative accounts (see figure 1.1. ).
------------  j More | j Still More |
| Processing | ----> | Processing |  > | Processing |
Figure 4.1. Part of Neisser’s summary of the information processing 
approach (from Neisser, 1976).
The basic criticisms of such analyses are that drawing an arrow between 
boxes does not explain how a certain piece of information causes the 
appropriate process(es) to operate on it, nor does assigning a label to 
a box sufficiently explain how information is transformed from one type 
to another. *
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As process models were seen to be required to provide explanations in 
psychology, a greater communality with the discipline of artificial 
intelligence (AI) began to arise. As AI was involved in developing 
systems doing
things that would require intelligence if done by men (Minsky,
1 968, p.v)
there had always been a certain overlap in interests. However, with the 
requirement of process models to provide explanations in psychology and 
the consequent need to be able to describe processes in detail, the 
adoption of programming languages; which do this in computing, seems a 
natural progression. At present this notation appears to be the best 
candidate in the attempt to unambiguously represent mental activity. 
Whether or not it will remain so depends on the demonstration of 
inadequacy in the notational system (rather than in any particular 
process so described or the hardware it is implemented on) and/or the 
development of some superior notational system.
2.2. Current conception.
The assumption presently underlying the development of the information- 
processing approach is that both the brain and computer are essentially 
symbol manipulators. Two related consequences of considering the brain 
as a symbol manipulator are that it gives a new perspective to the dualist 
separation of mind and body (Boden, 1977) and brings mind into the 
physical universe (Newell, 1981).
However, the analogy between brain and computer does not mean that the 
two are identical. Too often, a distorted picture of the attempt to 
comprehend by applying the computational analogy is perceived, if this
137
point is not fully appreciated. It is important to remember that the 
similarity of symbol manipulation is a function of a particular type of 
abstraction. Therefore, the real value of the computer metaphor in 
psychology is not in the computer, but in the nature of the abstracted 
computational processes that can be implemented on it.
2.3. Forms of abstraction.
David Marr (eg. Harr, 1977; Marr, 1982; Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Harr & 
Poggio, 1977) in his development of the metatheory of information- 
processing has concluded that there are in fact three levels; more
correctly types of abstraction, at which an information-processing task
must be understood before its operation is fully comprehended.
The first type of abstraction is what Harr terms the computational
theory. This characterises the underlying nature of the process. The
goal of the process is identified, as are the rules that define the 
constraints that the process must conform to. Harr regards the goal of 
the process as corresponding to what it does and its constraints why it 
does it. The next type of abstraction is in terms of the representations 
and algorithms that constitute a process • and concerns how the 
computational theory of the process may be implemented, while the third 
type of abstraction is in terms of the physical realisation of the 
process in the particular information-processing device.
Although the difference between theory and representation and algorithm 
(sometimes expressed as theory and implementation) has been noted by 
other writers (eg. Palmer, 1978; Winograd, 1977; see section 2.5.), as 
yet no one has specified the nature of the different abstractions in such 
detail as Harr.
138
In addition to specifying the nature of these three forms of abstraction, 
Marr ( 1977) also distinguishes between type 1 and type 2 theories of 
information-processing. Type 1 theories are obtained from processes 
which can be abstracted in the terms of a computational theory. Type 2 
theories are obtained from processes which can only be abstracted in 
terms of their representations and algorithms, as their interaction is 
their simplest description. The determining factor is the modularity of 
the process: how independent the sub-processes are of the other sub­
processes as they operate (Marr, 1982).
Marr has identified modularity as a principle of information-processing 
design. If a process is not designed in a modular fashion it is extremely 
difficult to modify. Due to the interactive nature of non-modular 
processes, small changes can have deleterious repercussions throughout 
the whole process. Therefore, modification of such a process is a 
complex and effortful undertaking. Consequently, for the type of 
development of biological information-processing systems conceived by 
evolutionary theory, a modular structure would be much preferred.
2.4. Philosophical position.
An important consequence of appreciating that there are different types 
of abstraction possible in the analysis of information processing tasks 
is that it reveals the physical realisation (eg. physiological 
mechanisms in psychology), representation and algorithm, and 
computational theory as different conceptualisations of the same events. 
The different forms of abstraction describing these events are imposed 
by us in our attempt to comprehend and have no other sort of reality. 
This means that the physiological mechanisms are the manifestation of 
computational theory or representation and algorithm, when the terms of
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reference are physiological. When the terms of reference are 
representations and algorithms or computational theory, the events that 
an attempt is being made to describe have not changed, only the manner
of abstracting these events has altered.
The types of abstraction possible are not restricted to the three 
mentioned and some types of abstraction may be more or less related. 
However, it is not always possible to reduce or build one type of 
description from that of another. As the different types of abstraction 
describe the same events, but in different terms of conception there is 
no requirement for a veridical relationship.
2.5. The value of computational theory.
As the form that a representation takes determines the information which 
is made explicit and that which is made implicit, so the different 
descriptive conceptualisations of events will have greater and lesser 
degrees of utility for different purposes. Marr (1982) has argued and 
experience indicates that for the purposes of understanding, the most 
important type of abstraction is that of the computational theory. As 
he points out it is easier to understand if one comprehends the problem 
while examining the operations which attempt to solve it. An appropriate
example of this is the way computer programs tend to be written and
certainly are thought of, in high level languages which preserve the goal 
orientated aspect of the task, rather than in machine code which is 
closer to the physical realisation of the processes.
Stephen Palmer (1978) is another writer who has attempted to present a
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metatheory of representation and algorithm1 in the hope that this will 
provide a framework within which processes can be understood. He argues 
that it is necessary to have a conception of what the limits of different 
representations and their associated algorithms are and consequently 
what functional differences exist between them. In effect what Palmer 
is doing is abstracting the process in terms of what it can do, or the 
goals it can achieve. However, Palmer is not interested in defining the 
constraints within which a process must operate. He is more concerned 
with determining the inherent constraints of any particular 
representation and algorithm. His objective is to be able to identify 
or eliminate candidates for particular jobs.
Although both Marr and Palmer have utilised similar types of abstraction, 
the products of their efforts are somewhat different. Whereas Marr’s 
specification of the nature of the particular types of abstraction has 
contributed to the development of the theory of information processing, 
Palmers informal; perhaps intuitive, use of such abstractions has 
achieved what is essentially a categorisation of process ability, rather 
than a metatheory of representation and algorithm.
In a similar vein, Winograd has discussed the relationship between theory 
and programming. However, Winograd does not elaborate on the purpose or 
requirement of theory, but instead focuses on the role of alternative 
implementations as a means of providing the information from which a 
theory may be developed.
1 Marr and Palmer use slightly different labels to convey the same 
meaning. Marr's processes require representations and algorithms 
if they are to be implemented. Palmer's representation depends on 
processes (Marr’s algorithm) to be implemented.
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2.6. The need for computational theory.
In terms of Harr's distinctions, it is the information-processing task 
conceived in terms of the computational theory that is most novel and the 
terms of the representation and algorithm, and physical realisation 
which are most familiar. In common with the majority of workers involved 
with information-processing systems, psychologists' descriptions of 
processes have been presented mostly in terms of representations and 
algorithms, with some touching on the underlying physical realisation: 
the physiology, neuroanatomy, etc. Indeed, prior to the development of 
information-processing metatheory, process models were defined in terms 
of representations and algorithms.
The usual argument presented to support and encourage the use of process 
models as a vehicle for theoretical expression and development is that 
they provide psychology with three important assets. By adopting the 
notation utilised in programming, psychological processing can be 
represented unambiguously, a criterion by which the sufficiency of these 
ideas can be assessed is provided: if a model of psychological processing 
is to be a viable possibility it should when programmed be able to carry 
out the task or set of tasks it claims to describe, and in running a 
computer simulation, previously unrecognised features of a model's 
operation are revealed; particularly with less tractable models.
However, despite the obvious theoretical and practical advantages 
afforded by the construction of this type of model, some concern has been 
expressed by its very advocates regarding the product of such an 
approach. One problem associated with information-processing tasks is 
that a great variety of representations and algorithms can produce the 
same result. Different representations and algorithms can carry out the
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same task and any combination which mirrors human performance may, or may 
not be equivalent to that employed by a human or animal subject. Newell 
( 1 973) touched on this when he expressed concern with regard to the 
dichotomous nature of hypothesis construction and the proliferation of 
models (in terms of representations and algorithms) to accommodate data 
previously thought to contradict a hypothesis. Indeed, Anderson (1976) 
has gone so far as to argue and attempt to demonstrate the impossibility 
of determining which type of representation and algorithm is employed. 
The use of computer models would seem to have replaced ambiguity with 
irreducible variety. But is such a situation really unique?
In all sciences there are alternative explanations of empirical 
phenomena. The fundamental purpose of the scientific method is to 
identify the account which accrues most support. That this should be 
more difficult in psychology is not very surprising. It may be the case 
that present experimental techniques are not able to discern between 
serious candidate models, but at the moment it would seem that the range 
of potential candidates has not been identified. Perhaps in the light 
of greater knowledge of information-processing attained through the 
effort of identifying this range, methods of comparison will not only be 
available, but fairly obvious.
However, along with the need to explore alternative representations and 
algorithms, there is also the requirement for some method of accumulating 
what is learned. It is also in this role that the abstraction of 
computational theory is vitally important. Newell's (1973) main concern 
was that there was no accumulation of knowledge. In its place was an 
abundance of alternatives. A similar concern over the lack of "unifying 
principles" has come from Johnson-Laird (1978). Such unifying 
principles are a consequence of a different type of conception. They are
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not to be found in descriptions of representations and algorithms, but 
rather have to be abstracted from those descriptions. It is the 
abstraction of computational theory which is the critically important 
conception of an information-processing task and it is in these terms 
that scientific principles of such processes will be formulated (Marr, 
1982 ) .
2-7. Computational theory and process implementation.
The development of the theory or metatheory of information-processing 
has affected the argument favouring the expression of theoretical ideas 
in terms of process models. The most obvious consequence of applying 
this rationale is that the benefit of revealing hidden features of a 
model's operation by running it on a computer is seen to be an exposition 
of an erroneous computational theory, or the use of more general 
representations and algorithms than are required for the process 
described by the computational theory.
With the appreciation of the additional abstraction of computational 
theory, the importance of the programming notation is complemented 
rather than degraded. It would seem that for comprehension and 
theoretical purposes the computational theory is most important. For 
more "practically" oriented purposes, knowledge of the way in which 
process(es) are implemented is important. In such circumstances a 
description of the process(es) in terms of representations and 
algorithms is required. But for a complete understanding of a 
psychological process it must be able to be described in all terms of 
abstraction.
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As was mentioned earlier, the sufficiency of a process implementation 
although supporting a correspondence between the model and reality, does 
not mean that this is the method employed by the system being modelled. 
However, fewer models should operate satisfactorily within the 
stipulates of the computational theory. By applying the computational 
theory and eliminating potential candidates, the task of finding the 
appropriate implementation is made slightly easier.
2.8. Computational theory and control processes.
Rabbitt (1979) has criticised models of information-processing because 
of their failure to describe the way in which these processes change with 
time. Rabbitt attributes the blame for this state of affairs to the 
omission of control processes in information-processing models. 
However, part of this problem may be due to the previously unrecognised 
fact that the process models which have been presented were not whole 
models. These models have lacked the abstraction of the computational 
theory and due to the relationship between this and control processes, 
have made the description of the latter extremely difficult.
It is from the account of the computational theory that the constraints 
on a process are defined. Knowledge of the limits and requirements of 
a process is a prerequisite to the determination of effective control 
processes. Although not often thought of in such terms, control 
processes attempt to allow the process(es) to fulfill their purpose or 
attain their goal. When expressed in such terms it can be seen that 
control processes require a computational theory to provide the detail 
of their job specification.
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3. Biological Considerations In Psychological Theory.
3.1. Introduction.
The evolutionary requirements of biological systems emphasised the value 
of modular process design. This is one example of the benefit of 
considering the particular types of requirements of such systems, as 
attempts are made to model and understand them.
3.2. Purpose of the system.
Donald Norman (1982) has discussed in some detail the differences between 
animate systems and the type of inanimate systems typically described by 
cognitive scientists, be they philosophers, computer scientists, or 
psychologists. Norman points out that while the type of inanimate system 
designed by cognitive scientists has as its main function the doing of 
the defined cognitive task, in contrast, the animate system has as its 
main function the business of living. This can involve a variety of 
tasks such as obtaining food, protecting from physical injury, 
establishing relationships, reproducing and looking after the young. 
Given such different objectives, Norman suggests that the generally held 
view that cognitive operation is that which biological functioning 
sustains is actually back to front. Instead he argues that cognitive 
operation developed as a tool to aid the animate system with the problem 
of survival. Norman raises the possibility that intellectual thought is 
an artifact of the production of a larger intelligent component; 
oriented toward more fundamental objectives such as those described 
above, attaining some critical mass which provides it with sufficient
computational power to determine its own direction.
Irrespective of the extent to which one concurs with Norman's views, the 
point is made that when considering any task, it is important to regard 
its psychological performance in relation to the types of problem that 
animate systems have evolved to cope with. The view that psychological 
performance is dependent upon, or is derived from processes which share 
the fundamental, aspect of ecological utility rationalises the use of data 
from a variety of different sources; such as natural and clinical 
observation and experiments investigating list learning, when similar 
types of psychological problems are being tackled. A consequence of this 
view is that the type of models that psychologists should be trying to 
formulate should reflect this aspect of cognitive functioning. Models 
which can only carry out one artificial task are extremely unlikely to 
include processes which replicate those utilised in psychological 
performance.
4. Some Modelling Considerations Acquired From Experience.
4.1. Structure.
Although primarily a product of cognition conceived in terms of the 
particular task requirements which was criticised by Norman, much 
research has indicated the advantage of psychological models which do not 
rigidly partition aspects of information-processing. When the purpose 
of a system has been to simulate human behaviour the distinctions in
2 This has similarities with the Colebrook hypothesis (Rutherford & 
Hamilton, 1900), which was originally presented to account for a 
great deal of indiscriminate and contradictory human behaviour.
terms of the quasi-independent topics of perception, learning, language
and memory have blurred. The benefit of a system which allows
information present in one domain to relate to information in another is
intuitively obvious and practically demonstrable, yet the value of such
an ability is emphasised when the higher order purpose of the system is
considered. For animate systems in particular the capacity to utilise
information collected from a variety of operational sources has
3
significant consequences for survival.
4.2. Basic process.
One interesting feature of the type of models which unite different types 
of performance or aspects of information-processing is that they tend to 
do so by equating a variety of different tasks on some basic problem. 
This problem seems to be the determination of what is being presented to 
the system, either as an external stimulus event or as an internally 
generated entity, such as an intended movement or a puzzle solution. In 
all cases determination is made on the basis of information present in 
the system. Items corresponding to the representation are made 
available to the system and their degree of correspondence is assessed. 
The basic goal of such process(es) is to map information into existing 
representational structures.
A variety of different conceptions of information-processing such as 
proposed by Moore and Newell (1973), Minsky (1975), Bobrow and Norman 
(1975), Bobrow and Winograd’s (1977), Schank and Abelson (1977),
3 There is an interesting parallel between this and the comparative 
lack of interaction of information from different sensory modali­
ties in lower animals (Carlson, 1 980, p.7).
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Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) and Sanford and Garrod (1981) have converged 
in agreement on this view of the initial stages of processing. One of 
the advantages of this type of system is the wealth of 
information/processes that are potentially available to take part in any 
operation. There is of course, a direct relationship with context in 
that semantic context is often regarded as being the representational 
structure into which the presented information is mapped.
5. Summary Of Criteria And Considerations For A Psychological 
Account.
5.1. The form of characterisation.
At present influenced by a greater understanding of the nature of 
information-processing: through the development of computer science in
general and AI in particular and its relationship with psychology, slowly 
psychologists are changing their criteria of what constitutes an 
adequate explanation of psychological phenomena. It is now appreciated 
that information-processing can be described in several terms of 
abstraction. Of greatest value to theoretical development and in 
eliciting comprehension is the abstraction of computational theory. The 
abstraction in terms of representations and algorithms is necessary if 
a description is to be implemented and if what is normally considered to 
be psychological processes are to be specified. The abstraction of a 
process in terms of its physical realisation with human and animal 
subjects involves those descriptions employed by the neurosciences. 
Accounts in terms of each form of abstraction are necessary for a 
complete understanding of information-processing, but to answer 
different questions, different abstractions will be more or less useful.
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5.2. The type of system.
In determining the purpose and form of a psychological process, it is 
important to bear in mind the requirements of an animate system. 
Processes specifically devised to meet artificial task demands are less 
likely to model processes used by the animate system, than are 
modifications of ecologically valid processes which meet the artificial 
task demands.
5.3. Theory development.
With the framework to abstract information-processing now available, the 
development of "unifying principles" seems more likely. Although this 
type of development has not been made explicit, there has been of late 
a general agreement on the need for large knowledge structures into which 
information is mapped as an initial process in "intelligent" 
functioning.
CHAPTER FIVE
PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT PHENOMENA
1. Introduction.
The notion of context has been utilised in many different accounts of 
human behaviour, but few of these have actually been attempts to explain 
the empirical phenomena of environmental context. Most of the accounts 
which have used the concept of context in their elaboration have done so 
in an attempt to explain more general aspects of behaviour. However, 
despite the differences in focus, this latter type of account should 
still contribute to an explanation of the way in which context exerts its 
effects, even if that contribution is only in the form of a simple 
inversion of the account.
2. The Phenomena Of Environmental Context.
2.1. Summary of environmental context effects.
Before considering how well different accounts accommodate and explain 
the environmental context phenomena detailed in chapter two, it is worth 
summarising the basic effects which have been observed across the 
different experiments employing a variety of paradigms and types of
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environmental context. Table 5.1. summarises these phenomena.
PHENOMENA LABEL
1. Greater free recall in reinstated Free-recall effect,
learning context.
2. Greater cued-recall in reinstated Cued-recall effect,
learning context, but to a lesser
extent than 1.
3. No disadvantage to recognition Recognition effect,
outside learning context.
4. Greater free-recall with more Multiple context effect,
learning contexts.
5. Greater free-recall outside Self-generated context
learning context if subject effect.
thinks of learning context.
6. Less interference between infor- Interference effect,
mation sets if they are presen­
ted in different contexts.
7. Greater ability to judge periods Temporal-judgement effect,
of time when they are distingui­
shed by a change in context.
Table 5.1. Summary of basic environmental context phenomena.
2.2. Interference effects.
Although seven effects have been listed, it is worth pointing out that 
only six have been demonstrated as empirical phenomena. As yet, 
interference has been forwarded only as an "explanation*' of reductions 
in correct remembrance. Bilodeau and Schlosberg (1951), Greenspoon and 
Ranyard (1957) and Dallett and Wilcox (1968) have all carried out 
experiments purporting to reduce interference by introducing a change in 
environmental context between information sets (ie. word-lists). 
However, none of these papers contain any report of the empirical 
phenomenon of interference: intrusions. Only the number of correct
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responses and/or the number of relearning trials is reported. 
Consequently, it remains to be demonstrated that changes in context 
reduce interference. Therefore, subsequent consideration of a model’s 
ability to account for environmental context phenomena will be 
restricted to the other six effects, although an account of interference 
is provided in chapter six (section 2.1.).
2.3. Temporal judgement effects.
As different accounts of the environmental context effects are 
presented, it should become evident that the temporal judgement effects 
reported by Block are really a consequence of processes which utilise 
context information retrieved with nominal entities. As these processes 
are likely to be particular to this function, it is not intended to 
examine this aspect of the effect. The main consideration will be the 
way in which such nominal entities are retrieved, although the ability 
of a system to provide context information which could input to processes 
providing temporal judgements will be discussed.
3. Pre-cognitive Accounts.
3.1. Carr and McGeoch.
The first psychological accounts of environmental context effects were 
presented in the terms of stimulus-response associationism. One of the 
first investigators of environmental context phenomena Harvey Carr, 
states this position quite succinctly.
As a rule any activity can be most readily reinstated in that 
situation in which it was acquired because the two must 
necessarily become directly associated (Carr, 1925 p.251).
McGeoch’s (1942) explanation of why forgetting occurs, although firmly 
based in associationism also, began to describe some of the mechanics 
underlying this facet of memory performance. McGeoch postulated a three 
factor account of forgetting, the factors being:
i) interference by intervening activities, 
ii) altered stimulating conditions, 
iii) inadequate set at the time of recall.
The factor of most interest here is that of altered stimulating
conditions. McGeoch suggested that any stimulus defined by an 
experimenter is the nominal stimulus only and that the actual functional 
stimulus can include other features of; the environment, the subject's 
state and, mental activity at the time of learning. It is this whole 
functional stimulus which becomes associated with a response. McGeoch 
cites Carr (1925) when he states that,
retention will be higher the more numerous and complete are the
stimuli earlier associated with the activity and now present
again at the time of measurement of retention... Alteration 
or removal of these stimuli at the time of recall will be 
correlated with a failure of recall (McGeoch, 1942 p.501).
One of the main developments in McGeoch* s account of the effect of 
altering stimulating conditions from that of Carr's (1925), was the 
formal distinction between the nominal and functional stimulus. 
Although Guthrie (1935) at least, had implied in his discussions of 
learning that a single response could be associated with a combination 
of stimuli or stimulus elements (eg. Guthrie, 1935 p.28), McGeoch made 
this notion explicit.
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3.2. Appraisal.
In common with most associationist-behaviourist writers, Carr (1917, 
1925) provides little more than detailed and formalised descriptions of 
situations, rather than descriptions of the psychological processes 
which give rise to the behaviour observed in such situations. Although 
McGeoch (1942) makes an important point explicit with regard to the 
nature of the information encoded as the stimuli, his account still has 
more to do with the associationist-behaviourist style, than it does with 
the type of account now regarded as approaching an explanation.
4. Anderson And Bower.
4.1. Introduction.
The idea that a stimulus may have a variety of encoding permutations has 
recurred in many models of learning and memory. Bower (1972a), Estes 
(1955; 1959), Madigan (1969), Martin (1968; 1971; 1973), Melton (1970) 
and Tulving (1968) all utilise the concept of stimulus variability at 
encoding in their accounts of psychological processes.
In all of these models some particular notion of context is utilised to 
produce the variation in stimulus encoding. In most cases, this notion 
of context is most comparable to what has been described as semantic 
interpretation (eg. Madigan, 1969; Martin, 1968; 1971; 1973; Melton, 
1970). However, Bower (1972a) formulated an account of stimulus 
encoding variability which is less restrictive in its notion of context, 
regarding it not only as a product of semantic interpretation, but also 
as what has been termed here as state and environmental information. 
Bower recognises the contribution of other models of stimulus encoding
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variability; particularly Estes (1959) and Martin (1968), to his 
account.
4.2. Encoding variability.
In his exposition of the model, Bower suggests that a nominal stimulus 
is encoded by a variety of operators. The product of each operator is 
a stimulus element. An encoded stimulus is represented by a pattern, or 
particular set of stimulus elements. It is in the determination of the 
probability of each operator being active and so encoding a stimulus 
element that the context acts (see figure 5.1. ).
nominal
stimulus
sampling
probabilities
encoding
process
stimulus
elements
associated
responses
operator #1
R6
-►operator #2(XQH )■
operator #n
contextual
influences
Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of Bower's notion of encoding 
variability (from Bower, 1972a).
One of the advantages of Bower's model compared to those of Madigan, 
Martin and Melton is that it details how similar semantic interpretations 
still can differ in their representation (see Crowder, 1976, p.288). The 
nature of the encoded representation of the stimulus is not as absolute 
as in previous accounts of stimulus encoding variability. Bower also 
suggests that each response item can be another cognitive element such
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as an idea or concept. The idea or concept could represent membership 
to a particular set or list. In this latter case, Bower would term the 
idea or concept a list marker or tag. It is with the association of the 
group of elements representing the nominal stimulus to the list marker 
that Bower's (1972a) account meets up with that of Anderson and Bower's 
(1972; 1974) accounts of list item recognition and recall.
4.3. FRAN (free recall in an associative network).
Anderson and Bower (1972) postulate that at encoding stimuli items are 
associated with context via list markers. These list markers represent 
the relationship between each occurrence of an item and the context 
prevailing at its presentation. The context is assumed to be composed 
of a variable and almost infinite number of elements with which there is 
a probability that any particular set of these elements will become 
associated to the presented item via the list marker (see figure 5.2.).
At recognition, a decision is made as to whether an item was previously 
presented by assessing how much evidence there is for the item belonging 
to the list in question. This is done by determining the number of 
contextual elements associated to the item's list marker which are also 
members of the prescribed contextual set. This set is identified by 
special list markers which identify the "prototypical" representation of 
the list-N contextual elements. It is with these elements that a 
comparison is made with the possible list-N items' associated contextual 
elements. A signal detection analysis is proposed to carry out the 
decision process on the basis of probability distributions which 
'■**. describe the difference between list items and non-list items.
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Words list
markers
contextual
elements
{B
{C>
list i 
elements
list j 
elements
Figure 5.2. Schematic diagram of the associations between words,list 
markers and context (from Anderson & Bower, 1972).
This describes how potential set items are assessed as members of a 
prescribed set or list, but one of the more eloquent parts of Anderson 
and Bower's model is the provision of a method which produces items for 
assessment. To begin with, they assume that an associative memory 
network already exists. As items are presented, their representations 
in this network are activated. From each of these nodes there are a 
variety of associative paths to other nodes representing other items. As 
the set of items are presented, any pathways between set items are tagged 
with a list marker. The consequence of this is that at recall a route 
can be followed through the associative memory network between nodes 
representing items. This route identifies items as potential members of 
the required set. Items so generated are then assessed for set
membership at the recognition phase as previously described.
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4.4. HAM (human associative memory).
The model just described, presented by Anderson and Bower (1972), was 
embodied in the computer program FRAN (free recall in an associative 
network). Their 1974 update of this account was based on HAM (human 
associative memory; Anderson and Bower, 1973) which had as its main focus 
memory for language rather than single words or items. HAM utilises a 
propositional representation and distinguishes between words and 
concepts as well as specifying the semantic relationship between 
concepts. HAM parses each proposition into a tree-like structure. This 
representation can be broken down into two sub-trees; one embodying the 
context and the other the fact. The context node is further divided into 
location and time nodes, while the fact node is also decomposable to 
subject and predicate nodes. The last division necessary to describe is 
that of the predicate node into relation and object nodes. The nodes are 
defined by the nature of the links between them which describe the 
semantic relationship. Near the bottom of the tree are the concept nodes 
which are connected to particular instance words. These nodes represent 
the particular idea that each subject has of each concept and are assumed 
to lie in memory beforehand (see figure 5.3.).
Such a propositionally based model is able to represent explicitly the 
complex information structures that Anderson and Bower's earlier 
formalisation could only imply. Previously, the list marker of dog; now 
represented by the concept node j, would have been associated to a group 
of contextual elements. In the HAM system the implied contents of this 
group of contextual elements can be explicitly represented by the 
contextual propositions such as "stomach gurgling", "I study dog " and 
"list-N".
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w i ri w k ti
I imagine
Wt TI wt ri
study dog
Wi TI
list-N
1 mI
Wi tI W* fl
stomach gurgle
i i
wt ri wi n
chase cat
Figure 5.3. Propositions formed in memory after the presentation of 
the word dog (from Anderson & Bower, 1974).
Anderson and Bower explain how, on the basis of the type of information
"V
encoded in the memory representation, different reasons for believing 
that an item is one of the required set will result. Retrieval in the 
HAM system depends primarily upon a MATCH process. This process attempts 
to correlate two information structures; the probe and a piece of the 
associative memory structure. Essentially the probe is a representation 
in the system of the question being asked of memory, with its exact 
structure determined by the nature of the question. The MATCH process 
identifies terminal nodes in memory similar to those in the probe and 
attempts to locate associative paths which connect these terminal nodes 
with the same type of associative relation that those of the probe are 
connected with. The MATCH process tries to provide the part of memory 
which gives the greatest match with the probe structure. This type of
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memory access is effective if a comparison between the probe and some 
part of the memory system is possible. If such a comparison cannot be 
made because certain propositions which the probe consists of have not 
been encoded in memory, an answer may still be able to be given on the 
basis of an inference from the information that has been encoded in 
memory. For example, Anderson and Bower (1974) suggest that a persistent 
noise or any other occurrence or aspect of the experiment could be 
encoded along with the nominal stimuli items. If the subject encodes 
that such an event happened during the experiment then an inference can 
be made that the word associated with this event was a presented nominal 
stimuli item and so therefore a member of the sought after set. The 
system can accommodate different strategies to assess the evidence of 
presentation. The confidence with which a subject asserts that an item 
was presented during the experiment will be a function of the type and 
amount of information the subject can obtain with respect to the item in 
question.
4.5. Appraisal.
Anderson and Bower provide the first account of the effects described in 
chapter two that approaches the requirements of the "ideal" model 
described earlier. Although Anderson and Bower's account extends over 
the life of two models, both* are claimed to be functionally equivalent 
at the level of analysis set by the former (Anderson & Bower, 1974, 
p. 409 ). The major problem for both the FRAN and HAH models is to 
accommodate the different environmental context effects with recall and 
recognition. In both systems the same context information is used in the 
retrieval and recognition phases. As a result, it is difficult to see 
how context dependent recognition could be unimpaired, while context 
dependent recall is impaired when the test environment does not match
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with the learning environment.
It is this inability of "two process" models (also Kintsch, 1970) to 
account for the difference between environmental context effects in 
recall and recognition, that led Smith, Glenberg and Bjork (1978) to 
conclude that Tulving and Watkin’s (1973) view of recall and recognition 
employing essentially similar retrieval processes could account for the 
data more succinctly.
It is rather ironic that while Anderson and Bower’s model seems as though 
it could cope with the more complex phenomena of environmental context 
such as multiple context effects (through the creation of a larger number 
of prototype list markers) and self-generated context (through the 
operation of the probe creation part of the MATCH procedure in HAM), it 
fails on the basis of its fundamental method of deciding which items are 
to be sought after and when obtained, which are required. However, while 
HAM can provide a basis for the explanation of temporal judgement 
effects; as temporality is included as part of the context ''information 
recorded, to account for the effects reported by Block would require 
particular methods of encoding temporal information and assessing it 
which are quite different to the processes employed in HAM.*
1 For a criticism of Anderson and Bower's computational approach see 
Kolers and Smythe (1984) and Allport (1984).
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5. Norman And Rumelhart’s System For Perception And Memory.
5.1. Introduction.
The LNR research group were also early proponents of propositional 
representations. Indeed, the model of cognition presented by Rumelhart, 
Lindsay and Norman (1972) and subsequent research presented by Norman, 
Rumelhart and LNR research group (1975) has much in common with the HAM 
propositional system. A forerunner of these models: a model of
perception and memory, presented by Norman and Rumelhart (1970) also 
makes explicit use of context as a component in its operation.
5.2. System description.
As part of the first semantic analysis in this model, context is attached 
to the components of the individual memories; the attributes. The 
attributes are already present in the memory store, so only the context 
cues are actually "novel" introductions. The pattern of attributes 
attached to by context cues defines the items presented (see figure
5.4. ).
b
h l
o
Figure 5.4. Memory representation employing context markers on each 
attribute (from Norman 8c Rumelhart, 1970).
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At retrieval, using whatever information is presented, the system tries 
to identify the appropriate "other half": context or attributes. In 
recognition the subject is given a test item whose attributes are then 
checked against the context they are associated with. If an item in 
memory is found with a criterion number of similar attributes 
corresponding to a consistent context (or contexts), this is taken to be 
a previously presented item. At recall the subject uses the information 
about context available and tries to retrieve all the individual 
attributes associated with the context. After this, an attempt is made 
to determine what the item must have been.
In their description Norman and Rumelhart make no new suggestions as to 
what context is, or could be. They leave this question open, but from 
the apparent influence of the context in defining an item via the 
attributes, a primarily semantic aspect is implied.
5.3. Compatibility.
This model of perception and memory presented by Norman and Rumelhart 
provides a good example of the problems created by the separate systems 
approach criticised earlier. Norman and Rumelhart attempted to link the 
different systems which had been proposed by researchers investigating 
different parts of performance. Their model copes with this task quite 
well, but they themselves admit that due to the requirement of making 
each component compatible with the others, certain compromises and 
consequently deficiencies occur in the model’s performance. It is 
perhaps due to the experience of this attempt, that they now favour a more 
wholistic system approach, with perception, language, memory, etc. 
regarded as different aspects of the whole system’s performance, rather 
than as discrete systems in their own right.
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5.A. Appraisal.
With respect to providing an account of environmental context phenomena, 
the major problem for the model is that it is far too dependent upon 
external context cuing. The main conception of context in the model 
seems to be semantic. In situations where such a context exists and could 
"accompany" an item at each presentation, the model would be able to 
operate as described. However, when context is able to be removed from 
the item as environmental context can be, the fundamental pieces of 
information against which the attributes are checked are removed, making 
this process inoperable.
Of course, if context is composed of semantic and environmental 
information, these processes still could operate. In such a situation 
different contributions of semantic and environmental information have 
to be assumed to account for the effects on free-recall, cued-recall and 
recognition. One way in which this could be done is by an automatic 
association of predetermined proportions of the different types of 
context. Alternatively, a process which first identified the item via 
the attributes, and on the basis of this identification and the current 
goals of the system, decides the type of context employed, could be 
implemented. In many models this would be a tenable assumption, but due 
to the passive bottom-up nature of this model, the requirement of an 
active top-down process is a significant alteration to the models whole 
conception.
The data on multiple learning environments would seem to create a few 
problems also. Presumably the effect of multiple learning environments 
would be to increase the number of contexts used to associate to the 
attributes. For environmental context to exert an effect on recall, the
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recall attempt must occur in an environment with context information 
suitable to cue the context associated to the attributes. In other 
words, it has to occur in the learning room(s). Due to this necessity 
it is not possible for items presented in one room to be more 
advantageously recalled in another. Indeed the model would predict a 
decrease in the amount able to be recalled in a multiple learning room 
paradigm.
For a model to account for self-generated context effects, at a minimum, 
it needs to be able to do several things. First, it must be able to 
obtain some record of the relevant context. This means that on the basis 
of only a nominal cue, a record of context containing information akin 
to that used in the encoding of the nominal stimuli must be made 
available. Then it must be able to match the internally generated 
context information with that "associated" to the nominal stimuli 
items", or with whatever representation is being used.
Norman and Rumelhart's model would seem to be able to cope with these 
requirements by utilising various expressions of a context. Presumably 
the record of the presentation environment would be stored as an item, 
ie. attributes associated with a context, and would require a similar 
context to cue these attributes. This may be achieved if the similar 
context was something relating to the experiment. A context which in 
nominal terms was equivalent to labeling the attributes as having been 
used in an experiment should be able to identify both the record of 
environment and the nominal stimuli items.
Temporal judgements provide another difficulty for the model. The data 
from Block’s experiments suggest that it is the changes in context which 
provide information about duration. This is particularly problematic
166
for Norman and Rumelhart's model as it operates primarily by utilising 
constancy of context. If change in context is to be used to provide 
information it seems as though this would have to be done after a constant 
factor had identified the entity to be considered via the context 
associated attributes. One possible method would be to establish two 
functionally different types of context. The first would allow an entity 
to be retrieved by context constancy. The other type of associated 
context could then be used to provide input to those processes which 
would determine duration. However, again this calls for considerable 
alteration to the structure of the model.
5.5. Conclusions.
Overall the Norman and Rumelhart (1970) model fails to give an adequate 
account of the basic environmental context phenomena, mainly through a 
rigidity in the way the context is associated to the attributes and 
subsequently cued. It would seem more efficient to adopt or construct 
some alternative system which operates in a manner compatible with the 
functions required, rather than to persevere with one which becomes more 
awkward and ungainly with each modification. However, one interesting 
feature that does arise in considering how the model could cope with the 
tasks manifested in the environmental context experiments is that 
context can be conceived of at different levels. This aspect of context 
will be returned to in chapter ten, where its relation to similar points 
raised in chapter one f*section 2.1.), will be discussed.
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6. Tulving's Encoding Specificity / GAP System.
6.1. Nature of the account.
The encoding specificity hypothesis was first forwarded by Tulving and 
Osier ( 1 968) to explain their findings from a study of the effect of 
retrieval cues. The types of cues and context that researchers have 
generally used to investigate encoding specificity have been semantic. 
However, the nature of the encoding specificity hypothesis and what 
Baddeley (1976, p.293) has distinguished it from; the encoding 
specificity principle, has made them favourite candidates in the attempt 
to provide an explanation of environmental context effects (eg. Metzger, 
Boschee, Haugen h Schnobrich, 1979).
Tulving (1974) provides the following description of what he terms the 
encoding specificity principle.
the properties of the memory trace of a word event are 
determined by specific encoding operations performed on the 
input stimuli, and ... it is these properties, rather than the 
properties of the word in semantic memory, that determine the 
effectiveness of any given stimulus as a retrieval cue for the 
event. The principle suggests that if a stimulus in the 
retrieval environment renders possible or facilitates recall 
of the target word T, the retrieval information was 
appropriate to or compatible with the information contained in 
the episodic trace of T. Conversely, if a particular stimulus 
is ineffective in retrieving a particular trace, the 
conclusion follows that the appropriate relation was lacking 
(Tulving, 1974, p.778-779).
As Baddeley ( 1976, p.293) has pointed out, the "principle" is not an 
experimentally testable hypothesis: it cannot be falsified and is self- 
fulfilling. What is experimentally testable, is the hypothesis that 
only information encoded with the to-be-remembered items at input will
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be useful as retrieval cues for those items. Of course the difficulty 
is determining exactly what is encoded at input, without employing 
subjects' remembrance as an indicator.
Tulving (1982; 1983) has incorporated the notion of encoding specificity 
in his General Abstract Processing System (see figure 5.5.).
OBSERVABLES PROCESSES STATES
original
event
interpolated |_ 
event |
retrieval | 
cue |
memory
performance
Figure 5.5. The GAP system. Arrows indicate "influences" and broken 
arrows indicate states that do not influence a current 
act of remembering, but could influence later ones (from 
Tulving, 1983).
It can be seen from the diagrammatic representation of the General 
Abstract Processing (GAP) system that the processes of ecphory are of 
vital importance for memory performance. Ecphory is the process that 
produces a particular combination of semantic and episodic information. 
It is this combination of (ecphoric) information that is used in the
conversion
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comparison with memory traces. Encoding specificity states that the 
greater the similarity of the ecphoric and memory traces, the greater the 
chance of a match and consequently, successful retrieval. Presumably 
retrieval would continue with the result of the match between the 
ecphoric information and the memory trace being input to the conversion 
process. Tulving differentiates between the types of performance 
required in recognition and recall tasks, and relates this to the amount 
of ecphoric information that is required for the conversion process to 
elicit the actual memory performance. Less ecphoric information is 
required for recognition performance (familiarity judgement) than is 
required for recall performance (identification of nominal items).
6.2. Relation to environmental context.
As the environmental context is part of the overall nominal stimuli 
context present during the nominal stimuli input, it is possible for it 
to be encoded with the nominal stimuli items. When memory is tested in 
the same environment, the environment can act as a retrieval cue 
providing extra ecphoric information. Recall in such situations should 
be superior compared to situations where "ineffective retrieval cues" 
are provided, such as other environments.
6.3. Eich’s cue dependency account.
Very closely related to the account of environmental context phenomena 
that would be expected from Tulving* s GAP system is Eich* s ( 1980)'account 
of state-dependent effects. Eich’s view of state-dependent effects 
shares the (seminal) conceptual structure of Tulving*s GAP system and 
applies not only to state-dependent effects, but also to environmental 
context phenomena.
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The basic notion in Eich’s account is that the more explicit the cues that 
are provided, the easier it is to obtain appropriate ecphoric 
information. In addition, the conversion process requires differing 
amounts of ecphoric information for the different types of memory 
performance. As recognition tasks require the least amount of ecphoric 
information for their performance and provide the greatest intrinsic 
ecphoric information (a copy cue), they should be least influenced by 
fluctuations in the ecphoric information of reinstated encoding 
conditions. On the other hand, the recall task requires most ecphoric 
information for performance and provides the least intrinsic ecphoric 
information. Consequently, it should be influenced most by fluctuations 
in the provision of encoding condition ecphoric information. Cued- 
recall; falling as it does between the two in terms of the amount of 
ecphoric information provided by the cue item, should be less influenced 
by changes in encoding conditions than recall, but more influenced than 
recognition.
6.4. Appraisal.
Compared to the models presented by Anderson and Bower and Norman and 
Rumelhart, Tulving's system would seem to provide a comparable account 
of the effect of a change in environment on recall. The GAP system also 
can account for differing effects with free-recall, cued-recall and 
recognition under the common assumption that environmental context is 
not the only information stored with the nominal item, and that this when 
cued in conjunction with the different performance conversion thresholds 
can make the additional environmental context information
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provided by a reinstatement of the encoding environment less important. 
However, the GAP system has considerable difficulty in attempting to 
account for such environmental context phenomena as the multiple context 
effect, the temporal judgement effect and the self-generated context 
effect. The latter phenomenon can be accommodated if it is assumed that 
either the GAP system can provide itself, or can be provided with some 
equivalent to a retrieval cue, but one that is generated internally.
One of the major problems in accepting Tulving's GAP system as providing 
an account of environmental context effects is that the GAP system is 
only an outline of some of the kinds of processes that seem to be be 
employed to encode and retrieve information from memory described in the 
manner parodied by Neiser and criticised by Allport (see chapter four, 
section 2.1. ). In terms of the what and how of processing, Tulving's 
description seems to be a combination of both, without satisfying the 
criteria of either.
Perhaps such criticisms are unfair as Tulving does describe the GAP 
system as,
not a theory.. It’s purpose is not to explain, let alone 
"predict", any specific phenomena. It represents an overall 
structure within which explanations of various elements of 
remembering and their interactions can be, and perhaps must 
be, sought. It is logically compatible with a large variety 
of specific models...(Tulving, 1983, p.129-130).
2 See Godden and Baddeley's (1980) account presented in section 8.3. 
of this chapter for a similar exposition.
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However, it remains to be seen if psychologists will pay attention to 
such restrictions of use, or if they will be tempted by the apparent 
sophistication of the system and its presentation to misrepresent it as 
a model of memory, and attempt to employ it as a means of explaining and 
predicting memory performance effects, as has been done here.
In terms of the utility of the GAP system as an overall structure, already 
it would seem to be redundant. Not only are most of the concepts 
presented in the GAP system to be found in the model presented in chapter 
six, but because of the nature of this model they are much more clearly 
identified. The nature and form of Tulving’s GAP system is such that the 
manner of its operation is extremely ill defined. In an attempt to 
specify the operation of the system's components and their interaction, 
Tulving goes to the length of presenting new and unique terms of 
description. However, without a non-ambiguous account of (at least) 
each process goal, rather than a nominal identification of the processes 
involved in the GAP system, such new terms achieve little clarity.
With respect to encoding specificity; which often has been suggested as 
an account of various effects without the accompaniment of the GAP 
system, it is worth pointing out that neither is this an explanation, ie. 
a description of a process in any of the terms of abstraction discussed. 
It is a hypothesis with some support which requires explanation. 
Unfortunately, these hypotheses; which are a vital and integral part of 
scientific procedure, can clog up the process of providing explanations 
when they themselves are misconceived as providing such explanations.
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7. Glenberg's Component Levels.
7.1. Introduction.
In the same way that Martin (1968; 1971; 1973), Madigan (1969), Melton 
(1970) and Bower (1972) have attempted to give accounts of repetition 
effects, Glenberg (1979) has also presented an explanation of such 
effects based on what he calls a "component levels theory". The term 
component stems from the fact that different types of information 
contribute toward the representation of an entity in mind. The levels 
tag comes from reference to a "hierarchy" of use; some types of 
information are used in more representations than others.
7.2. Model description.
Glenberg postulates three types of component: contextual, structural and 
descriptive. The Contextual component includes not only information 
which has been previously categorised as environmental and physiological 
information, but also that which has been roughly described as cognitive 
or process context (eg. Block, 1980; Underwood, 1977; chapter two, 
section 4.1). This type of information is automatically encoded as 
presented items are perceived. However, this information is not only 
encoded, but it can also influence the encoding of the other information 
types.
The Structural component involves information which has been related in 
some manner, such as by association or categorisation. The type of 
structure identified will depend upon the prevailing (mainly cognitive) 
context.
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The final information type; the Descriptive component, is obtained from 
the existing semantic memory representation of the item. Two things 
determine exactly what will be taken from the whole semantic memory 
representation. First, as with the structural component, control 
processes will determine the extent and complexity of information 
process to be entertained and secondly, the context (again mainly 
cognitive) will guide which aspects of the complete semantic 
representations will be written into the new representation.
At retrieval, cues provide access to the memory traces. A retrieval cue 
increases its effectiveness as its encoding resembles that of the memory 
trace. The ability of the multicomponent retrieval cue to better 
activate the multicomponent memory trace as the correspondence between 
the two increases is tempered by a decrease in this ability, as the number 
of traces which contain any particular component increases. Glenberg 
also points out that it is possible for traces retrieved on the basis of 
one information type to act as cues for retrieval by any other 
information type.
7.3. Relation to environmental context.
This account makes specific provision for different types of information 
and as- a consequence is able to accommodate the Tdata from the 
investigations of environmental context using recall, cued-recall and 
recognition measures. The notion that a cue's effectiveness is 
inversely related to the number of traces it is a component of also 
provides an account of the benefit of multiple learning contexts.
The data obtained from the self-generation of environmental context 
presumably would be accommodated by Glenberg's "component levels", in a
manner similar to that of Norman and Rumelhart's model. Descriptive 
information would be associated, or would categorise (structure) the
nominal stimuli information as having been presented in the particular 
environmental context. The provision of a cue corresponding to that 
descriptive information associated with the nominal stimuli items should 
make this information available. In common with Norman and Rumelhart's 
model, context information, but in a more semantic form, ie. descriptive 
rather than contextual, is used to access the nominal stimuli items. 
This can be done in two ways. In a manner similar to Norman and
Rumelhart's model, the descriptive component could provide access to low 
level context information about the environment which would be checked 
against similar information encoded with the nominal stimuli items.
Alternatively, it could be assumed that the form of the context 
associated with the nominal items at encoding, was of a similar high 
level which would allow a direct comparison with the cued descriptive 
information. This latter method cannot be applied in Norman and
Rumelhart's model as the only way to record an item such as an environment 
is via the attributes and their associated contexts, and the item can be 
recomposed only after context has cued the attributes. Always, some 
context is needed to identify the environment the presentation occurred 
in, whereas in Glenberg's account the high level context descriptive 
information can be the cue as well as the information associated to the 
nominal items in the memory trace.
As Glenberg explicitly states that there is a change in the components 
stored in the memory trace of nominal items over time, it is quite simple 
to accommodate the requirement of a rate of change of context to provide 
the basis for an account of the temporal judgement effect. The only 
proviso in such a system is that there should be other components in the 
trace of "doing the nominal activity" or “being in the particular place"
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that can be activated by a cue containing corresponding components.
7.4. Appraisal.
In common with Tulving's encoding specificity, Glenberg utilises 
predictive hypotheses rather than explanations to account for observed 
effects. For example, the assumption that the number of "traces" that 
a cue is utilised in reduces its overall effectiveness to elicit any of 
those traces is a hypothesis which has empirical support (eg. Watkins & 
Watkins, 1975).
However, the hypothesis is presented in terms that require explanation; 
how does this effect manifest itself? The inclusion of such hypotheses 
in terms of the result some situation produces, rather than in terms of 
how such an effect comes about, can increase the ability of the model to 
predict the outcome of events, but not explain how such outcomes arise.
0
The model can be criticised on the basis that judged by the criteria of 
the terms of abstraction of representation and algorithm, it does not 
describe sufficiently how the processes operate. However, Glenberg*s 
account also can be criticised for failing to suggest what it is trying 
to achieve. This relates to the point concerning the ecological utility 
of psychological processes. It is difficult to believe that the purpose 
of any process(es) is to fulfill the task demands made by experiments on 
repetition effects, but this is the apparent reason for proposing this 
theory.
What Glenberg has done is identify a variety of important factors that 
influence memory encoding and retrieval. What he has not done is to 
describe the processes that give rise to these factors.
177
8. Direct Attempts To Explain Environmental Context Effects.
6.1. Introduction.
The experimental investigation of the relationship between environmental 
context and memory has produced a variety of phenomena to be accounted 
for. Despite this, very few attempts have been made to provide 
psychological explanations for these effects, beyond reference to views 
of forgetting founded in that presented by McGeoch (1942).
8.2. Smith's cueing account.
Although Smith, Glenberg and Bjork (1978) attempted to identify the locus 
of the environmental context effects in terms of a non-specific generate 
and recognise model of retrieval, this was but appended to a view of 
memory and memory formation, as an almost indiscriminate associationist 
operation; a view little changed since the days of Ebbinghaus. This 
"theoretical" approach to environmental context effects in memory has 
continued through Smith’s research and although similarities between 
these effects and other psychological phenomena have been identified, 
there has been no elaboration beyond this. Overall, the general account 
of environmental context effects presented by Smith is that 
environmental context can act as a retrieval cue.
8.3. Godden and Baddeley's relative cueing account.
In their later p*aper, Godden and Baddeley (1980) present an account of 
the lack of environmental context influence on recognition which 
requires assumptions about the way in which information is encoded. 
Essentially Godden and Baddeley argue that as there is only an arbitrary
178
relationship between environmental context and the nominal stimuli, it 
will not influence the way in which this information is interpreted. In 
recognition, as so much information is provided by the to-be-recognised 
item, the extra information provided by the arbitrary relationship with 
context will exert no effect. In recall, however, where much less 
information is provided to identify the to-be-remembered items in 
memory, even the small amount of information provided by the arbitrary 
relationship with environmental context will aid retrieval and exert an 
effect.
Since then, Baddeley (1982a) has refined his ideas, introducing the 
notion of processing domains (cf. Craik & Jacoby, 1979) and rather than 
considering context as intrinsic or extrinsic; which he considers to lack 
the connotation of being a psychological consequence, he now 
distinguishes between interactive and independent context. Baddeley 
accounts for the discrepant effects of environmental context on recall 
and recognition as a consequence of two factors. The first is that 
nominal items and environment are encoded independently and in parallel. 
However, the relationship established between the two can aid access to 
the nominal item and so benefits recall. It is assumed that recognition 
presents a problem of determining previous occurrence, rather than one 
of access. This process is not influenced by the relationship between 
the nominal item and the independent context and so no environmental 
context effects are observed with recognition measures.
8.4. Appraisal.
The model of memory underlying the account of environmental context 
effects presented by Godden and Baddeley is superior to that implied by
Smith in that explicit acknowledgement is made of the interactive nature
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of memory performance. All memory effects are by definition a 
consequence of the encoding, storing and retrieval of information. Any 
model of information-processing which attempts to account for memory 
performance will need to reflect this interactive feature.
However, the accounts presented by Godden and Baddeley, and Baddeley fail 
to meet the criteria required of a process model and in this respect have 
much in common with the style of Tulving's account and the levels of 
processing presentations (eg. Craik & Jacoby, 1979; Jacoby & Craik, 1979; 
Lockhart, Craik & Jacoby, 1976). Baddeley briefly considers the nature 
of his account and argues that its purpose is to
provide a coherent framework to assist in the understanding of 
a wide range of phenomena (Baddeley, 1982, p.726).
A similar view also has been forwarded by Norman (1979), but to support 
the argument for more process oriented accounts. Doubtless, the type of 
descriptive accounts criticised do provide a sort of understanding, but 
the danger is that this is achieved by the application of terms of 
abstraction that obscure the unique features of the processes described. 
It is the unique features of a process that makes it possible to determine 
why that process and not another was implemented.
Although the concept of recollection as introduced by Baddeley (1982)
would seem to be useful in accounting for some of the other environmental 
context effects, it is not specified enough to enable it to be
distinguished from alternative methods of achieving similar goals.
However, as an identification of a psychological phenomenon that has 
implication for the types of processes suggested to achieve remembrance, 
it is well overdue.
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One change in the account presented by Baddeley (1982), to that presented 
by Godden and Baddeley (1980), is the adoption of a "two-process" view 
of recall. Unfortunately, this may be a detrimental amendment, as is 
illustrated in chapter eleven, when the implications of such "two- 
process" views are considered and relevant evidence is presented.
CHAPTER SIX
A SCHEMA BASED ACCOUNT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT PHENOMENA
1. Schema Model Of Psychological Processing.
1.1. Introduction.
All of the theoretical conceptions considered in the previous sections 
have been unable to give complete accounts of the environmental context 
phenomena identified in chapter two. One of the fundamental criticisms 
has been that the type of description of psychological mechanisms has 
been (and would be) insufficient to provide what has been classed as an 
explanation. The requirement to provide an explanation in the form of 
a process model is a hard standard to meet. Although there is a 
difference between formal models; which attempt to describe in terms of 
the process criteria, and in-formal models; which describe the ideas 
leading to the formal model, it cannot be expected that either form of 
the ultimate process model is to be found in the present literature. 
Although the majority of process models are still^-at the informal stage 
of development, what seems to be important is that the science of 
information-processing is paid heed to and that both formal and informal 
m°dels are conceived in accordance with this available knowledge.
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1.2. The schema system.
In a series of articles, Norman and Bobrow (Bobrow 8r Norman, 1975; 
Norman, 1979; 1982; Norman 8c Bobrow, 1976; 1979) have developed a view 
of psychological information-processing which conforms to this approach. 
Of course they are not alone in producing such a view, but their model 
has developed from a general view of human performance, enabling it to 
provide a framework for more specific examinations of particular aspects 
of psychological processing.
They suggest that the processing system is composed of an autonomous 
collection of schemata. Each schema is an independent processing 
structure which can communicate with the other schemata. Information is 
processed in both top-down and bottom-up fashions, with constant 
feedback regarding the state of schemata processing. Processing is an 
active operation in that schemata "compete" for information. The schema 
with slots which best "fit" the data available at that time takes 
precedence and provides a continuous output of partial results to other 
schemata as its processes operate. As the whole system operates in this 
manner there are no stages of processing as envisaged by earlier types 
of psychological model. The schemata determine the direction of the 
information processing by virtue of the suitability of subsequent 
schemata for the outputs of previous schemata.
The notion of schemata is related to other conceptions of knowledge 
structures mentioned earlier. Although there has been some debate over 
the fundamental type of psychological representation (eg. analogue vs
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propositional; place vs additive) and the importance of such
distinctions (eg. Palmer, 1978), the point has been made that different 
types of representation are feasible, provided there are suitable 
interfaces between these representations (Bobrow, 1975). The terms in 
which schemata are discussed do not distinguish between the types of 
representation that could be employed, but rather describes the 
architecture of the system, and the goals and requirements of those
processes involved in particular aspects of psychological performance.
As psychological processes are called from and make continual use of 
other memory information, an important consideration in any model system 
should be the manner by which the relevant information is obtained from 
the vast quantities available. For example, perception depends upon the 
integration of new sensory information with existing knowledge 
structures (ie. schemata). However, the structures appropriate to
integrate this information must be identified and selected from all the 
information that constitutes memory. In effect, there is a memory 
retrieval problem.1 Norman and Bobrow have suggested that the transfer 
of information occurs through the formation of descriptions. A
description is an intermediary in memory retrieval.
One of the principles of operation of the system Ls an ability to be vague 
or precise in the specification (via the description) of an idea, event
1 Sanford (1985, p.95-98) provides further examples and details of 
psychological processes that depend upon memory information.
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or item. The degree of specificity necessary is dependent upon the 
purpose of the description and the form of other descriptions. For 
example, if there are five boxes of which four are made of wood and one 
is metal, it is possible to identify the metal box with a "vague" 
specification. It can be identified as "the metal box". In contrast, 
if one of the wooden boxes is to be identified then the specification has 
to be more precise than just "the wooden box". Perhaps colour, shape, 
size, or location, could be included to identify the intended object. As 
there is a continuum of specification possible, the task requirements 
will determine the lowest level of specification that can be usefully 
employed.
1.3. Memory records.
A description of an entity can be a single, or collection of 
perspectives. A perspective is a particular view of an event, idea or 
item. A perspective is formed by identifying the significant fields of 
a prototype, while a prototype is itself a previously existing schema.
The level of specification of a description is determined by the choice 
of a prototype (and necessarily its perspective) and further 
specification of the differences between the entity and the perspectives 
employed in the description (see figure 6.1.).
In a fashion similar to Minsky's (1975) frames, where each slot in the 
frame is potentially a sub-frame, so Norman and Bobrow s system is
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DESCRIPTION
PROTOTYPE #1 PROTOTYPE #2 PROTOTYPE #k
PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE
further
specification
further
specification
further
specification
Figure. 6.1. Diagrammatic representation of description 
structure.
organised with each description potentially the component (ie. prototype 
schema) of another.
This is the structure of what Norman and Bobrow term a memory record. 
Records are regarded as being the basic unit of memory and have the 
property that access is to all of the record, or none of it.
Rumelhart and Norman (1978; 1981; 1982) have described different modes 
of learning which could give rise to the type of memory record outlined 
above. This is an area requiring much more research and theoretical 
development. It is also a topic which is outside the scope of this 
thesis.
1.4. Memory retrieval.
Norman and Bobrow (Norman, 1982; Norman St Bobrow, 1979) identify four 
aspects of memory retrieval, which they are quick to point out, are not 
considered to be stages. They regard retrieval as a cycle of continual
specification, matching, evaluation and if necessary, fault diagnosis. 
This cycle refines the description of the desired information with
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respect to the product of evaluation until the information has been 
retrieved, or the whole process terminated (see figure 6.2.).
ASPECT USES AS INPUT PROVIDES AS OUTPUT COMMENT
Retrieval
specification
Match:
Evaluation
Failure 
diagnosis:
Purposes, Target May require
needs, description, memory
descriptions. verification 
criteria.
retrieval.
Target Memory
description records.
Memory records, If success, May require
verification terminate. memory
criteria. If failure, 
diagnose.
retrieval.
Information Revised
from evaluation retrieval
process. specification.
Figure. 6.2. Four aspects of memory retrieval (concatenated from 
Norman*, 1982 and Norman & Bobrow, 1 979).
(i) retrieval specification: this consists of two types of information; 
the target description and verification criteria. When a description is 
formed often it is not known what form other characterisations in memory 
have. In addition, the characterisation in memory can be desired in 
order to fill a gap in knowledge, so the specification of that 
characterisation has to be based on information other than an explicit 
description of the entity. In such a case the specification has to be 
formed from information such as why the description is required and what 
seems to be consistent with that which is already known. The provision 
of information to form a retrieval specification may itself require 
memory retrieval.
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(ii) matching: this label covers both the access to candidate records and 
the selection of those which correspond to the target description. At 
present there are a variety of candidate methods by which this may be 
accomplished. However, the form of abstraction of this model is not 
concerned with the detailed description of such processes, rather this 
model stipulates the goals and restrictions on any implementation of this 
process.
(iii) evaluation: the verification criteria formed by the retrieval 
specification are applied here. Williams and Hollan (1981) describe the 
verification procedure as an attempt to identify those records that are 
wrongly retrieved and to lower the probability of distortion by 
inference. As performance differences such as between recall and 
recognition would suggest, they describe a variety of ways in which 
retrieved memory records may be verified. One of the phenomena observed 
by Williams and Hollan was overshoot. This is where a person continues 
the retrieval process in an attempt to assess the validity of a candidate 
memory “record. This suggests that if necessary, the evaluation 
procedure may also employ memory retrieval.
(iv) fault diagnosis: if a retrieved record fails to meet the 
verification criteria it will still be similar to the desired memory 
record. In such a case the reason(s) for it failing to meet the 
verification criteria will contribute information to the formation of a 
new retrieval specification.
There are two factors which determine the success of memory retrieval. 
Constructabilitv refers to the ability to create an appropriate 
description to identify a particular memory record. Discrijnina.bility 
refers to the ability of an appropriately constructed description being
able to discriminate from all records in memory, its target record. 
Therefore, the records retrieved from memory depend on the form of the 
retrieval specification created at the time of retrieval and the form of 
the encodings of other records in memory.
1.5. Environmental context, memory records and descriptions.
In the terms of Norman and Bobrow's model, what a subject has to do in 
order to be able to remember some idea, item or event is to construct an 
unambiguous description to be stored as a memory record. That 
environmental context influences the retrieval of information suggests 
that it is incorporated in the memory records formed through descriptions 
at encoding. There are a variety of ways in which this could occur. 
Environmental context could be represented by the schema which is used 
to perceive the whole environment. In other words, a high level schema 
could identify the nominal stimuli items as having been presented in that 
environmental context. Alternatively, low level schemata; representing 
certain features of the environment, could be incorporated in the 
descriptions of these items. This is comparable with the type of 
representation of nominal stimuli items suggested by most other models 
employing the notion of context.
These are the two basic ways in which environmental context could be
V *
utilised in the formation of a description of nominal stimuli items. 
However, the nominal stimuli items themselves have to be described at 
some level. Items can be described in relation to each other; producing 
associative effects, and in terms of higher order schemata; producing 
category effects. Although this raises the possibility that 
environmental context information could be employed as a component in a 
nominal item description at a variety of different levels, the results
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of Smith, Glenberg and Bjork (1978, expt.3) suggest that environmental 
context is represented (at least) with each individual nominal item.
The environmental reinstatement effect with free recall is accounted for 
by assuming that whatever the form of context utilised to describe the 
memory record, it has a greater chance of being used similarly in the 
retrieval specification when the subject is in a situation where this 
information is available ie. the learning environment. The smaller 
context effect with cued-recall and apparent lack of effect with 
recognition, is accounted for by considering the form of the retrieval 
specification that could be constructed in these situations. In 
recognition, virtually all of the information presented at encoding is 
re-presented. Therefore, the retrieval specification has a greater 
chance of being appropriately constructed. The explanation of cued- 
recall is identical, but with the acknowledgement that there is less 
correspondence between the information presented at learning and test 
with the cued-recall paradigm, than there is with the recognition 
paradigm. The greater context effect with cued-recall is what would be 
predicted.
The data on self-generated context is handled very easily by Norman and 
Bobrow's model in comparison with all the other models considered. This 
is because Norman and Bobrow’s model includes the translation of external 
information to a form used by the processing system and details the way 
in which this information is communicated throughout the system. 
Consequently, the explanation of the data on the self-generated context 
is similar to that of context reinstatement with free recall. A 
retrieval specification to try and identify a memory record containing 
information about the learning room would be constructed. With a 
successful retrieval this information can then be used to form retrieval
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specifications to identify the nominal items in memory.
Multiple environmental context learning effects also are quite easily 
coped with. If similar descriptions are formed for several items, 
discriminability is reduced. This could happen if the same 
environmental context information was employed in the descriptions of 
many items. The consequence would be a reduction in the number of items 
able to be recalled. One way of preventing such an occurrence would be 
to increase the number of contexts, so reducing the likelihood of 
environmental context information overlap in the descriptions formed. 
Provided construction of retrieval specifications are appropriate, the 
increased discriminability should allow an increase in recall. This 
explanation assumes the same type of processes that will be suggested to 
explain the inverse relationship between the extent of "cue" use and its 
effectiveness (see section 2.1. ).
The nature of the model described by Norman and Bobrow provides a basis 
for an account of temporal judgement effects. As context information is 
contained within a description and descriptions are decomposable, it 
should be a simple operation to provide the necessary input to the 
processes which determine duration.
2. Further Applications Of The Model.
2.1. General
One feature of Norman and Bobrow’s model is the suggestion that much of 
the effort involved in psychological processing, such as perception, 
language and thinking, is in an attempt to obtain and provide for
unambiguous specifications of memory records. The initial stage of this
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process is achieved by mapping information into knowledge structures as 
discussed in chapter four (section 4.2.). Bobrow and Norman (1975) have 
already claimed that another principle of psychological processing is 
that all data must be accounted for. All signals received must be 
processed at some level. This bottom-up, data driven analysis need not 
provide specific descriptions. More specific descriptions will be 
required if the data is unexpected: outside of the default values of the
predicted schema to the extent that extraordinary further specifications 
(excuses) are required, or if the incoming data are determined as 
relevant to the schemata involved in the central analysis, ie. that 
currently using most processes.
As Norman and Bobrow's model is process oriented; many of its ideas 
having been implemented in KRL (Bobrow h Winograd, 1977), it is capable 
of providing explanations of those predictive hypotheses which were 
criticised earlier for masquerading as explanations. The data 
supporting the encoding specificity hypothesis is explained in terms of 
constructability. In cases where an item that is known to be available 
to the subject.^but has not been recognised, an inappropriate retrieval 
specification is assumed to have been employed. In contrast, the inverse 
relationship between the frequency of particular information used in 
"memory traces" and its effectiveness as a cue is a consequence of the 
reduced discriminability caused by similar or overlapping descriptions.
In a similar fashion interference effects would be expected if different 
items are encoded using similar types of description. Interference 
effects also could be a consequence of poor constructability. If 
retrieval specifications are not specific enough they will not be able 
to identify the memory record uniquely.
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The later expression of the levels of processing framework (Craik & 
Jacoby, 1979; Jacoby 8r Craik, 1979; Lockhart, Craik 8c Jacoby, 1976) 
contains many ideas similar to those presented in Norman and Bobrow's 
model. In particular, there is a correspondence between the notions of 
level of elaboration and domain, and level of specification. However, 
again the advantage is with the Norman and Bobrow model because it is 
process, rather than "descriptively" orientated. This allows the 
“levels of processing" account to be accommodated by the schema model. 
One consequence of this is that effects such as the interaction between 
level of processing and encoding specificity (Fisher 8c Craik, 1977) can 
be explained parsimoniously.
More recently, Morton, Hammersley and Bekerian (1985) have employed very 
many of the aspects of the schema system presented by Norman and Bobrow
(1979). However, for some odd reason they precede their model’s 
description by falsely criticising such schema models for being unable 
to give an account of why almost everything about a person can be 
remembered, except their name. The model presented by Morton et al. also 
seems to have a tendency to regard memory records as passive entities. 
This view is reminiscent of the inappropriate analogy of "memory as a 
warehouse".
2.2. The amnesic syndrome.
One reason for interest in environmental context effects is the 
relationship between these effects and the amnesic syndrome (see 
Weiskrantz, 1978). Both human and animal experiments have shown a 
striking dependence on environmental context in subjects with bilateral 
hippocampal damage. However, given the grand nature of the deficit in 
human performance with such damage, it has been surprisingly difficult
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to produce similar performance decrements in animals by hippocampal 
destruction. As a result several reasons have been suggested for the 
apparent discrepancies. For example, Horel (1978) has argued that 
hippocampal damage is not the cause of the amnesic syndrome; the 
possibility that the hippocampi are involved in different psychological 
operations in humans compared to animals has been raised; and also that 
the reason for so few deficits in animals' performance is because the 
type of tasks they are presented with are not equivalent in the nature 
of their psychological requirement to those presented to humans (eg. 
Iversen, 1976). The latter argument is usually followed by a demand for 
more formal analysis of task requirements, but one problem with this is 
that the result of any such analysis depends upon the particular model 
of psychological processing applied.
The reasons for the apparent dichotomy between human and other animal 
performance with hippocampal damage are not mutually exclusive, but if 
the direction of research in this area has been guided by any one of these 
arguments it would have to be identified as the analysis of a task in 
terms of its psychological requirements. A great deal of effort has gone 
into the identification of tasks which can and cannot be carried out in 
a normal manner by hippocampal subjects: humans and other animals. On 
this basis, researchers in the area have developed models which attempt
2 Horel (1978) argues that amnesic effects attributed to hippocampal 
damage are actually a consequence of severing the temporal stem 
which carries afferents and efferents of temporal cortex and amyg­
dala, but not hippocampus. In human subjects the most detailed 
psychological examination of deficits has been carried out on 
amnesic patients who are still alive. Presently therefore, it is 
not possible to obtain detailed and exact determinations of locus 
and extent of damage. Animal data is more available, but debate has 
continued as to whether the hippocampal damage alone causes the 
effects, or if accidental temporal stem damage could be the cause.
to discriminate between the ability to do some tasks and the inability 
to perform normally on others. With respect to a desire to understand 
the psychological processes underlying environmental context effects, 
these are potentially interesting and important models because they have 
to account for extreme environmental context dependency.
2.3. Environmental context effects as a consequence of hippocampal 
damage.
Winocur and Olds (1978) have demonstrated that animals' performance on 
tasks previously thought to be immune from the effect of hippocampal 
damage is significantly impaired, if at test the environment is changed. 
In addition, it was shown that tasks previously affected by the 
hippocampal damage could be maintained at a normal level if the 
environmental context in which the task was learned and tested was made 
distinctive enough (Winocur & Bindra, 1976; Winocur h Olds, 1978; 
Winocur, 1980).
A similar type of effect has been shown with human amnesic patients. 
Winocur and JCinsbourne (1978) presented paired-associate words to 
amnesic subjects in a very distinctive environment. In this condition 
subjects asked to recall the latter word; given the former as a cue, could 
perform at the same level of competence as normal subjects. Normal 
subjects did not show any improvement between normal environment 
learning and recall, and distinctive environment learning and recall. 
However, some improvement in normal subjects', performance in the 
distinctive compared to normal condition may have been obtained if a 
free-recall task had been employed. It is worth noting that the only 
type of verbal memory task which amnesics appear to have any degree of 
success with involves the provision of a (partial) copy cue (see also,
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Warrington & Weiskrantz 1968; regarding copy cues, see chapter one, 
section 4.3.)
2.4. Models of hippocampal function
In attempting to account for the possible functions of the hippocampus, 
a great number of models have been generated. Many have been abandoned 
over the years including Milner’s (1966; 1968) consolidation hypothesis, 
Warrington and Weiskrantz's ( 1 968; ; 19 7 0; 1973 ) retrieval interference 
hypothesis, while Gaffans (1972; 1974) familiarity hypothesis seems to 
have been ignored rather than rejected.
An edition of the nineteen-eighty volume of Physiological Psychology was 
devoted to hippocampal function. This edition carried papers from many 
workers researching in this area and provided a good summarisation of the 
different approaches being applied and the psychological models being 
developed. Roughly four different views are evident and will be 
presented briefly here.
Thompson and Berger (Thompson, Berger, Berry, Hoehler, Kettner & Weisz, 
1980) apply what they call a "model system" approach to the study of the 
brain subtrates of associative learning. Employing the intact mammalian 
brain and selecting a “prototypic" behavioural system having the 
properties of associative learning which are well defined and 
characterised that exhibits robust learning, they adopted the approach 
of recording neuronal unit activity during the course of learning. Their 
goal is to characterise the activity of various brain systems in learning 
and memory. They believe that once this is accomplished, the structures 
and systems that exhibit altered activity with learning will have been 
identified and analysis of synaptic mechanisms will be feasible. All
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major brain systems must be explored, but due to the extensive literature 
on hippocampal involvement in learning and memory, they regarded it as 
a good place to begin. In order to investigate this structure in the 
manner described above, they decided to use the classical conditioning 
of the rabbit nictitating membrane (NM) response to a tone-conditioned 
stimulus (CS) using a corneal airpuff unconditioned stimulus (UCS), 
while recordings were taken from chronically implanted micro-electrodes. 
Both single and multiple unit recordings were made.
This type of work and the data accumulated from it has suggested to the 
researchers that the hippocampus is involved in registering the temporal 
sequence of events. Typically, the hippocampal activity measured in the 
classical conditioning paradigm precedes the behavioural response by 
35-49 msecs. This relationship evolves during the first eight CS-UCS 
pairings (Berger, Alger & Thompson, 1976). Berger, Clark and Thompson,
(1980) have recorded from other limbic structures connected to and via 
the hippocampus and conclude that the electrical activity does not 
originate in the hippocampus, but from the entorhinal cortex or its 
afferents (this includes other cortex). What the hippocampus does is to 
amplify this output from the entorhinal cortex relative to spontaneous 
activity rates. These results (plus others) are consistent with a view 
of the limbic system modulating sub-cortical brain mechanisms critical 
to conditioned behavioural responding.
Solomon (1980) takes the temporal position further. He argues that the 
hippocampus uses this temporal information to allow the animal to ignore 
stimuli which do not uniquely predict a change in the probability of the 
occurrence of the UCS. In turn, this allows the animal to attend to 
stimuli which do signal such change. This view; shared by Moore and 
Stickney (1980), is in accord with an experiment by Devenport and
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Holloway (1980). They found that hippocampal animals displayed a large 
amount of superstitious behaviour in comparison with the controls. From 
this they suggested that the hippocampus is involved in the detection of 
contingency and without it the animal relies on contiguous 
relationships. This suggests that the hippocampus does more than 
register the temporality of events. Indeed it must, as without the 
structure this function is unhindered. It seems likely in fact, that the 
observed temporal relationships may have more to do with the paradigm 
employed than any special function of the hippocampus. It is difficult 
to think of any function which the hippocampus could fulfill in learning, 
which would not produce similar temporally related data if examined in 
this way. So, apart from achieving a greater understanding of the neural 
pathways conveying information into and out of the hippocampus, all that 
can be taken from the classical conditioning-electrophysiological 
studies is that the hippocampus may be involved in identifying relevant 
stimuli.
A far different approach to the study of hippocampal function is that 
taken by O'Keefe and Nadel. They take what they call a neuroethological 
approach. That is, they study electrophysiological recordings and other 
physiological interventions of the hippocampus and their effect upon 
behaviour in more natural tasks as compared to the usual experimental 
paradigm. An example of this arrangement would be an artificially 
created environment with objects lying in particular locations. The 
animals (rats) would be taught to obtain water from a particular place. 
This place would be defined in terms of its relationship with the other 
objects. Therefore, the place need not always be in the same point in 
space, but would always be in the same point in relation to the other 
movable objects. Alternatively, the goal point could be identified by 
a cue, such as a light above it. O'Keefe and Nadel have demonstrated that
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hippocampal animals are incapable of locating the goal if it is defined 
in terms of the spatial relationships between the other objects. They 
have also recorded increased activity from the hippocampus when the 
animals utilise this strategy to locate the goal. O'Keefe and Nadel 
(1978) theorise that the hippocampus forms a cognitive map of space using 
the objects within that space. Nadel and Willner (1980) take this one 
step further in claiming that environmental context is superordinate to 
its components. It cannot be regarded as a compound of component 
stimuli, but instead is a greater whole. They see the cognitive map of 
the environment produced by the hippocampus as the receptacle for other 
information. Nadel and Willner therefore claim that environmental 
context contains, and presumably through some sort of association, 
predicts events. This is an interesting view and the thought of 
environmental context acting as some sort of schema to which other 
information could be attached has already been mentioned. 
Unfortunately, it does not explain why humans and animals become more 
environmentally context dependent when the supposed schema producer is 
destroyed.
O'Keefe and Conway (1980) reported a new memory task for rats called the 
"despatch task"; the evidence from which provides good support for the 
cognitive map theory. The rats are taught a spatial task. The goal is 
in relation to cues, with a different location depending upon the 
arrangement of the cues. In the test situation, the animal is allowed 
to see the cues from a confined position. The cues are then removed and 
after a delay, often of half an hour, the animal is released to locate 
the goal. Hippocampal animals (ie. fornix lesion - cuts output from 
hippocampus) cannot perform correctly on this task while normal controls 
can. However, hippocampal animals can perform on the cued task, when all 
the cues are laid beside the goal. However, neither control nor
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hippocampal animals can seem to maintain the memory over time when this 
latter cued learning task is tested. Both normal and hippocampal animals 
can learn to locate the goal when it is cued, as long as the cues remain. 
If the cues are removed, the animals from both groups cannot locate the 
goal. It seems that this type of task does not produce an effective "long 
term" trace. O ’Keefe and Conway admit to having no explanation for this.
Another proponent of the spatial function of the hippocampus was David 
Olton. Using a radial eight arm maze and recording from single units in 
the hippocampus, Olton accumulated evidence which seemed to suggest that 
there were cells of the hippocampus which responded only to particular 
spatial aspects of the environment. However, Olton has changed his mind 
regarding the function of the hippocampus. He now believes that the 
behaviours associated with hippocampal damage etc. are indicative of a 
working memory deficit.
Olton (Olton, Becker & Handleman, 1980) defines working memory to be that 
used in experimental procedures when information on any single trial is 
useful only for that trial. Reference memory is tapped for information 
which is useful for all trials. All behavioural tasks have a reference 
memory component, whereas only some will have a working memory component. 
Olton claims that hippocampal animals are impaired on working memory type 
tasks only. He also claims that impairment is found in working memory 
types of tasks irrespective of whether the task can or cannot be 
performed using a cognitive mapping strategy.
Olton's analysis and that of Hirsch (1980) share certain similarities.
♦. i
Hirsch argues that the hippocampus is involved in what he calls the 
conditional retrieval of information from memory. Conditional
operations allow two (and presumably more) highly similar situations to
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be treated quite differently. Conditional probabilities are an example.
The statement that given Y , p = 0.5 is in no way a contradiction of the
i a
one that given Y , p = 0.02, despite the fact that p is the same c a .  a
entity in both cases. As retrieval is regarded to be the selection of 
one piece of information from among many possible candidates, and as many 
things may be known about a given item, retrieval will be to a greater 
or lesser extent a conditional operation. The process of conditional 
retrieval is then defined as the result of interaction between a 
categorical operator representing global factors, and a local operator 
representing local considerations. Interaction between these two types 
of operator is said to be necessary for constructing dimensional
representations, including maps. Hirsch presents a convincing case for 
this model, which seems able to account for the majority of the available 
data. Unfortunately, he does not particularly explain the processes by 
which the local and global operators work. The similarity with Olton’s 
ideas is in the fact that both writers seem to be describing systems which 
are either dependent upon or select information which is quite specific 
in nature.
The final view to be presented is that of Gordon Winocur. He regards
hippocampal animals as being limited in their ability to extract
information from their environments, and as a result are more vulnerable 
to the effects of interference when relevant stimuli are spatially or 
temporally disassociated, or rendered ambiguous by conflicting 
experiences. Winocur believes that the hippocampal syndrome reflects a 
basic processing deficit. In this respect his view is more general than 
others and therefore probably is less incorrect.
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2.5. General assessment of amnesic syndrome models and data.
The data presented by the different theorists certainly support their own 
contentions, but some have little power to account for other hippocampal 
effects. Thompson and Berger et al.'s work is more of an attempt to 
describe the physical realisation of processes rather than the 
representation and algorithm, or the computational theory. 
Consequently, the other descriptions of processes presented in other 
terms of abstraction are not in competition. However, when this 
essentially correlational paradigm is used to provide causal accounts in 
other terms of abstraction, a certain dubiety must be attributed to their 
conclusions. One of the difficulties associated with this approach may 
be appreciated by distinguishing the terms of abstraction involved, and 
considering an analogous situation: would it be possible by observing
the changes of current in a digital computer, and its output of numbers, 
to ascertain that it was performing an analysis of variance, if one did 
not already comprehend the underlying nature and purpose of such a 
process?
Overall the data and models from the hippocampal literature seem to 
converge on the assessment that tasks which require a large amount of 
specificity are impaired. Hirsch almost describes the Norman and Bobrow 
model when he talks of global operators (prototype-perspective) and 
local operators (further specification). Olton*s definition of working 
memory type tasks is really a statement of tasks which need a fairly high 
degree of specificity to be carried out correctly. The analysis given 
by Winocur is what one would expect if the deficit was an inability to 
properly or adequately specify the task requirements.
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The work of Thompson and Berger et al. also could be accommodated by this 
viewpoint. It was suggested that what their work had shown was 
hippocampal involvement in some type of attentional process; the 
identification of pertinent stimuli. This would be necessary in order 
to specify the task requirements. As was mentioned earlier, it is 
difficult to attribute any particular functional aspect to the 
hippocampus on the basis of this data, but the information obtained from 
these micro-electrode-classical conditioning studies certainly is 
compatible with the function proposed.
O'Keefe and Nadel's explanation of hippocampal function in terms of 
cognitive mapping has a great deal of supportive evidence. However, it 
is likely that if the hippocampus is involved in the formation of 
unambiguous memory record descriptions, then damage to this system would 
also effect the ability to form spatial representations. Therefore, the 
deficit in spatial ability can be regarded as a consequence of impairing 
the processes which contribute to establishing a cognitive map, rather 
than being the origin of the deficit.
3. Appraisal Of. And Predictions From The Schema System.
3.1. Framework and process.
Probably the most important aspect of a schema based system is that it
provides a structured and powerful framework within which mental
activity can be considered. However, it is one thing to accept the
notion of "packages of processes" operating on sensory input and schemata 
output, thereby providing information and knowledge, and another to be 
able to describe the processes which carry out such tasks. It is likely 
that by attempting to understand the processes upon which the gross
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schemata operations depend, our comprehension of the nature of schemata 
will change. It even may become evident that schemata are, as Schank 
(1981) has suggested, momentary creations of underlying psychological 
processes; entities which in themselves are little more than processing 
artifacts. At present however, our level of theoretical sophistication 
makes the conceptualisation of schemata a necessary rather than just a 
useful construct.
3.2. Encoding and retrieval interactions.
One feature of the schema system which contributes to the power of the 
framework is its emphasis on the variety of different types of 
information encoding and retrieval that are possible. This is an 
important feature of psychological processing which must be borne in mind 
when consideration is made of the way in which any effect is manifested.
The ability to remember; which is a continually ongoing activity serving
most other psychological processes with information, depends upon
discriminability and constructability. Consequently, the factor that
first sets a limit on the ways in which information can be retrieved is
the nature of its encoding. Only information which has been incorporated
into an entity’s description can be effective in retrieving that memory
record. However, it is possible.that a salient part of the target memory
7*
record, which could discriminate the description from others, would be 
ineffective. This would occur if in the construction of the retrieval 
specification the pertinent piece of information had been omitted.
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3.3. Encoding and retrieval interactions in relation to environmental 
context effects.
With respect to environmental context effects the obvious and first 
requirement for an effect is the inclusion of some sort of environmental 
context information in the memory record. Subsequently at retrieval, 
similar environmental information must be used in the construction of the 
retrieval specification and this information must be utilised in the 
retrieval of the target memory records. It is possible to conceive of 
a situation where although similar environmental context information was 
present in both target and retrieval specification, some other 
information was actually effective in identifying the sought after 
record.
As the attempt to retrieve information is based on a disambiguation of 
one memory record from others on the basis of retrieval specification, 
it could be possible to have more than one disambiguating retrieval 
specification of the same memory record. The number of different, but 
unique retrieval specifications of the one memory record will depend on 
the detail in which the entity was encoded in the attempt to achieve an 
unambiguous record.
Norman and Bobrow (1979) have argued that with lower "levels of 
processing" both constructability and discriminability are likely to be 
low because of the comparatively small number of unique descriptions 
which can be created from the relatively small number of features 
(identified by schemata) at this level. With higher levels of processing 
more schemata are available and so a greater number of unique 
descriptions should be possible, resulting in increased discriminability 
and constructability.
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Apart from the phenomena of increased recall and decreased interference 
with higher level processing", another consequence of the greater 
number of different, yet unambiguous retrieval specifications is a 
reduction of dependence on any particular unique retrieval specification 
for remembrance.
3.4. Predictions.
In relation to environmental context effects, this line of theorising has 
certain predictions associated with it. If it is assumed that 
environmental context information's inclusion in memory records is a 
robust aspect of processing, then a reduction in the alternative detail 
of descriptions formed at encoding should increase the dependence of 
retrieval specifications upon disambiguation by environmental context 
information. Conversely, an increase in the alternative detail of 
descriptions formed at encoding should decrease the dependence upon 
disambiguation by environmental context information. In the former case 
one would expect a comparatively large environmental context effect and 
in the latter case if the alternative retrieval routes were sufficient, 
no environmental context effect should be observed.
In the next two chapters experiments which specifically examine these 
predictions will be presented. Subsequent chapters report studies which 
continue what is basically an exploration of the processes through which 
environmental context exerts its influence. As this is carried out, 
constant reference will be made to the model of psychological processing 
outlined in this chapter in an attempt to obtain a theoretical, as well 
as an empirical grip on the phenomena.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
EXPERIMENT TWO
THE INFLUENCE OF LOW LEVEL SEMANTIC ELABORATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXT REINSTATEMENT EFFECT.
1. Introduction
1.1. Environmental alterations.
In chapter three the requirement for effectively different environmental 
contexts was outlined. The observation of an environmental context 
effect indicated that effectively different environments had been 
created. Although there was some discussion of the psychological 
processes which could have been involved in the production of this 
effect, ultimately these depend upon there being differences between 
environments to provide the basis for differential operation.
Unfortunately, just after this experiment was completed, notice was 
given that the University was to begin major construction work very close 
to the building where the room environments were located. The major 
problem this created was noise. In an attempt to eliminate this, 
alterations to the room environments were necessary. The most 
significant alteration to the appearance of the room environments was the 
boarding-up of the window in Room A. All in all, the result of this and
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other slight changes was to make the two main environments: Rooms A and 
B more alike.^
The problem caused by any change in environmental context is determining 
the extent to which the findings of experiment one can be assumed to 
extend to the new conditions. The particular problem caused by these 
changes is that the increased similarity of the two environments may 
preclude any effect.
1.2. Aspects of memory performance.
In the preceding chapter it was predicted that "low level" processing of 
nominal stimulus items would produce greater environmental context 
dependency. "Low level" processing was taken to be descriptive of 
operations which did not produce detailed encoding or retrieval 
specifications. However, the account of retrieval processes presented 
in chapter six concentrates on only one aspect of encoding and retrieval: 
the need to uniquely identify a memory record. The way in which the 
construction of records and the processes that retrieve them, provide and 
obtain information to allow disambiguation was largely ignored. It is 
to the relationship between this latter aspect of retrieval and memory 
performance that attention is now turned.
1 Detailed descriptions of the room environments discussed are 
presented in appendix A.
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1.3. Memory organisation.
Mandler (1979) has suggested that there are two independent dimensions 
of organisation: integrative and elaborative. Integrative organisation 
refers to intrastructural or within-item organisation and elaborative 
organisation refers to interstructural or between-item organisation. 
The two dimensions are illustrated in figure 6.1. below.
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Figure 6.1. A graphic analogy of integration and elaboration (from 
Mandler, 1979).
The processes which give rise to the types of organisation identified by 
Mandler seem to be enhanced by different types of rehearsal: maintenance 
or primary rehearsal increases intrastructural organisation, while 
elaborative or secondary rehearsal increases interstructural 
organisation.
In relation to memory performance, it seems that the types of processes 
underlying maintenance rehearsal which give rise to a highly integrated
memory record enhance familiarity judgements (Mandler, 1980), and are
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involved in what Jacoby and Dallas (1981) have termed perceptual
identification. It is the processes underlying elaborative rehearsal
that give rise to those memory records that are most easily produced for
evaluation in situations which require recall or recognition, although
integrative processing benefits recognition performance more than recall 
2
performance.
1.4. Descriptions, organisation and retrieval.
In the production of a description therefore, the choice of prototype, 
perspective and further specification influences the type of 
organisation that will be manifested by the memory record. In this 
system it is not possible for the two dimensions of organisation to be 
wholly independent. Instead, it is better to regard the two types of 
organisation as describing opposite ends of a continuum of potential 
memory record structures. Similar views also are advanced by Craik and 
Jacoby (1979) and Glenberg and Adams (1978).
As was described in chapter six, the retrieval of information may require 
several retrieval cycles before an entity is retrieved. Initially, the 
retrieval specification is formed from what little is known of the sought 
after record, such as its assumed purpose. As retrieval continues, a 
variety of records are likely to be presented for assessment. From
2 For a review of the evidence pertaining to the different types of 
processing and their relation to memory performance, see Craik 
(1981 ) .
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these, or from the difference between their content and that deemed to 
be required, further pertinent information can be acquired. This 
information can then be utilised in the subsequent retrieval
specification formed as part of the next retrieval cycle.
If these processes of retrieval are considered, the advantage(s) 
afforded the attempt to retrieve elaborately encoded information becomes 
apparent. With a greater number of schemata contributing toward a 
description, the chance of initial retrieval specification and 
subsequent retrieval specifications incorporating pertinent information 
is increased. As any retrieval specification has to be formed from what 
is known about the desired entity, the more pertinent information that 
a retrieval specification begins with and accumulates, the more
successful it is likely to be. Although this may seem to be a very
obvious fact, its consequences are important. As more pertinent
information is uncovered, the retrieval specification can be made more 
pertinent to the target. As the pertinence of the .information increases, 
so will the pertinence of the records procured for assessment. In other 
words as the idealised retrieval proceeds, the approach to a successful 
retrieval specification will be exponential.
In addition, elaborate encoding is likely to increase the number of forms 
of description that could uniquely specify an entity in memory. If 
sufficient detail to disambiguate one form of description is not 
available, elaborate encoding may allow another form of description to 
identify the entity. The degree of similarity between the descriptions 
that are formed to identify the entity in memory will determine the
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usefulness of the information contained in the old-form retrieval 
specification, for the new-form retrieval specification. Also, it is 
possible that the same information re-structured; establishing another 
form of retrieval specification, could achieve disambiguation. An 
interesting theoretical problem is the extent to which an entity can be 
retrieved by differing descriptions, before it is considered that these 
descriptions are retrieving separate representations.
1.5. An illustration.
In relation to the stimuli presented in these experiments, elaborative 
processing would result in what is normally described as "associations" 
being established between words, or rather between their 
representations. What this means in terms of the system just described 
is that schemata representing the words are being utilised to form 
descriptions. The schemata employed can be at a variety of levels, but 
for simplicity in the following example it will be assumed that they are 
all at the semantic level: a level that is normally available in
consciousness after the presentation of a noun.
If the three words KING, RIVER, and SKY are associated together, it is 
likely that the subject will form some description representing (amongst 
other things) a king by a river, perhaps looking at the sky. A variety 
of other features of this scene may be included, depending upon the 
degree of default value usage by the elaborative processes and any other 
schemata suggested by those involved in the encoding. In addition, 
subjects would need to record in some manner, which of the schemata
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employed were specifically instantiated by the word stimuli.
Elaborative encodings such as this can have their retrieval initiated by 
a variety of different pieces of information. Probably the first thing 
incorporated in the retrieval specification is that "independent" words, 
rather than a story or a description of a pictorial scene, have to be 
recalled. In addition, the subjects will probably notice that the words 
were nouns and are likely to be aware of the fact that they had "seen some 
links" between words.
As the subject builds up a retrieval specification, there is three times 
the chance of incorporating a piece of information (at the level of the 
semantic word schemata) pertinent to the scene of the king by the river 
looking at the sky, than there is of incorporating one of any other three 
pieces of information at the same level (ie. probability of independent 
events: Ptking] = 1/x, PCriver] = 1/x, PCsky] = 1/x, whereas Piking or 
river or sky] = 1/x + 1/x + 1/x = 3/x, where x = number of possible 
schemata choices).
Given that a retrieval specification includes a representation of king, 
the schemata produced for assessment are likely to include the three item 
description. If they do not, then it is likely that the representation 
of one of the other items will be presented for assessment (ie. river or 
sky). If the second schema in a three schema description is then 
incorporated in the retrieval specification it is very likely that the 
target description will be uniquely identified. This type of process 
could begin with any piece of information and in a situation where only
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three schemata were involved in a description, three separate 
combinations or "routes" to the three item specification would be 
available.
Obviously, this is a ridiculously idealised and simplified illustration 
of the types of retrieval that could be employed after elaborate encoding 
had been in operation. However, even this example serves to demonstrate 
the power and flexibility of the proposed system at retrieval when 
elaborate encoding takes place.
1.6. Experimental promotion of non-elaborative encoding.
To promote subjects' formation of descriptions that are discriminable 
primarily through the use of environmental context care must be taken to 
provide an experimental task that does not require, nor encourage, 
elaborate processing. At the same time however, it would be 
unsatisfactory if not pointless, to have subjects perform some task that 
prevented their perception and reading of the stimuli as words. In such 
a situation there would be doubt over the equivalence of the instruction 
to "recall the words", between the last experiment and this. 
Fortunately, word stimuli are unlikely not to be read. Reading is such 
an automatic process (especially with student subjects) that it would 
require very extreme circumstances to prevent.
Several different methods of minimising the elaborateness of subjects 
encoding operations have been employed in experimental studies. As most 
of these investigations have been inspired by Craik and Lockhart s (1972)
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views on levels of processing, the form of elaboration that has been
3
controlled has been semantic. One common method is to require subjects
to answer questions about each word as it is presented. The nature of
the question biases the type of processing carried out on the word. It
is also likely that the act of asking separate questions about each word
directs attention to each word in turn, rather than to any potential
links between words. However, a task which could be carried out by
subjects on the basis of a set of instructions provided before any of the
stimuli were presented was considered to be more compatible with the task
carried out by the subjects in the previous experiment. Although it is
likely that subjects attempting to memorise a list of words will employ
a variety of different processing strategies to do so; and although this
may also have some correspondence with the changes in processing directed
by the various questions about the words, it was felt that the subjects'
allocation of processing resources over the course of the word
presentation was more likely to be affected and altered by a task which
imposed its own process-time requirements. As environmental context
information must be encoded at some point in time, the allocation of
■ ■ «*
processing resources may be an important feature of environmental 
context effects.
Eventually a task that fulfilled all of the requirements discussed and 
that could be accommodated within the time restrictions of the stimuli
3 Indeed, human processing is so semantically biased that it is 
difficult to imagine elaboration in any other way.
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presentation rate was decided upon: subjects were asked to count the 
number of words that had three or more vowels. In addition, the task was 
explained as an examination of attention and perception.
1.7. The effect of subjects' ideas about the experiment.
In all experiments, the opinions that subjects have regarding the purpose 
of their activities can influence their behaviour as much if not more 
than any instructions given by an experimenter. In memory experiments 
utilising an unintentional learning paradigm, any suspicion on the part 
of the subject that they are to have their memory for the presented items 
tested will have serious consequences in terms of the type of processing 
they are likely to engage in and their subsequent ability to remember. 
The general effect of such a suspicion is liable to eliminate or
substantially reduce the distinction between elaborative and non- 
elaborative processing.
As has been discussed previously, there is a tendency for people to try 
and find meaning in what they are presented with (see chapter one, 
section A.2.). In other words, people tend to employ elaborate encoding 
strategies. Continuous non-elaborative processing is therefore an
unusual processing strategy. Consequently, when subjects' processing 
fluctuates under elaborate processing instruction conditions, it is 
likely to vary in degree, whereas under non-elaborate processing 
instructions, any suspicion of having to remember the presented items or
reversion to the normal mode of processing is liable to produce a
qualitative rather than a quantitative change in processing. A
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qualitative change in encoding mode should produce an increase in recall 
score well out of proportion to that which may be expected on the basis 
of inter and intra subject differences within a processing mode.
1.8. Attempts to cope with confounding variables in the experiment.
To reiterate, there are two related problems which could arise and 
influence the results of this particular experiment. Subjects could 
form the opinion that their memory for all or some of the words will be 
tested and so alter their mode of processing. In addition, subjects' 
incidental changes in processing (to a more elaborate encoding mode) will 
also increase their ability to recall the words.
To prevent subjects who had formed a suspicion at encoding that their 
memory would be tested from contributing to and distorting the pattern 
of results, a questionnaire: designed to provide further information on 
the types of encoding and recall strategies employed during the 
presentation and test phases, was administered to subjects at the end of 
the experimental session. If subjects responded that they had made an 
attempt to learn any of the presented words they were replaced by another 
subject whose responses on the questionnaire suggested that they had not 
attempted to learn any of the words.
To cope with incidental changes in processing, it was decided to invoke 
statistical control of learning. Fortunately, the experiment was 
designed with the inclusion of a recognition test as a closure task. 
This provided all that was required of a control variable for analysis
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of covariance.
1.9. Recall protocol recording and the questionnaire.
The single questionnaire administered to subjects attempted to provide 
some insight into what subjects were doing during the 10 minute 
presentation and test periods. Also, it was decided to alter the method 
of recall from a version written by the subject to a tape-recorded 
version. To what extent the verbal output may queue recalled items is 
not known, but it is certainly less than that required when the written 
method is employed. One problem overcome by the verbal method of recall 
is subjects forgetting recently recalled items as they write down one or 
more remembered just before. From the subjects' point of view this 
method of data provision is easier, but it also can be more rigorous. 
Subjects are aware that everything they say and to some extent do, is not 
only recorded, but recorded in time. This can encourage subjects to 
maintain their attempt to recall words, whereas if they had to write them 
down they could abandon their recall attempt as difficulty increased, 
knowing that the experimenter would be oblivious to how much effort they 
had expended in trying to remember.
For an account of the requirements of a control variable in analysis 
of covariance, see Kirk (1982).
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1.10. Recall environment familiarity.
Experiment one was criticised on the grounds that the visual matching 
task may have prevented subjects from paying attention to the 
intermediate environment. If this was so, subjects in the DIFFERENT 
conditions would still be less familiar with their recall environment 
than SAME condition subjects. This, rather than the environmental 
context at presentation matching with the environmental context at test, 
could be the factor causing the difference in recall between conditions.
To ensure that this was not the case, the familiarity of recall 
environment was again manipulated, but this time Smith's procedure of 
having subjects pay heed to the intermediate environment by instructing 
them to draw it was adopted. This procedure is likely to make subjects 
more familiar with the intermediate environment than with any other 
environment. In such circumstances any comparative decrement in recall 
in DIFFERENT conditions could not be attributed to a lack of familiarity.
1.11. Increase in time spent in waiting area.
One other procedural change was introduced in this experiment. Whereas 
in experiment one subjects spent only 30 seconds in the waiting area 
between rooms, subjects in the present experiment were allowed 2 
minutes. The main reason for this change was to make the transition 
between environments and the preparation of the environment the subject 
was to enter next, less frantic. The original purpose of such a short 
gap as 30 seconds between rooms was to reduce the opportunity subjects
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had to rehearse any of the presented words. However, the information 
obtained from subjects in experiment one during their debriefing 
indicated that the recognition test presented for closure was having the 
desired effect.
In addition, the nature of the drawing task in this experiment was such 
that if subjects were going to make an attempt to rehearse any of the 
presented words, they would have ample opportunity to do so during the 
10 minute drawing period. An extra 1 minute and 30 seconds potential 
rehearsal time was unlikely to exert any significant effect.
1.12. Reasons for paradigm change.
Although these changes bring this experiment (and as will be seen, future 
experiments) more in line with the paradigm employed by Smith, they move 
-the paradigm further from that employed in experiment one. It would have 
been convenient if full comparisons could have been made between 
experiment one, this and future experiments. However, with the 
alterations in environment being unavoidable and in themselves 
confounding any comparison, it seemed to be a good time to introduce 
other changes based on the experience gained from running experiment one 
and the view of the purpose of the experiments developed since the 
instigation of the study.
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1.13. Experimental hypotheses.
The present experimental hypotheses replicate and extend those of 
experiment one. The hypotheses are replicated in that the order of best 
to worst recall is similar and extended in that the degree of difference 
between SAME and DIFFERENT condition recalls is predicted to be greater. 
Of course it is exactly this latter hypothesis which cannot be evaluated 
until some appropriate comparison is made.
In the meantime, for simplicity, this experiment is confined to; testing 
the tenability of the familiarity account of several environmental 
context effects, examining the effect of a different psychological 
processing mode in relation to the environmental reinstatement effect, 
and investigating the practical and theoretical utility of an 
alternative analytical procedure in the study of environmental context 
effects.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
Although all subjects were naive regarding the purpose of the 
experiment, several subjects behaved in a manner determined by 
their belief in the purpose of the experiment, rather than as 
instructed. These subjects were identified by their answers to the 
questionnaire administered at the end of the experimental session. 
Any subject who responded that they had made an attempt to learn 
some, or all of the words as they were presented was replaced by a 
subject who had not responded in such a manner. All subjects; 
including those whose data was not analysed, were paid one pound for 
taking part in the experiment. Indeed, it was not until subjects had 
completed the session, had been debriefed and paid, that their 
responses to the questionnaire were seen. Eventually, 48 Glasgow 
University students; males and females of approximately equal 
numbers, completed the experiment in a satisfactory manner.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Rooms A, B and C2 were employed in the experiment. Descriptions of 
these rooms can be found in appendix A.
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2.3. Stimuli:
All the stimuli used in this experiment were identical to those used 
in experiment one.
2.4. Apparatus:
As in experiment one, the slides were projected onto the white walls 
in both presentation environments: rooms A and B. However, whereas 
previously the Kodak projector slide presentation rate had been 
controlled by an electronic timer, the limitations of this device 
had prompted the development of a computer controlled slide 
presentation system (details of this system's operation can be 
found in appendix CJ. A footswitch was placed under the desk in 
both rooms A and B. Slide presentation was initiated by one press 
on either of these switches. A microphone in each of the two rooms 
was connected to a JVC stereo cassette deck, and a buzzer controlled 
by the computer was placed in the waiting area.
2.5. Questionnaire:
A very simple questionnaire consisting of three separate questions 
was formulated in an attempt to obtain information about what the 
subjects were doing during the presentation and recall periods, and 
how similar they thought the room environments A and B were. The 
two questions regarding encoding and recall were open ended, 
requiring subjects to write in their own words what they did at
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presentation and recall, while the third question required subjects 
to provide a value on a scale ranging from 1 to 100 indicating how 
similar they thought rooms A and B were (a greater value indicated 
greater similarity). A specimen copy of the questionnaire can be 
found in appendix D.
2.6. Design:
As in experiment one, a two factor (3 x 2) between subjects design 
was applied. The first factor was defined by the relationship 
between the presentation environment and the recall environment; 
same or different, and the familiarity of recall environment. The 
second factor was defined by the two learning environments, rooms 
A and) B*.
2.7. Procedure:
Each subject’s 34 minute experimental session was divided into 
three 10 minute periods, separated by two, 2 minute waiting periods. 
In the first 10 minutes subjects viewed an automatic presentation 
of the 70 word slides. Each slide was presented for 3 seconds with 
a variable 1 to 1.5 seconds gap between slides as they changed. 
Subjects were told of the slide presentation times and were 
instructed that their only task was to count the number of words 
containing three or more vowels. They were then told to press the 
footswitch under the desk in front of them to initiate the 
presentation when the experimenter left the room. When the
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presentation was complete, the buzzer sounded in the waiting room 
informing the experimenter, who returned and administered the 
recognition task. Subjects were allowed 2.5 minutes to mark the 
words they recognised. After the recognition task was completed, 
subjects returned to the waiting area for 2 minutes before moving 
to the next scheduled room. In the second environment subjects were 
given a piece of paper and a pencil, and were asked to draw; in as 
much detail as possible, a view of the room from where they were 
sitting. If they found that they had completed their drawing before 
the experimenter returned, they were asked to draw the room again, 
but from a different angle and to continue drawing until the 
experimenter did return. After 10 minutes the experimenter 
returned and directed the subject back to the waiting area. After 
another 2 minutes, subjects entered the appropriate room 
environment and were asked to recall all the words they had been 
presented with in the first period, including those in the 
recognition test, that they could remember. Subjects were 
instructed to say' each word that came to mind out loud, as their 
recalls were being recorded. The subjects were asked to begin as 
soon as the experimenter left the room and to keep trying to
remember more words until he returned. After ten minutes had 
passed, the experimenter returned to stop the subjects free
recall. Those subjects in the SF and DF conditions were then asked
to complete the questionnaire. All subjects then returned to the
waiting area where they were paid and debriefed. The room order for 
those subjects in the SAME and FAMILIAR (SF) condition was ABA/BAB, 
the room order for the DIFFERENT and FAMILIAR (DF) condition was
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ABB/BAA and the room order for the OIFFERENT and UNFAMILIAR (DU) 
condition was ACB/BCA.
2.8. Scoring:
Each subjects' verbal recall protocol was transcribed and scored in 
the same manner as reported in experiment one.
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3. Results.
3.1. ANCOVA Of P-Item Recall.
3.1.1. selection of a covariate.
As was described in the introduction (sections 1.7. and 1.8. ), the 
purpose of employing ANCOVA was to control for the degree of elaborative 
processing which subjects were assumed likely to engage in. Some 
assessment of the degree of elaborate processing that subjects have 
engaged in can be made from the subjects' performance on the recognition 
test. Apart from scoring subjects' recognition performance in terms of 
the number of correctly identified items (RHTS) and the number of 
incorrectly identified items (RFAS), d' scores were also considered.
However, although d ‘ scores might be regarded as a more sophisticated and 
accurate measurement, there were problems in using this measure with the 
present data. To calculate d ‘ scores, the probability of a hit and the 
probability of a false-alarm have to be known. For proper calculation, 
both of these values should be greater than zero. Unfortunately, in the 
present experiment many subjects made no false-alarm responses and as a 
result, many d ‘ calculations would have been extremely unreliable. 
Excluding subjects that provided no false alarms causes other problems. 
Apart from reducing the power of the analysis by lowering sample size, 
the exclusion of these subjects alters the distribution of scores. In 
this case only potentially high d ‘ scoring subjects would be excluded 
from the analysis.
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Consequently, as a preliminary to the analysis of covariance, a stepwise 
(forward and backward) multiple linear regression (Dixon, 1983) was 
carried out to determine the most efficient predictor of P-item recall 
and to ensure that the overall regression of predicted and predictor 
variables was linear. As the two predictor variables employed in this 
procedure were RHTS and RFAS, any advantage in P-item recall prediction 
afforded by a model incorporating both variables (similar to a d' value) 
should be detected.
In stepwise (forward or backward) regression; as the variables with the 
largest F-values are chosen from a set of potential predictor variables, 
the usual F-tables do not apply. The probabilities associated with the 
F-values obtained through such procedures are affected by the fact that 
with a greater number of potential predictor variables there is a greater 
likelihood of obtaining high F-values by chance. Unfortunately, the 
appropriate probabilities are a function of not only the number of 
subjects and the number of variables, but also the correlational 
structure of the potential predictor variables. The correlational 
structure of the predictor variables is important as it reflects how much 
unique information is being provided by each predictor. If all predictor 
variables were orthogonal, the actual significance level would be given 
by,
1 -  ( 1 -  a ) m
where a is the tabled alpha value and m is the number of orthogonal
predictor variables.
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As the amount of unique information provided by each predictor decreases, 
so the likelihood of a high F-value occurring by chance decreases. If 
all predictor variables are perfectly correlated, the tabled probability 
of the F-value is the actual significance level. In most situations 
however, the correlational structure is not so simple as all or nothing. 
Consequently, calculating the probabilities associated with the F-to- 
enter, F-to-remove and the F-value of the overall regression line, can 
be a difficult and time consuming exercise. In addition, there is 
presently no general agreement as to the best method of calculation.
For these reasons, the adjusted probabilities reported with stepwise 
regressions have been calculated on the basis of the formula presented 
above. To give some idea as to the degree of conservativism of the 
adjusted p-values, the correlations between the predictor variables are
T *  ^ 5also presented.
The best prediction of P item recall was obtained using RHTS alone. The 
F-to-enter value (ie. the F-value of that proportion of the variance 
accounted for by a variable when the variance accounted for by the other 
variables is partialed out) for RFAS was less than 1. Table 7.1. gives 
those values associated with the simple regression equation.
The basic assumptions underlying a regression analysis are that the error 
terms from the model are normally and independently distributed with mean 
zero and exhibit homoscedasticity (ie. common Y variance at each X). 
However, as these assumptions are extremely unlikely to be fulfilled
5 For further discussion of this topic see Draper & Smith (1981, 
p.311), Forsythe (1983) and Forsythe, May and Engleman (1971).
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variable
std reg 
coef f R2
adj
R F( 1 ,46)
ad j 
P
predictor
corr
RHTS 0.417 0. 174 0. 156 9.71 0.006 0.101
Table 7.1. Summary of simple regression of P-item recall on RHTS.
unless the type of regression applied to the data is compatible with the 
relationship between predicted and predictor variables, the assumption 
reduces to one of linear regression (Keppel, 1982).
A chi-square test of homoscedasticity suggested that this assumption was
p
tenable, X (1) = 2.03, p = 0.15. An examination of the plot of P-item 
recall against RHTS and the plot of residuals (P-item residuals against 
predicted P-item recall and the normal probability plot of P-item 
residuals) also supported the assumptions of the regression analysis and 
consequently, that linear regression was appropriate.
3.1.2. preliminary analysis for ANCOVA.
Unlike the preliminary data analysis in experiment one, an F-max test 
prior to the ANCOVA would not be appropriate. Variance estimates in the 
ANCOVA contributing to the assessment of the F-value are made after the 
removal of the variance accounted for by the relationship between the 
covariate and dependent variable. Consequently, it is after this 
variance has been removed that a test of homogeneity of variance should 
be carried out (Huitema, 1980). This is most easily done as a final check 
on the tenability of the assumptions underlying.the analysis.
2 3 0
The regression coefficient that removes the variance on the error term 
explained by the covariate-dependent variable relationship, is obtained 
by pooling the within-group regression coefficients. However, an 
important assumption underlying this procedure is that there are no 
significant differences between within-group regression coefficients. 
To check this, a test of homogeniety of within-group regression 
coefficients is carried out. In addition to the assumption that the 
overall form of regression is linear, it is also assumed that there is 
linearity of regression within each treatment group. One problem in 
examining this assumption directly would be determining the significance 
of any departure from linearity. In the same way that the significance 
of tests of variance homogeniety are assessed, the probability of 
obtaining such departures from linearity (with the particular number of 
groups and sets of scores) would have to be determined in relation to the 
probability of obtaining such results by chance, from similar sub-sets 
of linearly related data. At present there are no established procedures 
for doing this. One way round this problem is to test the linearity of 
the between groups regression line. This is simply the regression of the 
dependent variable group means on the covariate group means. Any 
deviation from linearity of regression within any of the groups will 
distort the linearity of the between groups regression line and 
consequently, any departure from linearity within the treatment groups 
will be assessed by this test.
The most efficient order of tests of the assumptions underlying the 
ANCOVA is therefore:-
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(1) linearity of overall regression line.
(2) homogeneity of within group regression lines.
(3) linearity of between group regression line.
(A) normal distribution and homogeneity of within group variances.
The first assumption has already been checked in relation to the 
determination of the most efficient predictor of P-item recall. The 
assumption of homogeneous within group regression lines was not 
challenged by the results of its test, F(5,36) = 0.721. A subsequent 
test of the linearity of the regression between the group means; given 
the homogeniety of the within group regression lines, was not 
significant, F (4,4 1 ) = 0.005. It can be assumed therefore, that the 
assumptions of homogeneous and linear within group regression lines are 
tenable.
The last assumptions to be tested are those of within group variance 
homogeneity and normality of distribution. Here the usual tests of 
homogeneity (with appropriate df reduction) can be used with the adjusted 
dependent variable scores (Huitema, 1980, p.118). Harley’s F-max was 
computed; using the adjusted values presented in the top section of table 
7.A., and revealed no significant departures from the assumptions of 
normality and variance homogeneity, F-max(6,6) = 5.95.
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CONDITION ABA BAB ABB BAA ACB BCA
X RECALL 6.12 7.25 3.87 5.37 5.00 4.37
S. D. 3.18 5.23 3.87 3.58 3.25 2.82
CONDITION SAME 
FAMILIAR(SF)
DIFFERENT 
FAMILIAR(DF!
DIFFERENT 
I UNFAMILIAR(DU)
X RECALL 6.68 4 . 62 4 . 68
S.D. 4 . 33 3.72 3 . 04
Table 7.2. Unadjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items.
CONDITION ABA BAB ABB BAA ACB BCA
MEAN 5.00 5.87 6.00 7.37 6.50 6.25
S.D. 1 .85 1.46 1.07 1.51 1.69 1.83
CONDITION SAME 
FAMILIAR(SF)
DIFFERENT 
FAMILIAR(DF)
DIFFERENT 
UNFAMILIAR(DU)
MEAN 5.43 6.68 6 .37
S.D. 1 . 67 1 .31 1 .76
Table 7.3. Covariate mean and standard deviation.
CONDITION ABA BAB ABB BAA ACB BCA
X RECALL 7.58 7.61 4.08 3.87 4.58 4.27
S.D. 1.83 4.46 3.05 3.38 3.28 2.37
CONDITION
SAME
' FAMILIAR(SF)
DIFFERENT 
FAMILIAR(DF)
DIFFERENT 
UNFAMILIAR(DF)
X RECALL 7.59 3.98 4.42
S.D. 3.41 3.21 2.86
Table 7.4. Adjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items.
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3.1.3. overall ANCOVA F-tests.
As in experiment one, a 3 x 2 (presentation-recall environment
match/recall environment familiarity x presentation environment) 
completely randomised design was applied. The dependent variable was 
subjects' P scores and the covariate was their RHTS scores.
Figure 7.1. illustrates the significant main effect of presentation- 
recall environment match/recall environment familiarity, F ( 2,A 1) = 5.37, 
MSe = 10.29. The other main effect of presentation environment was not 
significant, F(1,41) = 0.03, nor was the interaction between these two 
factors, F(2,41) = 0.01. The pooled within group regression coefficient 
of P-item recall on RHTS was 1.246.
R
E
C 4
A
L
L 2
ABA BAB 
SF
ABB BAA 
OF
ACB BCA 
DU
Figure 7**1- Adjusted mean recall of P-items per group
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3.1.4. specific comparisons.
Again, as in experiment one, planned orthogonal pair-wise comparisons; 
using Fisher's protected LSD (Huitema, 1980; Kirk, 1982), confirmed that 
the significant main effect was due to the difference between SF and DF 
conditions, t(41) = 3.019. An orthogonal comparison (two-tailed)
between the means of the DF and DU conditions revealed the unpredicted 
superiority of DU condition recalls to be non-significant t(41 ) = 0.381 
(see table 7.4. and figure 7.1.)
3.1.5. power and degree of association.
A post-hoc analysis of the power (1-B) of the F-test identifying the
significant main effect revealed it to be operating at approximately
2
0.95. The degree of association (W ) between the significant main effect 
and subjects P scores was calculated to be 0.166.
3.2. ANOVA Of P. R And F-Item Recall.
3.2.1. preliminary analysis.
As in chapter three, P, R and F-item recall was prepared for analysis by 
calculating the proportion of the total number of items presented, that 
were recalled. No significant departures from the assumption of 
normally distributed data was found with the proportion recall of P, R 
and F-items, skew/standard error and kurtosis/standard error < 1.96.
Prior to further analyses the proportion values were multiplied by 100 
to produce percentage recall. The only reason for doing this was to make 
the scores more meaningful.
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Hartley's F-max test on the between subject scores indicated that the 
assumption of homogeneous error variances was tenable, F-max(6,7) =
3.19. Table 7.5. contains the means and standard deviations pertaining 
to this analysis.
Condition ABA BAB ABB BAA ACB BCA
X recall 34 . 65 29 . 03 34 .65 35.49 33. 19 32.43
S.D. 16.95 16.04 18.31 20.38 14.95 11.40
Table 7.5. Percentage mean and standard deviation of total P, R and 
F-item recall per condition.
As in chapter three, Anderson's (1958, p.259) symmetry test indicated 
that the probability of the heterogeneity of variance of differences 
occurring by chance was 0.005.
3.2.2. overall F-tests on word type recall.
A three factor ( 3 x 2 x 2 )  mixed design analysis; with repeated measures 
on the third factor, was carried out. The first two factors were 
identical to those described in the previous analyses, while the third 
factor expressed the type of word recalled (P, R or F-item). Table 7.6. 
contains a summary of the results of this ANOVA, while Table 7.7. 
contains the means and standard deviations pertaining to the word type 
comparison.
SOURCE df mean square F P
Huynh-Feldt 
P
FML 2 131 .732 0.34 0.714
LE 1 123.457 0.32 0.576
FL 2 135.783 0 .35 0.707
error 42 387.908
word type (W) 2 21756.780 99.66 0.000
W x FML 4 468.885 2.15 0.086
W x LE 2 287.346 1.32 0. 273
W x FML x LE 4 255.922 1.17 0.329
error 84 218.314
Table 7.6. Summary of the three factor mixed ANOVA.
P  R  F
X
I
| 8 . 8 9
i
4  8 . 3 3 4  2 . 5 0
S . D .
1
| 6 . 2 3  
1
1 7 . 0 8 2 2 . 2 3
Table 7.7. Percentage mean and standard deviation of recall of each 
word type.
However, in addition to this significant effect, the interaction between 
presentation-recall environment match/recall environment familiarity 
and word type approached significance. The means and standard 
deviations of the pertinent comparisons are presented in Table 7.8. and
plotted in figure 7.2..
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S F D F D U
x  1 1 1 . 1 5 7 . 7 1 7 . 8 1
p 1
S . D .  | 
1
7 . 2 1 6 . 2 2 5 .  08
x  1 4 9 . 3 7 4 6  . 87 4 8 . 7 5
R |
S . D .  | 
1
1 1 . 7 6 2 0 . 4 2 1 7 . 8 8
x  1 3 5 . 0 0 5 0 . 6 2 41 . 87
F  |
S . D .  | 
1
2 5 . 0 4 2 5 . 8 9 1 3 . 5 9
Table 7.8. Percentage mean and standard deviation of word type by 
condition.
Figure 7.2. Mean transformed recall of word type by condition.
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3.2.3. specific comparisons.
Pair wise (two tailed) orthogonal comparisons5 revealed a significant 
difference between overall F and P-item recall, t(84) = 9.630, but not 
between overall R and F-item recall, t(84 ) = 1.664.
3.3. Questionnaire Data
3.3.1. encoding and retrieval strategies.
As a consequence of the screening procedures described in section 1. of 
this chapter, only slight variations on the general strategy of counting 
the number of words with more than three vowels were observed. These 
variations seemed to be caused as much by the different forms of 
expression used by the different subjects, as any substantial 
differences in processing. As a result no attempt was made to categorise 
the descriptions of strategies employed at encoding.
Examination of the descriptions of retrieval attempts revealed a greater 
variety of strategies. One main distinction was between the items on the 
recognition test and those only presented by slide. 19 out of the 28 
subjects who completed the questionnaire made a distinction in their 
attempt to recall these items. The probability of this occurring by 
chance is 0.026 (binomial test; assuming that it is equally likely that 
subjects would, or would not distinguish between the two forms of
5 As in chapter three; because the homogeneity of variances of differ­
ences assumption was untenable, separate error terms were calculat­
ed for each comparison (Kirk, 1982).
2 3 9
presentation).
Of those 19 subjects who distinguished between the two forms of 
presentation, 8 stated that they had imagined the recognition test list 
of words on the slip of paper, as they had tried to remember. Of these 
8 subjects, 6 were in the SF conditions and 2 were in the DF conditions. 
5 subjects (3 SF and 2 DF; 3 of whom were included in the previous 8) also 
reported imagining the slide presentation, as they tried to remember.
The reasons for the brevity of the open-ended questionnaire data analysis 
will be presented in section 4.7. of the discussion.
3.3.2. rating of environmental similarity.
The median rating of the similarity of the two rooms; A and B, was 25 (X 
= 31.18, S.D. = 24.10). Regression analyses were carried out to see if 
the subjective ratings of environmental similarity (SIM) predicted P- 
item recall. As the ANCOVA reported in section 3.1. of this chapter has 
already established a difference between SF and DF conditions in terms 
of P-item recall, for simplicity it was decided to carry out two separate 
regression analyses: one for the SF, and one for the DF conditions. Table 
7.9. contains summaries of these analyses.
condit'n variable
std reg 
coef f R2
ad j 
R F df P
SF SIM -0.281 0.079 0.013 0.86 1,10 0.376
DF SIM -0.280 0.078 0.010 1.19 1 ,14 0.294
Table 7.9. Summary of SF and DF condition regression with SIM 
ratings predicting P-item recall.
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Chi-square tests of homoscedasticity indicated that this assumption was
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tenable in each analysis (SF, X = 0.13, p = 0.72; DF, X = 0.01, p =
0.92). An analysis of residual plots (as described in section 3.1.1.)
also suggested the tenability of the assumptions underlying the
regression analysis.
3.4. Multiple Linear Regression Model Predicting P-item Recall.
Apart from SIM ratings, RHTS also were found to predict P-item recall 
(see section 3.1.1.). It was decided to investigate the predictive power 
of the linear regression model employing both RHTS and SIM variables. 
For the same reasons as expressed in section 3.3.2., separate analyses 
were carried out for SF and DF conditions.
3.4.1. linear model for SF conditions.
As in section 3.1.1., a stepwise linear regression was carried out. The 
best prediction of P-item recall was obtained using RHTS only. The 
F-to-enter value for SIM was less than 1. Table 7.10. summarises the 
regression model.
variable
std reg 
coef f R2
ad j 
R F(1,10)
ad j 
P
predictor
corr
RHTS 0.723 0.523 0.476 10.98 0.000 -0.413
Table 7.10. Summary of SF condition regression model predicting 
P-item recall.
A chi-square test of homoscedasticity suggested the tenability of this
2assumption, X (1) = 0.56, p = 0.46. An examination of the plot types
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described in section 3.1.1. and obtained with the present data also 
suggested that the assumptions underlying the regression analysis were 
tenable.
3.4.2. linear model for OF conditions.
The only significant prediction of P-item recall was obtained using the 
variables RHTS and SIM. Tables 7.11. and 7.12. summarise this regression 
model.
variable R2
add
R F ( 2 . 13 )
ad j 
P
predictor
corr
RHTS, SIM 0. 433 0.346 4.97 0.049 0.172
Table 7.11. Summary of 
recall in
overall regression 
the DF conditions.
model predicting P-item
Variables
std reg 
coeff F(1,13)
ad j 
P P
RHTS 0.605 8.14 0.028 0.014
SIM -0.384 3.28 0. 177 0.093
Table 7. 12. Individual contributions of RHTS 'and SIM to model.
The chi-square test of the homoscedasticity assumption suggested this
p
was tenable, X (1) = 1.61, p = 0.21. An examination of the diagnostic 
plots described earlier and obtained with the present data, also 
suggested that the assumptions underlying the regression analysis were 
tenable.
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However, as can be seen from table 7.12., SIM does not contribute
significantly to the regression model. The slight increase in the amount
of variation accounted for when SIM is incorporated into the model allows
the calculated F-value to achieve significance at the (arbitrary) 0.05
2
level, but this slight increment in R really does not justify the 
inclusion of an extra predictor variable. Table 7.13. summarises the 
regression model incorporating RHTS only.
std reg 9 ad j ad j
variable coef f R R F (1 , 14) P
RHTS 0. 539 0. 290 0.240 5.73 0.061
Table 7.13. Summary of regression model predicting P-item recall in 
the DF conditions incorporating RHTS only.
Once again, but with RHTS as the sole predictor of P-item recall in the
DF condition, the chi-square test suggested that the homoscedasticity
2assumption was tenable, X (1) = 0.86, p = 0.35. An examination of the 
plot types described previously and obtained with the present data, also 
suggested that the assumptions underlying the regression analysis were 
tenable.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. The use of P-item recall data.
As in chapter three, the data revealing the effect of environmental 
context was subjects' P-item recall scores. The argument for employing 
P-item recall as the primary data is the same in this experiment as it 
was in the last. However, in this situation where an attempt was made 
to determine the mode of processing that subjects would employ as they 
encoded the word stimuli, the rational is more obvious through its 
seemingly greater pertinence. A single score; the total of P, R and 
F-item recall, would represent not only any variation in the processing 
of the stimuli list, but also the influence of the re-presentation of a 
sub-set of these items, the presentation of new items (fillers) and the 
accompanying variation in processing modes and presentation times. The 
division of recall into P, R and F-item categories is in an attempt to 
reduce the number of potential effects, represented by each score. The 
magnitude of the word category effects, in this and the previous 
experiment, would seem to validate such a division.
4.2. The operation of ANCOVA.
Prior to further discussion, it may be useful to consider the operation 
of the analysis of covariance. Such a discussion may prove useful not 
only for the elucidation of the present experimental results, but also 
for subsequent experiments in which ANCOVA is the primary method of data 
analysis.
2 4 4
Analysis of covariance is the product of the combination of two 
statistical techniques: (linear^) regression analysis and analysis of 
variance. As well as recording a measure on the dependent variable for 
each subject, one or more concomitant (control) variables must be 
measured. The concomitant variables represent a source of variance that 
is not controlled by the experimental procedures and is assumed to 
influence the dependent variable. The ANCOVA procedure adjusts the 
dependent variable such that the effect of the variation represented by 
the concomitant variable is removed. The benefit of such a procedure is 
that it allows a more accurate analysis of the effects of the 
experimental variables.
To remove the variation in the dependent variable scores that is 
associated with the concomitant variable, the weighted average (pooled) 
regression coefficient of the regression of the dependent variable, 
across each of the experimental conditions is calculated. The linear 
model for the completely randomised one factor, one covariate ANCOVA is 
therefore,
(1) Yij = u + Aj + b (Xi j - X) + ei(j),
for i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,p, where Yij is the i * th subject's score 
in the j'th treatment, u is the general mean of all Y scores, A is the 
effect of the j'th treatment level, b is the regression coefficient of
7 ANCOVA can be carried out using non-linear regression. However, 
even in situations where non-linearity is present transformations 
to achieve linearity are usually carried out in preference to the 
application of non-linear regression. Some of the reasons for this 
are the greater complexity of non-linear regression calculations 
and the difficulty of interpreting non-linearly adjusted effects 
(Draper 8c Smith, 1981).
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the dependent variable (Y) on the predictor variable (X), Xij is the 
covariate (predictor variable) score corresponding to the Yij, X is the 
mean of all covariate scores, and ei(j) reflects random variation due to 
any uncontrolled source. The model for the completely randomised ANOVA 
is ,
(2) Yij = u + Aj + ei(j ) .
Applying a little bit of algebra to the linear models above, the model 
for the values free of the effects of the concomitant variable can be 
obtained,
(3) Yaij = Yij - b(Xij - X) = u + Aj + ei(j).
The models for analyses employing more than one factor are simple 
generalisations of the one factor case, with additional terms to 
represent the extra factors and their interactions. For example, the two 
factor model for ANCOVA is,
(4) Yijk = u + Aj + Bk + (AB)jk + b(Xijk - Xjk) + ei(jk),
with the term B representing the effect of the k’th treatment level and 
the term AB representing the interaction between the treatment levels. 
The corresponding ANOVA model is,
(5) Yijk = u + Aj + Bk + (AB)jk + ei(jk).
. ' * ■
Consequently, the model for the adjusted scores is,
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(6) Yaijk = Yijk - b(Xijk - Xjk) = u + Aj + Bk + (AB)jk + ei(jk).
Apart from providing an estimate of the normal ANOVA terms as in models
(2) and (5) , the ei( j) in models (3) and (6) are likely to be smaller than
those in (2) and (5) due to the extraction of variance associated with
the concomitant variable. The reduction in the error term is despite a 
decrease in the error term degrees of freedom: the denominator producing 
the error means square, which is a consequence of the regression 
adjustment. Usually, the variance removed by the regression (unless 
systematic) can be accommodated only by the error parameter in the ANOVA 
model.
Useful illustrations of the effect of such ANCOVA operations are provided 
by Kirk (1982). Figure 7.3. graphically presents two hypothetical 
experimental conditions. The relationship between the dependent 
variable (Y) and the concomitant variable (X) forms a scatterplot for 
each condition represented by the two ellipses.
Y
C o n d i t i o n a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  Y f o r  a  
g i v e n  v a l u e  o f  X
M a r g i n a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  Y
X
Figure 7.3. Scatterplots for two treatments when covariate means 
are equal (from Kirk, 1982).
2 4 7
Through each ellipsis is a line representing the regression of Y on X. 
In ANOVA the error variance is determined by the dispersion of the 
marginal distributions, while in ANCOVA it is determined by the 
dispersion of the conditional distributions. The greater the 
correlation between X and Y, the narrower are the ellipses and the 
greater is the reduction of the error variance in the ANCOVA.
Figure 7.3. reflects a situation in which the concomitant variable group 
means are equal. However, it is possible, even with random allocation 
and particularly without it, for situations to arise in which the 
concomitant variable means will not be equal across conditions. Figure 
7.4. presents some examples of the types of effect that can be obtained 
in such circumstances.
adj  -2
adj -2adj  - 1
x 2 X . .  X  ,
y.
adj-I
Figure 7.4. Scatterplots for two treatments when covariate means 
are different (from Kirk, 1982}.
In example (a) and (b) the difference between adjusted dependent variable 
means is less than the difference between the unadjusted means, whereas
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in example (c) the converse is true.
There may be two direct consequences of the ANCOVA procedures. The 
first, which has already been discussed is that the error variance is 
likely to be reduced. This in itself will allow a more powerful test. 
The second consequence is that the adjustment carried out on the 
dependent variable may alter the group mean values of the dependent 
variable. As the previous examples demonstrate this can either increase 
or decrease the difference between the V variable group means, depending 
upon their associated X variable group means.
Essentially, ANCOVA can be considered as consisting of two procedures. 
The first procedure is an adjustment of dependent variable scores on the 
basis of the regression of these scores on the concomitant variable 
scores. The second procedure is an analysis of variance on these 
adjusted scores.
4.3. Evidence of non-elaborative processing.
A quick comparison of the number of P-item words correctly recalled in 
this experiment with the number obtained from subjects in the last, gives 
much credence to the claim that with respect to forming descriptions of 
the word stimuli, a lower level of processing was in operation. Despite 
the other differences between the two experiments, it seems unlikely that 
any factor other than a change of processing mode could explain such an 
overall decrement in recall.
Further evidence from the subjects’ recall supporting the view that low 
level processing was being carried out on the words, comes from the
different patterns of word type recall effects reported in the two
2 4 9
experiments. In both experiments the filler items are introduced after 
the major word presentation and in both experiments they serve the same 
purpose in the recognition task. However, differences occur in the type 
of processing the fillers receive as part of the recognition task in the 
two experiments. As has been suggested, in experiment one little 
attention need be given to filler items due to the easy identification 
of the recognition items from the word list. It would be expected that 
as recognition would be more difficult in experiment two, greater 
consideration would be given to the filler items. The cross-over of P 
and F-item recall rank positions between experiments conforms with this 
viewpoint and suggests a difference in processing mode to the detriment 
of P-item recall in this experiment.
All in all, the changes in word type recall imply that the form of the 
task presented to subjects achieved the goal of eliciting a low level 
(semantic) processing mode.
4.4. P-item analysis: general conclusions.
The pattern of P-item results obtained in the present experiment 
replicates the pattern observed in experiment one and the general pattern 
of effect reported by Smith (1979, expt.1). The pattern of results 
obtained in all of these studies supports the view that the environmental 
context effect is a consequence of a match/mismatch between presentation 
and test environment contexts.
Despite the alterations to the two rooms, the observation of an 
environmental context effect indicates that sufficient differences (of 
some sort) between rooms still remain. Indeed, the magnitude of effect 
is greater in this experiment than it was in experiment one. This is
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despite the feeling that there was a reduction in the degree of 
difference between rooms and that this could have precluded any effect. 
Given such a situation, it is tempting to attribute the increase in 
effect to the change of processing mode. However, apart from the changes 
in environments and experimental procedure, the use of ANCOVA and the 
increase of power associated with such an analysis also contributes to 
the general muddle of factors varying between experiments that confounds 
any direct comparison.
Under the ANCOVA form of analysis, the nature of the room factor requires 
some mention. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight, 
ANCOVA equates recall scores as if they were from subjects that had 
obtained the overall covariate mean. Consequently, in the ANCOVA the 
potential benefit (and effect) of any presentation environment is 
eliminated. The ANCOVA procedure simplifies the interpretation of the 
results, by restricting effects to recall. Consequently, the lack of 
room-specific effects is to be expected. However, the lack of influence 
of any combination of presentation room and recall environment, 
continues to suggest that some aspect(s) common to, or equal across rooms 
is involved in the production of the environmental context effect.
Although it is not possible to determine all the consequences of each of 
the changes in procedure, the general impression is that an experiment 
more sensitive to the influence of environmental context has been carried 
out. Certainly, the demonstration of an environmental context effect 
indicates that the changes in procedure have had no effect on the basic 
result of the experiment.
4.5. Assessment of the familiarity hypothesis.
Given the task of drawing the intermediate environment which is likely 
to make the subject more familiar with this room than any other and the 
overall experimental results, one would seem able to conclude that 
environmental familiarity has no influence on subjects' recall.
As a last attempt to resurrect the notion that environmental familiarity 
has influence on recall, it could be argued that the lack of a difference 
between DF and DU conditions was due to the similarity of rooms A and B. 
To maintain this position in the light of the environmental context 
effect observed, it would have to be said that higher levels of 
difference between environments are necessary to produce differences in 
recall on the basis of the familiarity of recall environment, than are 
necessary to effect differences on the basis of a match or mismatch 
between presentation and test environments. Such an account would 
require a considerable change in the model underlying the original 
familiarity hypothesis, and still would have to admit that the influence 
of recall environment familiarity cannot account for the data observed 
in these and presumably other environmental context studies.
4.6. ANOVA of P. R and F-item recall.
Apart from examining the main effect of word type on recall 
the ANOVA also was focussed on the possibility of a 
interaction between the presentation-recall environment 
environment familiarity, and word type factors.
The argument presented to account for the main effect of word type was
that subjects processed recognition task items more elaborately than
, interest in 
significant 
match/recall
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P-items because of the task differences between the original 
presentation and the recognition task, while the further increment of 
R-item recall was attributed to these items having been presented twice. 
P-items should have been processed only once in a non-elaborative manner. 
Within the experiment therefore, there are different levels of 
processing of word types. As a result it might be expected that there 
would be some evidence pertaining to the predictions drawn from the model 
presented in chapter six. If the predictions of an effect of 
environmental context with low level, but not high level processing are 
supported by the data, there should be an interaction between the two 
factors mentioned above. The specific form of the interaction should be 
an increment in the recall of P-items in the SF condition in comparison 
to P-item recall in DF and DU conditions, with R and F-item recall being 
unaffected by the particular SF, DF or DU condition.
Although the pertinent interaction did not reach the 0.05 level of 
significance, it came close enough to warrant consideration. However, 
an inspection of the form of the interaction suggests that rather than 
it being due to the pattern of P-item recall alone, the major 
contribution is from the pattern of F-item recall. There would seem to 
be no theoretical reason as to why F-item recall should be so affected. 
However, tracing the greater recall of F-items in the DF condition back 
to the raw data reveals that this increment is caused by three (out of 
sixteen) subjects recalling an unusually high number of filler items. 
So, whatever the reason for these subjects' recall including a large 
number of F-items, it does not seem to have been shared by the other 
subjects in the same condition.
In relation to the lack of an effect caused by a greater recall of P-items 
in the SF condition, a lack of power would seem to be the cause. In the
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original P-item analysis greater power was provided by the use of RHTS 
as a covariate (concomitant/control variable). It is also worth noting 
that other than reducing the error term, the effect of the ANCOVA was to 
increase the difference between the recalls obtained in the SF, and DF 
and DU conditions. This is because; despite random allocations of 
subjects, the degree of elaborate processing being carried out by 
subjects across SF, DF and DU conditions was not equal. The degree of 
relationship between RHTS and recall is such that even small differences 
in RHTS can have a significant and potentially distortive effect on the 
pattern of results obtained.
It would appear that this retrospective analysis has not provided a 
short-cut answer to the question of whether or not mode of processing 
interacts with the influence of environmental context. As has been said 
already, this question will be returned to; with more appropriate data 
upon which to base an answer, in the next chapter.
4.7. Open-ended questionnaire data.
One, if not the major problem in analysing the questionnaire data is 
determining an appropriate null hypothesis to test. In only one occasion 
did it seem reasonable to define the likelihood of response. In 
situations where subjects had mentioned strategies other than dividing 
the to-be-searched sets into presentation list and recognition task 
list, it seemed impossible to identify what the range of alternative 
strategies were. Consequently, the determination of the probability of 
the subjects' choice of strategy on the basis of chance would seem to be 
impossible. Such an inability to relate subjects' performance to some 
estimate of its general likelihood means that it can be said only if the 
data conforms, or counters some intuitive notion.
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Beyond the problem of drawing inferences from such data, it is worth 
mentioning that the hope that subjects might provide some insight into 
their psychological activity was not really fulfilled. Despite
spending, sometimes extraordinary lengths of time filling out the
questionnaire, the type of self-reports provided did not really tap into
the processes that are the focus of study. Typically subjects would 
write "I could remember the words with more than three vowels easiest”, 
or "I remembered words that had some personal association". As these 
examples demonstrate, subjects were stating what the result of their 
attempts to remember were, rather than how they were able to remember 
such things.
However, despite the difficulties encountered in interpreting and
relating the open-ended questionnaire data to psychological processes, 
there was some indication that environmental context was being used to 
aid recall. Not only were some subjects consciously aware of their use 
of environmental context, but they also considered it important enough 
to write down.
4.8. Similarity ratings and recall.
It is suspected that several subjects employed a nominal type of scale,
or just "agreed" with the reminder of the form of the scale, ie. 1 =
totally different (see appendix D). This would explain why there was
such high variation in subjects' scores. The median value of 25 would 
seem to indicate a general opinion that rooms A and B were quite 
dissimilar. Although a negative relationship; indicating greater recall 
with lower similarity ratings was obtained, there was no significant 
prediction of P-item recall in either the SF or DF conditions.
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The relationship between similarity ratings and P-item recall requires 
some consideration in its interpretation. Previously, (chapter two, 
section 5.3.; this chapter, section 1.1.), the view was expressed that 
large differences in environmental contexts were more likely to give rise 
to environmental context effects than small differences. The assumption 
was that in similar environments, subjects in the DF condition would be 
able to obtain environmental information compatible with that encoded 
with the nominal stimuli items and would therefore be able to recall as 
much as subjects in the SF condition. In the SF condition, as the 
original presentation environment is also the test environment, the 
degree of similarity between the presentation environment and the other 
environment should be a redundant factor. Consequently, if there is a 
relationship between environmental similarity and subjects' ability to 
recall, evidence pertaining to this relationship should be found only in 
the DF conditions.
The first analysis demonstrated there was no significant prediction of 
P-item recall using only similarity ratings. However, as it had been 
demonstrated already that apart from the SF or DF type condition, RHTS 
also predicted P-item recall, it was decided to investigate the ability 
of similarity ratings to predict P-item recall when the variance 
explained by RHTS had been removed. These separate analyses revealed 
■that only in the DF condition was there a significant prediction of 
P-item recall made with RHTS and similarity ratings. However, the actual 
contribution of SIM was not significant. When RHTS alone was used as the 
predictor variable; although the prediction of P-item recall was no 
longer below the 0.05 level, there was no significant loss in the ability 
of the model to predict P-item recall. The situation is somewhat 
confused if the role of the alpha level is not appreciated as being quite 
an arbitrary cut off point.
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Although there are theoretical reasons for expecting the degree of 
difference between environments to influence the environmental context 
reinstatement effect, it may have been too optimistic to expect this to 
be reflected in such a crude measure as similarity ratings. However, an 
alternative is that a non-significant relationship was observed due to 
a lack of statistical power. This possibility is examined in experiment 
four (chapter nine), where a sample size of almost double that of the 
present DF condition contributes relevant data.
4.9. Examination of model predictions.
The observation of an environmental context effect with non-elaborative 
processing is one piece of evidence in accord with the model of encoding 
and retrieval presented in chapter six. Of course, the observation of 
the effect under these conditions only supports one of the predictions 
made. The second of the specific predictions is examined in the 
following chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT 
EXPERIMENT THREE
THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH LEVEL SEMANTIC ELABORATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXT REINSTATEMENT EFFECT 
A COMPARISON WITH LOW LEVEL SEMANTIC ELABORATION
1. Introduction
1.1. Aim.
In chapter seven; in line with the prediction made in chapter six, it was 
shown that low level processing was conducive to the production of an 
environmental context effect. The main purpose of the experiment 
reported in this chapter is to examine the validity of the related 
prediction that high level processing should prevent the manifestation 
of such an effect.
1.2. Implications of prediction.
The rationale behind this prediction has already been explicated in 
chapters six and seven, but essentially an environmental context effect 
is not expected with high level processing because there should be many
more ways that a target memory record could be uniquely described. Of 
course, if the assumption that the ‘inclusion of environmental context
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information is a robust aspect of processing is adhered to, the 
implication must be that there is something “better" about the use of 
non-environmental context information to distinguish between memory 
records.
Alternatively, if the assumption of the robust inclusion of 
environmental context information is dispensed with, it could be easily 
argued that environmental context information is ineffective in 
distinguishing memory records, because it is not encoded when high level 
processing is in operation. The question as to whether environmental 
context information is encoded, but not used, or not encoded at all, will 
be retuned to in chapters ten and eleven. However, a prerequisite to 
such consideration is the presentation of credible evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that high level processing does indeed inhibit the 
manifestation of an environmental context effect.
1.3. Experimental promotion of elaborative processing.
' ■+
For the experiment described in chapter seven, a major problem was 
preventing subjects from engaging in elaborate processing. In the 
present experiment there is the comparatively easy task of promoting 
elaborate processing.
One of the main reasons for the ease with which elaborate processing can 
be elicited from subjects, is their tendency to search for meaning 
(Bartlett, 1932). In terms of the present model, the search for meaning
translates to elaboration, as the cognitive (and emotive) structures
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that accommodate the stimuli are instantiated.
The benefit of mnemonic strategies such as constructing a story using 
stimuli words, or forming an integrated image of the stimuli items is 
well documented (eg. Bower, 1972b; Bower & Clark, 1969; Bower & Winzenz, 
1970). The explanations of why such benefit should be obtained from the 
use of such encoding strategies have much in common with the type of 
consequences of elaborate processing suggested by the schema model. 
Baddeley (1976, p.355-357) in particular, identifies the discriminative 
capacity and redundancy of coding available with semantic elaborate 
processing.
In an attempt to ensure an elaborate representation of the word stimuli; 
as well as anticipate what some subjects might do anyway, it was decided 
to instruct subjects to employ both story construction and imagery 
mnemonics. Subjects were told to form a story using the words as they 
were presented and at the same time, imagine the events*of their story 
in their minds eye.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
48 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were naive 
regarding the purpose of the experiment and were paid one pound for 
taking part.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Rooms A and B were employed in the experiment. Descriptions of these 
rooms can be found in appendix A.
2.3. Stimuli, apparatus and questionnaire:
The stimuli, apparatus and questionnaire used in this experiment 
were identical to those used in experiment two; described in chapter 
seven.
2.4. Design:
A two factor (2 x 2) between subjects design was applied. The first 
factor was defined by the relationship between the presentation 
environment and the recall environment; same or different. The 
second factor was defined by the two learning environments, rooms 
A and B.
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2.5. Procedure:
Again, this was a replication of the procedure employed in 
experiment two. The only procedural difference between the two 
experiments was the type of instructions given to subjects prior to 
the presentation of the stimuli words. Subjects were told that 
their task was to memorise all of the words that they would be 
presented with, but in a particular way. It was explained that 
their ability to remember the words would be aided if they 
incorporated the words into some sort of story format and at the 
same time imagined the events of the story; in their minds eye, as 
they constructed it. Subjects were then asked to use this mnemonic, 
bearing in mind that their use of the words in the story did not have 
to follow the order of the word presentation.
2.6. Scoring:
Each subjects' verbal recall protocol was transcribed and scored in 
the same manner as reported in chapter seven.
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3. Results.
3.1. ANCOVA Of P-Item Recall.
3.1.1. selection of a covariate.
As in chapter seven, a stepwise linear regression was carried out to 
determine the most efficient predictor of P-item recall and to ensure 
that the overall regression of predicted and predictor variables was 
linear. The two predictor variables employed were; RHTS and RFAS.1
Again, the best prediction of P-item recall was obtained using RHTS only.
Although the F-to-enter value for RFAS was 5.01, this value was not
. . 2 
significant at the 0.05 level. Table 8.1. gives those values associated
with the simple regression equation.
std reg adj adj predictor
variable coeff R R F (1 ,46) P corr
RHTS 0.451 0.204 0.177 7.68 0.018 0.013
Table 8.1. Summary of simple regression of P-item recall on RHTS.
1 For the same reasons as detailed in chapter seven (section 3.1.1.), 
d ‘ scores were not employed as a predictor.
2 see chapter seven, section 3.1.1.
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A chi-square test of homoscedasticity suggested the tenability of this 
2
assumption, X (1) = 0.02, p = 0.88. An examination of the plot types 
described in chapter seven (section 3.1.1.) and obtained with the 
present data, also suggested that the assumptions underlying the 
regression analysis were tenable and consequently, that linear 
regression was appropriate.
3.1.2. preliminary analysis for ANCOVA.
The same type and order of ANCOVA assumption checks described in chapter 
seven (section 3.1.2.) were followed in this analysis.
The linearity of the overall regression line was supported by the results 
of the regression analysis described in the previous section. The test 
of homogeneous within group regression lines did not provide any evidence 
to the contrary , F (3 , 24 ) = 1.00, nor did the test of the linearity of the 
between group means, F(2,27) > 0.00.
The top section of table 8.4. presents the data upon which Hartley's 
F-max test was carried out. This revealed no significant departures from 
the assumptions of normality and variance homogeneity, F-max(4,6) =
2.17.
*
The results of these tests indicated that the assumptions underlying the 
ANCOVA were tenable.
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CONDITION ABA BAB ABB BAA
X RECALL 20.75 17.75 19. 12 19.37
S.D. 8.31 8.38 8.89 7.63
CONDITION SAME DIFFERENT 
FAMILIAR(SF) FAMILIAR(DF)
X RECALL 19.25 19. 24
S.D. 8.34 8.28
Table 8.2. Unadjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items.
CONDITION 
X RECALL 
S.D.
ABA BAB ABB BAA 
8.37 7.37 7.62 8.12 
0.52 1.30 1.51 0.83
CONDITION SAME DIFFERENT 
FAMILIAR(SF) FAMILIAR(DF)
X RECALL 7.87 7.87
S.D. 0 .99 * 1.22
Table 8.3. Covariate mean and standard.deviation.
CONDITION ABA BAB ABB BAA
X RECALL 19.10 19.39 19.95 18.55
S.D. 7.43 6.66 9.18 6.23
CONDITION SAME DIFFERENT
FAMILIAR II SF) FAMILIAR(DF)
X RECALL 19.24 19.25
S.D. 7.06 7.84
Table 8.4. Adjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items.
265
3.1.3. overall ANCOVA F-tests.
A 2 x 2 (presentation-recall environment match/mis-match x presentation 
environment) completely randomised design was applied. The dependent 
variable was subjects' P scores and the covariate was their RHTS scores.
Unlike the ANCOVA analysis reported in chapter seven (section 3.1.3.), 
the main effect of presentation-recall environment match did not even 
approach significance, F (1,27) < 0.00, MSe = 57.86. As before, neither 
presentation environment, F(1,27) = 0.04, nor the presentation-recall 
environment match by presentation environment interaction, F(1,27) = 
0.09, was significant. The pooled within group regression coefficient 
of P-item recall on RHTS was 3.290.
3.1.4. Power.
Assuming that an effect of environmental context; if manifested under 
these conditions, would have the same magnitude as that observed in 
chapter seven, the power (1-B) of the relevant F-test in this analysis 
would be operating at approximately 0.10. In order to achieve the same 
power at the same level of significance as the comparable F-test reported 
in the previous ANCOVA analysis, the sample size would need to be 
increased from 32 to 288 subjects. Alternatively, the power of the 
F-test could be increased by reducing the level at which the F-value is 
regarded as significant. However, the probability that the observed 
difference between the two means occurred by chance, is unity (ie. p = 
1.00). Obviously, it is not credible to set the level of significance 
at 1.00, irrespective of the power achieved by doing so.
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3.2. Questionnaire data.
3.2.1. encoding and retrieval strategies.
All subjects reported that they had attempted to construct a story and 
image of the story's events from the words presented to them; as directed 
by the experimenter's instructions, and that they had reconstructed the 
story and images as part of their attempt to recall the presented words. 
However, it seems that most subjects were unable to incorporate all the 
presented words into one coherent story and instead adopted the (sub) 
strategy of forming several smaller stories.
In addition to using the story and image mnemonics at retrieval, nine 
subjects (4 SF, 5 DF) distinguished between the presentation and list 
words, while one subject in the DF condition reported using "the room 
itself to jog... memory". Another subject in the SF condition mentioned 
an attempt to “recall moods and atmospheres ttyat ..(she)..had related 
with these words" to help her remember.
Another interesting aspect of the recall reports was that only one 
subject mentioned any difficulty in identifying the presented words from 
their total remembrances. Byway of explanation, the subject attributed 
this to using the imagery mnemonic too heavily.
3.2.2. rating of environmental similarity.
The median rating of the similarity of the two rooms; A and B, was 30 
(X = 34.89, S.D. = 21.50) .
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3.3. Combined Analysis Of Experiments Two And Three.
3.3.1. introduction.
A comparison of the ANCOVA results obtained in experiments two and three 
reveals that the reinstatement effect observed in the former experiment 
was not observed in the latter experiment. Nevertheless, in strict
statistical terms, this is not equivalent to saying that there is a 
significantly different reinstatement effect in one experiment as 
compared to the other. To assess the significance of difference between 
effects. it is necessary to examine the interaction between the
experiments (ie. type of processing) and the environmental 
reinstatement/change factor. The only way to do this is to carry out a 
combined analysis of the two experiments. However, there are two issues
to consider in relation to such an analysis: one is primarily
methodological and the other is primarily statistical, but as always, the 
boundary between the two is hazy.
3.3.2. subject allocation.
The first issue concerns the preference of random allocation of subjects 
to conditions. The use of the word "preference" stems from the fact that 
in many studies where random allocation is impossible, conventional 
statistical analyses are still carried out. As this is generally 
acceptable; provided care is taken in the interpretation of the results, 
obviously it is not an absolute necessity to randomly allocate subjects 
H o  conditions.
The preference for random allocation derives from the assumptions
underlying the determination of the sampling distribution of a data set
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and consequently, the test of the null hypothesis. The assumption of 
randomness is essentially that there is no systematic effect on the 
allocation of scores. Of course, in most scientific investigations some 
source of systematic effect on the allocation of scores is hypothesised, 
but all other effects on scores are assumed to be random. On this basis, 
if the estimated probability of such a partition of scores is low enough, 
the null hypothesis may be rejected. However, it is only if the 
systematic effect on the scores can be attributed to only that source 
identified as the independent variable, that the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and acceptance of the alternative hypothesis can be 
considered to support the model with which the latter hypothesis 
conforms. Therefore, random allocation of subjects to conditions is one 
way of trying to ensure that no other source of systematic bias effects 
the scores. If random allocation is not carried out, it must be 
carefully considered whether the method of subject allocation would 
produce any systematic effect on the scores.
In each of the experiments two and three, subjects were randomly 
allocated to the different conditions. In all experiments reported, 
subjects were obtained from the same population: Glasgow University 
undergraduate students. Across all the experiments reported in this 
thesis, the only difference between experiments in terms of subject 
allocation, is the time period within which each group of subjects was 
obtained. However, several experiments were carried out in 
comparatively quick succession, with each experiment extending over a 
period of time longer than the gap between experiments. One consequence 
of this was that subjects recruited towards the end of one experiment 
were likely to be taking part in this experiment nearer in time to 
subjects participating at the beginning of the next experiment, than 
subjects taking part in the same experiment, but who were recruited at
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its start. So although there is a difference in terms of the periods of 
time in which the subjects were allocated, these periods are not as 
distinct as at first they may appear.
If clearly distinct time periods are assumed, the question this raises 
is what kind of influence could this have? The only plausible effect of 
such sampling is that different types of subject would be available and 
so different types of subject would take part in the different 
experiments. This could happen possibly, if certain experiments were 
carried out around exam times. It might be expected that in these 
situations the type of subject taking part in experiments would not have 
exams, or would be less concerned about them than other subjects who may 
have participated in experiments conducted at other times. However, 
this argument seems rather unlikely given the attitudes of the majority 
of potential subjects to their exams and especially when this was 
combined with the prospect of earning a pound in about thirty minutes. 
When it is also considered that there was a subject pool of some ten 
thousand students, in different and changing pre, post and non-exam 
states, any real influence is doubtful. In addition, for this factor to 
exert an effect on the results of any combined analysis, it would have 
to be assumed that significantly different sub-groups would be selected 
and that these group types would interact with the variables manipulated 
between experiments. Such occurrences would seem to be quite unlikely.
Beyond the details of random allocation and the potential consequences 
of non-randomness, there would seem to be a contradiction between the 
apparent acceptance of the validity of comparing the results, of completed 
experimental analyses (as in reviews etc.) and the assumed equivocality 
of a more rigorous and formal statistical comparison. Although it might 
be argued that the potential differences between experiments; in such
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terms as have been discussed, are implicit in any review comparison, it 
seems that they are unlikely to be made explicit unless it suites the 
purposes of the reviewer.
3.3.3. statistical analysis.
The second issue for consideration concerns the manner of the statistical 
comparison. The purpose of the ANCOVAs was to examine the experimental 
manipulations when that variation known to be associated with RHTS was 
removed. The relationship between RHTS and P-item recall is regarded as 
reflecting the degree of elaborative processing carried out by subjects 
at presentation. In ANCOVA the covariation of covariate and dependent 
variable is eliminated by extracting that variation determined by the 
deviation from the overall covariate mean. In other words, the variation 
in the dependent variable due to variation in the covariate is eliminated 
by adjusting the dependent variable score to that expected if all 
subjects had obtained the overall covariate mean as their covariate 
score. Consequently; in order that only variation unaffected by the 
experimental treatments is removed, the covariate must not be influenced 
by the experimental manipulations. It is a failure to meet this 
requirement that prohibits the use of RHTS as a covariate in a combined 
ANCOVA. Although RHTS is independent of the differences in recall 
environment within each experiment (as being measured before their 
introduction assures), this independence does not extend to the type of 
instructions that subjects received. As would be expected, RHTS is 
influenced by the level of processing induced by the task instructions. 
This is clearly revealed by an ANOVA comparison of the covariate scores 
obtained in the two experiments, F( 1 ,78) = 25.68. As there are no
alternative acceptable covariates, an ANCOVA cannot be performed.
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Although a combined analysis cannot be carried out using ANCOVA 
procedures, still it is possible to extract the variation associated with 
the covariate, and compare the effects of the two experiments. In fact, 
one way of doing this is suggested by the ANCOVA linear model (see chapter 
seven, section A.2.).
The model underlying the ANCOVA defines each subject's score as 
consisting of the usual ANOVA model components, plus a component that is 
a function of the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
covariate. By subtracting this component representing the relationship 
between the covariate and dependent variable, the adjusted score is 
obtained. The linear model therefore, provides a means of calculating 
a score for each subject that is free of the variation associated with 
the covariate.
The two separate ANCOVAs carried out in this and the previous chapter, 
provide the values required for the calculation of the adjusted scores. 
Each adjusted score would be based on the particular relationship between 
P-item recall and RHTS as described by the within group regression 
coefficient for that processing condition and the average RHTS score for 
that processing condition.
Adjusting scores on the basis of specific group regression lines, rather 
than on the basis of an average regression line has advantages and 
disadvantages. On the plus side is the fact that as more unique
information is preserved regarding the different conditions, more 
accurate adjustments are likely to be made to the scores (Winer, 1971). 
In addition, as the adjustment to each subject's score is made with 
respect to the particular covariate group mean, any difference between 
groups will be maintained. On the minus side is the fact that a degree
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of freedom is lost with every regression line that is used.
In chapter seven (section 4.2.), the ANCOVA was heuristically described
as consisting of two procedures: an adjustment to the scores identical
to that described above, and an ordinary ANOVA of these adjusted scores.
If this was a totally accurate description of the ANCOVA procedure, it
may be wondered why such restrictive assumptions as homogeniety of within
group regression coefficients are made, when the different groups could
have their adjusted scores calculated separately using different
regression coefficients. In fact, some of the ANCOVA assumptions such
as the homogeniety of within group regression coefficients and the
validity of the covariate overall mean are made on the basis of
3
computational convenience, rather than theoretical necessity.
Unfortunately however, the ANCOVA adjustment is not as straight-forward 
as previously described and actually involves the use of two regression 
lines: the overall regression of the dependent variable on the covariate 
and the pooled within group regression of the dependent variable on the 
covariate. The former is used to adjust the total sum of squares while 
the latter is used to adjust the error sum of squares. Treatment effects 
are obtained by subtraction.
This roundabout method of adjustment is in an attempt to maintain the 
independence of the F-ratio numerator and denominator, which is one of 
the F-test assumptions. The adjustment on the basis of the two
3 For example, Searle (1971) has provided alternative computational 
procedures for ANCOVA with heterogeneous within group regression 
coefficients.
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regression lines described above, maintains this independence, whereas 
an adjustment on the basis of the single within groups regression line 
could produce correlated scores. However, Lindquist (1953) has shown 
that if a dependent variable is normally distributed, the numerator 
(MSB6) and denominator (MSWG) are statistically independent. This is 
because MSBG depends on the means of the samples, whereas MSWG depends 
on the variance of the samples and with normally distributed data, the 
mean and variance are independent. Consequently, if it can be assumed 
that the adjusted scores are normally distributed, the assumptions of the 
F-ratio would be satisfied and it would be valid to perform an ANOVA on 
the adjusted scores.
Although an F-max test has already been carried out on the adjusted 
scores and this test is sensitive to departures from normality as well 
as variance homogeniety, it would seem valid to examine the data further 
for two reasons. First, the F-max test is not very powerful and though 
this power was satisfactory in relation to the previous analyses, it 
seems appropriate in this rather novel situation that more stringent 
criteria be applied. Secondly, a glance at the within group variances 
of the two experiments suggests that a transformation to achieve 
homogeniety of variance may be in order. An assessment of the tenability 
of the normality and homogeniety of variance assumptions will be required 
after the data transformation.
3.3.3. preliminary analysis.
One method of assessing the assumption of normally distributed data is 
to carry out a chi-squared test, as suggested by Hays (1973). In order 
to carry out this test, some set of arbitrary class intervals must be 
arranged. The number of scores falling into each class interval is
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compared to that expected under the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution. Hays states that the expected frequency in each interval 
must be five or more. Unfortunately, as there are only sixteen subjects 
per group (collapsing across the non-significant factor of presentation 
environment), the maximum number of class intervals possible, with five 
expected scores, is only three. As the calculation also involves the use 
of the mean and standard deviation, a total of three degrees of freedom 
are lost. This leaves a chi-squared value with zero degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, this test cannot be applied sensibly to this data.
An alternative to the chi-square assessment is that suggested by Engelman 
(1983) and previously applied to the data reported in chapters three and 
seven. Engelman employs the ratio of the sample skew and kurtosis values 
to the sample standard error. This value is read as a Z-score and so can 
provide a probability of the skew and kurtosis values deviating from the 
normal by chance. In other words it operates as a significance test.
An examination of the adjusted scores of experiments two and three in 
terms of the skew and kurtosis values just described (skew/S.E. CSK], 
kurtosis/S.E. [KU]) suggested that the assumption of normally 
distributed data was tenable. However, an F-max test indicated a 
significant departure from the assumption of variance homogeniety, F- 
maxU , 14 ) = 6.00.
Logarithmic and square root data transformations were investigated, with 
least variance heterogeniety being observed after the log transformation 
Y ‘ = log(Y + 2), F-max(4,14) = 3.26. Subsequent examination of SK and 
KU values suggested that the assumption of normally distributed data was
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tenable also.* Table 0.5. presents the mean, standard deviation, SK
KU values.
processing |
I
LOW HIGH
recall cf. | 1 I
presentation. |
I
SAME | DIFF 
1
SAME | DIFF
I
X j 
1
1
1.00 | 0.79 
1
1.18
I
| 1.18 
I1
S.D. | 
1
1
0.14 | 0.25
I
0.19
1
| 0.21 
I1
SK. | 
1
I
-0.42 | -1.49
I
-0.49
I
| -0.16 
I1
KU. | 
1
I
-0.42 | -0.12
I
0. 64
1
| -1.14
I
Table 8.5. Mean, standard deviation, SK and KU values per condition
3.3.5. overall ANOVA F-tests.
A 2 x 2 (level of processing x presentation-recall environment match/mis­
match) completely randomised design was applied. The DU conditions of 
experiment three were excluded from the analysis to achieve a completely 
crossed design. The dependent variable was transformed adjusted P-item 
recall.
4 This assessment of normal distribution is actually more stringent 
than the nominal (two tailed, alpha = 0.05) level would suggest. As 
the number of SK or KU values increases, there is a greater chance 
that one or more of these would be above the critical value of 1 .96. 
The same rational leads to the use of the specially constructed 
F-max tables; rather than the normal F tables, and the alterations 
to alpha levels when multiple comparison tests are carried out.
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high
low
I
1 . 2 0 |
I
1.15 |
I
1.1 0 |
X I
1 .05 |
R I
E 1.00 |
C I
A 0.95 |
L I
L 0.90 |
I
0.85 |
I
0.80 |
I 
/
l i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SAME DIFF
Figure 8.1. Mean transformed adjusted recall by group.
Three significant effects were obtained: level of processing, F (1 , 5 8 )  =  
32.26, MSe = 0 . 0 4 ,  presentation-recall environment match/mis-match,
F ( 1 ,  5 8 )  =  5 . 1 0  and the interaction between these two factors, F(1 ,5 8 )  = 
4.34. Figure 8 . 1 .  illustrates these effects.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. Questionnaire data.
One of the most important contributions of this data is its additional 
support for the presumed view of subjects' encoding and retrieval 
strategies.
In comparison to the variety of retrieval strategies employed in 
experiment two, subjects in this experiment seem to have been quite 
conservative. This probably reflects the productivity of the story and 
imagery retrieval mnemonics. Subjects are much more likely to change 
their retrieval strategy when it is not producing any to-be-remembered 
words, than when it is operating quite successfully.
It is also interesting to note the difference between the responses 
provided in this experiment compared to the last. Here subjects give 
much clearer basic accounts of what they did to obtain recall, rather 
than describing the category of remembered item as they had in experiment 
two. This is probably a consequence of the conscious mediation of 
retrieval through the use of the mnemonics. As a larger part of the 
retrieval process is occurring consciously, there should be a greater 
ability to introspect.
Over the course of the experiment, at no time were subjects informed that 
reconstructing/remembering the story would aid recall, although they 
were informed that the use of such mnemonics at presentation should help 
their memory for the words. However, if subjects were not aware, or had 
not assumed the method of employing the mnemonics at retrieval, then the 
appropriate use the mnemonics at retrieval by all subjects indicated that
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they learned very quickly.
Although the problem of establishing a null hypothesis to test remains: 
even on an anecdotal level, the accounts provided by subjects suggest 
some interesting manners of psychological process operation. Despite 
the apparent uniformity of the subjects' retrieval strategies in this 
experiment in comparison with the last (see section 4.2.), the number 
observed serves to indicate the potential variety of retrieval 
strategies that subjects can employ.
The comparable ratings of environmental similarity across this and the 
previous experiment excludes any account of the "non-reinstatement 
effect” in terms of differing perceptions (descriptions) of the two 
environments. In turn this emphasises the role of the encoding and 
retrieval strategies employed in eliminating the environmental 
reinstatement effect.
4.2. Levels of processing and the relationship between RHTS and 
P-item recall.
The vastly superior recognition (RHTS) and (P-item) recall performance 
in experiment three lends strong support to the view that the different 
tasks engaged in by subjects produced two different levels of semantic 
processing. One feature of the different levels of semantic processing, 
is the greater variation of P-item recall in the high level processing 
condition, before and after the covariate adjustment. The greater 
variation in high level processing condition scores suggests that a 
greater variety of successful and unsuccessful retrieval (sub) 
strategies were employed by subjects, in this condition than in the low 
level processing condition. This result contrasts with the apparent
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conservativism of the strategies reported by high level processing 
condition subjects when compared with the reports of low level processing 
condition subjects. The discord probably reflects a difference in the
criteria applied to what merits being reported. It seems likely that a
much higher criterion is applied by the high level processing condition 
subjects, as they have a greater repertoire available. In addition, the 
subjects view of the purpose of the experiment will influence their 
criteria of what to report. Consequently, basic reports of the use of 
the story and imagery mnemonics predominate.
The effect of the greater variation in the high level processing
condition pre-adjustment recall scores can be seen in the relationship 
between the standardised and unstandardised regression coefficients 
across processing conditions. Although the unstandardised regression 
coefficient in the high level processing condition is nearly three times 
that of the low level condition, the standardised regression 
coefficients (equivalent to the correlation coefficient in simple 
regression) are quite comparable.
Essentially, what the two kinds of regression coefficient reveal is that 
while the type of relationship between RHTS and P-item recall is
different between conditions; with almost three times as many words being 
recalled per RHTS item in the high level condition, the extent of the 
association between the two variables across conditions is similar. 
Presumably, the ability to predict subjects' P-item recalls from their 
RHTS scores derives from the successful use of common processes of 
remembrance in both tasks.
Mandler (1980) has suggested that recognition performance is dependent
upon two separate processes: retrieval (of context) and familiarity.
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Familiarity is considered by Mandler to be the phenomenonological 
experience of a match with information in memory that has been 
integratively processed (see chapter seven, section 1.3). What Mandler 
describes as the retrieval of context corresponds with that which has 
been described here as constructing an appropriate retrieval 
specification and as has been discussed, obtains a large degree of 
benefit from previous elaborate processing.
It should be expected therefore, that the processes common to recognition 
and recall would be those that contributed to the production of 
elaborative memory structures. Certainly, the superiority of RHTS 
scores in experiment three cf. experiment two is in accord with this 
view. However, given the degree and extent of elaborative processing 
carried out in experiment three, there seems to be relatively little 
association between RHTS and P-item recall. Indeed, it is little more 
than that observed in experiment two, when elaboration was at a minimum. 
This, in conjunction with the high P-item variation in experiment three 
already attributed to the different uses of the story and imagery 
mnemonics , suggests that the manner in which these mnemonics are employed 
at recall, does not match the way in which they benefit recognition.
4.3. Level of processing and environmental context effects.
Figure 8.1. clearly reveals the nature of the interaction effect that had 
been suggested by the separate ANCOVAs carried out on the data collected 
in experiments two and three. The observation of an environmental 
context effect when subjects engage in low level semantic encoding, but 
not when they engage in high level semantic encoding, conforms with the 
predictions made in chapter six, and so provides support for the schema 
model underlying the account of encoding and retrieval.
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The demonstration that the manifestation of an environmental context
effect is influenced by the type of encoding of the nominal stimuli must
encourage a reappraisal of the view that environmental context effects
5
are unreliable phenomena. As the majority of studies examining 
environmental effects have employed intentional learning paradigms, it 
is perhaps surprising that so many effects have been obtained and 
reported. However, it is extremely unlikely that the observation of 
environmental context effects only depends upon the level of semantic 
processing engaged in by subjects at encoding. Indeed, all of the 
factors identified in chapter two could exert some influence on the 
manifestation of environmental context effects.
4.4. Encoding vs retrieval.
All of the factors listed in chapter two are encoding factors. The view 
of their operation is that in some way they may bias the formation of the 
nominal item descriptions such that use is not, or cannot be made of 
environmental context information at retrieval. The obvious consequence 
of environmental context information incorporated in retrieval 
specifications being unable to provide any retrieval advantage, is that 
no environmental context effects are observed.
Focusing attention on the process of memory representation formation 
seems to lead naturally to consideration of whether or not environmental 
context information is being encoded. Of course the only means of 
examining this is to test memory, and this depends on retrieval
5 Of course, it is not the phenomena that are unreliable, but rather 
our knowledge of the conditions that produce them.
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processes. So, before any attempt is made to try and determine if the 
lack of an effect indicates that environmental information has not been 
incorporated into the nominal items' descriptions, or that it has, but 
this information is redundant when so many other forms of retrieval 
specification are available, it would be useful to have more information 
on the ways in which subjects use environmental context information at 
retrieval.
In the two experiments reported here, subjects' ability to recall was 
influenced by manipulating the level of semantic processing engaged in 
at encoding. Although this was expected to have an effect on retrieval, 
no specific attempt was made to direct the type of retrieval engaged in 
by subjects. However, in the next chapter an experiment is reported that 
attempts not only to influence the level of semantic encoding engaged in 
by subjects, but also to direct the type of retrieval strategy that they 
employ at recall. It may be that the manifestation of environmental 
context effects are affected as much by conditions at retrieval, as at 
encoding.
CHAPTER NINE
EXPERIMENT FOUR
AN ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE STRATEGIC USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
INFORMATION AT RETRIEVAL
1. Introduction.
1.1. Strategic use of environmental context information.
The work of Smith ( 1979, expts.2 & 3; 1 984 ) has demonstrated that the use 
of the retrieval strategy of self-generating the encoding environment 
when in a different environment can enable subjects to recall as much as 
subjects recalling in the presentation environment. The success of this 
strategy would seem to depend on how well the subject can remember the 
encoding environment. Such a conclusion is suggested by Smith's (1979, 
expt.3; 1984) findings that the benefit of self-generating the 
presentation environment is eliminated if subjects experience several 
environments over the course of the experiment. Presumably, as Smith 
(1979) has suggested, memory for environmental context is similarly 
influenced by the same factors as influence other types of memory.
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1.2. Object and design of experiment.
In chapter seven, many subjects self-reports of the retrieval 
strategies they employed mentioned the use of some environmental context 
information as a means of identifying a search set. The fact that 
subjects in the DF condition were employing self-generation of encoding 
context retrieval strategies raises the possibility that the recalls in 
the DF condition may have been lower had no such strategies been used.
To properly examine this possibility; using the same basic paradigm as 
described in chapter seven, two new conditions must be compared. In one 
condition, subjects should receive instructions that would prevent them 
from employing a self-generation of encoding environment retrieval 
strategy, while in the other condition subjects should be instructed to 
use just such a strategy.
Instructing subjects to think of some alternative environment rather 
than the encoding environment has the merit of not only being easy to 
carry out, but also of closely matching the self-generation of encoding 
environment strategy. Presumably there would be little difference in 
the psychological processing requirements of thinking of two simple 
places. In fact, for the purposes of the experimental investigation, 
different processing requirements are tolerable, provided they are 
biased in favour of the non-encoding environment condition. Smith 
(1979, expt.2) had subjects think of a room at home in an attempt to 
prohibit the use of the self generation of encoding environment strategy, 
but rather than risk any excessive overlap between the subjects' rooms
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and the encoding environment, it was decided to instruct subjects to 
think of a totally different type of environment; namely a beach at 
sunset.
If the use of a self-generation of encoding environment strategy is 
effective, then the recalls of those subjects in this condition should 
be greater than the recalls of those subjects prevented from employing 
such a strategy. In relation to the experiment reported in chapter 
seven; if the self-generation strategy is effective, subjects employing 
it should recall as much as subjects in the SF condition. If subjects 
in the DF condition of experiment two had benefited from the use of the 
self-generation of encoding environment strategy and the attempt to 
prevent the use of this strategy is effective, then these subjects should 
recall less than those subjects in the DF condition of experiment two.
However, given the experimental paradigm of the two conditions just 
described, there is still one other potential source of influence on the 
results. As mentioned before, Smith has demonstrated that subjects who 
experience several environments before recall in the DF condition obtain 
no benefit from the self-generation strategy. In the paradigm employed 
here, subjects in the DF condition spend ten minutes in the recall 
environment, prior to returning there to recall. It just may be that 
this is enough to cause a decrement in their ability to remember the 
encoding environment. A simple modification to the room order for the 
DF condition -enables any- such influence to be eliminated. Having 
subjects return to draw the encoding environment, rather than the recall 
environment before recall, should if anything, aid their ability to
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remember the encoding environment at the time of recall.
1.3. Questionnaire alterations.
In the two previous experiments an open-ended questionnaire was
administered to subjects at the end of the experimental session.
However, in terms of the purpose of the questionnaire, a problem
encountered was that subjects' responses to the questions were often at 
a tangent to the type of response that the questions were intended to 
elicit. In an attempt to overcome this problem the questionnaire was 
modified. This involved a slight rewording of some questions and the 
inclusion of some new ones, which were intended to force the subjects to 
be more specific about certain aspects of their psychological
activities. A specimen copy of the questionnaire is presented in
appendix D.
1.4. Paradigm modifications.
In experiments one, two and three, no effect of presentation environment 
was observed. As a consequence of this and the extra effort involved in 
changing the presentation environment equipment control, it was decided 
to abandon the complementary sub-conditions (eg. for ABB, BAA) and 
present all subjects with the stimuli words in environment A only.
In the previous two experiments, several subjects had come very close to 
obtaining a recognition hit score (RHTS) of ten out of ten, but 
fortunately no subject actually achieved a perfect score. If some aspect
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of recognition performance is to be used as a covariate in the ANCOVA, 
it is important that this performance is free to covary with recall 
performance. If the indice of measurement of recognition has a ceiling 
occurring prior to the recall performance ceiling, then any covariation 
in recognition and recall performance above this cannot be represented. 
To reduce the likelihood of this happening, the number of RHTS (and 
filler) items was increased to fifteen. As the five new RHTS items were 
randomly selected from the P-item list, the proportions of recognition, 
filler and P-items were altered (see section 2.3. for details). 
Increasing the number of RHTS and filler items will obviously increase 
the time required to complete the recognition task. However, it had been 
noticed that the vast majority of subjects had completed the recognition 
test by the first one and a half minutes. Given the approximate time 
schedule of twenty words in one and a half minutes, it was thought that 
subjects could quite easily cope with thirty, in two and a half minutes. 
If comparisons are to be made with previous experiments with the RHTS 
score used as a covariate in the P-item analysis, any change in the 
relationship between RHTS and P-item recall would be a potentially 
disruptive factor. Fortunately, if this was the case then it would be 
identified by the checks on the assumptions underlying the ANCOVA. Any 
change in the relationship between RHTS and P-item recall would be 
indicated by heterogeniety of the within-group regression lines.
1.5. Learning.
So much for the intended format of the experiment. As the results and 
discussion will reveal, the subjects' behaviour in the experiment would 
not quite conform to the restrictions imposed by the different
conditions.
One of the problems in the present experiment that had been encountered 
previously in experiment two was the tendency of subjects to try and 
learn some of the presented words. In experiment two, a stiff criterion 
was set and any subject reporting an attempt to learn any of the stimuli 
words had not even had their verbal protocols transcribed. However, 
probably as a consequence of asking subjects directly if they had made 
any attempt to learn any of the presented words; in the new version of
the questionnaire, a greater proportion of those doing so were
identified. As the number of subjects identified as having made an
attempt to learn some of the words approached fifty-percent, economy of 
subjects and effort suggested that it would be prudent to examine the 
effect of the type of learning reported by these subjects. Generally 
this learning took the form of an attempt to remember particular words, 
rather than anything as elaborate as subjects were instructed to carry 
out in experiment three.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
34 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were naive 
regarding the purpose of the experiment and were paid one pound for 
taking part.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
As before, rooms A and B were employed in the experiment. 
Descriptions of these environments can be found in appendix A.
2.3. Stimuli:
For the reasons described in section 1.5., five words were randomly 
selected from the P-item list and added to the list of recognition 
items. Five more words of a similar type to the whole stimuli set 
were randomly selected from the Kucera and Francis (1967) word 
count, to serve as filler items. There were therefore, fifteen 
recognition and fifteen filler items typed in upper case and 
randomly ordered in one column on slips of' pSper, which were 
presented to subjects to carry out the recognition task.1
1 A full listing of all stimuli and filler words is presented in
appendix B.
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2.4. Apparatus:
This was identical to that used in experiments two and three, and 
described in chapter seven.
2.5. Questionnaire:
A simple questionnaire; based on that presented to subjects in 
experiments two and three, was administered to subjects after they 
had completed their experimental session. A specimen copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in appendix 0.
2 . 6 . Design:
A one factor, between subjects design was applied. The three levels 
of the factor were defined by the order of rooms: AAB or ABB, and 
the type of retrieval strategy the subject was instructed to use: 
self-generation of the encoding environment, or the self-generation 
of an inappropriate environment (ie. a beach at sunset).
2.7. Procedure:
The procedure employed in this experiment contained only slight 
modifications to that employed in experiment two. Again the 
experiment is primarily distinguished by the type of instructions 
given to the subjects. As in experiment two, all subjects were
in strutted that their task was to keep a count of the number of words
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presented to them that had three or more vowels. At recall, after 
being told that they had to try and recall all the words presented 
to them during the first experimental period, subjects were told 
that their ability to remember the words they had been presented 
with would be aided if they imagined a particular scene as they 
attempted to recall. The particular scene they were asked to 
imagine depended on their allocated condition. Those subjects in 
conditions 1 and 2; where they were asked to imagine the encoding 
environment, were told the "real" reason for doing this, ie. it 
should help them to remember the stimuli words, while those subjects 
in condition 3; who were asked to imagine a beach at sunset, were 
told that the relaxation caused by such a thought should help them 
to remember. The room order for subjects in condition one was AAB, 
while for subjects in conditions 2 and 3 it was ABB.
2.8. Scoring:
Each subject's verbal protocol was transcribed and scored in the 
same way as described in chapter seven. The only difference, due 
to the change in proportions of recognition, filler and P-items, was 
the total number of each type of item that could be scored. As well 
as the subjects' verbal recall, each subject's questionnaire data 
was scored on four counts. Three of these were nominal designations 
and identified if the subject had or had not i) attempted to learn 
any of the words at presentation, ii) consistently maintained the 
instructed retrieval strategy and iii) utilised the self-generation 
of encoding environment as a retrieval strategy. The fourth score
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obtained from the subjects completed questionnaire was their rating 
of the two environments similarity.
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3. Results.
3.1. ANCOVA Of P-item Recall.
3.1.1. identification of P-item predictors.
A stepwise linear regression analysis was carried out to determine the 
best predictor of P-item recall. Previously, the variables included in 
such an analysis had been RHTS and RFAS, but here whether or not a subject 
had made an attempt to learn any of the words (LR) was included as a 
(potential) predictor variable.
The best prediction of P-item recall was obtained using RHTS only. The 
F-to-enter values of RFAS and LR; after the entry of RHTS, were F{1,32) 
= 0.89 and 0.68 respectively. Table 9.1. gives those values associated 
with the simple regression equation of P-item recall on RHTS.
variable
std reg 
coef f R2
ad j 
R F( 1 ,32)
ad j 
P
predictor
corr
RHTS 0. 479 0.229 0.205 9.51 0.010 0.510
Table 9.1. Summary of simple regression of P-item recall on RHTS.
A chi-square test of homoscedasticity suggested the tenability of this
2
assumption, X (1 ) = 0.18, p = 0.67. An examination of the previously 
described plot types (see chapter seven, section 3.1.1.) obtained with 
the present data, also suggested that the assumptions underlying the
regression analysis were tenable.
3.1.2. preliminary analysis for ANCOVA.
2 9 4
As before, the ANCOVA assumptions were examined as part of the complete 
data analysis. The linearity of the overall regression line was 
supported by the results of the regression analysis described in the 
previous section. The tests of homogeniety of within group regression 
lines, F( 2,2 8) = 0.20 and linearity of the between group regression line, 
F(1,30) = 0.00, suggested that the homogeniety and linearity assumptions 
underlying the ANCOVA were tenable.
Hartley’s F-max test, carried out on the data presented in table 9.4.
revealed no significant departures from the variance homogeniety and
2
normality assumptions, F-max (3,10) = 1.66.
3.1.3. overall ANCOVA F-tests.
A one factor completely randomised design was applied. The three levels 
of the factor represented the three conditions described in the 
introduction and method sections. The dependent variable was subjects’ 
P scores and the covariate was their RHTS scores.
The ANCOVA revealed no significant differences between conditions, 
F(2,30) = 0.23, MSe = 7.06. The pooled within group regression
coefficient of P-item recall on RHTS was 0.563.
2 As there were unequal numbers of subjects across groups, the df of 
the F-max denominator was calculated from the number of subjects in 
the largest group (ie. 12). The result of such a procedure is an 
increase in the stringency of the test (Kirk, 1962).
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CONDITION AAB ABB ABB
X RECALL 4.70 4.00 5.42
S.D. 2.41 3.16 3.09
Table 9.2. Unadjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items
per group.
CONDITION AAB ABB ABB
X RECALL 9 .50 8.92 10.08
S.D. 1 .35 3 . 23 1 .97
Table 9.3 . Covariate mean and standard deviation per group.
CONDITION AAB ABB ABB
X RECALL 
S.D*.
4.70 
2. 1 6
4 . 33 
2.7 9)
5.09
2.76
Table 9.4. Adjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items 
per group.
3.1.4. power.
A post-hoc analysis of the power of the analysis; assuming a mean square 
effect that would have provided a significant F-value when divided by the 
obtained MSe value, suggested that the F-test would operate with a power 
(1-B) of approximately 0.45.
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3.2. Questionnaire Data.
3.2.1. subjects making an attempt to learn some words.
Out of the 34 subjects participating in the experiment, 15 responded that 
they had made an attempt to learn some words. No subject reported that 
they had specifically tried to link words in any way, but subjects did 
state that they had "noticed" some links between words.
3.2.2. subjects maintaining the instructed strategy.
Only 10 out of the 34 subjects maintained the instructed strategy. Host 
subjects employed several strategies to try and recall words. These 
strategies ranged from randomly generating candidate words to see if any
could be identified as having been presented, to using some more
sophisticated means of generation such as those items with three or more
vowels, or trying to remember the words that had made them think of some
particular topic.
3.2.3. subjects in the non-encoding environment generation condition.
Despite being instructed to think of a beach at sunset to "aid" recall, 
9 out of the 12 subjects in this condition reported using a self- 
generation of encoding environment strategy. (These subjects are 
included in the 24 not maintaining the instructed strategy, reported in 
the previous section). Apparently, only 3 subjects in this condition did 
not use the strategy that the condition was supposed to prevent and all 
of these subjects reported employing some other method of retrieval such 
as mentioned in section 3.2.2..
3.2.3. similarity of environment ratings.
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The median rating of environmental similarity (SIM) was 19 (X = 23.81, 
S.D. = 20.26 ) .
3.3. Regression Model Of P-Item Recall.
As in chapter seven (section 3.4.), a stepwise linear regression was 
carried out to determine the model that most efficiently predicted P-item 
recall. The predictor variables employed were; RHTS, RFAS, LR, constant 
retrieval strategy or not (CS) and SIM. As described in section 3.1.1. , 
only RHTS significantly predicted P-item recall. All other variables 
failed to make any significant improvement to the RHTS regression model. 
Table 9.5. lists the F-to-enter values of all the potential predictor 
variables after the entry of RHTS.
variable F(1,30)
CS
LR
SIM
RFAS 1 .46 
1.15 
0.70 
0.14
Table 9.5. Non-significant predictor variables’ F-to-enter.
3 Two subjects failed to provide SIM ratings, so for this analysis N 
= 32.
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3.4. Combined Experiment 2 And Experiment 4 ANCOVA.
3.4.1. selection of a covariate.
To equate the RHTS, RFAS and P-item recalls across experiments, the 
proportion of words correctly recognised or recalled was calculated for 
each subject. An examination of the proportion distributions revealed 
RFAS to be the only variable significantly deviating from the assumptions 
of normality, skew/standard error = 6.31, kurtosis/standard error = 
9.47. A square root transformation (Y ' = sqrt[Y] + sqrt[Y+1]) was found 
to restore normality of distribution most effectively.
A stepwise linear regression using the proportion of RHTS (PRHTS) and the 
transformed proportion of RFAS (RPRFAS) as predictor variables again 
identified PRHTS (ie. RHTS) as the only significant predictor of 
proportion P-item recall (PP). The F-to-enter for RPRFAS; after the 
entry of PRHTS, was 2.53. Table 9.6. gives the values associated with 
the simple regression of PP on PRHTS.
variable
std reg 
coef f R2
ad j 
R F( 1 ,80)
ad j 
P
predictor
corr
PRHTS 0.437 0.191 0.181 18.86 <0.001 0.033
Table 9.6. Summary of simple regression of PP on PRHTS.
2
As before, a chi-square test of homoscedasticity, X (1) = 1.05, p = 0.31, 
and the plotted data (see chapter seven, section 3.1.1.) suggested that 
the assumptions underlying the regression analysis were tenable.
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3.4.2. preliminary analysis for ANCOVA.
Prior to the ANCOVA analysis all P-item and RHTS proportion scores were 
multiplied by 100. This was to reveal differences between scores in 
terms of more comprehensible percentages rather than between the 
previous decimal places. The linearity of the overall regression line 
was supported by the results of the previous regression analysis. The 
tests of homogeniety of within group regression lines, F(2,76) = 0.76 and 
the linearity of the between group regression line, F(2,78) = 0.93, 
suggested that these assumptions were tenable.
Hartley's F-max test; carried out on the data presented in table 9.9., 
revealed no significant departures from the homogeniety of variance and 
normality assumptions, F-max (3,32) = 1.42.
CONDITION S Dt D2
X RECALL 11 . 1 5 7. 16 8.56
S. D. 7.04 5.48 5.29
Table 9.7. Unadjusted
percentage
mean recall and standard deviation of 
P-items per group.
CONDITION S D1 D2
X RECALL 54.37 65.31 63.33
S.D. 16.72 15.65 15.68
Table 9. 8. Covariate mean and standard deviation per group.
CONDITION S D1 02
X RECALL 12.64 7.21 8.37
S.D. 5.36 4.81 4.66
Table 9.9. Adjusted mean recall and standard deviation of percentage
P-items per group.
3.4.3. overall ANCOVA F-tests.
A one factor completely randomised design was applied. The three levels 
of the factor represented; the same retrieval context as at presentation 
(condition SF in experiment 2) and designated here as S, a different 
retrieval context cf. presentation (conditions DF and DU in experiment 
2) and designated here as D1 . and a different retrieval context cf. 
presentation, but with subjects employing the self-generation of 
encoding/ presentation environment as a retrieval strategy (conditions 
1, 2 and 3 in the present experiment) and designated here as D2. The 
dependent variable was subjects' percentage P-item recall and the 
covariate was their PRHTS scores.
Figure 9.1. illustrates the significant effect obtained, F(2,78) = 6.22, 
MSe = 24.34. The pooled within group regression coefficient of
percentage P-item recall on PRHTS was 18.72.
* ♦ 9
12 | |
X 1 1  | j
I I
R 10 | |
E  j |
C 9 | |
A  j j
L 8 | |
L | |
7 I I
/ I
I______I___
S D1 D2
Figure. 9.1. Adjusted mean recall of RPP per group.
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3.4.4. specific comparisons.
As the pairwise comparisons between means that were of interest were not 
orthogonal, the Dunn-Sidak procedure was employed (Kirk, 1982). The 
(one-tailed) comparison of conditions S and D1 again revealed a 
significantly greater recall in condition S, tDS/3,78 = 3.538. The 
(two-tailed) comparison of conditions S and D2 also found significantly 
greater recall in condition S, tDS/3,78 = 2.806, but no significant 
difference was obtained in the (one-tailed) comparison of conditions D1 
and 02, tDS/3,78 = 0.944.4
3.4.5. power and degree of association.
A post-hoc analysis of the power (1-B) of the F-test identifying the
significant effect revealed it to be operating at approximately 0.82.
2The degree of association (W ) between the effect and subjects RPP 
scores was calculated to be 0.114.
4 As there is still much debate about the most appropriate method of 
making multiple comparisons, Fisher’s LSD was also calculated for 
the non-significant contrast. Despite this more powerful test, 
there was still no significant difference observed, t(78) - 0.959.
Critical tDS/ 3 ,78(alpha = 0.05, one tail) = 2.151; (two tail) = 
2.440.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. Experiment four.
4.1.1. assessment of design.
Although the power of the ANCOVA in the analysis of experiment four does 
not match that of the previous analyses identifying significant effects, 
there are good reasons to suspect that an increase in power still would 
not reveal any significant effects. First, a comparison of the adjusted 
and unadjusted means of the three conditions does not suggest that their 
"differences" are being masked by a large variance component. Of course 
this argument really only applies to the two conditions in which subjects 
were instructed to use a self-generation of encoding environment 
retrieval strategy. As nearly all subjects instructed to use a dummy 
strategy in fact used the same strategy as all the other subjects, a 
difference on this basis is hardly expected. As this contrast between 
the types of self-generation strategy was originally of primary 
interest, the failure to achieve different retrieval strategies was the 
reason for concluding the study with such a comparatively small number 
of subjects in each condition. However, the nature of this failure may 
reveal as much about the types of processes underlying memory retrieval 
as would a significant difference between two successfully manifested 
conditions.
♦•1.2. influence of learning.
The result of the regression analysis reported in section 3.1.1., did not 
find the addition of LR to significantly benefit the prediction of 
recall. After the variation that could be accounted for by RHTS was
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removed, LR did not account for a significant amount of variation. RHTS 
was entered into the regression model first because, when the amount of 
variation that each variable alone could account for was calculated, RHTS 
could account for most. However at this point, the F-to-enter value for 
LR was (FI,32) = 4.08. The reduction in the amount of variation
accounted for by LR after the entry of RHTS is due to their correlation
(r) of 0.46. In other words, RHTS and LR are measuring much the same 
thing. This suggests that under these conditions, the effect of the 
degree of elaborative encoding engaged in by subjects, when they report 
making an attempt to learn some words is being accommodated by their RHTS 
scores.
Of course there is not a perfect correlation between RHTS and LR. One 
reason for this is that the RHTS score does not reflect just elaborative 
encoding. Recognition performance also is influenced by integrative 
organisation (Mandler, 1979; 1980; Craik, 1981, see chapter seven,
section 1.3. . This topic will be returned to in chapters ten and
eleven) .
4.1.3. self-generation of encoding environment.
Considering the lack of effect between the two self-generation of
encoding environment conditions distinguished by room order, it would
seem that the ten minute period spent drawing the recall environment did 
not hamper subjects’ ability to recall, nor did the ten minute drawing 
of the encoding environment increment their ability to recall. To obtain 
the type of interference effects reported by Smith, more extreme
circumstances probably are required. It is most likely that subjects
would have to be presented with more than just two rooms over the course
of the thirty-four minute experiment, before their ability to remember
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one of them would be affected.
4.1.4. questionnaire data.
Some of the most interesting findings in the experiment were revealed by 
the questionnaire. The type of learning engaged in by about half of the 
subjects has already been discussed. This in itself again demonstrates 
that subjects in an experiment are not necessarily operating only in the 
manner that their instructions may require of them.
However, most revealing was the finding that nearly all subjects who were 
told to think of the dummy environment to "help them remember", actually 
thought of the same alternative: the encoding environment. Presumably 
the reason subjects began to think of the encoding environment was 
because they were having little success with the dummy environment and 
so adopted a more familiar strategy that had provided them with some 
success in the past. The number of subjects adopting this single 
strategy, despite specific instructions to use another, supports the 
view that indeed this is a commonly employed method of aiding memory, as 
was suggested in chapter one.
That most subjects did not stick to one (ie. the instructed strategy) 
method of trying to remember words is not very surprising. A little 
introspection is enough to suggest that retrieval attempts use many 
different methods to attain their goal. It seems to be the way of 
retrieval; and particularly so when difficult, to attempt to employ 
several routes to the target item. Unfortunately, this aspect of 
retrieval makes it very difficult to control precisely, especially in 
free recall type situations, where subjects are provided with relatively 
long periods of time in which to produce their remembrances. Even if it
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was possible for subjects to exert total conscious control over their 
retrieval(s) , in a situation where the conditions are purposefully made 
difficult for them to remember, the naive subject is bound to be tempted 
to try other potentially more successful strategies to achieve a “better" 
performance, even if it is just to avoid looking quite so stupid.
4.1.5. similarity ratings and overall regression model.
In common with the previous experiments, the ratings of environmental 
similarity indicate that subjects regarded the two rooms as quite 
dissimilar. In fact, the mean rating obtained in the present experiment 
is “just" significantly less than that obtained in experiment three, 
t (5 7 ) = 2.000, but is not significantly less than that obtained in
experiment two, t( 58 ) = 1.265.
As with the regression model for the OF condition in experiment two, SIM 
did not have any significant influence on the prediction of P-item recall 
(see section 3.3.). Despite the increase in power through the increase 
in sample size (error terms comparable), no significant relationship 
between SIM and P-item recall was observed. In fact, over the two 
regression analyses, the nature of relationship changed: in the DF 
condition of experiment two a negative relationship was obtained, 
whereas in the present conditions a positive relationship was observed.
Whether the lack of a stable and significant relationship between 
similarity ratings and P-item recall is a consequence of an inappropriate 
theoretical model or an inappropriate method of investigating the 
relationship; through the use of a rough and variable rating scale, will 
have to be determined by further research.
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4.2. Combined ANCOVA of experiments two and four.
4.2.1. issues raised by the combined analysis.
The results of the ANCOVA and the specific comparisons raise two major 
questions. First, why did the self-generation of encoding environment 
fail to increment the recalls of subjects in the different recall 
environment conditions to a level comparable with that of subjects in the 
same recall environment condition; as has been observed by Smith on 
several occasions. And secondly, why were subjects in the different 
recall environment conditions that had not been instructed to use the 
self-generation of encoding environment strategy able to recall as much 
as those subjects who had been so instructed?
One simple answer to both of these questions is that the self-generation 
of encoding environment is an ineffectual strategy. However, Smith has 
produced considerable evidence supporting the utility of such a 
strategy, and indeed much of the evidence presented in chapter one and 
the information obtained here from the questionnaire would suggest that 
there must be some value in employing this strategy, or it would not be 
so commonly reported and applied.
♦■2.2. lack of effect of retrieval strategy; 01 vs 02.
It may be remembered that in experiment two, as well as in this 
experiment, a number of subjects in the DF condition reported employing 
a self-generation of encoding environment strategy. Although fewer 
subjects in the DF condition of experiment two than in the dummy 
retrieval strategy condition of experiment four, reported employing this 
strategy, it may only appear that this strategy was less employed. Such
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an effect could be a consequence of the differences in the questionnaire. 
In the version given to those subjects in the condition reporting a 
widespread use of such a strategy, there was a direct question asking if 
just such a strategy was used, while in the other condition, subjects
were only asked what they had done at recall.
In other words it is possible that all the subjects in the different 
recall conditions may have been employing similar self-generation of 
encoding environment strategies. This would certainly explain the lack 
of difference observed between conditions D1 and D2, as in effect there 
is no difference to be detected.
If the account of the equality of D1 and D2 conditions is valid, the 
second major question that is raised by the results of the combined 
analysis of experiments two and four is substantially changed. Rather 
than asking why condition D1 and D2 recalls are similar, it has to be 
asked why Smith was able to obtain conditions in which subjects 
apparently did not use the strategy of self-generating the encoding 
environment at recall, when such conditions could not be attained here.
It has already been suggested that subjects in the dummy retrieval 
strategy condition adopted the self-generation of encoding environment 
as a strategy because of their lack of success with their instructed 
strategy. Subjects in Smith's experiments were asked to memorise the 
words as they were presented, so presumably they would find much less 
difficulty recalling the words than subjects recalling under the present 
experimental conditions. It may be therefore, that it is the difficulty 
°f recall and or the lack of an alternative that causes subjects to
consciously use this strategy. This is in accord with the anecdotal
evidence presented in chapter one (section 1.1.), which suggests that the
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awareness of use of environmental context information tends to occur when 
retrieval becomes more difficult.
However, presumably as subjects in Smith’s experiments were not filling 
their whole recall period with the constant outpourings of their 
successful memory retrievals, one would expect them also to have some 
difficulty in recalling the stimuli words. In such a case it would be 
expected that at some point they too would employ a self-generation of 
encoding environment strategy. Therefore, the difference in the use of 
such a strategy would be one of degree, rather than of use or non-use. 
The more easily a subject can remember information; which should be 
related to the amount of elaborative processing engaged in at encoding, 
the less likely they are to employ a self-generation of encoding
environment strategy.
This account of the influence of the degree of elaborative encoding upon 
the extent of the self-generation of encoding environment retrieval 
strategy use also accords with the explanation of the failure to 
increment the recalls obtained in different recall environment
conditions, when this retrieval strategy was employed in the present 
experiment. The premise underlying the explanation is that a memory of
something will never be as detailed as the actual entity that it is a
record of.
The influence of a high degree of elaborative encoding and retrieval has 
been described in detail in chapter seven and to a lesser extent in 
chapter eight. However, to reiterate briefly, a high degree of 
elaborative processing at encoding provides the means for multiple 
access to the memory records. In such circumstances the dependence upon 
any one type of information for successful retrieval is reduced.
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Consequently, environmental context information, being one type of 
information that can be employed to describe an entity, becomes less 
crucial in the specification of that entity.
If subjects have employed only a certain degree of semantic elaborative 
processing in their encoding of the stimuli items, there may be benefit 
to be had from the additional use of environmental context in their 
retrieval specifications. In such cases the provision of environmental 
information in its original form will produce recall superior to that 
obtained if this information is not provided, ie. an environmental 
context reinstatement effect. With a fairly elaborate representation 
there will be several ways that the target item could be unambiguously 
specified, so the benefit to the retrieval process will be limited. In 
other words, there will only be a slight environmental context effect.
Although the self-generation of encoding environment only produces a 
memory record that partially represents the environmental information 
present at encoding, where little further information is required to 
uniquely specify the target items, this strategy will have the effect of 
making up the difference in the number of items remembered. The 
information provided by the self-generation of the encoding environment 
is sufficient to "top-up" the retrieval specifications such that target 
items can be uniquely identified and so properly retrieved.
In the situation where virtually no semantic elaborative processing has 
occurred at encoding, there will be a great dependence on retrieval 
specifications using alternative sources of information. In such 
circumstances the retrieval specifications formed will be more ambiguous 
and generally will require much more information to achieve unique 
identification of target items. Consequently, the effect of that
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environmental information provided by the self-generation strategy will 
not be so great, as the discrepancy between the amount of information 
required for unique specification cannot be provided by the partial 
representation of the encoding environment obtained through the use of 
the self-generation strategy. However, the re-presentation of the 
encoding environment and the full detail of information it contains will 
provide sufficient information to allow a greater number of target items 
to be uniquely specified and successfully retrieved.
k. 2.3. when is environmental context information used?
It may seem from the present account of the use of environmental context 
in retrieval that it is employed only as a last conscious resort, when 
all other types of strategy have failed. However, it has also been 
argued that the psychological processes underlying most behaviours only 
reveal themselves by entering into consciousness, when they encounter 
difficulty (Bobrow 8c Norman, 1975; Williams 8t Hollan, 1981). Later, 
recognition tasks in which many subjects reported an obliviousness to the 
colour contexts at test, will be seen to demonstrate environmental 
context phenomena. However prior to this, the present paradigm, 
involving free-recall and room environment, will be employed in the 
examination of another factor indicated as having effect on 
environmental context phenomena. The following chapter reports an 
investigation into the influence of increased presentation-test gaps on 
the environmental context reinstatement effect.
CHAPTER TEN
EXPERIMENT FIVE 
THE INFLUENCE OF RECALL DELAY ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
REINSTATEMENT EFFECT.
1. Environmental Context Effects Over Time.
1.1. Evidence and current account.
Although extremely few in number, those studies which have examined the 
influence of varying presentation-test gaps on environmental context 
phenomena have found greater effects with larger delays (see chapter two, 
section 5.5.). However, the two studies manipulating this variable have 
employed very different levels. Smith (1982) examined presentation-test 
gaps of thirty seconds and five minutes, while Mayes, Meudell and Som 
(1981, expt.2) looked at the difference between immediate cued-recall 
and cued-recall after one week. The common finding of larger effects 
with longer presentation-test gaps suggests that as time passes, the 
utility of environmental information in nominal item descriptions for 
retrieval increases, in relation to the alternative forms of 
specification. This interpretation is consistent with the previous 
accounts of environmental context effects based on the model presented 
in chapter six, but it is not the only account of the effect of time that 
has been presented.
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1.2. Differential accessibility.
Mayes, Meudell and Som (1981) suggest that environmental "features" 
become less accessible more rapidly than other types of features. As 
contextual features are important in retrieval (in some unspecified 
manner), the "cuing” provided by the restoration of the encoding 
environment aids retrieval and so increments recall.
Although the Mayes et al. account may seem quite simple, there are some 
difficulties in determining its consequences. This is one result of 
providing a generally descriptive, rather than process orientated 
account of the data (see chapter four).
There are actually four separate assumptions involved in the Mayes et al. 
account. The first is that for retrieval, environmental context 
information is important. The second is that environmental context 
information becomes less accessible quicker than other types of 
information. Thirdly, that restoration of the presentation environment 
"cues" the environmental context information and finally, that this cued 
information can be utilised effectively by the system.
This account is handicapped by the vaguery of its assumptions. That 
environmental context information is important is already demonstrated 
by the observation of environmental context effects. What is required 
is an account that details how environmental context information is 
important. Is it important because it activates environmental 
information in the memory record? If so, how does it find the relevant
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memory record? Is it important because without its presence it is 
unlikely to be incorporated in some sort of retrieval specification? 
This latter possibility seems unlikely given the style of the Hayes at 
al. account.
As all other assumptions, but for that regarding the relative 
accessibility of environmental context information depend directly, or 
indirectly upon the unspecified manner in which environmental context 
information is important for retrieval, this would seem to be the only 
part of the account that could contribute further insight into the 
retrieval processes that produce the environmental context effects 
observed.
The hypothesis of differential loss of accessibility to environmental 
context information raises some interesting theoretical questions. How 
would the requirement of differential accessibility influence the view 
of the model underlying the accounts of the environmental context 
effects? Can an item description be considered as being comprised of 
autonomous components?
An examination of the structure of the model presented in chapter six 
would suggest that a memory record can be broken down into smaller 
component parts, although the extent to which this can be done will 
depend on the nature of the particular memory record/description. 
Indeed, it is this ability that allows relevant information to contribute 
to the new retrieval specification on the subsequent retrieval cycle. 
Therefore, there is no major obstacle to prevent accommodation of the
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hypothesis that environmental context information becomes less (or more) 
accessible than other types of information. But would there be any 
advantage to such an inclusion? Could inclusion of the relative 
accessibility of environmental context information improve the account 
of the environmental context effects reported in chapters seven and 
eight, and the similar increase in effect with the multiple presentation 
paradigm?
1.3. Level of semantic processing effect.
Consideration of the potential benefit of the differential accessibility 
hypothesis in relation to the effects observed in experiments two and 
three, can be summarised quite succinctly: there is none. As the only 
difference between the two processing level conditions was the 
instructions received by the subjects, the different effects of 
environmental context observed in these two conditions cannot be 
attributed to any variation in the presentation-test gap affecting the 
accessibility of environmental context information.
Although the hypothesis of differential accessibility cannot account for 
the level of semantic processing effects in isolation, it may be worth 
considering how the hypothesis could interact with the present model to 
provide an alternative account of these effects.
One possibility is that environmental context information used in the 
specification of nominal stimuli items becomes less accessible as a 
consequence of the type of high level processing employed at retrieval.
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However, it would seem unlikely that environmental context information 
would become more inaccessible when high level retrieval processes were 
operating. Apart from the majority of studies observing environmental 
context effects using intentional learning paradigms, and so it would 
seem fair to assume, having some degree of high level processing employed 
by subjects at retrieval, both theoretical and introspective accounts 
suggest autonomous retrieval cycles that each utilise many different and 
varied types of information; especially as retrieval difficulty 
increases. Given such retrieval processes, it is incredibly difficult 
to imagine any reason why the use of one type of information on one cycle 
should inhibit the use of another type of information on another cycle. 
In the previous experiment it was exactly this type of efficient use of 
information that eliminated one of the planned differences between 
conditions.
1.4. Multiple presentation environment effect.
It seems probable that at least one difference between multiple 
presentation and reinstatement paradigms will be the degree of 
environmental context effect that they manifest. In chapter nine it was 
observed that although subjects employed self-generation of presentation 
environment strategies at recall, this did not increment their recalls 
to equal that of subjects in the reinstated presentation environment 
condition. It was argued that the reinstated condition advantage could 
be attributed to the difference between the ability to remember something 
and actually experiencing it again. The observation of multiple
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presentation environment effects indicates that retrieval can be aided 
by that environmental information obtained from memory, while the 
results of experiment four would suggest that reinstatement effects 
should be larger than multiple presentation environment effects due to 
the superior availability of environmental information. Consequently, 
reinstatement paradigms are likely to be more sensitive to any benefit 
provided to retrieval by environmental context information.
Despite the paradigms and presentation-test gaps employed by Mayes et al. 
and Smith being considerably different, still it would be expected that 
similar processes would underly the general increase in environmental 
context effects over time. Although the schema model easily achieves 
such a parsimonious account, the same cannot be said of the Mayes et al. 
account.
The Mayes et al. account would require memory information to be accessed 
differently in the multiple environment situation, in comparison to the 
reinstated environment situation. The reason for this is that in their 
account the reinstatement condition obtains benefit through the cueing 
action of the reinstated environment. Without such cueing, 
environmental features cannot be accessed to aid retrieval. However, 
the observation of an increased multiple presentation recall environment 
effect over time, when such effects can be obtained with recall in 
neutral (non-cueing) environments, demonstrates that cueing is an 
unnecessary requisite for the effect.
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Of course as an alternative and perhaps last resort, advocates of the 
Mayes et al. account could argue that the the five minute delay is not 
long enough to allow environmental context information to become 
inaccessible and attribute the increase in effect to chance, citing as 
evidence the lack of an interaction in Smith's analysis.
1.5. Comparison of accounts.
The unique aspect of the Mayes et al. account is the hypothesis that over 
time environmental context information becomes less accessible than 
other information. If it is assumed that this does not happen, then in 
order to account for the increase in environmental context effects with 
time, it must be assumed that at least the use, if not the presence or 
accessibility, of other forms of retrieval information decline with 
time.
Without any qualification; in terms of how the subjects' style of 
processing could affect the benefit obtained by subjects recalling in the 
presentation environment, the view taken by Mayes et al. makes the simple 
prediction that with time, the benefit obtained from a reinstatement of 
the presentation environment always will increase. This means that 
given sufficient time between presentation and test, an environmental 
context effect always will be observed. The problem is identifying what 
sufficient time is.
With respect to the conditions described in chapters seven and eight, it 
would be expected that with longer presentation-test gaps, the
environmental context effect observed with low level processing would 
increase, while an effect of environmental context should become 
manifest in the high level processing conditions. However, if the 
environmental context reinstatement effect is attributed to a loss of 
accessibility to environmental context information over time (unless 
cued by the reinstatement of the presentation environment), retrieval 
must become more dependent upon alternative forms of nominal item 
description, especially semantic elaboration. In such circumstances, 
subjects in a low level processing condition, attempting to recall after 
some time in a different environment to presentation, would be at a 
particular disadvantage. Not only would the environmental information 
have diminished in accessibility, but also they would have very little 
semantic information from which to construct retrieval specifications. 
Although subjects in the comparable high level processing condition 
should experience a similar lack of environmental information 
accessibility, they still should have access to semantic information 
upon which to base retrieval.
However, if it is assumed that the emergence of larger environmental 
context effects over time is a consequence of the decline in the use of 
other forms of retrieval information, similar predictions are derived. 
According to this account, low level processing, non-reinstated 
presentation environment subjects would experience most difficulty due 
to the lack of appropriate environmental context information and from the 
further decrement in semantic information available to be used in 
retrieval as a consequence of the passage of time.
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It should be expected that there would be differences in the decrements 
of recall as a consequence of these different factors. Unfortunately, 
it is as yet impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the size 
of such decrements and so provide any prediction of effects.
1.6. Redundancy of differential accessibility.
Essentially, the Mayes et al. account depends on the hypothesis that 
environmental context information becomes more accessible than other 
forms of information over time. But in fact, if it is assumed that all 
forms of information become equally inaccessible over time, an advantage 
for reinstated presentation environment conditions still is predicted. 
This is because still there would be more environmental context 
information pertinent to the formation of appropriate retrieval 
specifications (or even to activate environmental features in a target 
memory representation) in this condition. This is the account of the 
reinstatement effect presented in chapter six. Therefore, in terms of 
the schema model, the hypothesis of greater inaccessibility of 
environmental context information is unnecessary.
1.7. Some theoretical clarification.
In the preceding discussion there has' been much use of the terms 
environmental context information or "features , and semantic 
information. It is worth emphasising that such terms should not be taken 
to refer to any objective types of "real" world information defined in 
an a priori manner.
320
If the schema model of processing is examined, it can be seen that the 
terms environmental and semantic information actually refer to the 
products of psychological processing. It is the form of the schemata 
that succeed in accommodating the information received from the sensory 
apparatus that determines the persons unconscious and conscious 
perception and interpretation of the "real" world.
Using the terms environmental and semantic information too freely can 
suggest objective types of information, with some pre-ordained 
definition in the "real" world, which people do or do not encode. All 
information enters the system via the sensory apparatus. Consequently, 
the person‘s consideration of whether or not this information has some 
deep meaning depends on the type of psychological processing the original 
physical information receives.
One consequence of failing to appreciate that there is no objectively 
defined a priori information types (only common processes) is the 
application of inappropriate terms of conception in the attempt to 
comprehend the influence of these factors in psychological processing. 
The inappropriate abstraction of such information creates a false 
dichotomy that restricts the manner in which it seems valid for 
information to be of use.
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1.8. Experimental design.
Having discussed the different accounts of the apparent phenomenon of 
greater environmental context effects with longer presentation test gaps 
at some length, it would seem appropriate to put the phenomenon and 
accounts to test. Subjects recall was tested after twenty-four hours 
using the basic reinstatement paradigm in conjunction with a level of 
semantic processing manipulation. The reinstatement paradigm was 
employed because of its presumed sensitivity to environmental context 
effects, while the level of processing manipulation was included to allow 
comparisons to be drawn with the previous experiments.
The recall delay of twenty four hours was chosen for both theoretical and 
practical reasons. It was thought that despite the degree of semantic 
elaboration in high level processing conditions, a free recall paradigm, 
rather than a cued-recall paradigm, should manifest any benefit of 
environmental context. In addition, as a low level processing condition 
comparison would be possible, any change in effect over time should be 
able to be detected. Finally, pilot studies employing forty eight hour 
and one week presentation test gaps, had demonstrated a similar pattern 
of results across all recall delays and a great difficulty in getting 
subjects to return after more than twenty four hours.
With the lack of specification of what constitutes sufficient time for 
such effects to be observed, the lack of any significant increment in 
environmental context effect can always be accounted for by claiming
insufficient time between presentation and test. It is a simple enough
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exercise to test this hypothesis by increasing the recall delay, but 
subsequent failures to obtain any change in effects can always be 
accommodated by recourse to the same argument. Obviously in these 
circumstances, other criteria would have to be applied to assess the 
validity of the account.
1.9. Experimental hypotheses.
As detailed previously, it is expected that with increasing 
presentation-test delays, environmental context effects will increase. 
In addition, there should be an interaction between the presentation- 
recall environmental context match/mis-match factor and level of 
processing, with greater presentation delays.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
64 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were naive 
regarding the purpose of the experiment and were paid one pound for 
taking part.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Rooms A and B were employed in the experiment. Descriptions of these 
rooms can be found in appendix A.
2.3. Stimuli, apparatus and questionnaire:
The stimuli used in this experiment were identical to those used in 
experiment four; described in chapter nine, while the apparatus 
employed was the same as had* been used since experiment two; 
described in chapter seven.
2.4. Design:
A two factor (2x2) between subjects design was applied. The first 
factor was defined by the type of instructions given to subjects at 
presentation, ie. the level of processing induced. The second 
factor was defined by the relationship between the presentation
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environment and the recall environment; same or different.
2.5. Procedure:
Subjects were required to attend two 10 minute sessions, 24 hours 
apart. At the first session subjects were randomly allocated to one 
of the processing conditions. This determined if they received 
task instructions as described for experiment two, or as described 
for experiment three. After the presentation of the stimuli words, 
subjects were given the recognition task to complete. As before, 
subjects were given 2.5 minutes to mark the words they recognised. 
At the end of the recognition test after the ten minute session was 
over, the subjects were taken to the waiting area where they were 
told that the first part of the experiment was complete and that the 
next day they would have to do the same thing again, but with a 
different set of words. The reason for the experiment was given as 
an investigation into the development of cognitive strategies. It 
was hoped that this would prevent subjects from being tempted to 
rehearse any of the presented items prior to their next visit. When 
subjects returned the following day, they were again randomly 
allocated to either the same, or a different environment (cf. 
presentation) to recall. All subjects received the same 
instructions to”’ try and recall all the words that they had been 
presented with the day before, including any from the recognition 
test, that they could remember. As before, subjects were told to 
say each word out loud; as it would be recorded, to start as soon 
as the experimenter left the room and to keep trying to remember
325
more words until he returned. After ten minutes had passed, the 
experimenter returned to stop the subjects' free recall. All 
subjects then returned to the waiting area where they were paid and 
debriefed. For the same reasons as described in chapter nine there 
were no complimentary room order sub-conditions. Therefore, the 
room order for subjects in the same (S) conditions was AA, and for 
the different (D) conditions it was AB.
2.6. Scoring:
Each subjects' verbal recall protocol was transcribed and scored in 
the same manner as reported in chapter nine.
326
3. Results.
3.1. ANCOVA Of P-Item Recall.
3.1.1. selection of covariates.
As before, stepwise linear regressions were carried out to determine the 
most efficient predictors of P-item recall in the two processing 
conditions and to ensure that the overall regression of predicted and 
predictor variables was linear. For the same reasons as detailed 
earlier, the two predictor variables employed were; RHTS and RFAS.
In the low level processing condition, again RHTS proved to be the 
variable most highly correlated with P-item recall with no significant 
contribution being made by RFAS (F-to-enter = 0.05), but in the high 
level processing condition, this situation was almost reversed. Here, 
the variable most highly correlated with P-item recall was RFAS. 
However, in this condition the prediction of P-item recall made by RFAS 
was not significant and obviously, nor was the contribution of RHTS 
(before entry of RFAS, F-to-enter = 1.10, after entry of RFAS, F-to-enter 
= 0.69). Table 10.1. gives those values associated with the simple 
regression equations.
2
Chi-square tests of homoscedasticity (RHTS X [1] = 0.81, p = 0.37; RFAS
2
X [1] = 1.16, p = 0.28) and an examination of the plot types described 
in chapter seven (section 3.1.1.) and obtained with the present data, 
suggested that the assumptions underlying the regression analyses were
tenable and consequently, that linear regression was appropriate.
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std reg ? adn ad j predictor
endt varbl coef f R R F (1,30) P corr
LOW RHTS 0.611 0 .374 0 . 353 17 . 89 <0.001 0.301
HIGH RFAS 0. 230 0 . 053 0.021 1 .68 0 .368 -0.124
Table 10.1. Summary of simple regression of P-item recall on RHTS.
Although the prediction of P-item recall by RFAS was not significant, it 
was decided to use RFAS as a covariate in the ANCOVA as still it increased 
the power of the analysis by reducing the error variance.
3.1.2. preliminary analysis for ANCOVA.
The linearity of the overall regression line in each processing condition 
was supported by the results of the regression analyses described in the 
previous section. The test of homogeneous within group regression lines 
did next indicate significant heterogeniety in either condition; low 
level F(1,28) = 2.18, high level, F(1,28) = 0.52.
As there are only two groups in each'ANCOVA, the usual method of assessing 
the linearity of the within group regressions, ie. by testing the 
linearity of the between group regression line, cannot be applied. With 
only two groups, there is no way of telling if the straight line between 
the two points identified by the covariate and dependent variable means 
is, or is not appropriate. Expressed more formally, it means that there 
are insufficient degrees of freedom on the numerator to allow an F-test 
to be performed. As an alternative to such an analysis, the graphical 
procedures suggested by Draper and Smith (1981) and referred to by 
Huitema (1980) were employed. These procedures are identical to those
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used to assess the tenability of the assumptions underlying the overall 
regression analyses, but applied to each group, rather than to the whole 
data set.
For both low level processing conditions, tests of homoscedasticity did
2
not indicate any significant departure from the assumptions, X (1) = 
2
0.41, p = 0.52; X (1) = 0.04, p = 0.85, nor did examination of any of the 
plot types described in chapter seven (section 3.1.1.). A similar
conformity to the regression analysis assumptions were observed with
2 2 
both high level processing conditions, X (1) = 0.28, p = 0.60, X (1) =
1.32, p = 0.25.
Hartley’s F-max test; carried out on the data presented in table 10.4., 
indicated that there was a significant departure from the normal 
distribution and/or heterogeniety of variance in the high level 
processing condition, F-max(2,15) = 4.48, but not in the low level
processing condition, F-max(2,15) = 2.03. An examination of the
distributions of the significantly heterogeneous conditions revealed 
that two unusually large scores (unadjusted; 41 and 28) were the primary 
cause of the failure to meet the ANCOVA assumptions. However, as these 
scores were also the main cause of the difference between the two means, 
it was decided to rely on the robust nature of the ANCOVA,1 rather than 
attempt a rectifying transformation.
1 Huitema (1980) provides a discussion of the consequences of assump­
tion failures in the ANCOVA. For a more detailed account see Glass, 
Peckham and Sanders (1972).
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LOW LEVEL HIGH LEVEL 
PROCESSING | PROCESSING
1
CONDITION CD<<<
CD<<<
X RECALL
1
3.56 2.62 | 15.69 11.56
S.D.
I
1.55 1.75 | 9.05 4.21
Table 10.2. Unadjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items
per group.
LOW LEVEL 
PROCESSING
HIGH LEVEL 
(RHTS) | PROCESSING 
1
(RFAS)
CONDITION AA AB | AA 
1
AB
X RECALL 9.31
1
8.3 7 | 0.81 
1
0.81
S.D. 2.63
1
2.58 | 1.22
I
0.83
Table 10.3. Covariate mean and standard deviation per group.
LOW LEVEL HIGH LEVEL
PROCESSING I PROCESSING
I
CONDITION AA AB | AA AB 
1
X RECALL 3.39
1
2.80 | 15.69 11.56
I
S.D. 1 .55
I
1.75 | 8.76 4.14
I
Table 10.4. Adjusted mean recall and standard deviation of P-items
per group.
3.1.3. overall ANCOVA F-tests.
Two separate ANCOVAs were carried out with low and high processing 
condition data. In both analyses the two groups were distinguished by
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whether subjects recall; after 24 hours, took place in the same, or in 
a different environment to presentation. In the low level processing 
condition the covariate was RHTS and in the high level processing 
condition the covariate was RFAS. In both ANCOVAs the dependent variable 
was P-item recall.
In neither of the ANCOVAS was there a significant effect of presentation- 
recall environment match/mismatch: low level processing condition,
F(1,29) = 1.45, MSe = 1.82, regression coefficient = 0.376; high level 
processing condition, F(1,29) = 2.81, MSe = 48.52, regression
coefficient = -1.620.
3.1.4. power.
Assuming the same percentage difference between groups (relative to the 
overall mean) as obtained in experiment three, the power (1-B) of the 
F-test on the low level processing condition analysis would have been 
operating at > 0.99.
3 3  1
3.2. Low and high level processing conditions combined analysis.
3.2.1. introduction.
As in chapter eight, a combined analysis of adjusted P-item recall was 
undertaken.
3.2.2. preliminary analysis.
Hartley’s F-max test carried out on the adjusted scores of the low and 
high level processing conditions revealed that there was a significant 
and extreme departure from the assumptions of normality of distribution 
and/or the assumption of homogeniety of variance, F-max(A ,14) = 65.55.
Logarithmic and square root data transformations were investigated, with 
greatest conformity to the assumptions being observed after the log 
transformation, Y ’ = log(Y + 1), F-max(4,14) = 3.33. Subsequent
examination of SK and KU values suggested the tenability of the 
assumption of normally distributed data. Table 10.5. presents the mean, 
standard deviation, SK and KU values.
processing LOW |
I
HIGH
recall cf. 
presentation. SAME
I I
| DIFF |
I I
SAME
I
I DIFF
I
X 0.62
I I
| 0.56 |
I i
1.16 I 1.07
I
S.O. 0. 14
1 1 
| 0.13 | 
1 |
0. 24
I
| 0.15 
|
SK. 0.82
1 1 
| -1.06 | 
I |
-1.19
I
| -0.57
I
KU. -0. 66 | -0.01 I 
I I
0.78
I
I -0.69
I
Table 10.5. Mean, standard deviation, SK and KU values of 
transformed adjusted data per condition.
3.2.3. overall ANOVA F-tests.
A 2 x 2 (level of processing x presentation-recall environment match/mis­
match) completely randomised design was applied. The dependent variable 
was transformed adjusted P-item recall.
In contrast to the combined analysis reported in chapter eight, in this 
analysis only the level of processing factor was observed to exert a 
significant effect, F(1,58) = 49.41, MSe = 0.03. Neither presentation- 
recall environment match/mis-match, F(1,58) = 1.37, nor the interaction 
between this and level of processing, F(1,58) = 1.14, was significant.
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3.3. Combined analysis of 14 minute and 24 hour environmental context 
reinstatement experiments.
3.3.1. introduction.
To formally examine the relationship between recall delay, level of 
processing and presentation-recall environment match/mis-match, an 
analysis of the adjusted data from experiments two, three and five was 
undertaken.
3.3.2. preliminary analysis.
As the total number of P-items that could be recalled by subjects in 
experiment five was less than that possible in experiments two and three 
(50 cf. 60), the proportion of total recall achieved by each subject was 
calculated. As Hartley’s F-max test indicated extreme heterogeniety of 
variance, F-max(8,14) = 65.54, arcsine, logarithmic, square root and 
inverse transformations were investigated. The most successful 
transformation in reducing variance heterogeniety was Y' = 1/y + 12,
where y represents the proportion recall, F-max(8,14) = 9.17.
Fortunately, this F-max value is just under the value at which it is 
suggested by Keppel (1982) that the validity of the ANOVA should be of 
some concern.
The major disadvantage with the transformation described above is that 
the order of highest to lowest score is reversed. This can cause some 
confusion in the interpretation of the means. Table 10.6. presents the 
means, standard deviations, SK and KU values.
3 3 4
delay 14 MINUTES
processing I LOW I
I
HIGH
recall cf. 
presentation.
1 1 
I SAME | 
1 1
DIFF
I
| SAME
I
1
| DIFF
X 1 3.14 |
I |
3.83
I
I 2.00
I
1
| 2.03 
1
S.D.
1 1 
| 0.52 | 
1 |
0.73
I
I 0.43 
1
1
| 0.47 
1
SK. I 0.43 | 
1 |
1 .62
1
| 0.51 
1
1
| 0.17 
1
KU.
1 1 
| -0.46 | 
1 1
-0.16
1
| -0.68 
1
1
| -1.19
I
delay |
I
24 HOURS
processing |
I
LOW 1
1
HIGH
recall cf. | 
presentation. |
I
SAME DIFF
1
| SAME 
1
I1
I
DIFF
I
X I 
1
3 . 60 3.73
1
| 2.16 
I
1
1
|
2.4 0
1
S.D. | 
1
0.34 0.28
1
| 0.64
I
1
1
I
0.4 3
1
SK. |
i
-1.14 0.43
1
| 1 .29
I
1
1
I
0.56
1
KU. | 
1
-0.46 i o CD
1
| 0.63 
\
1
1
1
-0.73
Table 10.6. Mean, standard deviation, SK and KU values of
transformed adjusted data by condition.
3.3.3. overall ANOVA F-tests.
A 2 k 2 x 2 (recall delay x level of processing x presentation-recall 
environment match/mis-match) completely randomised design was applied. 
The dependent variable was transformed adjusted P-item recall.
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All main effects were significant; recall delay, F ( 1 , 1 1 2 ) = 5.02, MSe =
0.27, level of processing, F (1,112) = 248.96 and presentation-recall 
environment match/mis-match, F(1,112) = 9.95.
Only one interaction effect was significant: recall delay x level of 
processing x presentation-recall environment match/mis-match, F(1,112) 
= 5.45. Figure 10.1. illustrates the effects reported. To counter the 
reversal of mean order caused by the transformation and bring the form 
of the figure more in line with previous plots of such effects, the Y-axis 
has been inverted.
-* high level 14 min
-* high level 24 hrs
- low level 14 min
_ low level 24 hrs
2 . 0 0
A 2.20 
0
J 2.40
T 2.60 
R
A 2.80 
N
S 3.00
R 3.20 
E
C 3.40 
A
L 3.60 
L 7
3.80
Up-___
.. .
SAME DIFF
Figure 10.1. Mean transformed adjusted P-item recall by group.
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3.3.4. specific comparisons.
The (simple main effect) comparisons of interest are between the two 
levels of the presentation-recall environment match/mis-match factor 
under the different combinations of the other two factors. Essentially, 
it is to check that; under the same power, only the low level processing, 
14 minute delay conditions exhibit an environmental context 
reinstatement effect.
Planned orthogonal contrasts were carried out on the two means 
representing the environmental reinstatement and non-reinstatement 
conditions under each combination of recall delay and level of 
processing. A significant difference was observed between the means of 
the presentation-recall environment match and mis-match conditions in 
the 14 minute recall delay and low level processing combination, t (112) 
= 4.161, but not between the similar means in any of the other recall 
delay and level of processing combinations: 14 minute recall delay and 
high level processing, t (112) = 0.114; 24 hour delay and low level
processing, t(112) = 0.708; 24 hour recall delay and high level
processing, t ( 1 12 ) = 1 .329.
The comparisons above make use of the robustness of the t-test with equal 
sample sizes, to cope with the variance heterogeniety observed. 
However, the validity of the results of these comparisons is supported 
by the fact that the only other comparison to approach significance (24 
hr delay and high level processing), if calculated separately, would 
provide an MSe greater than that employed in the previous comparisons, 
MSe = ( 0.64 2 + 0.4 3 2)/2 = 0.30.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. Low level processing RHTS and P-item recall relationship over 
twenty-four hours.
The finding that over twenty-four hours the unstandardised regression 
coefficient reduces from 1.246 to 0.376, while the standardised 
regression coefficient increases from 0.417 to 0.611 requires some 
explanation. The reason for these changes is the variance associated 
with the covariate and (particularly) the dependent variable. As recall 
decreases over the twenty-four hour period, this is reflected in the 
number of P-items recalled per RHTS item: the unstandardised regression 
coefficient. However, it is also the case that as recall delay 
increases, so the variance of P-item recall decreases. This leads to the 
increase in the standardised regression coefficient, as this indice 
takes variance into account. Therefore, the pertinent question is why 
does the P-item recall variance decrease over the twenty-four hours. 
This variance decrement is impressive and significant as F-tests carried 
out on the error variances from the 14 minute and 24 hour unadjusted and 
adjusted score ANOVAs reveal; unadjusted, F (42,30) = 5.1 1, adjusted,
F ( 4 1 ,29 ) = 5.65.
It would be expected that a greater number of items could be recalled in 
the fourteen minute condition in comparison to the twenty-four hour delay 
condition. This difference should provide a greater potential range of 
scores. However, a greater potential range does not explain why subjects 
actually produce recalls that are more or less alike. Presumably, the 
reduction in recall variation reflects a reduction in the number of 
different types of strategy being employed to retrieve the target items. 
As the relationship with RHTS increases over time, it suggests that the
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strategies employed by subjects at recall must be those that have 
communality with those employed at recognition.
As was mentioned in chapter eight (section 4.2.), Handler (1980) has
argued that recognition performance can operate on the basis of 
integrative and elaborative processing. Although Handler's account of 
recognition performance is in terms of a "two-process theory" (Eysenck, 
1984; Tulving & Thompson, 1973), the ideas it contains can be expressed
conveniently in terms of the schema system.
As outlined in chapter seven (section 1.4.), in the schema system, 
integrative and elaborative processing can affect the form of both the 
encoding descriptions and retrieval specifications created. A retrieval 
specification may be constructed by employing the recognition item 
encoded via integrative processing and incorporating other related and 
potentially useful information obtained via elaborative processing.
If the information provided by the recognition probe is sufficient in 
itself to provide a unique specification of the relevant memory record 
on an early retrieval cycle, then the matching process will occur 
extremely quickly and may appear as some authors have described it, as 
"direct access" (Baddeley, 1982b; Mandler, 1980; Tulving & Thompson, 
1973; Wickelgren, 1979). However, in the terms of the model presented 
in chapter six, “direct access" is a consequence of the greater speed 
with which a discriminable retrieval specification can be constructed (a 
full account of the rational underlying this argument will be presented 
in the next chapter).
Handler (1980) claims that the utility of integrative processing for 
"retrieval" decreases at a greater rate than elaborative processing.
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Presumably this is because the integrated representation employs
perceptual schemata, which normally identify only a small number of 
features in relation to the number of semantic features that can be 
identified. As time passes, the discriminability of these "perceptual" 
descriptions will decrease as similar descriptions are constructed. For 
these reasons it would seem that the reduction in low level semantic 
processing P-item recall variation after twenty-four hours must be 
attributed to a reduction in the efficiency; if not the number, of
successful retrievals based on integrated information across subjects. 
The nature of the successful retrieval strategies engaged by subjects 
becomes more uniform as the possibility of retrieving items on the basis 
of integrated information (alone) decreases. Therefore, the strategies 
common to recognition and free-recall should be those employing 
elaborately processed information.
The question that follows this account is how could subjects in the 
fourteen minute delay conditions have obtained benefit from integrative 
processing, when they were presented with a free recall task? The answer
to this is that as reported in chapter seven (section 3.3.1.) a good
number of subjects turned their free-recall task into a recognition task 
by self-generating and imagining candidate words on the wall (where the 
stimuli had been projected). It is interesting to note that in the SF 
condition where most subjects reported such a strategy, the prediction 
of P-item recall by RHTS was greatest. Although there are many problems 
associated with any attempt to draw conclusions on the basis of the 
questionnaire data, it is tempting to suggest that the highly significant 
prediction in this condition is in part a consequence of the particular 
correspondence between integrative and elaborative processing engaged by 
subjects at recognition and free-recall.
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4.2. High level processing RHTS and RFAS relationship with P-item 
recall over twenty-four hours.
Unlike the quantitative changes observed in the prediction of P-item 
recall in low level processing over twenty four hours, high level 
processing prediction undergoes a qualitative change over this time 
period. The account of the similarity of high and low level processing 
condition standardised regression coefficients, presented in chapter 
eight (section 5.1. ), provides the basis of the account of the RHTS to 
RFAS predictor change.
Here and in chapter eight, it has been suggested that comparable 
standardised regression coefficients are a consequence of similar 
retrieval strategies underlying recognition performance. However, it 
has been suggested also that the greater variance in adjusted recall in 
the high level processing conditions was due to the employment of other 
retrieval strategies; specifically those based on the story and visual 
imagery mnemonics. As these strategies were very unlikely to be employed 
in the recognition task, only that part of recall performance that was 
not based on those strategies could contribute to the relationship with 
RHTS. Consequently, the variance produced by the mnemonics was not 
accounted for and was taken to be the cause of the greater variance in 
adjusted recall.
Applying a similar logic to the change in predictor variable, the loss 
of RHTS predictive power is taken to be a result of dissimilar strategies 
being employed at recognition and recall. As the vastly superior 
adjusted recall must be attributed to the efficient retrieval enabled by 
the use of the story and visual imagery mnemonics, it would follow that 
the reason for the change in predictor variable was also caused by
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subjects concentrating on the use of strategies based on these mnemonics, 
rather than fully re-employing those retrieval strategies used at 
recognition. The insignificant, but superior prediction of RFAS is 
probably a consequence of this variable representing the extent of 
subjects guessing because they have not uniquely specified the word 
stimuli. Without unique specification, subsequent retrieval cannot be 
selective. The consequence is that unless the retrieval specification 
is generalised, recall will diminish. However, it should be remembered 
that the prediction of P-item recall made by RFAS was not significant and 
was very similar to that of RHTS (1.10 cf. RFAS, 1.68).
4.3. Recall delay, level of processing and environmental context 
effects.
The failure to observe any effect of environmental context with either 
high or low level processing after twenty four hours is contrary to the 
findings of the other studies examining environmental context effects 
over time. As mentioned in the introduction, it could have been argued 
that the reason for the lack of an environmental context effect, is 
insufficient time between presentation and test, either to allow the loss 
of accessibility to environmental features without cueing, or to allow 
the discriminability of nominal items on the basis of semantic 
specification to decrease, such that retrieval on the basis of 
environmental context information provides advantage. However, as the 
environmental context effect with low level processing is eliminated by 
the twenty four hours recall delay, it is extremely unlikely that 
insufficient time is the cause of the lack of effect. Presumably an 
account of the reduction in the environmental context effect observed in 
the low level processing conditions over time will provide some insight 
into why no environmental context effect emerged in the high level
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processing conditions over the same time period.
The observation of almost exactly the opposite effects after a recall 
delay of twenty four hours to that predicted indicates not only the 
incorrect nature of the accounts presented, but perhaps also a slight 
naivety of the accounts. It would seem reasonable to expect the 
components of environmental context phenomena to conform to the style of 
normal memory operation, yet the accounts of environmental context 
effects after recall delay make no allowance for this. This is perhaps 
a consequence of designing models specifically to give an account of an 
effect, rather than designing a model that primarily attempts to achieve 
the goal of memory retrieval within defined constraints (see Marr, 1982, 
p.347-349). Effects can indicate the constraints under which the 
processes operate and as such should be accommodated by the model, but 
they should not be the sole reason for the model's existence.
The lack of an effect of environmental context in experiment five 
indicates that no advantage was obtained by*, the subjects in the 
reinstated presentation environment at recall. The ability of subjects 
in both conditions to recall something indicates that they were able to 
construct some retrieval specifications that were successful in 
retrieving information from memory. In a situation where subjects are 
having difficulty in recalling the nominal information and they have 
ample time to explore alternative retrieval strategies, it seems 
unlikely that they would employ strategies that ignored available and 
potentially useful environmental context information. Experiment four 
has already demonstrated how unlikely this is. The only alternative 
therefore, is that the environmental context information available for 
inclusion in the retrieval specifications; with which successful 
retrieval was previously achieved, is now no longer useful. It seems
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most likely that for such information to have lost its utility, the form 
of the nominal item memory records must have changed, such that the 
discriminability of nominal items on the basis of unique environmental 
context information no longer affords significant advantage. In other 
words, the environmental context information incorporated in the nominal 
item memory records is represented with less specificity.
One of the basic characteristics of memory; revealed in a multitude of 
studies, is the way in which experiences become abstracted over time. 
Experiments employing text (eg. Bartlett, 1932; Thorndyke, 1977) shapes 
(eg. Carmichael, Hogan b Walters, 1932), faces (Reed, 1972), etc. have 
shown that while in the short term memory may maintain considerable 
detail, over time this is lost until eventually, only the gist of the 
experience remains. Although the state of knowledge with respect to the 
exact representation of "natural" environment makes the conception of an 
abstract form a rather speculative exercise, the ubiquity of the 
phenomenon is such that it would seem unreasonable not to expect similar 
changes to occur with the representation of environmental context.
The effect of time on the memory for most materials; the decline of detail 
and the emergence of gist, has been well accommodated by schema type 
models (eg. Abelson, 1981; Alba b Hasher, 1983; Graesser b Nakamura, 
1982). Minsky (1975) suggests that each frame (or schema) would be 
organised in a hierarchical manner, with the information most important 
or fundamental to the particular entity represented at the top of the 
hierarchy^and the less important information at successively lower 
levels of the hierarchy. Variation in essential aspects of a 
representation (the top levels of the frame) would reduce the predictive 
utility and therefore the validity of the representation. The loss of 
detail and the emergence of gist in remembrance is explained by the the
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loss of instantiated values at the lower levels of the frame, but the 
retention of the fact that the frame was instantiated. Over time
therefore, remembrance comes to be based more and more on the 
prototypical representation.
If the same interpretation is applied to the representation of the two 
room environments employed here, it would suggest that the same
prototypes are used in the formation of the descriptions of the two 
different environments. The differences between the two environments 
are represented at relatively low levels of the representational 
hierarchy and are lost with the passage of time. As the detail of 
information required to distinguish one room environment from the other 
is no longer available in the memory records of the nominal stimuli 
items, no advantage is obtained from attempting to recall in the 
presentation environment. By the time recall is required, the
environmental context representations of these particular rooms have 
become very similar through their prototypical abstraction. Subjects 
may have representation of the oddity of the rooms and the bare, sparse 
and blandly decorated building annexe in which the rooms were situated. 
Indeed, it is probably the similarity in oddity and location (see
appendix A), that leads subjects to employ similar prototype schema in 
their representation of the two environments. This in turn contributes 
to the loss of discriminability as unique information is represented only 
at low levels.
In contrast, many other studies of the effect of environmental context 
on memory; including Mayes et al. , have used a normal environment and 
an "unusual" environment. Using this combination of environments may 
■facilitate the environmental context effect over time. It is very likely 
that the prototypes employed to form a description of an ordinary room
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or environment are different to those employed to form a description of 
an unusual environment. In such a situation as the Mayes et al. study, 
the differences in the environmental context representation would not be 
restricted to the lower levels of the representations. As time passed, 
discrimination would be possible on the basis of environmental context 
information, but not with some alternative forms of specification due to 
a parallel loss of detail. Consequently, the potential utility of 
environmental context information for retrieval would increase, 
resulting in greater benefit to reinstated presentation environment 
conditions and therefore, larger environmental context effects.
The general account of how environmental context information aids 
retrieval of nominal items also suggests why Mayes et al. observed that 
after the week delay, subjects tested in the unusual environment 
reinstatement condition could remember le-ss than subjects tested in the 
ordinary environment reinstated condition. It would be expected that 
the remembrance of an unusual environment would be more difficult than 
the remembrance of an ordinary environment. The description of an 
ordinary environment is likely to have been formed longer and retrieved 
more often than an unusual environment memory record. There is good 
evidence indicating that prior retrieval benefits subsequent retrieval 
(Bjork, 1975; Bjork & Geiselman, 1978; Tulving, 1966). In addition, 
default values on the prototype are likely to be better approximations 
to the real instantiated values of the ordinary environment than the 
unusual environment, so reconstruction of a memory record utilising the 
defaults will be more accurate.
Although the environmental context representation is part of a memory 
record, the model presented suggests that the record is a composite. As 
the previous account suggested, it is possible that there would be
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difficulty in obtaining the exact form of the original memory record that 
is to match with the target description. For those reasons above, it 
would be expected that ordinary room environmental context descriptions 
would be more accurately defined and easily assembled as part of the 
memory record, with a consequent increase in nominal item 
discriminability and success of retrieval.
4.4. A model assumption and prospective tests.
Throughout this chapter there has been the implicit assumption that 
irrespective of the form of encoding processes, environmental context 
information would be incorporated in the description and consequently, 
the memory record formed. However, in chapter eight (section 1.2.) an 
alternative account of the lack of environmental context effect was 
mentioned. This account simply asserts that under certain conditions 
environmental context information is not encoded and therefore cannot 
provide advantage at recall.
The following chapter-attempts to examine this possibility with respect 
to the high and low level semantic elaboration encoding conditions. The 
experiment reported also examines the generality of the schema model 
account by employing a different form of environmental context and a 
different test of memory.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
EXPERIMENT SIX
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECOGNITION, LEVEL OF 
PROCESSING AND PRESENTATION TIME, IN TERMS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REIN­
STATEMENT EFFECT, USING BACKGROUND COLOUR AS THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
1. Introduction.
1.1. Control of environmental context.
One of the biggest problems in the study of the influence of 
environmental context is obtaining and maintaining effectively different 
environments. As discussed in chapter three, at present there is some 
difficulty determining the extent to which room type environments 
differ. For more detailed investigations of the specific influence and 
effect of environmental context, the ability to determine and easily 
control environmental context would be extremely useful.
In the short term, one way of obtaining accurate description and control 
°f environmental context is to employ simple univariate types of 
environment such as stimuli background colour. Although the study of the 
influence of such environments has its own validity and application, for 
it to be useful in the manner outlined above, similar manipulations with 
different types of environmental context must be shown to produce similar
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environmental context effects.
1.2. Design restrictions with an unintentional learning paradigm.
The use of an unintentional learning paradigm in the presentation of 
nominal stimuli items restricts the use of a within subjects design. 
Obviously, subjects given one stimuli presentation, followed by a test 
of their memory for these items, cannot be expected to be naive enough 
to believe the experimenter when again he says that they do not have to 
learn the items on the second presentation. An alternative procedure is 
to have a single presentation and to incorporate the different types of 
test conditions in one test session. Unfortunately, with recall this 
could result in an interaction between retrieval strategies and 
remembered items between test conditions. In turn, this can give rise 
to theoretical complications and ambiguity regarding the influence of 
the former and latter retrieval strategies, and the originally recalled 
items on subsequently recalled items, in relation to the particular 
effect under consideration.
Recognition procedures can alleviate the problems of testing memory 
under different conditions in the one test session without overlap from 
previous conditions. This is achieved by presenting independent sets 
(conditions) of nominal stimulus items and/or cues. As each subject is 
presented with the task of indicating whether or not the unique item and 
condition combination is a member of some previously seen stimulus group, 
there should be less likelihood of any relations between items being 
formed.
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In room type environmental context studies, there is the extra problem 
of organising subject transits from one room to another, first to 
manipulate the independent variable, but additionally to maintain 
adequate experimental controls in the within subjects design.
Happily however, apart from providing a greater ability to control the 
(nominal) environmental context variable, the use of background colour 
also facilitates the use of a within subjects design. As background 
colour context can be manipulated independently of the room type 
environmental context, there is no need for numerous subject transits. 
Subjects can remain stationary, while the experimental variables and 
controls are manipulated in terms of the classical conception of the 
experimental materials.
x.
The use of background colour; as the nominal environmental context, and 
recognition procedures allow the construction of an experimental 
methodology that seems able to overcome the problems normally 
encountered when an unintentional learning paradigm, in conjunction with 
a within subjects design, is considered as a means of investigating the 
effect of environmental context on memory. However, the suggestion that 
recognition should be employed as the memory test procedure raises the 
issue of the different abilities of various memory tests; polarised in 
recall and recognition, to detect environmental context effects.
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1.3. Comparison of recall and recognition.
The differences between recall and recognition effects have been 
discussed and debated in theoretical terms for some time (eg. Brown, 
1976; Broadbent h Broadbent, 1977; Mandler, Pearlstone & Koopmans, 1969; 
Rabinowitz, Mandler & Patterson, 1977a; 1977b). The major difference 
between views is whether or not the two behaviours are served by the same 
psychological processes.
Two-process models (eg. Anderson & Bower, 1972; Kintsch, 1970) have 
distinguished between a retrieval stage and a second 
recognition/decision stage. Recall involves both stages. However, when 
a copy-cue is presented for recognition it is assumed that access to the 
memory representation is direct. Consequently, recognition is assumed 
to involve only the latter of the two stages.
Other views of memory performance; such as that expressed by Tulving 
(1982; 1983) in his GAP system and that presented by Norman and Bobrow
(1979) in their account of descriptions, regard both recall and 
-recognition as requiring the operation of retrieval processes.
Essentially the former and latter views are in dispute regarding the 
manner in which access can be gained to a representation in memory. The 
question is whether access can be achieved directly or must involve 
retrieval.
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At present there would seem to be some confusion amongst psychologists 
as to what direct access actually means. For example, Baddeley (1982b) 
uses the term direct access, but seems to be using it to express a 
phenomenon, or phenomenological experience. However, authors such as 
Mandler (1980), Tulving and Thompson (1973) and particularly Wickelgren 
( 1979 ), seem to regard direct access as a process akin to that employed 
in the types of associative memory systems presented by Hinton and 
Anderson (1981).
Unfortunately, both of these uses of the notion of direct access are 
unacceptable in terms of a process account of memory performance. This 
is most obvious with Baddeley's use of the term. Baddeley uses direct 
access to describe a situation and not to describe any process underlying 
memory performance.
However, it is probably the use of the term by such as Mandler, Tulving 
and Thompson, and Wickelgren, that has the potential to cause most 
confusion. The reason for this is that the notion of direct access is 
only valid within a particular form of descriptive abstraction. 
However, within any of the forms of use in providing a process account 
of memory performance, the notion of direct access is invalid. By 
including the notion of direct access in their accounts of recognition, 
these authors seem to be prepared to allow some sort of magic to explain 
recognition, but not recall. It is the double standard of explanation 
that is likely to cause confusion and the continued use of an invalid 
notion under the guise of a component process that is likely to maintain 
it.
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In terms of the computational theory of a process (ie. the what and why) 
the use of the notion of direct access is insufficient to constrain any 
procedure that may attempt to access information in memory. A particular 
elaboration of the concept of direct access would be necessary for it to 
have validity within an account expressed in such terms of abstraction.
As presented by the likes of Mandler, Tulving and Thompson, and 
Wickelgren, the notion of direct access would seem to be presented as an 
attempt to explain how the access to memory is achieved. In this sense, 
the notion is part of the abstraction expressed in terms of 
representations and algorithms. However, the manner of direct access as 
presented by these authors is fully detailed by the term direct access. 
In other words, no form of computation (formal or informal) is described 
that would achieve direct access.^
In fact, in terms of a representation and algorithm account of the 
processes underlying memory performance, it can be shown that the notion 
of direct access is a contradiction in terms. If the purpose of an 
account expressed in such terms of abstraction is to describe at a level 
sufficient to allow such processes to be carried out, then stating that 
access to memory occurs directly begs the question of hoyy direct access 
is achieved.
1 Wickelgren does mention the relation between direct access and 
associative memory. However, despite hinting that procedures are 
required to achieve direct access, he continues with the use of this 
misleading term.
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In the associative memory systems presented by Hinton and Anderson, great
detail is gone into regarding how this "direct" access could be achieved.
In effect there can be no direct access to memory representations. This
is most easily illustrated if the requirements for comparing a stimulus
with a memory representation are considered. To begin with, prior coding
of this stimulus must transform its external representation to that which
is compatible with the form of representation employed by the nervous
system. In addition and perhaps more importantly from an information
processing point of view, the neural representation also must have
representation of those aspects of the stimulus that define it as
distinct from others. The construction of such representations (on the
basis of internally, as well as externally generated information) is a
2
necessary preliminary to any comparison with information in memory. In 
such a system how can any memory access ever be described as direct? At 
best the term "direct access" is an extremely bad simile that expresses 
some combination of ease and speed of one example of memory performance 
relative to some other.
1.4. The effect of mempry tests and contexts.
In the review of context effects presented in chapters one and two, one 
of the main conclusions was that the major difference between semantic, 
(perhaps) process, physiological and environmental contexts was in terms
2 The account of target description formation in the schema model is 
one attempt to detail; albeit in a different form of abstraction, 
the processes involved in producing such a representation.
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of the paradigms that were sensitive to their effect. These paradigms 
differ in the amount of information they provide subjects with, pertinent 
to the formation of retrieval specifications for the to-be-remembered 
items. This manner of scaling concords with the degree of environmental 
context effect observed. The free-recall paradigm, which provides the 
least retrieval information, is most sensitive to changes in 
environmental context, while the paradigm providing the most retrieval 
information: recognition, is rarely effected by such changes.
The schema model presented in chapter six provides a process oriented 
account of the manner in which this information could be used. According 
to the model, the lack of effect of environmental context with 
recognition is due to the superior constructability and discriminability 
of the retrieval specifications made possible by the provision of all the 
information constituting a copy-cue. However, as the schema model 
advocates a communality of processes for recall and recognition, it 
should be possible to obtain an advantage for reinstated environmental 
context conditions even with recognition, provided the redundancy of 
environmental context information for retrieval specifications can be 
eliminated.
Using the same method as described in previous experiments; namely to 
have subjects count the number of words containing three or more vowels, 
it should be possible to restrict the amount of semantic elaboration 
carried out in the production of an encoding description of each word. 
As before with free-recall, this should emphasise the role of 
environmental context information in the descriptions formed.
Consequently at retrieval, environmental context information should be 
a more effective information component in discriminating between memory 
records. The greater availability of this information in reinstated 
environmental context conditions at recognition should increase the 
constructability of appropriate discriminatory retrieval specifications 
and should result in an environmental context (reinstatement) effect 
with recognition.
The review also concluded that all the different types of context had 
essentially similar effect. The model presented to account for 
environmental context effects makes no special provision for 
environmental information; never mind different types of environmental 
information, but instead regards all types of information as 
(potentially) equivalent. Therefore, it would be predicted that 
provided the particular environmental context information enables and is 
employed to discriminate between target and other memory records, 
environmental context effects will be observed.
As the schema model makes no distinction in terms of the potential use 
of different sources of information, environmental context information 
in the form of nominal stimuli background colour should be predicted to 
affect memory retrieval in the same manner as room type environmental 
context. Similar effects should be observed under similar conditions.
However, in order to replicate the relationship between nominal stimulus
t
items and room type environmental context with background colour 
context, a slightly different design to that normally employed in
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e x p e r i m e n t s  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  c o l o u r  c o n t e x t  s h o u l d  b e  
a p p l i e d .  O f t e n  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  p r e s e n t  t h e  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l i  i t e m s  o n  
s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  b a c k g r o u n d  c o l o u r s .  T h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  p r e s e n t i n g  
s o m e  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l u s  i t e m s  i n  o n e  r o o m  a n d  o t h e r  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l u s  i t e m s  
i n  o t h e r  r o o m s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  h a v e  m o r e  i n  c o m m o n  w i t h  t h e  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  a n d  m u l t i p l e  
e n c o d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  S m i t h  ( 1 9 7 9 ;  1 9 8 2 ;  1 9 8 4 ) .  T o
a c h i e v e  e q u i v a l e n c e  w i t h  t h e  n o r m a l  s i n g l e  e n v i r o n m e n t  r e i n s t a t e m e n t  
p a r a d i g m ,  t h e  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l u s  i t e m s  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e n t e d  o n  o n l y  o n e  
b a c k g r o u n d  c o l o u r  a n d  t e s t e d  w i t h  t h i s  c o l o u r ,  o r  w i t h  o n e  o t h e r  c o l o u r  
a s  t h e  ( n o m i n a l )  c h a n g e d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t .
1.5. A different account of the lack of an environmental context effect.
T h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  a n y  f a i l u r e  t o  o b t a i n  a n - e f f e c t  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o n t e x t  h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r m s  o f  
n o m i n a l  i t e m  r e t r i e v a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  m a k i n g  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o n  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e d u n d a n t .  T h i s  a c c o u n t  i s  b a s e d  
o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s  o f  d e s c r i p t i o n  w e r e  
c r e a t e d  a t  e n c o d i n g ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a l w a y s  w a s  a  
b a s i c  p a r t  o f  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a l w a y s  w a s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  
t h e  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l i  i t e m  m e m o r y  r e c o r d s .
H o w e v e r ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  m e n t i o n e d  ( s e e  c h a p t e r  e i g h t ,  s e c t i o n  1 . 2 . ) ,  t h e r e  
i s  a n o t h e r  w a y  o f  l o o k i n g  a t  s u c h  r e s u l t s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  v i e w ,  t h e  
l a c k  o f  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t  e f f e c t  s i m p l y  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t e x t  i n f o r m a t i o n  h a s  n o t  b e e n  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e
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nominal stimuli item memory records.
Differences in processing resources have generally been considered in 
terms of a general pool of processing resources that enable the operation 
of the particular processes (eg. Broadbent, 1958; 1971; Kahneman, 1973; 
Moray, 1967; Neisser, 1967; Welford, 1952; 1968). In these terms, the 
lack of an environmental context effect may be attributed to the 
exhaustion of the pool of processing resources; such as general 
processing space, through the demands made by elaborative processes, 
which precludes or inhibits specification in terms of environmental 
context information.
However, Allport (1972; 1980) has suggested that the notion of a general 
pool of processing resources is inappropriate. Instead, Allport 
suggests that processing resources, or capacity is distributed 
throughout the nervous system by virtue of the existence of autonomous, 
modular systems, which are oriented to particular processing purposes. 
From this perspective, processing capacity is limited by-the—nature of 
the specific processing function and so requirements, by the specific 
type of data input, or output from other processes and by the ability to 
keep different goals concurrently active (Allport, 1980).
A l t h o u g h  e l a b o r a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  o u t l i n e d  o n l y  
i n f o r m a l l y ,  i t  s e e m s  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  a l l  t h r e e  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  l i s t e d  a b o v e  
c o u l d  b e  i n v o l v e d  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
c o n t e x t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r m e d  a t  e n c o d i n g .
Unfortunately, an examination of the effect of varying the presentation 
time of nominal stimulus items in relation to the two tasks intended to 
manipulate the degree of elaborative processing is unlikely to provide 
information enabling some conclusion to be drawn with regard to the 
debate between the different views of processing limitations. In both 
accounts, the processing limitations could be overcome by adopting a 
sequential strategy; specification via environmental context 
information, then via semantic referents, or vice versa. However, 
varying the presentation time and so effectively the time that each 
subject has to carry out the required task (per item) should allow some 
determination to be made as to whether the lack of environmental context 
effect is a consequence of time restrictions; as both accounts of 
processing limitation suggest, or the nature of the elaborated 
description (representation) formed at encoding, irrespective of the 
ability to encode environmental context information in the time 
available.
The nature of memory research is such that performance is always based 
on memory retrieval. Consequently, when constructing models of memory 
it is important to bear in mind that the lack of any particular effect 
need not have consequence for any process underlying memory performance, 
other than retrieval. The initial discussion in this section 
illustrates this. Just because no environmental context effect is 
observed does not mean that environmental context information has not 
been incorporated in the particular memory records. It remains a 
possibility that the lack of effect is a consequence of the type of memory 
retrieval employed. Consequently, the amount and degree of information
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required as the basis for drawing inferences regarding the nature of the 
memory representation requires that specific patterns of effects; rather 
than any single effect, be obtained.
1.6. Model predictions, experimental hypotheses and design.
If, as the review of the literature on environmental context effects 
suggests, the observance of an environmental context effect depends upon 
the subject having enough time to encode the environmental information 
in the description formed at encoding (see chapter two, esp. section
5.4.), then reducing the presentation time should reduce the 
environmental context effect. Also, if the lack of an environmental 
context effect in high level processing conditions was due to the 
inability of those processes encoding environmental context information 
to operate effectively through a limit on processing ability, caused by 
the introduction of those processes underlying semantic elaboration, 
then an increase in presentation time should increase the chances of the 
serial application of processes being completed and therefore should 
increase the likelihood of observing an environmental context effect in 
memory performance.
To test these ideas, a recognition paradigm using background colour as
the (nominal) environmental context in a mixed design was employed. Four
independent groups of subjects were established. Two groups received
low level semantic processing instructions, as reported in chapter seven
* *
and the other two groups received high level semantic processing 
instructions as reported in chapter eight.
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O n e  o f  t h e  l o w  l e v e l  g r o u p s  r e c e i v e d  t h e  n o m i n a l  s t i m u l u s  i t e m s  a t  a  
presentation rate identical to that reported in all previous experiments 
(excluding experiment one), while the other low level group were 
presented with each nominal stimulus item for only half of the normal 
presentation time.
Similarly, the two high level groups differed in the presentation times 
of nominal stimulus items. One group received items at the normal 
presentation rate, while the other group were presented with each nominal 
stimulus item for twice as long as normal.
As was mentioned earlier, to equate the use of environmental context 
between rooms and background colour, at presentation each subject 
received all nominal stimulus items on the one background colour. At 
recognition, subjects were presented with half of the nominal stimuli 
items previously presented, on the same background colour and the other 
half of the items on a (common) different colour.
The first experimental hypothesis; upon which the others rest, is that 
the results of experiments two and three will be replicated. In other 
words, with a nominal stimulus presentation rate of one item for 3 
seconds and an inter-stimulus gap of 1.5 seconds, there should be an 
environmental context (reinstatement) effect with low level processing, 
but not with high level processing.
Beyond this, if p r e s e n t a t i o n  time is a d e te rmi ni ng factor in the 
ob ta inm en t of e n v i r o n m e n t a l  co ntext ef fects for any of the reasons
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previously described, then in the low level processing, short 
presentation time condition, the environmental context effect should be 
reduced, while the environmental context effect should increase in the 
high level processing, long presentation time condition.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
64 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were naive 
regarding the purpose of the experiment and were paid one pound for 
taking part.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Two colours: red and blue, were used.
2.3. Stimuli:
2.3.1. Form of presentation:
Each stimulus word was presented in black upper case letters in the 
middle of a rectangle of colour on a black/blank screen (see figure 
1 1 .1 .).
I
SKY I
I
Figure 11.1. Form of presentation of word on colour.
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2.3.2. Low level and high level 3 seconds presentation conditions:
40 of the 85 items used in the previous experiments were randomly 
selected and employed as presentation items. Another 40 items; 
randomly selected from the remaining set of words employed in the 
previous experiments, were used as filler items in the recognition 
test.
2.3.3. High level 6 seconds presentation condition:
To prevent a ceiling occurring with respect to the number of items 
that could be correctly recognised in this condition, an extra 28 
items; similar to those in use, were selected from the Kucera and 
Francis (1967) word count. Half of these items were presented as 
stimuli items, while the other half were presented as filler items 
in the recognition test.
2.4. Apparatus:
An Apple II microcomputer was linked to a Sony portable colour 
television that had been modified to behave as a VDU. A footswitch 
and a response box also provided input to the micro.
2.5. Design:
Initially, a two factor mixed design was applied. The first factor 
(between subjects) was defined by (i) the level of processing 
induced by the instructions and (ii) the stimulus presentation 
times. The resulting four conditions were low level processing,
1.5 seconds presentation (LI.5). low level processing. 3 seconds
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presentation (L3), high level processing, 3 seconds presentation 
(H3) and high level processing, 6 seconds presentation (H6).
The second factor (within subjects) was defined by the relationship 
between the presentation background colour environment and the 
recognition background colour environment: same or different.
Within each first factor condition, half of the subjects were 
presented with the stimulus items on the red background and the 
other subjects received the stimuli items on the blue background 
colour. In conditions L1.5, L3 and H3, for each colour background 
presentation group, two word sets were created. One word set 
consisted of the 40 presentation items and the other word set 
consisted of the 40 filler items. From each of these word sets, 20 
randomly selected items were presented at recognition on the same 
background colour as at presentation and the other 20 items were 
presented on the other background colour. In condition H6, there 
were 54 presentation items and 54 filler items, and consequently, 
27 randomly selected items in each of the two background colour 
recognition conditions. The colour background pairing with words 
was constant across subjects, while a new order of presentation was 
randomly generated for each subject.
A counter-balance was also operated for preferred hand. In each of 
the experimental conditions, half of the subjects responded YES 
with their preferred hand, while half responded NO with their 
preferred hand.
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2.6. Procedure:
The same basic procedure as used in experiments two and three was 
employed here. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the first 
factor conditions. This assignment determined whether they 
received instructions as in experiment two, or three. Subjects 
were seated in a softly lit sound proof booth in front of the VDU. 
They were told that one after the other, a series of words would be 
presented on the screen in front of them. Each word was separated 
by an inter-stimulus gap of 1.5 seconds, similar to that obtained 
with the projector presentations in experiments one to five. No 
mention was made of the colour background. Subjects were given 
their instructions as dictated by their assigned condition and told 
to open the booth door when a message appeared on screen telling 
them that the presentation was complete., After the presentation 
the experimenter returned and asked the subjects to draw the booth 
and everything in it, in as much detail as possible. They were 
asked to keep drawing until the experimenter returned, turning the 
paper over and starting a new drawing if they felt they had finished 
the original. After 14 minutes the experimenter returned and 
explained that all the words that they had been presented with 
earlier were going to be shown again along with as many words that 
they had not seen earlier. They were told that their task was to 
try and identify as quickly, but as accurately as possible, all 
those words that they had been presented with previously. If they 
recognised a word from this set, they were to press the response key 
marked YES and if they decided that it did not belong to this set 
they were to press the response key marked NO. Subjects were asked 
which their preferred hand was; and depending upon their random 
allocation to preferred or non-preferred hand group, the response
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box was appropriately linked and labelled. Subjects were then 
asked to find a comfortable position in which to hold the response 
box before they initiated the presentation of each stimulus item. 
Subjects were told that a single word would be presented onto the 
screen every time they pressed the footswitch and would remain on 
screen until they made a response. To allow time for the subjects 
to prepare for each stimuli item, it was explained that there would 
be a 2 second gap between each footpress and each word appearing on 
screen. Subjects were asked to begin the task as soon as the 
experimenter left the booth and to come outside when a message 
appeared on screen informing them that the task had been completed. 
After completing the experiment, subjects were paid and debriefed.
2.7. Scoring:
The number of correct responses: recognition hits (RHTS) and
correct rejections (CR), and incorrect responses: false rejections 
(FR) and false alarms (FA), were calculated for each subject. In 
addition, the times taken to make these decisions were also recorded 
and each subject’s median time for each response type was 
calculated.
367
3. Results
3.1. Response type.
As subjects in the high level processing 6 seconds presentation encoding 
condition (H6) had been presented with twenty-seven, rather than twenty 
words of each type (ie. recognition item on presentation colour, 
recognition item not on presentation colour, filler item ...etc.), the 
proportion of correct responses made was calculated for each word type 
for each subject.
Although d ‘ values could be calculated from the data available, the fact
that some subjects did not produce false alarms raises problems similar
to those mentioned in chapter seven (section 3.1.1. ). In this particular
situation it is also the case that as subjects with no false alarms are
potentially high d' scorers, they would be expected to be most numerous
in the condition(s) affording most advantage to performance.
Consequently, the result of excluding these subjects would be to reduce
3
the effect of any advantage provided by any such condition(s).
3 There is a parallel here with the conditions under which a weighted 
means analysis should be carried out.
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3.1.1. Hits.
3.1.1.2. preliminary analysis.
The proportion of items correctly recognised by each subject was 
converted to a percentage. The only reason for such a procedure was to 
simplify the comprehension of these values. The percentage values were 
then analysed as a two factor (4 x 2) mixed design. An F-max test of the 
between subjects factor normality and homogeniety of variance 
assumptions suggested that both were tenable, F-max(4,15) = 1.92.
CONDITION
L 1 . 5 L3 H3 H6
X | 53.44 73 .44 8 5.00 81.25 |
same 1
S.D. | 
_ _ _ 1;
20.95 12.34 11.55 14.28 |
li
X |i 55.31 57. 19 83. 4 4 85.65 |
diff li
S.D. I 
1
1 6 . 4 & 15.91 13.99 14.62 j
Table 11.1. Mean and standard deviation of percentage hits per 
condition.
3.1.1.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor mixed ANOVA (processing/presentation encoding condition 
x retrieval colour context) was carried out on the hit percentages. This 
revealed main effects of encoding condition, F(3,60) - 16.97, MSe 
399 .46, and retrieval context, F( 1,60) = 4.02, MSe = 66.28, and an 
interaction between these factors, F(3,60) = 1 0.30 (see table 11.1. and 
figure 11.2.).
369
reinstated colour 
* changed colour
X
P
E
R
C
E
N
T
H
I
T
S
3.1.1.3. specific comparisons.
The comparisons of interest are between the four levels of the 
processing/presentation time encoding factor, and between the two levels 
of the colour context reinstatement/change factor under the different 
levels of the processing-presentation time factor. These comparisons 
should determine which processing-presentation time conditions differ 
and which encoding conditions exhibit a colour context reinstatement 
effect.
Planned (one tailed) orthogonal contrasts were carried out on the means 
representing the conditions described above. It was predicted that 
overall performance would follow a downward monotonic trend from 
condition H6 through to condition L1.5. Also, it was predicted that
50 |
/
I__________________________________________ ____
L1 .5 L3 H3 H6
CONDITION!
Figure 11.2. Mean percentage hits per condition1.
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reinstated colour conditions would exhibit superior performance in 
comparison with changed colour conditions.
No significant difference was observed in overall performance between 
conditions H6 and H3, t (60) = -0.154. However, a significant difference 
was observed between the encoding conditions H3 and L3, t(60) = 3.784, 
and L3 and L1.5, t ( 60 ) = 2.1 89.
Of the reinstated vs. changed colour comparisons, only two were in the 
predicted direction. These were the L3 and H3 conditions. Of these only 
L3 exhibited a significant advantage of colour context reinstatement, 
t(60) = 5.646. The calculated t-value of the H3 one tailed comparison 
was t(60) = 0.543. The remaining two (two-tailed) comparisons were not 
significant; L1.5, t (60) = -0.651 and H6, t (60) = -1.528.
3.1.2. False alarms.
3.1.2.1. preliminary analysis.
The proportion of items incorrectly identified as presentation item#*was 
analysed in the same manner as recognition hits. An F-max test of the 
between subjects factor normality and homogeniety of variance 
assumptions suggested that one or both, were not tenable, F(4,15) = 5.35. 
Subsequently, logarithmic, square root and arcsin transformations were
examined in terms of their ability to reduce the F-max statistic. The
*
transformation producing the lowest F-max value was, Y = sqrt(Y) + sqrt(Y 
+ 1) , F-max(4,15) = 2.98.
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3.1.2.2. overall F-tests.
A two factor ANOVA (factors defined as in section 3. 1 .1.2.); carried out 
on the root transformed data, revealed a main effect of encoding 
condition, F ( 3,60 ) = 9.09, MSe = 0.07, but not of retrieval context, 
Ft 1,60) = 1.69, MSe = 0.03. However, the interaction between these two 
factors approached significance, F(3,60) = 2.39, p = 0.078 (see table
11.2. and figure 11.3.).
CONDITION
L 1 . 5 L3 H3 H6
X I 26. 25 27.50 8.75 9.49
same |
S.D. |
_ _ | _
15.76 13.17 7.42 7.65
. x  1 24.06 18.12 10.31 9.4 9
diff |
S.D. | 
1
16.35 14.13 10.71 6.04
(a)
L1.5 L3 H3 H6
same
x  I 
I
S.D. |
I
1 .60 
0.26
1 .63 
0.19
1 . 29 
0.20
1.30
0.21
diff
--- 1 -
x  1 
1
1 .55 1.46 1 .32 1 .33
S.D. | 0. 29 0.26 0.22 0.14
(b)
Table 11.2. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed (a) and 
transformed (b) false alarms per condition.
3.1.2.3. specific comparisons.
A significant difference was observed between the overall means of 
encoding conditions H3 and L3, t(60) = 3.583, but not H6 and H3, t(60>
= -0.197 and 13 and L1.5 t( 60 ) = 0.393.
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reinstated colour 
* changed colour
1 . 65
xl 1 .60
—
1
1 . 55
R
A 1 . 50
N
S 1 .45
P 1 .40
R
0 1 .35
P
p
1 .30
r
A 1 .25
s
L1 . 5 L3 H3
CONDITION
H6
Figure 11.3. Mean transformed proportion of false alarms per 
condition.
Although the interaction between the encoding condition and- retrieval 
context factors was not significant, the F-test operated is two-tailed. 
As a prediction is made with respect to the direction of the effect, ie. 
more false alarms should be made with those items presented on the 
reinstated colour context, it is legitimate to investigate the pairwise 
comparisons of interest with a one-tailed t-test.
Only the two low level processing encoding conditions exhibited the 
predicted trend. Of these only the L3 condition exhibited a significant 
effect, t ( 1 5 ) = 2.020, L1.5 condition, t( 15) = 0.738. Neither of the two 
high level processing conditions exhibited a significant effect; H3, 
t(15) = 0.486 and H6, t ( 15) = 0.456.
3.2. Reaction times.
3.2.1. Introduction.
Although there is a perfect and inverse relationship between the number 
of hits and misses, and the number of false alarms and correct 
rejections, all the reaction times (RTs) obtained can be regarded as 
stochastically independent.
For each subject a median RT was calculated for each type of response (ie. 
hit, miss, correct rejection and false alarm) under each 
processing/presentation time and environmental context 
reinstatement/change condition.
The major purpose of the RT analysis is to determine the conditions under 
which an environmental context effect is manifested. Given the problem 
of a comparatively small number of false alarm and miss responses, and 
the reduction in the power of analysis this causes, it would seem 
appropriate to examine the RTs from each response type separately, in 
terms of processing/presentation time and environmental context 
reinstatement/change factors. This allows all data collected to be 
analysed, whereas an analysis in terms of a three factor 
(processing/presentation time, by response type, by environmental 
context reinstatement/change) mixed ANOVA, requires that subjects not 
providing RTs in all response type categories are ignored.
However, both forms of analysis should provide interesting information 
regarding the relationship and locus of effect of the different factors. 
Indeed as will be seen, the separate two factor (response type by 
environmental context reinstatement/change) mixed ANOVAs may be
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considered as subsequent interaction comparison analyses of the three 
factor ANOVA (Keppel, 1982; Kirk, 1982).
3.2.2. Complete RT data set ANOVA.
3.2.2.1. preliminary analysis.
A three factor ( 4 x 4 x 2 )  mixed design was applied. The factors were 
defined by processing/presentation time (P/PT), response type (RST) and 
environmental context reinstatement/change (CTX). An F-max test of the 
between subjects factor suggested that the normality and homogeniety of 
variance assumptions were tenable, F-max(4,15) = 3.23. However, to
maintain consistency of data presentation and to facilitate comparisons 
between analyses, a logarithmic transformation of the form Y' = log(Y + 
1) and identical to those implemented prior to all subsequent ANOVAs was 
carried out. The transformed data also satisfied the normality and 
homogeniety of variance assumptions, F-max(4,15) = 2.82.
3.2.2.2. overall F-tests.
The three factor mixed ANOVA was carried out on the transformed RT data. 
The results of this analysis are summarised in table 11.3., while tables
11.4. and 11.5. present the non-transformed and transformed means and 
standard deviations of the significant interaction (response type x 
process/presentation time). Figure 11.4. presents a plot of the 
transformed mean values.
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SOURCE df mean square F P
Huynh-Feldt
P
P/PT 3 0.03657 0.50 0. 685
error 41 0.07322
RST 3 0.20836 19.10 0.000 0. 000
RST x P/PT 9 0.03606 3.31 0. 000 0.000
error 123 0.01091
CTX 1 0.00015 0.02 0.890
CTX x P/PT 3 0.00277 0.35 0.786
error 41 0.00781
RST x CTX 3 0.00854 1.19 0.316 0.315
RST x CTX x P/PT 9 0.00365 0.51 0. 866 0.852
error 123 0.00718
Table I1.3. Summary/ of the three factor mixed ANOVA of transformed RT.
CONDITION
L1 . 5 L3 H3 H6
x I 1 .731 1 .638 1 .431 1.339 |
hits S.D. | 0.851 0.492 0.793 0.250 |
n I
_ _  l
348 418 539 721 j
1
x 1 1 .896 2. 150 2. 235 2.624 |
misses S.D. | 1 .144 1.147 1 .333 2.007 j
n 1
_ l
292 222 101 143 |
-- 1
x 1 1 .630 1 .893 1 .743 1.983 j
c . r . s S.D. | 0.617 1 . 024 0. 583 0.888 |
n I 479 494 579 782 |
------1 -
X 1 2. 178 1 .795 3.012 2.972 |
f . a. s S.D. 1 1 .382 0.690 2.324 1.722 j
n 1 
1
161 146 61 82 j
Table 11.4. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed response 
type RT and the number of RTs contributing to each mean 
per condition.
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L1.5
CONDITION 
L3 H3 H6
| hits
x  1 
1
0.419 0.414 0.300 0.367 |
S.D. | 0.115 0.074 0.066 0.035 |
j misses
X | 
1
0.437 0.476 0.491 0.518 j
S.D. |
__
0.135 0. 104 0.122 0.151 |
| c . r . s
x  1 
1
0.409 0.441 0.430 0.458 |
S.D. | 
1
0.091 0.115 0.087 0.123 |
| f. a . s
x  i 
i
0.469 0.435 0.553 0.569 |
S.D. | 
1
0.161 0.091 0. 159 0.140 |
n 1 13 14 8 10
Table 11.5. Mean and standard deviation of transformed response type 
RT and the number of subjects per P/PT condition.
*— * hits 
*--* misses 
.___, c . r . s
I
0.56 |
I
0.54 |
I
0.52 |
I
0.50 |
I
log 0.48 |
I
(RT+1) 0.46 |
I
0.44 |
I
0.42 |
0.40 |
I
0.38 I
I
1---------l T 5  L3 ^  H3 H6
Figure 11.4. Mean t r an sfo rm ed hits RT per condition.
. a. s
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3.2.2.3. specific comparisons.
As the separate response type analyses of the effect of the 
processing/presentation time factor to be reported can be considered as 
simple effect analyses, the only specific comparisons required here are 
those involving the main effect of response type.
The mean transformed RT of each response type: calculated using all the 
data available in each category, rather than just that from subjects 
providing RT data in all response type categories; as in the three factor 
ANOVA, is presented in table 11.6. below.
I response type X transformed RT sample size
I hit 0.388 64
I miss 0.482 59
I c . r . 0.417 64
I f. a . 0.503 48
Table 11.6. Mean transformed RT by response type.
Orthogonal analyses were carried out to determine which response type RTs 
were significantly different. As the homogeniety of variance of 
differences assumption was violated, separate error terms for each 
comparison were required. Given such a situation, it was decided to 
carry out separate F-tests employing all the data available for each 
comparison, rather than the sub-set of data from subjects providing a RT 
in each response category.
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The means, error terms and F-values for each comparison are presented in 
table 11.7. below.
comparison respective means df MSe F
hit vs cr. 0.388 vs 0.417 63 0.003 8.54
cr. vs miss 0.419 vs 0.482 58 0.006 18.94
miss vs fa. 0.477 vs 0.495 44 0. 007 1 .04
Table 11.7. Means, error terms and F-values of the three orthogonal 
comparisons.
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3.2.3. Separate two factor ANOVAs of RT by response type
3.2.3.1. Hits
3.2.3.2. preliminary analysis.
An F-max test of the between subjects factor normality and homogeniety 
of variance assumptions suggested that one or both were untenable, 
F-maxU,15) = 10.78. Logarithmic and square root transformations were 
examined, with the log transform providing the smallest F-max value, 
F-max(4,15) = 5.72.
L1. 5
C O N D I T I O N  
L 3  H 3 H6
€ 1 x ! 1 . 8 3 2 1 . 5 2 0  1 . 2 1 5 1 . 3 9 1
0 I same
N
T
I S.D. I 0 . 9 5 8 0 . 3 9 1  0 . 2 6 5 0. 2911
E ! x 1 . 6 7 3 1 . 6 9 8  1 . 3 2 6 1 . 2 9 8
X j diff
T j S.D. 0 . 6 4 0 0 . 5 3 4  0 . 4 6 7 0 . 2 4 0
(a)
C
0
N
T
I same
X |
I
S.D. |
I
0.431 
0. 134
0.397
0.067
0.342
0.051
0.376 | 
0.051 |
E
I
x I 0.416 0.423 0.360 0.360 j
X
T
I diff I
S.D. |
I
0.099 0.083 0.076 0.043 j
(b)
Table 11.8. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed (a) 
and transformed (b) hit RT per condition.
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3.2.3.3. overall F-tests.
The two factor mixed ANOVA (factors defined as in section 3.1.1.2.) 
carried out on the log transformed data revealed a main effect of 
encoding condition, F(3,60) =3.34, MSe = 0.011, but not retrieval 
context, F(1,60) = 0.17, MSe = 0.002. However, the interaction between 
these two factors did approach significance, F(3,60) = 2.27, p = 0.089 
(see table 11.8. and figure 11.5.).
reinstated colour 
* changed colour
log 
( R T + 1 )
0.43 |
I
0.42 |
l!
0.41 |!
I
0.40 |
I
0.39 |
I
0.38 |
I
0.37 |
I
0.36 |
I
0.35 |
I
0.34 | 
/
L1 .5 L3 H3 H6
CONDITION
Figure 11.5. Mean transformed hits RT per condition.
3 8 1
3.2.3.4. specific comparisons.
No significant differences were observed between the H6 and H3 encoding 
conditions, t(60) = -0.615, nor the L3 and L1.5 encoding conditions, 
t(60) = 0.516. However, a significant difference was observed between 
the H3 and L3 encoding conditions, t(60) = 2.213.
Although the interaction between the encoding condition and retrieval 
context factors was not significant, as the superiority of reinstated 
colour context conditions is predicted, it is legitimate to investigate 
the pairwise comparisons of interest with one-tailed t-tests (see 
section 3.1.2 . 3 . )
Of the four pairwise comparisons, only the 13 and H3 conditions exhibited 
superior speed of response with reinstated colour context and so merited 
further examination. Of these two comparisons only the L3 condition 
revealed a significant effect t(60) = 1.815; H3, t(60) = 1.1 72.
3.2.4. Hisses.
3.2.4.1. preliminary analysis.
An F-max test of the between subjects factor normality and homogeniety 
of variance assumptions suggested that .they were untenable, F-max(4,15) 
=4.01. An examination of logarithmic and square root transformations 
revealed the former to provide the lowest F-max value, F-max(4,15) = 
2.43.
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CONDITION 
L1.5 L3 H3 H6
C
0
N
T
E
X
T
(a)
C
0
N
T
E
X
T
Table 11.9. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed (a) 
and transformed (b) miss RT per condition.
3.2.4.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor mixed ANOVA; carried out on the log transformed data, 
revealed no significant effects. Encoding condition, F (3,60) = 0.85, 
MSe = 0.033, retrieval context, F(1,60) = 0.72, MSe = 0.011 and condition 
x context, F(3,60) = 0.55 (see table 11.9.).
3.2.5. Correct rejections.
3.2.5.1. preliminary analysis.
An F-max test of the between subjects factor normality and homogeniety 
of variance assumptions suggested that they were tenable, F-max(4,15)
3.06. However, for ease of comparison with the other response type RT 
analyses, a log transform was carried out, F-max(4,15) = 2.01.
same
X I
I
S.D. |
_ _ _ I
0 . 4 3 8  
0. 12 3
0 . 4 8 1
0 . 1 7 0
0 .  53 3  
0 . 1 8 9
0 . 5 1 7  | 
0 . 1 8 9  |
1
x  1 0 . 4 6 0 0 . 4 5 2 0 . 4 8 7 0 . 5 0 4  |
diff 1
S.D. | 
1
0 . 1 4 5 0 . 0 7 6 0. 143 0 . 1 3 5  |
(b)
same
X I
I
S.D. |
|.
1 . 854 
0. 870
2. 270 
1 .461
2.783
2.192
2.679 | 
2.261 |
1
x  1 2 . 055 1 .874 2.242 2.359 |
diff 1
S.D. | 
1
1.201 0.539 1 . 241 1.260 |
CONDITION
L1.5 L3 H3 H6
| same
x I 
I
S.D. |
- -  I -
1 . 659 
0. 574
1 .724 
0.670
1 .495 
0.478
1.796 | 
0.791 |
| diff
x I 
I
1 . 630 1.875 1 . 550 1.786 |
S.D. | 0. 573 1 .233 0.535 0.706 |
(a)
C
0
| same
x 1 
1
S.D. |
-  1
0 . 4 1 6  
0 .  092
0 . 4 2 3  
0.  104
0.390
0 . 0 8 0
0 . 4 3 3  | 
0 . 1 0 9  |
1
E
1
x 1 0.411 0 . 4 3 1 0 . 3 9 8 0 . 4 3 3  |
X
T
| diff 1
S.D. | 
1
0 . 0 9 0 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 0 8 4 0 . 1 0 0  i
(b)
Table 11.10. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed (a)
and transformed (b) correct rejection RT per condition.
3.2.5.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor mixed ANOVA; carried out on the transformed data, revealed 
no significant effects. Encoding condition, F(3,60) = 0.67, MSe - 0.019, 
retrieval context, FC1,60) = 0.13, MSe = 0.002 and condition x context, 
F(3,60 ) = 0.12 (see table 11.10.).
3.2.6. False alarms.
3.2.6.1. preliminary analysis.
An F-max test of the between subjects factor normality and homogeniety 
of variance assumptions suggested that one or both were 
F-maxU.,5) = 11.76. An examination of logarithmic and square root
transformations revealed the former to provide the lowest F-max value,
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F - m a x (4,15) = 3.39.
3.2.6.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor mixed ANOVA carried out on the log transformed data 
revealed a main effect of encoding condition, F(3,44) = 3.04, MSe = 
0.039, but not of retrieval context, F(1 ,44) = 0.05, MSe = 0.016, nor did 
the interaction between the two factors approach significance, F(3,44) 
= 0.35 (see table 11.11.).
CONDITION
L1 . 5 L3 H3 H6
| same
x  I 2. 259 1.711 3.836 2.773 |
S.D. |
______ |.
1 .705 0.44 4 3.807 1.855 |
I d i f f
x  I 
I
2. 096 1 .879 2.875 3.092 |
S.D. |
I
0.955 0.869 1.68 8 1.414 |
(a)
C X I 0.467 0.427 0.594 0.546
0 I same
N S.D. | 0.200 0. 073 0.274 0. 155
T II
E x  I 0.471 0.442 0.556 0.587
X I diff I
T S.D. | 0. 136 0.127 0.172 0. 156
(b)
Table 11.11. Mean and standard deviation of non-transformed (a) 
and transformed false alarm RT per condition.
3.2.6.3. specific comparisons.
No significant difference was observed in overall performance between  ^
encoding conditions H6 and H3, t(60) = -0.17*. However, a significant 
difference was observed between encoding conditions H3 and L3, t(60) =
2.855. No significant difference was observed between encoding 
conditions L3 and L1.5, t(15) = -0.495.*
4 Superior performance with false alarms; in common with misses, 
should be represented by larger erroneous response RTs. The as­
sumption is that greater time reflects greater uncertainty, mani­
fested in more retrieval cycles to obtain more information regard­
ing the status of the word in question.
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4. Discussion.
4.1. General conclusions.
As in the previous experiments, the pattern of effects of encoding 
condition would seem to indicate the success of the different 
instructions in eliciting different modes of processing. The major 
differences between encoding conditions occur between the H3 and L3 
conditions. This suggests that it is processing mode rather than 
presentation time, that exerts the most significant effect.
Beyond this, the replication of the environmental context reinstatement 
effects (as observed in chapters seven and eight), but detected here with 
a recognition paradigm (in terms of the number of hits and false alarms, 
and hits RT) and using background colour as the nominal environmental 
context supports not only the view of context suggested by the model, but 
also its emphasis on a communality of processes in recall and 
recognition.
'A,
4.2. Nature of reaction time data.
Of the analyses of reaction time data presented, most importance should 
be placed on the hit and correct rejection response times analyses. The 
reason for this; as mentioned in section 3.2.1. , is that these analyses 
employ most data. As most subjects performed the recognition task well, 
comparatively few misses and false alarm responses were made. For the 
analyses of these reaction times the consequence was not only that some 
subjects did not provide any responses in one category (ie. false 
alarms), but that many of those median values obtained in the miss and 
false alarm categories were derived from a much smaller number of
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reaction time scores than was the case for the other two response 
categories. A small sample size allows a greater influence of any rogue 
score. In turn this can produce greater variance of scores and so a less 
powerful and even misleading analysis. Although the mean retains more 
information about each score than the median, this aspect of the mean 
provides greater accuracy only if there is a superior ratio of scores 
genuinely representing the process(es) under investigation to rogue 
scores. The critical ratio will depend on the magnitude of deviation of 
the rogue scores. The use of mean values when there is a small sample 
size, or extreme rogue scores can provide a summary statistic that is 
quite unrepresentative of the values associated with the performance of 
the task under investigation. Given reaction time data, where slight 
inattentiveness to the task can produce very large rogue values and the 
small sample of scores produced by some subjects in the correct rejection 
and false alarm categories, it was decided to employ medians and not 
means.
4.3. RT ANOVAs discrepancy.
As an environmental context reinstatement effect was identified in the 
L3 condition of the hits RT analysis, but not in any of the other response 
type analyses, an interaction between all three factors in the three 
factor ANOVA should have been expected. A lack of statistical power 
would seem to be the reason for the non-significance of this effect. 
There are several reasons for a reduction in power between the hits RT 
analysis and the three factor analysis. The most obvious of these is the 
difference in magnitude of the relevant interaction error terms. In the 
hit RT analysis this is 0.002, while in the three factor analysis it is
0.007 An examination of interaction error terms across the other 
response type analyses reveals that only the analysis of correct
rejections provides an interaction term of comparable magnitude. The 
relevant miss and false alarm error terms are much higher. The size of 
the interaction error terms is inversely proportional to the number of 
data points contributing to its calculation. This finding supports the 
view expressed in section 4.2..
In addition to the effect of sample size on variation, the manner in which 
subjects with incomplete data records were eliminated from the three 
factor ANOVA would seem to have consequence for the results observed. 
This elimination is carried out on the same basis as was considered 
improper to enable d* analyses. As with the d' analyses discussed, 
eliminating subjects that did not provide false alarm or miss responses 
eliminates those subjects who performed the task best. The greatest 
proportion of these subjects should be found in the conditions that 
facilitate performance and this will include reinstated, rather than 
changed colour background environmental context conditions. As high 
performing subjects would be expected to complete hit responses quicker 
than other subjects, it is likely that the elimination of subjects on 
such grounds would lessen the differences between conditions in terms of 
RT as well as the number of response types.
i -
Finally, it is noteworthy that even the violation of the homogeniety of 
variance of differences assumption is operating to increase the alpha 
level (make significance less likely), rather than as normal, decrease 
the alpha level. Fortunately, *the slight effect this has on the alpha 
level is countered by the Huynh-Feldt adjustment.
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4.4. Retrieval strategies across conditions suggested by RTs.
An examination of figure 11.4. suggests two major components of the three 
factor ANOVA, processing/presentation time by response type interaction. 
First, there appears to be a general decrease in hits RT with an increase 
in processing/presentation time, in contrast to a lack of such effect 
with correct rejection responses and a general increase in RT over 
processing/presentation time with miss and false alarm responses. The 
second component is the apparent reduction in false alarm RT in the L3
condition. However, an examination of the separate response type RT two
factor ANOVAs reveals support for only two of these conclusions. Both 
miss and correct rejections are uneffected by changes in
processing/presentation time, while false alarm RT over
processing/presentation time differs only between low and high level 
processing (ie. L3 cf. H3) and is not effected by presentation time (ie. 
L1.5 cf. L3, H3 cf. H6).
The particular pattern of an increase in response type RT from hits to 
correct rejections to misses and false alarms suggests that at the end 
of each retrieval cycle, some assessment is made as to whether further 
retrieval cycles will be implemented. Presumably, hit item retrieval 
cycles are terminated when a valid match is considered to be made with 
information in memory. Such correct matches can be determined quicker 
as processing/presentation time increases. This gives support to the 
prediction made in chapter seven (section 1.4.) that there would be an 
exponential rate of approach to an appropriate target description.
Another interesting feature of the hit data obtained in this experiment 
is the way in which they appear to contradict the model of recognition 
presented by Atkinson and Juola (1974). One of the fundamental
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assumptions of this model is that as if the "familiarity” of an item 
cannot be employed to make a decision as to the stimulus item's previous 
occurrence, then a search of event knowledge (E/K) memory is initiated. 
The longer this memory search continues, the greater the probability that 
a correct response will be made. With the present hit data however, the 
presumed relationship between the probability of a hit and RT is not 
observed. In fact the opposite relationship is observed. As the 
probability of a hit increases (across conditions L1.5, L3, H3 and H6), 
the RT decreases. Proponents of the Atkinson and Juola model may attempt 
to account for such observation by attributing the decrease in RT to 
decisions made on the basis of high familiarity achieved by the 
elaborative processing engaged in the H3 and H6 conditions. However, 
this argument ignores two awkward facts. First, it seems odd that the 
RTs based on such "familiarity" judgements are not influenced by 
presentation time. Second, it is even more odd that judgements based on 
"familiarity" should be influenced by the form of processing engaged by 
subjects, when this seems to be distinguished by the manner of use of 
other knowledge. The form of memory representations formed at encoding 
in the conditions exhibiting high(er) hit probabilities should 
fiaoilitate what Atkinson and Juola have termed "extended memory search" 
and not decisions based on familiarity information.
As correct rejection responses take longer than hit responses, it
suggests that more information and so more retrieval cycles are required
before it is decided that the information sought is not present. This
finding is consistent with most studies of memory search carried out
5
since Sternberg (1969).
5 See McNicol and Stewart (1980) for a review of RT in memory 
research.
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The RTs associated with misses suggests that in an attempt to provide 
support to an earlier assessment that the item was not presented, more 
retrieval cycles are required before a (wrong) decision as to the items 
prior presentation is made. This decision could be based on verification 
criteria, or possibly on a combination of verification criteria 
satisfied and the number of retrieval cycles required to achieve this. 
The latter measure would approximate to retrieval time. Presumably, 
some limit to the number of retrieval cycles engaged would be set by the 
subject in response to the experimenter's instructions of responding 
with speed, but accuracy.
The false alarm RTs also seem to be accountable in a similar manner. 
However, the fact that the type of decision and response made is of false 
recognition suggests that prior to the final retrieval cycles, some 
assessment has indicated that the particular item is a member of the 
previously presented word set, otherwise retrieval would be terminated 
with the same RT as correct rejections. The extra retrieval cycles, 
probably in comparison to hits, but certainly in comparison to correct 
rejections, can be regarded as attempts to confirm or contradict this 
prior assessment, as in the overshoot phenomenon (see chapter six,
section 1 . 4.).
The increase in RT observed with false alarm responses as the level of
semantic processing increases is more difficult to account for than the
converse effect observed with hit response RT. However, one possibility 
is that after semantic elaboration, a vague retrieval specification may 
(via the processes described in chapter seven, sections 1.4. I 1.5.)
produce several candidate memory records, whereas a vague retrieval 
specification employing mainly integrated information may have 
difficulty in producing any memory records at all. Consequently, more
time will be required to assess the various candidates produced in the 
former situation than is required to terminate the latter retrieval 
process.
The observation of an environmental context effect with hit RT, but not 
false alarm RT, may seem slightly paradoxical given the presence of an 
environmental context effect in terms of the number of hits and false 
alarms. The advantage in terms of the number of hits and their RTs in 
the L3 condition indicates not only that environmental (colour) context 
information has been encoded and employed in retrieval specifications, 
but also that benefit has been derived from such inclusion. Likewise, 
the effect of environmental context in terms of the number of false 
alarms indicates that environmental context information is being used, 
but this time to the subjects’ performance disadvantage. Given this 
finding and interpretation, an environmental context effect in terms of 
RT might be expected with false alarms as well as hits. However, there 
are two (non-mutually exclusive) reasons why such an effect might not be 
observed; one primarily statistical and the other psychological. The 
first is the limited sample size. As has been mentioned, this is 
manifest not just in terms of the number of subjects contributing a false 
alarm RT, but also in terms of the number of RTs that contribute to the 
subjects' median scores, which are input to the ANOVAs. The result is 
greater variance and fewer degrees of freedom in false alarm RT scores 
and so, less powerful analyses. The second reason is that although false 
alarm response items eventually may be regarded as hit items by the 
subject, the greater RTs associated with false alarms; suggesting an 
attempt to obtain corroborative or contradictory evidence, may mask the 
environmental context influence. There may be greater variation in RT 
on the basis of the "checking" retrieval cycles than as a consequence of 
the environmental context factor. although in the retrieval
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specification verification criteria hierarchy, the environmental 
context information correspondence is placed in a position of sufficient 
importance to affect the final decision and response.
The lack of effect of environmental context on correct rejections; 
despite comparable power between this and the hits analysis, strongly 
suggests that environmental context information is not an essential 
component in the retrieval specifications constructed. Likewise; 
drawing on an assumed similarity of processing between correct 
rejections and misses, neither does it play a large part in the retrieval 
specifications constructed for items wrongly judged as not being members 
of the previously presented word set. Some sort of information other 
than that distinguished by the experimental manipulations must be used 
in the retrieval specifications resulting in correct rejections and miss 
responses. This implies that there is more than one mode of retrieval 
and; as there is no reason to believe that in condition L3 environmental 
(colour) context .information was not encoded as part of the miss items' 
descriptions, that at least the inclusion of environmental context 
information in retrieval specifications is under strategic control.
If the view that false alarm item "checking" masks the environmental 
context effect in terms of RT is accepted, then the pattern of results 
obtained would suggest that retrieval specifications incorporating 
environmental context information are constructed early in the retrieval 
process and if they do not disambiguate satisfactorily, other 
information is incorporated in the subsequent retrieval specifications 
instead. Such a procedure would comply with a general strategy of 
employing higher level retrieval specifications, only if lower level 
retrieval specifications failed to disambiguate and achieve a successful 
retrieval.
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However, consideration of the way in which the order of application of 
the different retrieval specifications that can be constructed is 
probably misplaced here, especially with the doubt concerning the 
validity of the false alarm and miss RT means as robust measures of the 
time taken to engage and complete the processes underlying such 
responses. Although much of the account based on the RT data is 
speculative; addressing issues beyond that which the experiment was 
originally designed to examine, it does serve to illustrate the potential 
of the approach employed.
4.5. The nature of the environmental context effect obtained.
The magnitude of the environmental context effects observed; especially
2
m  terms of the number of hits (W = 0.659), may seem extraordinary given 
the traditional failure to obtain any such effects with recognition 
paradigms. However, several factors may contribute to the magnitude of 
the effect. One important aspect of the experimental method is that the 
nominal stimulus words were presented on a background colour. Although 
this is stating the obvious, there would seem to be an important 
difference between the presentation of words in a room; apparently by 
convenience on a white wall, and the suspiciously significant fact that 
all presentation words were presented on the same block of colour. In 
the latter case, which describes the recognition-word colour experiment, 
the manner of presentation would seem to do more than increase the 
perceptual saliency of the nominal environment. The use of the colour 
background; although only verbally referred to in the same way as room 
environment, seems to connote that it is an important aspect of the 
experiment. If this is so, then it should be expected for subjects to 
employ an encoding strategy that incorporates information concerning the 
colour. This then could provide a basis for an advantage of reinstated
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colour context at retrieval.
Although the greater significance attributed to the nominal 
environmental context at encoding may account for some of the difference 
in magnitude of environmental effect between chapters seven and eleven, 
it cannot provide a complete account when the comparison is drawn with 
other environmental context studies. In such a comparison the type of 
processing carried out at encoding would seem to play a critical role. 
An interesting study would be to examine the relative contribution to the 
environmental context reinstatement effect of level of processing and 
cognitive (rather than perceptual) saliency.
It is aJ.so interesting to note that a prediction of an effect of colour 
environmental context effect in recognition; given low level processing 
is one of the consequences of Mandler's (1980) account of recognition 
performance. Handler suggests that integrative organisation/processing 
is heavily based on perceptual information, ie. low level schemata. As 
there should be a strong- bias towards intra-item processing in the low 
level conditions, the encoding descriptions formed should include a 
considerable amount of colour environmental context information. As 
recognition employs this sort of information primarily, it should be 
expected that a change in colour environmental context would be 
detrimental to such performance. To what extent room type environmental 
context would exert a similar effect should depend on the degree of 
encoding; as may be affected by the cognitive saliency of the nominal 
environment,6 and the level of discrimination such information provides
6 This would suggest a less automatic method of integrative process­
ing than is implied by Mandler (1980).
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at retrieval. with the present RED-BLUE distinction, this should be
relatively high.
4.6. Environmental context information unavailability, or non-use at 
retrieval.
The observation of an environmental context reinstatement effect in the 
L3, but not the L1.5 condition would suggest that some minimum time for 
the encoding of environmental context information is required, if it is 
to be of use in subsequent retrieval specifications. Unfortunately 
however, the lack of a significant effect of context reinstatement in 
either of the two high level processing conditions prevents an 
unequivocal determination of whether environmental context is encoded, 
but is redundant at retrieval, or simply is not encoded. Despite this, 
the pattern of results obtained strongly suggests that the former account 
is the more accurate.
In the H3 condition, in both the number of hits and hits RT, an advantage 
(although not significant) for reinstated colour context was observed. 
It would seem reasonable to assume that if the size of this effect was 
inhibited by limiting the ability of processing environmental context 
information by inducing story and image construction processes, so 
elaboration could occur within the allocated time, then increasing the 
time of presentation should facilitate the encoding of environmental 
context information. However, as the H6 condition provides no evidence 
of advantage to colour context reinstatements, nor any evidence of a 
general increment in performance, it implies that the H3 condition does 
not exhaust the processing ability of subjects. Consequently, the cause 
of the lack of environmental context reinstatement effect is very 
unlikely to be caused by any processing limitation. Given such a
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conclusion, it would seem that the best account of the lack of 
environmental context effect observed in high level processing 
conditions remains the redundancy of environmental information in memory 
records and for retrieval specifications, due to the variety of retrieval 
routes available when the nominal stimuli items have been elaborately 
encoded.
4 . 7 .  R e o r i e n t a t i o n .
Having initiated the consideration of the influence of environmental 
context on memory with anecdotes of attempts to remember in naturalistic 
situations, and having manifested and examined the reinstatement 
phenomenon with traditional experimental variables, it seems appropriate 
that the last experiment to be reported should return to consider a more 
commonly experienced type of remembering. In the following chapter, an 
attempt is made to recreate, in a more formal setting, the need to recall 
goal-oriented, intentional action.
CHAPTER TWELVE
EXPERIMENT SEVEN
AN INVESTIGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT AS AN AIO TO THE REMEMBRANCE
OF INTENDED ACTION
1. Introduction.
1.1. Different aspects of memory performance.
In the previous chapters the experiments that were reported dealt with 
the influence of environmental context on the ability to remember 
discrete verbal stimuli. As with most memory research, the reason for 
the use of verbal stimuli has more to do with their ease of presentation 
and general utility, rather than for any theoretical reason or 
commitment. However, although such verbally based tasks provide an easy 
way to examine the influence of environmental context on many aspects of 
memory performance, their ability to reflect in an ecologically valid 
manner, one aspect of memory performance that seems to be distinctly tied 
to environmental context; namely intentional action, is much more 
questionable.
1.2. Environmentsi context and intended action.
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An often cited example of environmental context influence that has also 
been cited to illustrate the effect of environmental context on intended 
action (Norman, 1981) is that anecdote reported by William James (1890),
very absent minded persons in going to their bedroom to dress 
for dinner have been known to take off one garment after 
another and finally get into bed, merely because that was the 
habitual issue of the first few movements when performed at a 
later hour (p.115).
The influence of environmental context on the remembrance of intended 
action can be further illustrated by considering the difficulty there is 
in describing how to carry out such activities as driving a car (when not 
in a car), or locating a book in a library through the use of the 
cataloguing system (again, when not in the library).
It may be argued that the difficulty in providing such descriptions is 
due to the relevant information being contained only within some 
procedure which controls these acts. Although this is certainly part of 
the difficulty, also it seems that access to the relevant procedures and 
access at appropriate points to the relevant sub-routines is achieved 
much more easily in the relevant environmental context.
Of course, in these sorts of situations there is much more than an 
arbitrary relationship between the environment and performance. In such 
cases, elements of the environment have a functional significance with 
respect to the performance of the task. This aspect of real environments 
may be considered a nuisance in determining the true influence of 
environmental context on memory performance. However, the fact that
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such performance is inextricably linked with elements in the environment 
not only indicates their importance in psychological processing, but 
also the consequent need for some theoretical account that can 
accommodate the relationships between such seemingly different entities 
(ie. environments, objects, plans and actions) and the ability to access 
one form of representation from another.
1.3. Models of action comprehension and intended action.
Models of intended action have been presented by Brewer (Brewer & Dupree, 
1 983 ; Lichtenstein 8c Brewer, 1980 ) and Norman (1981). In both of these 
accounts, the notion of schemata is employed as the basis for cognition 
and action. Brewer’s work focuses on subjects' comprehension and 
remembrance of actions, while Norman addresses the issue of initiating 
and accounting for the frequent' errors of action.
Brewer suggests that information mapped into plan-schemata (in the same 
manner as described in chapter six, section 1.2.) provides the means by 
which an abstract underlying structure can be identified from a temporal 
sequence of actions or events. In other words, action intent, or goals 
are derived from the structural relationships provided by plan schemata. 
In accord with memory performance observed with other types of 
information, Brewer and Dupree have noted that over time, memory for 
(deduced) goal-directed action exhibits a loss of detail and an emergence 
of gist.
.Norman proposes an activation-trigger-schema system (ATS) model that 
.controls action via sensori-motor schemata. For the operation of each 
schema, an activation value and a triggering condition must be fulfilled. 
Norman views the schemata as being organised in a heterarchical control
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structure, with each schema being relevant (ie. containing information 
and directing the control of motor activity) for only a small number of 
actions. Therefore, any sequence of actions (as most “actions" are) 
require several, or many schemata.
The highest level schema is termed the parent schema and represents the 
abstraction of intent. All those schemata activated by the parent schema 
are termed child schemata. Actions are initiated by the triggering of 
an activated parent schema. Child schemata are activated subsequently, 
with their triggering conditions controlling the particular order of 
schemata operation. Determination of the appropriateness of schema 
operation is carried out by means of descriptions (Norman Bobrow,
1 979 ) .
Norman identifies three main sources of action errors: intention
formation, activation and triggering. Of the catalogue of action slips 
provided by Norman, a sub-category of activation errors; capture errors, 
are associated most frequently with environmental context. However, as 
descriptions play a crucial role in intention formation and the 
actjlvation and triggering of the appropriate schemata, environmental 
context information could exert an influence at all stages of action 
execution.
An interesting correspondence exists between the anecdotal accounts of 
the sort of task influenced by environmental context, the models of 
intentional, goal-directed action and the suggestion from the state- 
dependent literature that particularly tasks involving a serial order 
component are affected by state changes. Actions with intent and 
therefore with goal-direction are well ordered in temporal sequence. 
Usually, prior actions set-up the conditions that enable subsequent
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actions to occur. Consequently, the theoretically oriented schema based 
models of intentional action may provide a means of accounting for the 
effect of physiological context (state) on such tasks.
1.4. The operationalisation of intended action.
The similarity of the models presented to account for the environmental 
context effects reported in the previous chapters and intended action 
suggests that there is substance to the anecdotes of environmental 
context influencing such action. The next step in the investigation of 
the potential relationship between environmental context and intended 
action would seem to be to attempt to formulate an intentional, goal- 
directed task that can be formally examined under laboratory conditions. 
Of course, the problem faced by any such attempt is achieving a valid 
correspondence between the "real-world" and laboratory situations on 
those factors which have effect on the behaviour under study, when these 
factors have yet to be identified.
For compatibility with previous experiments and in order that the goal- 
oriented task could be carried out with equal ease in two environments, 
it was important that no advantage to task performance was provided by 
any one environment. Tasks that wholly replicated real-world 
activities; apart from requiring a large amount of apparatus, tended to 
suffer from the problem mentioned in section 1.2., of being inter-twined 
with environmental features. To achieve equality in both room 
environments with such tasks would require the two environments to become 
more alike, as those environmental elements involved in in the task were 
replicated in each environment. Consequently, a simple task was devised 
that was independent of the environment in which it was performed. The 
task involved the ordering of a set of thirteen unique objects. The
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subjects goal was to place these objects in a particular order in a 
straight line across the table that they would be sitting at. Such a task 
not only maintains the goal oriented nature of the tasks described 
anecdotally and allows easy measurement of how well performance achieves 
this goal, but it also enables separation to be made between the ability 
of subjects to remember a particular pattern of objects and the order of 
object placement that leads to such a pattern.
1.5. Experimental hypotheses.
In common with other experiments reported in this thesis, this particular 
experiment is quite exploratory in nature. As a result, few specific a 
priori hypotheses can be presented. However, the general view and 
hypothesis is that goal-oriented actions practiced in a particular 
environment will be better remembered (ie. re-enacted) in that 
environment, as compared to any other.
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2. Method.
2.1. Subjects:
24 Glasgow University students; males and females of approximately 
equal numbers, participated as subjects. All subjects were naive 
regarding the purpose of the experiment and were paid one pound for 
taking part.
2.2. Environmental contexts:
Rooms A and B were employed in the experiment. Descriptions of these 
rooms can be found in appendix A.
2.3. Stimuli and apparatus:
13 different objects were used in the experiment. These items were: 
a hook, a button, a screw, a (wooden) crescent, a hinge, a (wooden) 
cube, a key, a paper-clip, a battery, a coin, a (small piece of) 
string, a (wooden) triangle and a di.
A set of instructions regarding the placement of the objects was 
recorded and Resented to subjects via a mono tape recorder; 
operated by a remote switch and hidden speakers (the instructions 
are detailed in section 2.5). Subjects verbal protocols were 
recorded on the same JVC stereo cassette deck via the microphones 
employed in experiments two to five.
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2.4. Questionnaire:
A simple questionnaire; based on that presented to subjects in 
experiment nine, was administered to subjects after they had 
completed their experimental session. A specimen copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in appendix 0.
2.5. Design:
Initially, a two factor (2 x 2) mixed design was applied. The first 
factor was defined by the subjects' second session environment, ie. 
same (S), or different (D). The second factor was defined by the 
session number, ie. first or second.
2.6. Procedure:
The experiment was carried out over two, approximately ten minute 
sessions, separated by twenty-four hours. On first arrival, 
subjects were led into room A and asked to sit at the table at the 
end of the room. The experimenter then informed the subjects that 
he would not be remaining in the room and that instead they would 
be directed in the task they had to perform by tape recorded 
instructions. The experimenter explained to the subjects that all 
they had to do was listen to the recording and follow the 
instructions that would be given at appropriate intervals. After 
ascertaining that t h e  s u b j e c t s  u n d e r s t o o d  what was about to happen, 
the experimenter l e f t  t h e  r o o m  an d s w i t c h e d  on the tape. The script 
of the recording w a s  as f o l l o w s :
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If you look at the table in front of you, you will see a variety of 
different objects. Look at the objects and make sure that you can 
unambiguously identify each one. There is a hinge, a screw, a hook, 
a piece of string, a battery, a triangle, a button, a paper-clip, 
a coin, a cube, a dice, a crescent and a key. Your task here is to 
place these objects in a horizontal line across the table. However, 
what you have to do is place these items along the line in a 
particular order. What will happen is that I will instruct you, 
item by item, to place each object somewhere along the line. Now 
just to avoid any mis-understandings, I will repeat what you have 
to do. You have to arrange the objects in a horizontal line across 
the table in front of you. To do this I will instruct you, item by 
item, where to place each object. OK. then, let's start.
First put the button in the middle of what will be your horizontal 
line of objects.
Place the hook to the right of the button.
Place the screw to the right of the hook.
Put the crescent between the hook and the screw.
Put the hinge at the right hand end of the horizontal line.
Put the cube at the left hand end of the horizontal line.
Place t h e  key half-way between the button and the cube.
Put the paper-clip between the button and the key.
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Put the battery to the right of the screw.
Put the coin between the paper-clip and key.
Place the string to the right of the cube.
Put the triangle between the battery and hinge.
Place the dice between the string and key.
Well that's you finished the first part. Now, put all the objects
into a pile as they were before.
At this point the experimenter returned and explained that the 
subject's task was to reform the line of objects by placing each 
object in the line in the same order as they had just been 
instructed. As they did this, subjects were asked to give a
detailed commentary of what they were doing, especially with 
respect to the order of placing the objects. Subjects were informed 
that their commentaries would be recorded (via the microphone in 
position and employed since experiment two) and from these, their 
ability to reform the line of objects in the correct order would be 
assessed. They were asked to begin as soon as the experimenter left 
the room (prior to entering to instruct the subjects, the 
experimenter had started the tape recording). Subjects were 
instructed to return to the waiting area outside; leaving the
r e c o n s t r u c t e d  l i n e  b e h i n d  th em , a f t e r  they had completed the task. 
S u b j e c t s  w e r e  t h e n  r e m i n d e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  to r e t u r n  t h e n e x t  d a y  at
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the same time to carry out an identical task, but with another set 
of objects. On returning for the second session, subjects were 
randomly allocated to either room A (same condition), or room B 
(change condition) . In both rooms subjects were invited to sit at 
the desks in front of the same pile of objects as they had seen the 
day before. The experimenter then informed the subjects that 
rather than as had been described the day before, their task on this 
day was to reform the original line of objects, placing the objects 
in the same order as they had originally been instructed. It was 
also explained that the reason for leading them to believe that they 
would be asked to carry out a different task was to reduce the 
likelihood of them thinking about, or practicing the task. 
Subjects were then asked to reform the line in the same order, 
provide commentaries of their actions as they did so and return to 
the waiting area when they were finished, leaving the intact line 
on the table, just as they had done on the previous day. When the 
subjects returned to the waiting area after completing the 
experiment, they were asked to return to the room they had just been 
in to complete the questionnaire (presented on a clipboard). After 
doing this the subjects were debriefed regarding the purpose of the 
experiment and were paid one pound for their participation.
2.7. Scoring:
The order of object placement was transcribed from each subject s 
two recorded commentaries. The final position of each object was 
recorded also. Employing this information it was possible to 
calculate Spearman rank order correlation coefficients, which 
estimated the degree of correspondence between the subjects 
performance and any particular standard.
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3. Results.
3.1. Introduction.
The values for the analyses reported here were obtained by calculating 
(for each subject) Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between 
two placement orders, or between two completed line orders. Correlation 
coefficients are identified by the notation rs. Three correlation 
coefficients were calculated for placement and line orders. The first 
(rs1) is the correlation between the first session performance and the 
instructed performance. The second (rs2) is the correlation between the 
second session performance and the instructed performance. The third 
(rs3) is the correlation between the first session and second session 
performances.
3.2. Placement order analyses.
3.2.1. Comparison of correlations.
3. 2.1.1. preliminary analysis.
As a two factor (2x3) mixed ANOVA design was to be applied to the data, 
an F-max test of the between subjects factor homogeniety of variance and 
normality of distribution assumptions was carried out. This suggested 
that one, or both of these assumptions were untenable, F-max(2,11) = 
6.10. As each rs value is expressed as a decimal point, squaring this 
value achieves a result comparable to that obtained by taking the square 
root of a number greater than 1.
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An F-max test on the transformed data (Y‘ = [Y]2) indicated that the 
homogeniety of variance and normality of distribution assumptions were 
tenable, F-max(2,11) = 2.86.
A test of the assumption of homogeneity of variance of differences was 
carried out (symmetry test, Anderson, 1958, p.259). This indicated that 
the probability of the heterogeneity of variance of differences observed 
occurring by chance was 0.063.
3.2.1.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor (subject group x correlation type) mixed ANOVA was carried 
out on the transformed data. The main effect of subject group approached 
significance, FM.22 ) = 3.72, MSe = 0.11 (tw<r-tailed test, p = 0.067), 
suggesting superior performance by subjects in the S group. A 
significant main effect of correlation type was observed, F(2,44) = 4.81, 
MSe = 0.04 (Huynh-Feldt p = 0.016), but no significant interaction
between factors was indicated, F(2,44 ) = 0. 83 (see table 12.1.).
S D S O
x  I 0.787 0.722 I | 0.635 0.565 |
rs 1 S.D. | 0. 133 0.216 | 
I
| 0.196
|
0.270 |
I
x  I 0.760
I
0.511 I
l
| 0.594 0.388 |
rs2 S.D. j 0. 135 0.372 | 
1
| 0.207 
j
0.319 |
I
x  I 0. 859
1
0.724 | | 0.746 0.572 |
rs3 S.D. |
I
0.099 0.228 | 
1
| 0.166 
I
0.283 |
Table 12.1. Correlations(a) and transformed correlations(b) by group.
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3. 2. 1.3. specific comparisons.
As the symmetry test approached significance, it was decided to employ 
specific error terms for the pair-wise comparisons. As the pair-wise 
contrasts were a posteriori and non-orthogonal, initially Tukey s HSD 
was calculated. This suggested that no two condition means were 
significantly different, rs3 vs rs1, q3, (A A ) = 1.07 7, rs3 vs rs2, q3, (AA) 
= 3.156 and rs1 vs rs2, q3,(AA) = 2.67A. Subsequently, calculation of 
Fisher s LSD identified the rs3 vs rs2 comparison as significant, t(A A) 
= 2.229, but not rs3 vs rs1, t(AA) = 0.761, nor rs1 vs r2, t(A A) = 1.886.
3.2.2. The effect of environmental context on performance as measured 
against original instructions (ie. rsl and rs2).
3.2.2.1. preliminary analysis.
In this analysis, as a two factor (2 x 2) mixed design was to be applied, 
an F-max test of the between subjects factor homogeniety of variance and 
normality of distribution assumptions was carried out. This suggested 
that one, or both of these assumptions were untenable, F-max(2,11) = 
A. 03. However, as before a square transform brought the data within 
acceptable limits, F-max(2,11) = 1.80.
3.2.2.3. overall F-tests.
A two factor (subject group x session) mixed ANOVA was carried out on the 
transformed correlation data. A significant main effect of session was 
observed, F(1,22) = *.78, MSe = 0.03, indicating superiority of
performance in the first session. However, there was no significant main 
effect of subject group. F11,22) = 2-33. MSe * 0.10. nor was there a
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significant interaction between factors, F(1,22) = 1.84.
3.2.3. The effect of environmental context on inter-session 
performance.
3.2.3.1. preliminary analysis.
As a one factor; two level, completely randomised design was to be 
applied, an F-max test of the homogeniety of variance and normality of 
distribution assumptions was carried out. The F-max test indicated that 
one, or both of these assumptions were untenable, F-max(2,11) = 5.32. 
However, an F-max test, subsequent to the same square transform applied 
previously, indicated that the tenability of these assumptions with this 
data set were tenable, F-max(2,11) = 2.89'.
3.2.3.2. F-test.
A one factor completely randomised ANOVA was carried out on the 
transformed data. A significant effect indicating the predicted 
superiority of S group subjects' performance was observed, F(1,22) = 
3.52, MSe = 0.03 (one-tailed test, p = 0.037, see table 12.1.).
3.3. Completed line order analyses.
3.3.1. Comparison of correlations.
3.3. 1.1. preliminary analysis.
As a two factor (2x3) mixed ANOVA design was to be applied to the data, 
an F-max test of the between subjects factor homogeniety of variance and 
normality of distribution assumptions was carried out. This suggested 
that both of these assumptions were tenable, F-max(2,11) = 2.78.
A test of the assumption of homogeneity of variance of differences was 
carried out (symmetry test, Anderson, 1958, p.259). This indicated that 
the probability of the heterogeneity of variance of differences observed 
occurring by chance was 0.004.
3.3.1.2. overall F-tests.
The two factor (subject group x correlation type) mixed ANOVA was carried 
out on the correlation data. No significant effects were observed. 
Group, F( 1,22) = 0.00, MSe = 0.05, correlation type, F(2,44 ) = 2.49, MSe 
= 0.02 and group x correlations, F(2,44 ) = 0.07.
S D
X I 0.828 0.828 |
rs 1 S.D. I 0.171 0.147 I
X I 0.738 0.754 I
rs2 S.D. j 0.224 0.142 I
X | 0.843 0.826 I
rs3 S.D. | 0.244 0.156 I
Table 12.2. Correl a t i o n s  by group.
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3.3.2. The effect of environmental context on performance as measured 
against original instructions (ie. rsl and rs2).
3.3.2. 1. Preliminary analysis.
As in this analysis, a two factor (2 x 2) mixed design was to be applied, 
an F-max test of the between subjects factor homogeniety of variance and 
normality of distribution assumptions was carried out. This suggested 
that both of these assumptions were tenable, F-max(2,11) = 1.40.
3. 3. 2.2. overall F-tests.
A two factor (subject group x session) mixed ANOVA was carried out on the 
correlation data. No significant effects were observed. Group, F(1,22) 
= 0.02, MSe = 0.04, session, F ( 1 ,2 2) = 4.75, MSe = 0.02 and group x 
session, F(1,22) = 0.05 (see table 12.2.).
3.3.3. The effect of environmental context on inter-session 
performance.
3.3.3.1. preliminary analysis.
As a one factor; two level, completely randomised design, was to be 
applied, an F-max test of the homogeniety of variance and normality of 
distribution assumptions was carried out. The F-max test indicated that 
both of these assumptions were tenable, F-max(2,11) = 2.44.
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3.3.3.2. F-test.
A one factor completely randomised ANOVA was carried out on the 
correlation data. No significant effect was observed, F(1,22) = 0.04, 
MSe = 0.04 (see table 12.2.).
3.4. Questionnaire data.
3.4.1. open-ended question responses.
Only 3 subjects (out of the twenty-three participants that returned their 
questionnaires) replied that they had not imagined themselves doing the 
task the day before, as an aid to performing the task in the second 
session. However, only 3 subjects replied that they had imagined more 
than the desk and objects in front of them. These 3 subjects also had 
imagined the room they had performed the task in previously to help them 
remember. Of these 3, only 1 was in the D condition. The only other 
strategies to aid task remembrance mentioned by subjects were trying to 
imagine the tape recorded instructions and "recalling actions". 13 
subjects mentioned the former strategy (7, D) and 4 subjects mentioned 
the latter strategy (2, D). Of course, most subjects (14; 7, 0) reported 
employing more than one recall strategy and of these 3 subjects (2, D) 
reported using three strategies. No subject indicated that they had used 
more than three recall strategies.
3.4.2. similarity of environment ratings.
The median rating of environmental similarity was 8.75 (X = 1 1.67, S.D.
= 11.40).
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4. Discussion.
4.1. Placement order analyses.
4.1.1. differences between correlation types.
The pattern of results obtained in the comparison of the placement order 
correlation types suggests that although subjects' performance in the 
first session was based on their remembrance of their instructions, their 
second session performance was based on their remembrance of their first 
session performance, rather than the original instructions. Although no 
direct evidence is available on the topic, as subjects were asked to try 
and reform the line in the same order as they had been instructed 
originally, it seems likely that their second session performance is due 
in part to an inability to distinguish between their remembrance of the 
original instructions and their remembrance of their first session 
performance. Of course it is possible that subjects could make some 
discrimination between their two previous activities, but as certain 
gaps occurred with respect to^the instructed performance, the easiest 
solution to this problem was to provide movements based on their more 
accessible memory for the session most recently performed. This 
explanation puts much more emphasis on the influence of time on 
remembrance. However, given that there was twenty-four hours between 
first session and second session performance, and roughly three minutes 
between performance carried out under instruction and first session 
performance, the latter account does .seem less reasonable.
Another inte resting finding was the effect of subject group. Although 
subjects were randomly allocated to reinstatement or change groups, on
this occasion it so happened t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i d e d  th e r e i n s t a t e d  g r o u p  w i t h
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superior performers. Fortunately, the use of a repeated measures design 
enabled this artifact to be identified. If a simple one factor ANOVA is 
calculated with rs2 data; employing S and D groups as the two levels, a
significant difference in favour of the S group is obtained (two-tailed
p = 0.04). However, as the two factor ANOVA, employing rs1 and rs2 data 
demonstrates, this effect is primarily a function of the lower overall
performance of the D subject group.
4.1.2. the effect of environmental context on the remembrance of 
placement order.
The lack of a significant interaction effect in the subject group by 
session ANOVA indicates that environmental context is not affecting 
placement order performance as measured against the original 
instructions. However, this is not particularly surprising given the 
results of the comparisons between correlation types, which indicated 
that subjects were basing their second session placement order 
performance on their memory for their first session placement order 
performance. Consequently, the measure of performance that is likely to 
reveal the effect of environmental context is rs3. The ANOVA employing 
this variable indicated the predicted superiority of reinstated (S) 
environmental context conditions.
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, there is much 
theoretical use of environmental context as a source of information that 
"activates", and/or “triggers" action schemata (see also, Norman & 
Shallice, 1965; Reason, 1979; 1986a; 1986b). In the Norman (19811 and 
Norman and Shallice (1985) accounts, one of the most interesting aspects 
from the perspective of environmental context involvement is how often 
environmental context is able to exert an effect on p e i f i n
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Influence can be exerted not only in the activation of a whole set of 
schemata, but also in the specific triggering of each schema in (or 
sometimes out of) sequence. Given the theoretical importance of 
environmental context in willed and automatic action, perhaps it is 
surprising that the environmental context effect observed is only 
marginally significant. However, this issue is discussed in the context 
of the differential effect of environmental context on placement and 
completed line order performance, towards the end of the next section.
4.2. Completed line order analyses.
In some respects, subjects' remembrance of completed line order is nearer 
to the type of remembrance required in previous experiments. Although 
an order has to be remembered, it can be defined in more ways than is 
possible for placement order. For example, completed line order 
performance can make use of not only sequence information (ie. defining 
in terms of previous, or subsequent entities), but also any "pattern" 
information available. The "pattern" allows the line to be defined from 
any point, eg. left, right, middle, or from any object, including 
reference points not actually part of the nominal object line, such as 
aspects of the table geography. The physical existence of the line also 
avoids the difficulties and demands that maintaining and operating a 
mental model of the order makes on processing. In comparison, the order 
of object placement has few sources of information that can be employed 
in defining the sequence of moves. Although the sequence of moves may 
be defined by start and finish points, between these there is little but 
the previous move and the subsequent move that can be employed in 
definition. Fortunately, in real life situations this predicament is 
likely to be alleviated by structured temporal environments.
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Nevertheless, despite the differences in placement and completed line 
ordering, the total lack of effect of either time, standard of 
comparison, environmental context, or subject group is as puzzling as any 
of the effects observed in the analyses of placement order. However, as 
a similar ordering of high to low correlation types is observed, there 
is a suggestion that similar factors are operating to influence completed 
line order performance.
The different effects of environmental context reinstatement/change on 
placement and completed line orders suggests that different processes 
are involved in these two aspects of the subjects' task. The lack of 
effect of environmental context on completed line order after twenty- 
four hours compares with the similar lack of effect observed with the 
recall of nominal stimulus words in experiment five (chapter ten). 
Consequently, these differences in the effect of environmental context 
support the view that there is greater similarity of processing between 
the recall of nominal stimulus words and completed line order, as opposed 
to placement order performance. In both cases, the recall performance 
was required after a presentation-test gap of twenty-four hours. 
Presumably, although the environmental context representation altered 
over time in the manner described in chapter ten, its degree of use by 
the processes underlying placement order performance highlights any 
discrimination that can be made.
4.3. Questionnaire data.
As in previous experiments, subjects ratings of the similarity of the 
environments suggested that they perceived them as being considerably
different.
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In common with all previous questionnaires, many subjects responded that 
they had imagined part of the environment in an attempt to aid their 
recall. Only three subjects responded that they had imagined the whole 
room, but most subjects indicated that they had envisaged the immediate 
area occupied by the task objects. So, although only a small part of the 
environment was involved, it would seem that the principle that 
environmental context information can be used as an aid to remembrance 
is adhered to. In fact, this suggestion of the local nature of the 
environmental information employed may contribute to the account of the 
comparative lack of effect of a change in environment. If subjects were 
confining their attention to the immediate locality of the objects, and 
as the objects were exactly replicated in both environments, there would 
be little to distinguish the two situations except the difference between 
table tops.
Finally, the variety of recall strategies operated by subjects and 
observed in previous experiments again was evident.
I
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
GENERAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
1. The Approach To The Investigation Of Environmental Context 
Effects.
1.1. Origins.
As stated in chapter six, much of the work reported) in this thesis is 
exploratory in nature. Although several experiments examined hypotheses 
generated by particular theoretical accounts, the general lack of 
specific theoretical accounts predicting environmental context effects 
sometimes forced a more pragmatic approach. However despite this, the 
conditions determining environmental context effects, and the 
environmental context reinstatement effect in particular, were sought as 
part of an attempt to understand the psychological influence of 
environmental context.
This general approach emphasises the role of psychological processing in 
the account of environmental context phenomena, with the term 
"conditions" including the different forms of psychological processing 
underlying the subjects' overt behaviour in the various experimental 
situations. This may seem to be a v e r y  o b v i o u s  an d p e r h a p s  r e d u n d a n t  
Point, made as it is with r e g a r d  to p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h .
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Nevertheless, it seems it is this consideration of what the person 
actually does in the various experimental situations that as much as any 
other factor distinguishes between the present research and other 
research into environmental context phenomena.
Previous research has tended to define situations and subjects' average 
responses, rather than involve itself with trying to describe the 
psychological processes that give rise to such environmental context 
effects. More recently, research has considered such processes, but 
only in a shallow manner. Usually, a very basic model of encoding and 
retrieval is referred to, as the the purpose or results of an experiment 
are discussed. It would seem that one of the reasons why subjects have 
been assumed to operate uniformly in such simplistic manners is because 
there were no alternative theoretical accounts that could accommodate 
non-verbal information (Tulving, 1979).
The fundamental problem faced by any theoretical account of 
environmental context phenomena is how to represent nominal and 
environmental context information. This is a fundamental problem as the 
form of representation determines to a very large degree the type of 
encoding and retrieval operations that need to and may be carried out. 
Without the theoretical development of a representational system that 
can provide an account of the basic environmental context effects to 
explore, the only direction that research on this topic can take is to 
demonstrate the situational variables that influence environmental 
context phenomena. Essentially, this is the difference between process 
oriented accounts and what previously were described as descriptive
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accounts. However, the success of an approach that attempts to account 
for environmental context effects in terms of psychological processing 
depends on the availability of good theory.
1.2. Some consequences.
The account of representation, encoding and retrieval provided by the 
schema model presented in chapter six allows for a great variety of 
different encoding and retrieval strategies. A variety of encoding and 
retrieval strategies can be employed not only by different subjects, but 
also by each subject in any experiment. Such ways of remembering are 
experientially and intuitively obvious, but they have not been 
accommodated, or explicated very well by previous theoretical accounts. 
Indeed, the high error variances commonly observed in psychology 
experiments (Cohen, 1977) are probably due to this theoretically and 
statistically unaccommodated aspect of behaviour, which is normally 
categorised under the heading of individual differences (Kirk, 1982).
For theoretical reasons, obviously it is important that the form of 
processing operated by subjects should not contradict that upon which 
predictions and hypotheses are based. However, as evidenced by several 
of the experiments reported here, in an experiment people do not always 
behave in such conforming ways as some research reports have tended to 
portray them (Claxton, 1980, p.13). As more sophisticated models are 
developed and more specific predictions and hypotheses are generated, 
the degree of control of subjects' processing will be required to 
increase. In .the present work some steps were taken to ascertain and
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control the manner of processing engaged by subjects. Eventually, it was 
discovered that the use of a relatively simple multivariate methodology 
was sufficient to statistically control the effect of subjects' 
processing on the dependent variable. Multivariate procedures are not 
only easier to apply as access to computing resources increases, but they 
also provide great potential for the experimental investigation of 
psychological processing; such as the examination of the relationship 
between recall and recognition, in addition to their more commonly 
recognised value in non, and quasi-experimental designs.
2. Findings And Implications.
2.1. Mode of processing.
Probably the most important finding reported in this thesis is the 
interaction between the form of psychological processing operated and 
the environmental context reinstatement effect. In itself this factor 
is likely to account for much of the apparent unreliability of the 
environmental context reinstatement effect. The importance of this 
factor in any account of, or prediction concerning environmental context 
effects demonstrates the need to be able to describe psychological 
activity. Without an insight into the psychological consequences of 
different tasks, the behavioural effects would remain enigmatic, as 
observed in the Fernandez and Glenberg (1985) study.
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2 .2 . Self generation of environmental context.
The difficulty encountered in trying to prevent subjects from employing 
a self-generation of encoding environment strategy provides an 
interesting insight into the retrieval process. The common use of this 
strategy supports the argument presented in the opening chapter that the 
use of environmental context to aid remembrance is quite common. Also, 
such common use would suggest that the self-generation strategy usually 
is an effective method of retrieval. Nevertheless, the question as to 
whether the use of such a strategy is a specific consequence of the 
difficulty of the attempt to recall has been raised. As mentioned in 
chapter one, an awareness of employing environmental context does seem 
to occur most often when there is difficulty remembering. Bobrow and 
Norman (1975), and Williams and Hollan (1981) argue that the difficulty 
of a task does not particularly change the way in which processing 
occurs, other than bringing the processes involved into consciousness. 
Although it is interesting to note the similarity of retrieval strategies 
revealed by the questionnaires and that proposed by Williams and Hollan, 
again this may be a consequence of similar recall difficulty, rather than 
the general applicability of the account. At present however, the weight 
of evidence indicating the utility of environmental context information 
in a variety of experimental situations; particularly those in which the 
response times suggest a lack of conscious mediation, supports the view 
that environmental context information is regularly and successfully 
employed at retrieval in a manner that conforms with the schema model and 
the particular description of its operation provided by Williams and 
Hollan.
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2.3. The influence of time.
The observation that increasing the presentation-test delay does not 
necessarily increase environmental context effects provoked 
consideration of the relationship between environmental context effects 
and the memory representation of the environmental context information 
involved. The suggestion that the representation of environmental 
context information "becomes" more abstract over time is consistent with 
several other ideas and opinions which have been expressed with respect 
to environmental context representation.
In chapter one, a relationship between environmental context and 
semantic context was observed. If semantic contexts were considered, 
each seemed to be associated with some environmental context. Likewise, 
if environmental contexts were considered, each seemed to have some 
meaning attached to it. Fernandez and Glenberg (1985) discuss some 
pertinent aspects of environmental context as they consider why they did 
not obtain the environmental context reinstatement effects they 
expected. As was discussed in chapter twelve, they suggest that natural 
environments; unlike those constructed for experimental purposes, are 
tied to events in special ways. Often environments enable, or cause 
certain events. The restaurant and its props in Schank and Abelson s 
(1977) notion of a restaurant script provides a theoretically compatible 
example. Another and very pertinent point that Fernandez and Glenberg 
make is that a critical feature of experimental environments is the fact 
that they are part of the experiment. This aspect of environmental 
context representation was r a i s e d  in r e l a t i o n  to N o r ma n  and R u m e l h a r t ' s
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(1975) model of perception and memory, in chapter five (section 5.4.). 
In other words, the subjects' context may be “taking part in an 
experiment, which includes information about e n v i r o n m e n t a l  context 
features, but at a lower level in the representational hierarchy. In 
such a situation, a change in the subjects' environment would not change 
the subjects context. Clearly, there is a relationship between these 
ideas and the notion of a type of semantic abstraction of environmental 
context representation.
Eich ( 1 985) has suggested that one reason for the lack of an 
environmental context effect may be the over-loading of the 
environmental context cue(s). However, the present discussion indicates 
how vague the notion of an environmental context cue is, even after 
eighty years of use. Another suggestion from Eich is that the studies 
of environmental context reinstatement with the greatest magnitude of 
effect may have succeeded by inducing a change in subjects' mood between 
environments, as well as changing environmental context information. 
Again this raises the question, what is involved in the representation 
of environmental context?
The account of the effect of the increased presentation-test delay on the 
environmental context reinstatement effect emphasises the inter­
relations between memory processes that give rise to this and probably 
many other effects. After consideration of basic schema accounts in 
conjunction with the architecture of the memory record proposed by the 
model, it may even be claimed that such effects should have been 
predicted. The account also suggests that much more attention need be
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given to the representation of environment, if a proper and full 
understanding of environmental context effects is to be achieved. The 
relationship between the theoretical notions of semantic and 
environmental context and the apparent need to account for such a 
relationship supports the view of the essential underlying similarity of 
physical (ie. environmental and state) context and semantic context 
effects.
2.4. Observations with recognition measures.
The observation of an environmental context reinstatement effect with a 
recognition paradigm given the appropriate form of processing, again 
demonstrates the validity and utility of the attempt to account for such 
effects in terms of processing which can vary in degree as well as form, 
rather than in terms of discrete experimental situations. The pattern 
of results obtained across the different conditions in the recognition 
experiment indicates as suggested, that there are factors at both 
encoding (processing time) and retrieval (memory record and retrieval 
specification compatibility) that may operate independently to influence 
the manifestation of environmental context effects.
Eich (1985) suggests that environmental context information may not be 
encoded with nominal items as frequently as has been presumed. 
Unfortunately, as described in chapter eleven (section 1.5.), there are 
problems associated with any simple attempt to infer that environmental 
context is not encoded. However, it seems that research into the nature 
of environmental context information processing and the use to which
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processing is put, will lead to a much greater understanding of 
environmental context effects. At present however, the evidence from 
the recognition experiment would suggest that provided subjects attend 
to/process environmental information sufficiently, and enough 
processing time is available per item, environmental context will be 
encoded as part of the memory record. Nevertheless, the manifestation 
of an effect still will depend on the retrieval processes that are 
engaged.
The results of the recognition experiment were not compatible with the 
predictions derived from the Atkinson and Juola model of recognition. 
This is quite ironic, as Mandler (1980) cites this model as one of the 
major influences on his account of recognition, and it is Handler's 
account which provides the basis for the detailed application of the 
schema model to situations requiring recognition. One of the basic 
problems with the Atkinson and Juola account as a model of general 
recognition is that it fails to allow for the fact that different types 
of information "carry more weight" than others. By simplifying the forms 
of information available they are able to mathematically model a 
particular form of assessment, but it is probably a form of assessment 
that takes place only within an information hierarchical level, if at 
all.
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2.5. Intentional action.
The experiment carried out to determine the effect of environmental 
context on intentional action was primarily an attempt to replicate an 
aspect of behaviour that experience and intuition indicated should be 
influenced by environmental context. However, it also turned out that 
this was one of the few areas where recent theoretical and anecdotal 
accounts had acknowledged the specific, rather than general and vague 
influence of environmental context. The demonstration of the effect of 
environmental context on intended action not only provides further 
support to the schema based account, but it also provides the 
experimental evidence that previously was lacking.
2.6. Conclusions.
Overall the demonstration of environmental context effects illustrates 
a important theoretical and practical aspect of psychological processing 
that largely has been ignored. The reason for this aspect of 
psychological processing being ignored is probably because its relation 
to other aspects of psychological processing has not been understood.
In chapter two (section 7.), it was argued that the oddity of 
environmental context effects was due to their implication of simple 
mechanistic control of intellectual function. Hopefully, this thesis 
has shown that the logic leading to this conclusion is flawed. Such 
logic is one consequence of the inappropriate abstraction of "semantic" 
and "physical" ' information. This inappropriate abstraction creates a
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false dichotomy between information types that restricts the view of how 
such information is able to be employed in psychological processing.
The psychological system alluded to by the descriptions presented here 
certainly is not simple, but neither is it wholly unfathomable. While 
the account may be termed mechanistic, the standard connotations of this 
term now must be obsolete. The effect of physical context is the 
consequence of a sophisticated processing system that strategically 
utilises information in a practical and effective manner.
2.7. Postscript.
There were several purposes to the presentation in chapter five of the 
possible and actual accounts of environmental context phenomena. These 
included the illustration of the use of environmental context as a 
theoretical construct and the changing requirements of theory. However, 
the main purpose was to demonstrate that as judged by empirical and 
metatheoretical criteria, these accounts failed to provide adequate 
explanations of the environmental context effects recorded in the 
literature and described in chapter two.
Consequently, the assessment that these models are inadequate and/or 
inappropriate formulations to accommodate the environmental context 
phenomena recorded in the literature makes redundant the exercise of
considering the ability of these models to account for the results of the 
experiments reported in chapters seven to twelve. The irrelevant nature
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purpose of
( s)ubsequent chapters..(was to)..report studies which 
continue(d) what..(was)..basically an exploration of the 
processes through which environmental context exerts its 
influence. As this..(was)..carried out, constant 
reference..(was)..made to the model of psychological 
processing outlined in this chapter in an attempt to obtain a 
theoretical, as well as an empirical grip on the phenomena 
(chapter six, section 3.4.).
All of the data obtained from the experiments reported in chapters seven 
to twelve could be accommodated by each of the accounts presented in 
chapter five. If the basic description employed by an account is 
accepted, it is not particularly difficult to to include or presume 
mechanisms that will manifest the effects observed. An example of this 
exercise of account remoulding is provided with Norman and Rumelhart's 
model. How unsatisfactory or ridiculous some of these accounts 
subsequently appear depends upon the metatheoretical criteria that are 
applied in their assessment. It is not possible to evaluate an account 
without reference to some such set of criteria. However, it would seem 
that the remit of this appendage is to assess briefly the worth of the 
unmodified accounts presented in chapter five with respect to the data 
presented in chapters seven to twelve, ignoring the important criteria 
that some of these accounts already have failed to meet.
The experiments reported in chapters seven to twelve have revealed an 
effect of environmental context reinstatement/change with mode of 
processing or degree of semantic elaboration, self-generation of 
presentation context, recall delay, recognition and intended action. Of
these presented, the simple cue based models, ie. Carr and McGeoch, 
Smith, Godden and Baddeley, and Norman and Rumelhart, make no allowances 
for differences in processing or the effect of time on the environmental
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context reinstatement effect, nor do they provide any mechanisms as would 
be required to account for the self generation of context or intentional 
action. The effect of environmental context on recall and recognitibn 
also requires a more subtle theoretical account than can be provided 
within the strictures of a pure and simple cue based model. This is 
demonstrated by Godden and Baddeley’s account of the "lack" of effect of 
environmental context on recognition.
Without employing metatheoretical criteria, it is possible to say only 
that Tulving's and Glenberg*s characterisations do not provide any 
mechanism to account for intended action and consequently, the effect of 
environmental context upon intended action, nor for the effect of time 
on environmental context effects. The other effects observed should be 
able to be accommodated, although this would have to be accomplished 
without reference to any specific representational structure or 
unambiguous description of the processes that give rise to these effects.
The final account to be considered and probably the one which has caused 
most concern, is that of Anderson and Bower (FRAN & HAM). This account 
apparently has renewed candidacy given the observation of an 
environmental context effect with recognition. However, there is no way 
that the tenability of this account can be evaluated without introducing 
metatheoretical criteria.
If forced, Anderson and Bower's model can give some account of the 
different effect of environmental context reinstatement/change on recall 
and recognition apparent in the literature. Recall items are identified
by list markers on the links between nodes in the associated memory 
network. If it is assumed that these list markers are identified and 
assessed as at the recognition phase, then a benefit to reinstated
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condition recall might be expected as two assessments involving 
environmental context information are required for recall, whereas only 
one assessment is required for recognition. However, it seems very 
unlikely that such a full scale assessment of list markers would be 
carried out at the point of identifying potential recall items. It would 
seem economical to carry out this operation on the basis of some simple 
nominal code. Either way, the Anderson and Bower account still cannot 
explain the relative size of the recall and recognition effects observed 
here, unless, as with the schema model account, it is assumed that the 
experimental paradigm biases the sort of information referenced by the 
list marker. However, this assumption requires some mechanism other 
than the probability based operation described (see chapter five, 
section 4.2.) to control the associations to and from the list markers. 
In addition, the Anderson and Bower account has the theoretical drawback 
of assuming "direct access" (see chapter eleven, section 1.3.), while HAH 
has been criticised with respect to its naive parsing assumptions (Kolers 
& Smythe, 1984), its lack of a formal semantic specification of its 
representational structure, its method of long-term memory search and 
its ability to reflect natural language effects (Anderson, 1976; Foss & 
Harwood, 1975).
As demonstrated previously and also by this brief consideration of the 
explanative ability of alternative models, one of the main attractions 
of the schema system is the ease with which the description of its 
representational structure and encoding and retrieval operations can 
provide a coherent account of so many observations.
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APPENDIX A
Environmental Contexts Used In Experiments: Descriptions 
Room A (37).
This was an oblong room 480cm in length, 210cm in breadth and with a 
ceiling height of 347.5cm. It was entered through a plain olive green 
door at the opposite end of the room to that at which the subjects were 
seated during the time they were in the room. Subjects sat on a black 
metal framed, black plastic cushioned office chair, with their backs to 
a window, facing the wall adjacent to the door. Just in front of them 
was a small black wooden table (55.5cm x 55.5cm x 70cm) upon which stood 
an Eagle International PRO.M30 microphone and beneath which was a foot- 
switch (both microphone and foot-switch were absent in experiment 1).
A brown storage radiator (72cm x 25cm x 65cm) occupied the corner 7.5cm 
from the back wall and 30cm from the wall to the subjects' right. On the 
radiator stood a Kodak Carousel projector. Halfway along the wall to the 
subjects' right was a large wooden fireplace which was blocked off. At 
the far end of this wall was an alcove of shelves which extended from the 
floor to a height of 240cm. The slides were projected onto the right half 
of the wall facing the subject. All walls and ceiling were painted white 
and the skirting, shelves and fireplace were painted dark brown, while 
the floor was covered in smooth grey carpeting.
An 11.5cm diameter ventilator pipe ran along the length of the room from 
the top corner of the wall facing the seated subject on their left hand
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side A6cm from the ceiling and 3cm from the left wall, connecting to the 
window. As explained in chapter seven, after the completion of 
experiment 1 the window was boarded over with dark hard wood fixed in a 
light soft wood frame.
The room was illuminated by two 80 watt white strip lights house in a 
double fitting, but without a casing cover and positioned in the middle 
of the ceiling, running along the length of the room. No significant 
change in light level was recorded; from the position where subjects sat, 
before and after the window was blocked off. The light level recorded
from this position was between 16-18 foot candles. All wires to and from
equipment (ie. projector, microphone and foot-switch) were hidden.
Overall the room gave a long, barren and empty impression.
Room B (38).
This measured 350cm in length, 160cm in breadth and had a ceiling height 
of 3A7.5cm. A green curtain hanging from a point 22cm below the ceiling 
divided the length of the room at a point 222cm from the entrance: a plain
olive green door, on the top wall.
Subjects sat at a large white formica covered table (137cm x 76cm x 72cm) 
which was placed with its breadth against the curtain and its length 
along the wall nearest to the door. Subjects sat on a red plastic chair 
placed at the middle of the table s length, facing the wall. Under the 
table at this point was placed a foot switch. Directly in front of the
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subjects, with its back against the wall was an Electrohome video 
monitor.
Joining with the green curtain dividing the room was a "square" of the 
same material (170cm x 132cm) fixed to the same wall beginning at a height 
of 64cm above that of the table. Behind this curtain hung a microphone. 
Behind and to the subjects' right in the corner stood a black metal 
framed, wooden topped stand (72cm x 46cm x 120cm). Another “square" of 
green curtain material (also 170cm x 132cm) followed the shape of the 
corner in which the stand was placed. The "square" was hung so that at 
the bottom it skirted the top of the stand along the corner walls, 
beginning at the corner of the stand nearest the door and extending 48cm 
past the length of the stand along the wall behind the subject. On top 
of the stand stood a Kodak Carousel projector.
During the experiment, illumination was provided by three desk lamps each 
containing one 60 watt Osram fireglow bulb. Two lamps were placed at 
each corner of the table against the wall and one lamp was placed on top 
of the video monitor. Slides were projected to the subjects' right above 
the lamp on the right corner and below the "square" of curtain. By using 
white on black slides a low illumination level could be maintained. From 
where the subject sat the light level recording was 6-8 foot candles.
All walls were painted white, the ceiling olive green and all skirting 
was painted dark brown, while the floor was covered in smooth grey 
carpeting. All wires to and from equipment were hidden. The overall 
impression was of a small, crowded and cramped, red and dark room.
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The Apple II computer, interfaces between computer and peripherals, JVC 
stereo cassette deck and various other pieces of apparatus, were located 
on the opposite side of the dividing curtain from the subjects' 
environment.
Room C1 (41).
This measured 235cm in length, 250cm in breadth, had a ceiling height of 
347.5cm and was entered from another small room. On the same wall as the 
entrance: a plain olive green door, a white formica topped table (137cm 
x 76cm x 72cm), was placed. The table's length extended out toward the 
parallel wall. Upon the table stood a 3 field tachistoscope, an 
electronic timer and a variety of electronic switches. On the left of 
the wall opposite the entrance were three shelves on brackets, cluttered 
with various pieces of equipment; such as morse switches, electronic 
timers and large quantities of different coloured wire.
The room was illuminated from the ceiling by two 80 watt strip lights in 
a double fitting and casing. All walls and ceiling were painted white 
and all skirting was painted dark brown. On the same wall as the three 
shelves, but to the right and flush with it, was a white wooden cupboard 
door.
Subjects were taken into the room round the table and sat on a black 
plastic chair facing the table with the exit to their right.
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Overall the room appeared small, bright and technically cluttered.
Room C2 (36).
This room was entered from a short corridor, again through a plain olive
green door. It measured 425cm in length, 250cm in breadth and had a
ceiling height of 352cm. To the left of a door on entering, at a distance 
of 45cm were 3 bracket shelves. The shelves extended from this point 
along the full length of this wall. All of these shelves were bare except 
for one bicycle tyre (originally found in the room) which hung from the 
corner of the top shelf next to the door.
On the left hand wall was a white formic topped table (137cm x 76cm x 
72cm). The length of this table was placed against the wall, beginning 
at a point 140cm from the corner where the shelves met this wall. Above 
the middle of this table on the left wall at a height of 284cm was a 
ventilator. A brown storage radiator (72cm x 25cm x 65cm) occupied a 
space against the skirting board on the wall facing the door and 40cm to 
the right of the left hand wall. Sitting on top of this storage radiator
was an orange traffic cone (also found in the room) 155cm along the right
wall from the entrance, was an olive green wooden panelled door. This 
door opened into another room. Immediately after the doorway (still in 
the first room) was another formica topped table of similar dimensions 
to that described above. The length of this table was placed along the 
right wall.
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Subjects sat upon a black plastic seat at the table which was against the 
left wall, with their backs towards the shelves and entrance. 
Illumination was from two sets of ceiling lights, each of two 80 watt 
strip lights housed in a double fitting without a casing cover and 
running along the breadth of the room. Each fitting was placed at a point 
100cm in from its respective parallel wall.
From where the subjects sat a large part of the adjacent room could be 
seen. This room measured 255cm x 270cm and had a ceiling height of 
347.5cm The room contained one white formica topped table of dimensions 
similar to those described above and two black plastic chairs placed at 
the mid points of each length of the table. The table was positioned with 
its length running across the breadth of the room with its far end placed 
against the left wall at a point beginning 92cm from the wall containing 
the entrance. One the back wall facing the entrance, at a point 52cm from 
the right wall and at the same height as the former, was another 
ventilator. Illumination was from two 80 watt strip lights, housed in a 
double fitting without a casing cover, placed in the middle of the 
ceiling and running along the breadth of the room. In both rooms all 
walls were painted white, ceiling olive green, skirting brown and the 
floor was covered in grey carpeting. Overall the impression was of a 
large bright partitioned room.
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APPENDIX B
Listings of stimuli, recognition and filler words.
Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Words on initial presentation.
KING FILM SHIP STONE CLAY HOLE
EDGE CAR BEAR CITY COFFEE KNIFE
SKY AIR CHAIN MOON DOOR KEY
RIVER WATCH BALL GUN MONEY BABY
GAS ROAD FIELD HOTEL STATION WHEEL
DOCTOR MOTOR COURT RAIN BANK ROSE
FLOOR SQUARE BAR TREE SAW BOOK
FIRE ISLAND NIGHT KITCHEN WELL BOX
SAFE PICK HAT WALL EYE BOTTLE
CASE WORD WAR GLASS BED BRITAIN
POLICE BLOOD FARM CHAIR OFFICE
RECORD HOUSE ROOM MARKET PHONE
R-items
TREE COFFEE
CASE POLICE
MOON ROOM
WHEEL WAR
BALL EDGE
F-items
BRIDGE FOOD
SIGNAL HELL
VALLEY DUST
RADIO TELEVISION
MAN GOD
Experiments 4 and 5.
Words on initial presentation.
KING FILM SHI P STONE CLAY HOLE
EDGE CAR BEAR CITY COFFEE KNIFE
SKY AIR CHAIN MOON DOOR KEY
RIVER WATCH BALL GUN MONEY BABY
GAS ROAD FIELD HOTEL STATION WHEEL
DOCTOR MOTOR COURT RAIN BANK ROSE
FLOOR SQUARE BAR TREE SAW BOOK
FIRE ISLAND NIGHT KITCHEN WELL BOX
SAFE PICK HAT WALL EYE BOTTLE
CASE WORD WAR GLASS BED BRITAIN
POLICE BLOOD FARM CHAIR OFFICE
RECORD HOUSE ROOM MARKET PHONE
R-items
TREE COFFEE BOOK
CASE POLICE CAR
MOON ROOM EYE
WHEEL WAR HOUSE
BALL EDGE ISLAND
F-items
BRIDGE FOOD FORM
SIGNAL HELL BACK
VALLEY DUST LIGHT
RADIO TELEVISION POINT
MAN GOD WORLD
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Experiment 6, conditions L1.5, L3 and H3.
Words on initial presentation.
KING FILM ISLAND WAR CHAIR WHEEL
EDGE CAR WORD FARM MARKET BABY
MAN AIR VALLEY GOD BED NIGHT
RIVER WATCH BALL GUN KNIFE KITCHEN
GAS SAFE BRIDGE HOTEL STATION
DOCTOR MOTOR COURT SQUARE KEY
FOOD CASE BAR BRITAIN SAW
WELL
Filler items on recognition test.
PICK PHONE POLICE BOTTLE STONE FIRE
TELEVISION EYE MONEY DOOR BOOK OFFICE
SKY ROOM SIGNAL RADIO HOLE DUST
TREE ROSE HOUSE FLOOR CLAY SHIP
FIELD RAIN MOON GLASS BLOOD
BOX NIGHT HAT RECORD HELL
WALL
COLLEGE
CHAIN ROAD BEAR COFFEE
Experiment 6, condition H6. 
Words on initial presentation.
KING CAR BALL SQUARE WHEEL STATE
EDGE AIR BRIDGE BRITAIN BABY HALL
MAN WATCH COURT CHAIR KITCHEN LEAD
RIVER SAFE BAR MARKET KNIGHT SHOW
GAS MOTOR WAR BED WINE BOTTOM
DOCTOR CASE FARM KNIFE LIST FAT
FOOD ISLAND GOD STATION CLUB LINE
WELL WORD GUN KEY METAL ANGLE
FILM VALLEY HOTEL SAW MUSIC DATE
Filler items on recognition test.
PICK EYE HOUSE RECORD FIRE HILL
TELEVISION ROOM MOON BEAR OFFICE COUPLE
SKY ROSE HAT STONE DUST PARTY
TREE RAIN ROAD BOOK SHIP SHAPE
FIELD NIGHT BOTTLE HOLE DINNER FIGURE
BOX CHAIN DOOR CLAY POOL LIGHT
WALL POLICE RADIO BLOOD SEASON BOARD
COLLEGE MONEY FLOOR HELL POINT DANCE
PHONE SIGNAL GLASS COFFEE LAND HANDLE
APPENDIX C
Computer Controlled Slide Projection System
Each Kodak Carousel projector was operated individually by the one Apple 
II computer (ie. at no time were the two projectors linked and operated 
simultaneously).
After receiving an input from a foot switch, the Apple initiated the 
slide presentation by sending a signal via a six pole socket to the 
forward slide change. Reverse slide change was not used.
A photo-cell placed in the Carousel projector lamphouse, between the 
light shutter and slide gate, signalled the onset of slide presentation.
The Carousel projector slide change procedure, after the initiation 
signal, involves the light shutter descending (by gravity feed) to block 
the light to the side, the slide being lifted into the magazine, the 
magazine turning round, the next slide dropping into the slide gate 
(again by gravity feed), and the shutter lifting allowing the light to 
pass through and project the slide. The whole operation to change from 
presenting one slide to another took approximately 1 to 1.5 seconds.
Due to the gravity feed method of light shutter operation, a variable 
delay of 100 to 170 milliseconds (average 150ms.),existed between the 
signal to change a slide and the completion of the light s shutter 
descent (ie. slide offset). To reduce this variation the signal from the 
Apple was programmed to occur 150 milliseconds prior to the end of the 
chosen slide presentation time. This had the effect of reducing the 
variation from the chosen slide presentation time to between -50 and +20 
milliseconds.
APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRES
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Questionnaire employed in experiment two.
Condition 
Name _____________
As the words were presented to you, what did you do?
When you were asked to recall the words, what did you do to remember 
them?
On a scale from 1 - 100, how similar do you think that the two rooms 
are?
N.B. 1 = totally different
100 = identical YOUR RATING -------
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Questionnaire employed in experiment three.
Condition
Name
As the words were presented to you, what did you do to learn 
them?
When you were asked to recall the words, what did you do to remember 
them?
On a scale from 1 - 100, how similar do you think that the two rooms 
are?
N.B. 1 = totally different
100 = identical YOUR RATING -------
Questionnaire employed in experiment four.
Condition Name
1/ As the words were presented to you, what did you do?
2/ Did you make any attempt to learn any of the words as they were 
presented? (tick the appropriate answer) YES NO
3/ Over the course of the recall time did you : (tick answer)
a) maintain the suggested retrieval strategy
b) have a break at any time or try to recall words in a different
way
4/ What did you do if you stopped or changed? and did this help you to 
remember any words?
5/ Did you remember any of the words due to their association with any 
others? (tick answer) YES NO
6/ At any time did you think of, or imagine the situation where you were 
being presented with the words? (tick answer) YES NO
7/ If you answered yes to question (6), please explain exactly what you 
thought, or imagined.
8/ On a scale from 1 - 100, how similar do you think that the two rooms 
are? (If you have only been in one room ignore this question)
N.B. 1 = totally different and 100 = identical YOUR RATING _______
Questionnaire employed in experiment seven.
Condition Name
1/ Did you imagine yourself doing the task yesterday in order to help 
you do it today? YES NO (please tick appropriate answer)
2/ If you did imagine doing the task yesterday, could you explain 
exactly how you did so ( if you answered NO to the previous 
question, please move on to the next),
3/ If you did not imagine yourself doing the task yesterday, how did you 
help yourself to remember the way to place the items today?
4/ Although you may have already stated in a previous answer, please say 
if you ever imagined, or tried to imagine the room you were in 
yesterday.
5/ If you did imagine being in the room yesterday, did you feel that it 
helped you remember at all?
6/ On a scale from 1 - 100, how similar do you think that the two rooms 
are? (If you have only been in one room ignore this question)
N.B. 1 = totally different and 100 = identical YOUR RATING
